James Paul Aery v. State of Minnesota

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1329

James Paul Aery, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed May 20, 2024
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-18-3347

James Paul Aery, Bemidji, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Michael V. Mahlen, Assistant County
Attorney, Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Frisch,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

A petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation

under the Minnesota Imprisonment and Exoneration Remedies Act (MIERA), Minn. Stat.

§§ 611.362-.368 (2022), when the petitioner’s conviction for actual possession of an

unlawful item was reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required

suppression of the evidence.
 OPINION

GAÏTAS, Judge

In 2020, this court reversed the drug-possession conviction of appellant James Paul

Aery because a search that revealed drugs in his pocket and his subsequent arrest violated

his constitutional rights. Following the reversal of his conviction, Aery petitioned the

district court for an order declaring him eligible for exoneration compensation under

MIERA. The district court denied Aery’s petition, determining that Aery was not eligible

for exoneration compensation because his conviction was reversed on a legal ground and

not based on his factual innocence. Aery now challenges the district court’s denial of his

petition.

We conclude that a petitioner is not exonerated for the purpose of seeking

exoneration compensation under MIERA when the petitioner’s conviction for actual

possession of an unlawful item was reversed solely on the ground that an unconstitutional

search required suppression of the evidence. Because we reversed Aery’s conviction based

on the unconstitutionality of the search that revealed the drugs in his pocket, he was not

exonerated as defined by MIERA. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Aery’s

petition.

FACTS

Aery was a passenger in the backseat of a car that police stopped for a traffic

violation. During the stop, police officers saw suspected drugs in plain view near the

driver’s seat. They asked the driver and the other people in the car, including Aery, to exit

the car. While police officers searched the car, one officer reported that Aery put his hand

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in his pocket. According to that officer, when Aery removed his hand from his pocket, a

small bag containing a trace amount of a crystalline substance fell to the ground. Based on

this observation, the officer handcuffed Aery and searched him. In Aery’s pants, the officer

found three glass smoking pipes and another small bag, which contained

methamphetamine.

Following this incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Aery with fifth-

degree possession of methamphetamine. Aery moved to suppress the evidence, asserting

that it was discovered during an unlawful search. The district court denied Aery’s

suppression motion, ruling that the officers had probable cause to arrest Aery for

constructively possessing the drugs observed near the driver and that the search of Aery’s

person was a lawful search incident to his arrest. Following a stipulated-evidence court

trial, the district court found Aery guilty and sentenced him to prison.

Aery appealed his conviction to this court, challenging the district court’s order

denying his motion to suppress. We reversed Aery’s conviction, determining that the

search of his pants violated the federal and state constitutions, which required suppression

of the evidence. State v. Aery, No. A19-1845, 2020 WL 7134872, at *1 (Minn. App.

Dec. 7, 2020).

Aery then petitioned the district court for an order determining that he was eligible

for compensation under MIERA. The district court observed that Aery’s conviction was

reversed because the evidence was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, and

not because Aery was “factually innocent” or “on grounds consistent with innocence.”

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Thus, the district court concluded that Aery “[did] not meet the statutory definition of

‘exonerated’” and was not eligible for compensation.

Aery appeals.

ISSUE

Was Aery exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation under

MIERA when this court reversed his drug-possession conviction on the ground that the

police discovered the drugs in his pocket during an unconstitutional search?

ANALYSIS

In this case, we consider whether a petitioner who was convicted for actual

possession of an unlawful item is eligible for exoneration compensation under MIERA

when the conviction is later reversed on the ground that an unconstitutional search required

suppression of the item. MIERA provides that formerly convicted people may obtain

compensation after exoneration if they meet specified criteria. Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362-

.368. It “establishes a multistep process for receiving compensation.” Back v. State, 992

N.W.2d 363, 366 (Minn. 2023). Whether an individual has been exonerated is the

threshold determination under MIERA. Kingbird v. State, 973 N.W.2d 633, 641 (Minn.

2022). A petitioner seeking exoneration compensation must first obtain a district court

order “under section 590.11 determining that the person is entitled to compensation based

on exoneration.” Minn. Stat. § 611.362, subd. 1; see also Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2022).

Section 590.11 defines the term “exonerated.” Relevant here, the statute provides

that a person is “exonerated” if a court “reverse[s]” the person’s conviction “on grounds

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consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). “[G]rounds consistent

with innocence” means the petitioner was either:

(1) exonerated, through a pardon or sentence commutation,
based on factual innocence; or

(2) exonerated because the judgment of conviction was
vacated or reversed, or a new trial was ordered, and there is any
evidence of factual innocence whether it was available at the
time of investigation or trial or is newly discovered evidence.

Id., subd. 1(c)(1), (2).

In his petition for exoneration compensation, Aery alleged that the reversal of his

conviction on appeal constituted an exoneration under section 590.11. But the district court

determined that the reversal of Aery’s conviction did not amount to an exoneration because

Aery’s conviction was not reversed “on grounds consistent with innocence.”

Aery, who is self-represented on appeal, challenges the district court’s

determination. He argues that he is factually innocent because his arrest and the subsequent

search of his person were unlawful. Whether a petitioner meets the definition of an

“exonerated” person for the purpose of MIERA presents a question of statutory

interpretation, which we review de novo. Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Minn. App.

2019).

In Kingbird, the Minnesota Supreme Court examined the term “factual innocence”

as used in section 590.11. 973 N.W.2d at 641-42. Kingbird, who was convicted for

unlawfully possessing a firearm based on his possession of a BB gun, sought exoneration

compensation after the supreme court held that a BB gun is not a firearm, and his conviction

was reversed on this ground. Id. at 642 (relying on State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485

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(Minn. 2016)). In considering whether Kingbird was exonerated for the purpose of section

590.11, the supreme court observed that “‘factual innocence’ is the state of being not guilty

of a crime (innocence) but only when the reason is restricted to or based on facts (factual).”

Id. Applying that interpretation of the term, the supreme court concluded that the change

in the law that resulted in the reversal of Kingbird’s conviction did not make Kingbird

factually innocent. Id. It noted that the facts of Kingbird’s case “did not change;” it

remained undisputed that Kingbird possessed a BB gun when he was not eligible to possess

one. Id. at 642-43. Rather, Kingbird’s case was reversed based on an issue of “legal

significance”—a change or error in the law. Id. at 642. Given this circumstance, the

supreme court concluded that Kingbird was not exonerated for the purpose section 590.11.

Id.at 643.

In Back, the supreme court again noted the distinction between a reversal of a

conviction based on factual innocence and one based on “an issue of legal significance.”

992 N.W.2d at 369. Back argued that she was exonerated when the supreme court reversed

her culpable-negligence-manslaughter conviction on direct appeal because the state had

failed to establish that she owed a duty of care to the shooter or the victim, which was an

element of the offense. Id. at 364-65. But the supreme court determined that Back was

not entitled to exoneration compensation because the reversal of her conviction “turn[ed]

on an issue of legal significance” and there was no new “evidence of factual innocence.”

Id. at 369.

Against this legal backdrop, we consider whether Aery was exonerated for the

purpose of section 590.11. Aery’s conviction was reversed. But it was not reversed “on

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grounds consistent with innocence.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(b)(1)(i). The conviction

was reversed because Aery was subjected to an unconstitutional search and the drugs found

in his pocket should have been suppressed. When a conviction for actual possession of an

unlawful item was reversed on the ground of an unconstitutional search that required

suppression of the evidence, the reversal was based on an issue of legal significance.

Notwithstanding the legal error in Aery’s case, Aery was not factually innocent. He had

illegal drugs in his pocket. And Aery has not established any new facts suggesting that he

is factually innocent. Thus, we conclude that Aery was not exonerated as defined by

section 590.11.

DECISION

Aery was not exonerated for the purpose of seeking exoneration compensation

under MIERA because his drug-possession conviction was reversed based on an issue of

legal significance and not based on his factual innocence. Because Aery was not eligible

for exoneration compensation, the district court did not err in denying his petition for

exoneration compensation.

Affirmed.

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