Gregory T. Dyrdal v. James Wallenberg

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1416

Gregory T. Dyrdal,
Appellant,

vs.

James Wallenberg, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed May 6, 2024
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge

Pennington County District Court
File No. 57-CV-22-792

David C. McLaughlin, Carrie E. Backman, Fluegel, Anderson, McLaughlin, & Brutlag,
Chartered, Ortonville, Minnesota (for appellant)

John A. Markert, Patrick H. O’Neill III, Larson King, LLP, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Evan M. Niefeld, Evan M. Niefeld, Ltd., Eden Prairie, Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and

Klaphake, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SCHMIDT, Judge

Appellant Gregory Dyrdal argues that respondents James Wallenberg, et al., co-

trustees of the Wallenberg Family Trust (the Trust), cannot enforce a money judgment

because Minn. Stat. § 550.366 (2022) bars enforcing a judgment for the unpaid balance of

a debt on agricultural property after three years from when the judgment was entered.

Because Dyrdal’s judgment debt is not a “debt on agricultural property” or incurred “while

in the operation of a family farm,” we affirm.

FACTS

In 2009, Dyrdal entered into a lease agreement for farmland with David Wallenberg

that included a purchase option. Dyrdal recorded the lease in March 2010. Unbeknownst

to Dyrdal, the farmland was owned by the Trust, not David Wallenberg—who has never

been a trustee of the Trust. In 2010, Dyrdal wrote a letter seeking to exercise the purchase

option in the lease. An attorney for the Trust notified Dyrdal that the Trust had no records

concerning the lease or purchase option regarding the property. Nonetheless, the attorney

noted that the Trust was willing to “put together a Purchase Agreement” to sell the farmland

to Dyrdal. Dyrdal did not exercise this purchase option with the Trust.

Dyrdal recorded a notice of lis pendens 1 with Pennington County and later filed a

lawsuit against the Trust to enforce the lease. The trustees counterclaimed for quiet title

1
A notice of lis pendens is a “warning that title to property is in litigation and impedes a
property owner’s right to free alienability of real estate.” Bly v. Gensmer, 386 N.W.2d 767,
769 (Minn. App. 1986).

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and slander of title. In that case, the district court concluded that Dyrdal’s lease constituted

a sublease with David Wallenberg who had no right to enter the lease. As such, the district

court held that Dyrdal had no right, title, or interest in the farmland. The court dismissed

Dyrdal’s claim and held a jury trial on the counterclaims. A jury found in favor of the

Trust, determined that Dyrdal committed slander of title, and awarded the Trust $34,997

in special damages. After entry of the verdict, the district court awarded additional special

damages of $76,581.25 in attorney fees, $6,671.61 in interest, and $7,487.06 in costs. The

total award to the Trust amounted to over $125,000. Judgment was entered in May 2016. 2

In 2022, the trustees attempted to collect on the judgment. Dyrdal sued the Trust to

shield his assets from the collection efforts, claiming that because the slander-of-title

judgment was an unpaid balance of a debt on agricultural property, the three-year statutory

limitation in Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 2, barred collection of the judgment.

The district court granted the Trust’s motion for summary judgment, concluding

that section 550.366 does not apply because Dyrdal’s debt did not arise from defaulting on

a farm obligation or from an agricultural debt. The court further concluded that Dyrdal

cannot prevail because the judgment debt arose from an intentional tort. The district court

dismissed, with prejudice, Dyrdal’s lawsuit because the Trust’s collection efforts were not

time-barred.

2
In December 2016, Dyrdal sued his attorney who represented him in the slander-of-title
litigation. Dyrdal v. McDowell, Nos. A18-1301, 2019 WL 2262239, at *2 (Minn. App.
May 28, 2019). The trustees also sued Dyrdal’s attorney in March of 2017 because they
were unable to collect damages from Dyrdal. Id. The district court consolidated both cases
and dismissed the lawsuits. Id. This court affirmed. Id. at *2-5.

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 Dyrdal appeals.

DECISION

Appellate courts review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine

whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its

application of the law. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.

2017); see also Kenneh v. Homeward Bound, Inc., 944 N.W.2d 222, 228 (Minn. 2020).

The parties here only dispute the application of law to the undisputed facts.

Dyrdal seeks protection under the statute, which provides that a “judgment for the

unpaid balance of a debt on agricultural property owed by a farm debtor may not be

executed upon real or personal property after three years from the date the judgment was

entered.” Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 2. The statute defines agricultural property as

“personal property that is used in a farm operation.” Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 1(1).

“Farm debtor” is defined, in relevant part, as “a person who has incurred debt while in

operation of a family farm.” Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subd. 1(2).

Dyrdal contends that the district court erred in relying on this court’s decision in

Green v. Kellen, 921 N.W.2d 768 (Minn. App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2019),

to conclude that the statute does not apply to judgment debts arising from intentional torts.

We disagree.

In Green, we rejected an argument that the three-year statutory bar applied to a debt

arising from defamation and conversion claims. Green, 921 N.W.2d at 769-70. We

concluded that the “judgment debt”—stemming from intentional torts—“was not a debt

owed on his agricultural property.” Id. at 772 (emphasis in original). Since the statute’s

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use of the word “debt” “does not encompass all judgment debts,” we concluded that a debt

arising from an intentional tort cannot be “on agricultural property” or “incurred while in

the operation of a family farm.” Id.

Dyrdal first argues that the intentional tort language in Green “was dictum that does

not bind” this court. Dyrdal fails to acknowledge the syllabus point in Green: “Minnesota

Statutes section 550.366 (2016), which provides a three-year limitation on the execution of

judgments for the balance of unpaid debts on agricultural property owed by a farm debtor,

does not apply to judgment debts resulting from intentional torts.” Id. at 769. As the

supreme court has stated, the syllabus of a case “summarizes the [authoring court’s]

holding.” Albright v. Henry, 174 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn. 1970); see also Sefkow v.

Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 214 (Minn. 1988) (citing syllabus of a prior opinion as authority).

The intentional-tort ruling in Green was essential to the holding in the case and cannot be

set aside as mere dictum.

Dyrdal further argues that Green should be limited to actions for the intentional torts

of conversion and defamation. Dyrdal asserts that, unlike conversion and defamation, his

debt relates to ordinary farm operations such as leasing and buying farmland. But a

slander-of-title debt is not “incurred debt while in the operation of a family farm” or “on

agricultural property.” Minn. Stat. § 550.366, subds. 1(2), 2.

Instead, Dyrdal’s debt from the slander-of-title judgment arose because a jury found

him liable for slander of title after he intentionally and maliciously published a false

statement about the property when he had no legal interest in the disputed property. See

Paidar v. Hughes, 615 N.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Minn. 2000) (describing elements of slander

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of title). The malicious act of publishing a false statement concerning the property is an

intentional tort that has no connection to the “operation of a family farm.” Minn. Stat.

§ 550.366, subd. 1(2). Thus, the district court correctly ruled that the three-year limitation

in section 550.366 does not bar the trustees from collecting the outstanding judgment

against Dyrdal for the intentional tort of slander of title.

Affirmed.

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