Larry Schultz v. Nancy Johnston

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1541

Larry Schultz,
Appellant,

vs.

Nancy Johnston, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 30, 2024
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-22-6558

Larry G. Schultz, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Harris, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Larson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to dismiss his constitutional claims

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
 FACTS 1

Appellant Larry Schultz is civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender

Program (MSOP) in Moose Lake, Minnesota. In August 2022, Schultz was temporarily

housed at the Forensic Nursing Home (FNH) in St. Peter, Minnesota. FNH allowed

residents to own certain video-game consoles. Schultz purchased a refurbished video-

game console.

After Schultz was transferred back to MSOP, an employee confiscated the video-

game console as contraband. Schultz filed multiple client-request forms with MSOP

employees to have his property returned to him. MSOP denied the requests, citing its

policy prohibiting refurbished video-game consoles as contraband.

Schultz filed a complaint alleging multiple constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Respondents, who are MSOP employees, moved the district court to dismiss for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The district court granted the

motion to dismiss with prejudice. This appeal followed.

DECISION

Schultz argues that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

A party fails to state a claim under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) when the complaint

does not “set[] forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.” Graphic Commc’ns, 850 N.W.2d

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The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, see Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e); as such, the facts of the complaint are
accepted as true. See Graphic Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund “A” v. CVS
Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 692 (Minn. 2014).

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at 692. When reviewing a district court’s rule 12.02(e) decision, appellate courts must

accept the facts stated in the complaint as true while construing all reasonable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Appellate courts review a district court’s decision to

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo.

Thompson v. St. Anthony Leased Hous. Assocs. II, LP, 979 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2022).

Fourth Amendment

Schultz argues that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint because

MSOP’s seizure of his property violated the Fourth Amendment.

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect an individual’s right to

be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 10. Whether Schultz has a valid Fourth Amendment claim requires this court to

determine whether: (1) he exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy in his

property, and (2) that expectation is reasonable. In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565,

571 (Minn. 2003). Appellate courts “must look to the nature of an interest to determine if

it is within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”

Carrillo v. Fabian, 701 N.W.2d 763, 768 (Minn. 2005).

“[I]nvoluntarily civilly committed persons retain the Fourth Amendment right to be

free from unreasonable searches that is analogous to the right retained by pretrial

detainees.” Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)

(quotation omitted). While committed or detained, a person’s expectation of privacy is

said to be of a “diminished scope.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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 The complaint states that “[a]s part of [MSOP’s] practices, policies and procedures,

[MSOP]’s search and seizure of [Schultz]’s property [was] without probable cause or

purpose.” The district court determined that Schultz “failed to allege factual content

sufficient to permit an inference that MSOP’s seizure of [his property] was unreasonable

under the circumstances,” noting MSOP’s interest in maintaining security and order when

it confiscates contraband from civilly committed persons. Given Schultz’s status as an

involuntarily committed person and security concerns associated with the residents of

MSOP, we conclude that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted related to the seizure of his property.

Schultz also argues that Minn. Stat. § 626.21 (2022) provides a private cause of

action for damages in the return of his property, suffered because of MSOP’s “unlawful

seizure” of his video-game console. Under Minn. Stat. § 626.21(a)(1), “[a] person

aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court . . . for the return

of the property . . . [if] the property was illegally seized.” Schultz did not show that MSOP

illegally seized his property. As explained above, the complaint failed to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted.

Substantive due process

Schultz argues that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint because

MSOP’s policies violate his substantive-due-process rights.

When the government’s conduct is “so egregious that it shocks the conscience,” it

has violated a person’s constitutional right to substantive due process. Mumm v. Mornson,

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708 N.W.2d 475, 487 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Only the most extreme instances

of governmental misconduct satisfy this exacting standard.” Id.

Substantive-due-process claims are reviewed differently depending on whether they

challenge a legislative action (a facial challenge) or an executive action (an as-applied

challenge). County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (“[C]riteria to

identify what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific

act of a governmental officer that is at issue.”); Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 407-08

(8th Cir. 2017) (noting different standards applied to substantive-due-process challenges

to Minnesota’s Civil Commitment and Treatment Act); see also State v. Hill, 871 N.W.2d

900, 906 (Minn. 2015) (recognizing differing standards under Lewis). Accepting the facts

of the complaint as true, we conclude that MSOP’s policy against contraband serves a

legitimate governmental purpose because it is imposed for a purpose other than a

punishment.

As the district court correctly noted, “[t]he [c]omplaint affirmatively allege[d] a

proper purpose, namely to ‘maintain a therapeutic environment and ensure the safety and

security of clients, staff, and the public,’ and contain[ed] no factual allegations that suggest

[that] the [p]roperty [p]olicy was implemented for anything other than [a] legitimate

purpose.” The complaint failed to state a substantive-due-process claim upon which relief

can be granted. Therefore, the district court did not err when it made its rule 12.02(e)

decision.

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Procedural due process

Schultz argues that the district court erred when it dismissed the complaint because

MSOP violated his procedural-due-process rights. To assert a viable procedural-due-

process claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to prove that (1) he has been deprived

of a protected life, liberty, or property interest (2) without “constitutionally sufficient”

procedural protections. Hall v. State, 908 N.W.2d 345, 358 (Minn. 2018).

The district court noted that “[Schultz’s] personal property rights may be reasonably

constrained in accordance with MSOP’s therapeutic or policy considerations.” The district

court also stated that: “[Schultz] ha[d] no constitutional right to [an] electronic gaming

system[].” We conclude that the district court did not err when it dismissed Schultz’s

claim. MSOP’s seizure of contraband did not deprive Schultz of a protected life, liberty,

or property interest.

Other claims

Schultz’s brief includes a section titled “other claims” that simply reargues the

alleged constitutional violations already addressed. We decline to readdress these claims

as inadequately briefed. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,

558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to reach an inadequately briefed issue);

Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Although some

accommodations may be made for pro se litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized

that pro se litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply

with court rules.”).

Affirmed.

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