In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ingram Oyugi

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1702

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Ingram Oyugi.

Filed May 6, 2024
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-23-632

Thomas Hagler, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant Ingram Oyugi)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Annsara Lovejoy Elasky, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Hennepin County Attorney’s Office)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and

Jesson, Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

After being found incompetent to proceed on various criminal charges, appellant

Ingram Oyugi was indeterminately committed as a person with mental illness who is

dangerous to the public (MI&D) pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 253B.18 (2022).

Oyugi challenges the indeterminate commitment, arguing that the district court erred by

(1) concluding that Oyugi engaged in overt acts capable of causing or attempting to cause

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
serious physical harm to another, (2) concluding that Oyugi was indeterminately

committable because he continued to meet the definition of a person who is MI&D and no

less restrictive alternative was available, and (3) admitting and considering certain hearsay

evidence and expert witness testimony. We affirm.

FACTS

Mental Health and Commitment History

Oyugi was first hospitalized for psychiatric concerns in 2019. Between 2019 and

2022, he was hospitalized five times after engaging in behaviors dangerous to himself and

others, including erratic driving, physically attacking his sister in 2020, wandering in

traffic, and exhibiting symptoms of psychosis. During his hospitalizations, he repeatedly

refused to engage meaningfully with staff, acknowledge his mental illness, and take

prescribed medications. During this time, civil commitment as a person who poses a risk

of harm due to mental illness (MI&H) was pursued but stayed.

Underlying Criminal Proceedings

On April 11, 2023, and April 21, 2023, two incidents allegedly occurred that led to

Oyugi being charged with several criminal offenses.

In the days leading up to the April 11 incident, officers were twice dispatched to

Oyugi’s residence—once on April 7 and again on April 9. On April 7, officers observed

Oyugi walking around the home with a baseball bat. On April 9, when officers returned to

the home, Oyugi, according to their report, “retreated back into the home and armed

himself with a bat” when they approached.

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 On April 11, Oyugi’s mother and sister told Oyugi that they were gathering some

belongings so they could leave the residence. According to the women, Oyugi started to

yell, pulled a can of bear mace from a pouch on his hip, and sprayed them in the face with

the mace. When officers arrived in response to a call, they found the women crawling

around in pain on the driveway. The women’s eyes were closed and difficult to open, and

their faces were red. The women reported that they were terrified to return home because,

every time they did, Oyugi became upset and violent. Oyugi refused to exit the home, and

the officers left Oyugi after determining that they would make an attempt to aid at a later

point in time. Oyugi was charged with two counts of misdemeanor domestic assault and

one count of misdemeanor disorderly conduct related to this incident.

On April 21, officers were called to the home to assist with serving an ex parte order

for protection against Oyugi. After attempting to coax Oyugi outside over the phone,

officers entered the home and heard him yelling from downstairs. Officers told Oyugi that

they had a court order requiring him to leave the residence, and Oyugi sprayed an aerosol

substance up the stairwell. Officers were forced to use gas masks to prevent them from

being contaminated by the spray as they continued in their efforts to contain Oyugi.

Additionally, Oyugi launched two taser probes at an officer, who was struck but not

injured. Officers tried to negotiate with Oyugi for several hours.

Oyugi was eventually detained and brought to the hospital. At the hospital, he

presented with “grossly psychotic symptoms and violent thoughts.” He was later

discharged to the county jail with a prescription for medication. He was charged with one

felony count of using tear gas to immobilize, one felony count of fourth-degree assault of

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a peace officer, and one gross-misdemeanor count of using tear gas or stun gun on a peace

officer in relation to the April 21 incident.

Competency and Civil Commitment

In May 2023, Oyugi was found incompetent to proceed on all pending criminal

charges pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 20.01. He was then referred for

civil commitment. Respondent Hennepin County filed a petition seeking to civilly commit

Oyugi as MI&D for an indeterminate amount of time. The district court appointed

Hennepin County Psychological Services to examine Oyugi, draft a report, and provide an

opinion. Mallory Jorgenson, Ph.D., LP, was appointed, reviewed Oyugi’s records, and

drafted a report.

The initial commitment hearing was held on July 11, 2023. At the initial hearing,

the district court received numerous exhibits offered by the county and heard testimony

from Dr. Jorgenson, Oyugi’s mother, and Oyugi. On July 20, 2023, the district court filed

an order committing Oyugi as MI&D to the Forensic Mental Health Program (FMHP) 1

pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 253B.18, subdivision 1(a).

In August 2023, a Jarvis hearing was held, during which Oyugi testified. 2 The

district court subsequently issued a Jarvis order authorizing the administration of

neuroleptic medications without Oyugi’s consent.

1
FMHP was formerly known as the Minnesota Security Hospital.
2
Jarvis refers to Jarvis v. Levine, in which the Minnesota supreme court held that health-
care professionals must obtain court approval before treating a patient with neuroleptic
medications without the patient’s consent. 418 N.W.2d 139, 150 (Minn. 1988). A “Jarvis

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 In September 2023, Meagan McKenna, Psy.D., LP, from the FMHP provided the

district court with a 60-day report pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 253B.18,

subdivision 2(a). A hearing was held on September 28, 2023, to determine whether Oyugi

continued to be indeterminately committable. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 2(a)

(requiring the district court to hold a review hearing “to make a final determination as to

whether the patient should remain committed as a person who [is MI&D]”). At the hearing,

the court received additional exhibits offered by the county and heard testimony from

Dr. McKenna and Oyugi’s mother. On September 29, 2023, the district court issued an

order committing Oyugi for an indeterminate period of time pursuant to Minnesota Statutes

section 253B.18, subdivision 3.

Oyugi appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not err by concluding that Oyugi engaged in overt acts
causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.

Oyugi first challenges the district court’s initial commitment determination. He

argues that the district court erred by concluding that he engaged in overt acts causing or

attempting to cause harm as required by Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02, subdivision

17(2)(i) (2022), because his actions did not rise to the level of “serious physical harm.” We

disagree.

hearing” and “Jarvis order” refer to the procedures for court approval for administration of
neuroleptic medication without a patient’s consent.

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 Whether Oyugi’s actions constitute “overt acts causing or attempting to cause

serious physical harm” within the meaning of the statute is a question of statutory

application that this court reviews de novo. See In re Civ. Commitment of Kropp, 895

N.W.2d 647, 650 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2017).

There is no statutory definition of “serious physical harm,” but appellate courts have

ascertained its meaning. Appellate courts apply the common understanding of the word

“serious.” In re Lufsky, 388 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Minn. App. 1986). Not every physical

consequence of every assault is “serious,” and courts must observe the distinction between

“physical harm” in the definition of a person who is MI&H and “serious physical harm” in

the definition of a person who is MI&D. See In re Kottke, 433 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Minn.

1988); see also Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subds. 17, 17a (2022). The person need not intend

to cause harm or actually cause harm for the conduct to meet the overt-act requirement.

See In re Jasmer, 447 N.W.2d 192, 195-96 (Minn. 1989). And it is not necessary that

“mayhem or murder” occur; less violent conduct may meet the statutory requirement.

Kottke, 433 N.W.2d at 884.

In its conclusions of law, the district court cited the April 11, 2023 incident—during

which Oyugi allegedly sprayed his mother and sister in the face with bear mace—and the

April 21, 2023 incident—during which he allegedly used mace and a taser to attack law

enforcement—as the overt acts causing or attempting to cause serious physical harm. 3

3
We note that Oyugi argues that the evidence of the 2020 incident, in which he attacked
his sister, was not clear and convincing. But, while the district court described this incident
in its findings of fact, it did not conclude that it constituted one of the overt acts. And
Oyugi’s argument regarding the 2020 incident does not persuade us that his 2023 actions

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 Oyugi contends that his actions do not rise to the level of serious physical harm

contemplated by the statute because they are analogous to actions that were found to be

insufficient to commit an individual as MI&D in Kottke. There, Kottke was charged with

two counts of misdemeanor assault for: (1) striking a security guard with a closed fist while

being escorted from a building, leaving red marks on the guard’s face, and (2) striking a

loss-prevention officer on the back with both fists, causing the loss-prevention officer to

fall and sprain his thumb. Id. at 882. The supreme court concluded that Kottke’s conduct

“neither inflicted nor was intended to inflict the serious physical harm of the type

contemplated by the statute” and therefore the evidence of the assaults was insufficient to

establish that Kottke was MI&D. Id. at 884. Kottke was described as “extremely mild-

mannered,” and his assaults were described as striking out “in a rather ineffectual way.”

Id. at 883. He had no history of similar behavior. Id.

Oyugi argues that, under Kottke, “only extreme acts of violence satisfy the statutory

requirement of serious physical harm” and that his act of spraying his mother and sister

with bear mace does not rise to the level of causing the serious physical harm contemplated

by the statute. He also asserts that his act of spraying his mother and sister with bear mace

does not satisfy the statute because, like the acts in Kottke, that act only amounted to alleged

misdemeanor assault. He makes a similar argument regarding his actions of using mace

and a taser against police because, he contends, those actions would have resulted in

misdemeanor charges had the victims not been police officers.

of spraying his mother, sister, and police with chemical irritants and firing a taser at police
were not overt acts causing or attempting to cause serious harm.

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 We disagree that Oyugi’s acts are not sufficiently serious to satisfy the statutory

requirement under Kottke. Oyugi’s act of spraying bear mace directly into the face of his

mother and sister rises to a higher level of physical harm than striking individuals with fists

in a “rather ineffectual way.” See id. While the security guard in Kottke suffered red marks

on his face and the loss-prevention officer suffered a sprained thumb after falling, Oyugi’s

mother and sister experienced pain that Oyugi’s mother described as “excruciating” from

being sprayed in the face with bear mace. When police arrived at the home, both women

were crawling around on the driveway with their eyes closed and difficult to open. Their

faces were also red. And, had Oyugi successfully maced the officers without their

protective equipment on, they too could have suffered the same level of harm. In other

words, regardless of the outcome of spraying the officers, the potential for harm was the

same.

Nor are we persuaded by Oyugi’s attempt to draw a rule from Kottke that

distinguishes between acts resulting in misdemeanor charges and acts resulting in felony

charges. What matters is the seriousness of the physical harm based on the facts, not the

level of criminal charges that might result.

We conclude that, consistent with Kottke, Oyugi’s actions in the April 11 and

April 21 incidents constitute overt acts causing or attempting to cause serious physical

harm.

Our conclusion is bolstered by our nonprecedential decision in In re Tempel, No.

C8-94-807, 1994 WL 468113 (Minn. App. Aug. 30, 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 27,

1994), which both parties cite. Nonprecedential opinions “are not binding authority except

8
as law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel” but “may be cited as persuasive

authority.” Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

In Tempel, we concluded that Tempel engaged in an overt act causing serious

physical harm when he reached behind his back, pulled out a can of mace, and sprayed his

caretaker in the eyes. 1994 WL 468113, at *1, *4. We stated that “[s]praying mace into a

person’s eyes is inherently dangerous” and concluded that “[Tempel’s] conduct me[t] the

standard for commitment as mentally ill and dangerous even if he did not inflict or intend

to inflict serious physical harm.” Id. at *4.

Oyugi argues that Tempel is distinguishable because Tempel had a gun, was charged

with a felony, threatened to kill the victim, and sprayed tear gas directly into the victim’s

eyes at close range. See id. at *1. We are not persuaded. First, we did not consider the fact

that Tempel had other weapons in his possession when concluding that the act of spraying

an individual in the eyes with mace met the “serious physical harm” requirement. See id.

at *4. Further, we concluded that the record did not support the district court’s finding that

Tempel threatened to kill the victim, and therefore that was not a fact considered in our

analysis. See id. at *2. Second, the level of charges is not dispositive. And third, as the

county points out, Oyugi’s characterization of his actions as “not intentionally” spraying

his mother and sister directly in the eyes is irrelevant. A person need not intend to cause

harm or actually cause harm for the conduct to meet the overt-act requirement. Jasmer, 447

N.W.2d at 195-96.

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 The facts here are analogous to those in Tempel. And, although Tempel is a

nonprecedential decision, we consider it persuasive authority in resolving the issue of

whether Oyugi’s actions rise to the level of “serious physical harm” required by the statute.

Finally, Oyugi argues that his actions do not meet the statutory criteria because bear

spray, mace, and tasers are legal to purchase and possess; the use of chemical irritants in

an inappropriate manner is a misdemeanor; and the statute criminalizing the inappropriate

use of chemical irritants does not include the “serious physical harm” language. These

points are not persuasive. An ordinarily nonlethal object that is legal to purchase may pose

a risk of “serious physical harm” to others when used improperly, and Oyugi does not

provide a compelling reason to conclude otherwise. Similarly, neither the fact that the

chemical-irritant statute criminalizes inappropriate use as a misdemeanor nor the fact that

the statute does not use the phrase “serious physical harm” means that inappropriate use of

a chemical irritant could not result in serious physical harm—it only means that serious

physical harm is not required to prosecute it as a crime.

The district court did not err by concluding that Oyugi engaged in overt acts causing

or attempting to cause serious physical harm to another.

II. The district court did not err by concluding that Oyugi is indeterminately
committable.

Before indeterminately committing an individual as MI&D following an initial

commitment determination, the court must hold a second hearing and must determine that

the patient continues to meet the statutory MI&D criteria. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subds. 2,

3. Oyugi argues that the evidence does not establish that he continued to meet the statutory

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criteria for indeterminate commitment because (1) he did not meet the definition of MI&D

because he was not substantially likely to cause serious harm in the future and (2) a less

restrictive alternative existed. Whether clear and convincing evidence supports the district

court’s determination that Oyugi continued to meet the statutory criteria for indeterminate

commitment as MI&D is a question of law that we review de novo. See In re Thulin, 660

N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).

A. Future Risk of Serious Harm

Oyugi argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was substantially

likely to cause serious harm in the future for two reasons. See Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,

subd. 17(2)(ii) (defining MI&D to require that “there is a substantial likelihood that the

person will engage in acts capable of inflicting serious physical harm on another”).

First, Oyugi argues that the evidence is insufficient because, at the August 2023

Jarvis hearing, Oyugi told the district court “that he understood that he was sick, that he

needed help, and that he wanted to continue his medication.” This argument is not

persuasive. A review of the testimony elicited at the Jarvis hearing reveals that, while

Oyugi said at one point that he was ill, that he needed help, and that he needed medication,

he contradicted himself moments later by asserting that he did not need medication and

that he was perfectly healthy.

Second, Oyugi argues that the evidence is insufficient because the district court

erroneously disregarded the fact that he was not violent during his confinement and that he

had not recently committed overt acts of violence. This argument is also not persuasive.

The district court considered Oyugi’s nonviolence while confined and recent lack of overt

11
acts but determined that there was still clear and convincing evidence that he remained a

serious danger to others. The district court made numerous findings related to the risk of

future harm that Oyugi posed, including findings of a pattern of escalating behavior,

Oyugi’s noncompliance with treatment, his limited understanding of his mental illness and

his treatment needs, and his failure to develop coping strategies to manage his anger and

impulse reactions. These findings are supported by Dr. McKenna’s testimony and report,

which the district court found credible and persuasive. Clear and convincing evidence

supports the district court’s determination that Oyugi continues to be dangerous to the

public.

Further, a lack of recent overt acts does not preclude a finding of continued

dangerousness, and good behavior in an artificial environment—like jail—is not

determinative of whether an individual poses a risk of future harm. See In re Irwin, 529

N.W.2d 366, 374 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995). Here, expert

testimony that Oyugi continued to be mentally ill and dangerous to the public is sufficient

to support the district court’s conclusion, despite Oyugi’s good behavior in jail. See id.

(upholding initial and indeterminate commitments as MI&D when the committed person

refrained from engaging in overt acts while in prison, but experts testified that the

committed person remained MI&D).

B. Less Restrictive Alternative

Oyugi argues that the district court erred by finding that a less restrictive alternative

does not exist because his mother testified that he could be treated at a less restrictive

facility like Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center (AMRTC).

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 Upon a finding that a person is MI&D, a district court must commit the individual

to a secure treatment facility unless there is a less restrictive state-operated treatment

program or facility available that is consistent with the patient’s treatment needs and the

requirements of public safety. Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1(a). The committed person

has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive alternative

exists. In re Civ. Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 25 (Minn. 2014). The district court’s

finding as to the least restrictive alternative will not be reversed unless it is clearly

erroneous. In re Dirks, 530 N.W.2d 207, 211-12 (Minn. App. 1995). A finding is clearly

erroneous if it is “manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not reasonably

supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d

214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). When reviewing for clear error, appellate

courts do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicting evidence. Id. at 221-22.

The district court found that “[c]ommitment for an indeterminate period of time to

the [FMHP] as a person mentally ill and dangerous to the public is currently the least

restrictive, available, and appropriate disposition.” That determination is supported by the

evidence. Dr. McKenna testified that, in her opinion, indeterminate commitment is the least

restrictive alternative. She explained that Oyugi’s psychiatric disorder has resulted in

episodes of paranoia and delusional beliefs and increasingly erratic and violent behavior

toward others. She testified that her biggest concern is Oyugi’s escalation of violence and

his lack of insight despite his history of receiving extensive services. She also testified that

it is clear that he will discontinue services and medication at the first opportunity. Similarly,

Dr. Jorgenson testified that she was unaware of any less restrictive alternative and that

13
treatment at AMRTC would be inappropriate for Oyugi given his history of noncompliance

with treatment and the ineffectiveness of past short-term interventions. Dr. McKenna’s and

Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony supports the district court’s determinations that short-term

treatment and return to the community would not be safe and that existing safeguards are

insufficient to manage Oyugi’s risk level.

The district court considered Oyugi’s mother’s testimony about AMRTC. It found

her testimony sincere but less persuasive and weighty than Dr. McKenna’s testimony. It

also found Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony to be highly persuasive. We will not disturb the

district court’s findings by reweighing the evidence or resolving conflicting evidence. See

id. 4

Oyugi also argues that, because a less restrictive alternative like AMRTC has not

been tried, his commitment to FMHP is “tantamount to an unjustified institutional isolation

of a person with a disability and is discriminatory,” citing Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring,

527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).

Oyugi’s reliance on Olmstead is misplaced. In Olmstead, the United States Supreme

Court concluded that states “are required to provide community-based treatment for

4
Oyugi makes other challenges to Dr. McKenna’s opinion that a less restrictive alternative
does not exist. He asserts that Dr. McKenna wrongly claimed he had already been treated
at AMRTC. But there is no evidence in the record that Dr. McKenna made this claim.
Oyugi also challenges Dr. McKenna’s use of terms such as “at various times” and “on a
number of occasions” to describe the frequency of his odd behavior—such as screaming in
his cell and making comments about demons, etc.—which, he claims, is inconsistent with
jail notes that only mention two occasions. Although there were only two entries about this
particular behavior, the entries appear to indicate that the behavior happened more than
twice.

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persons with mental disabilities when the [s]tate’s treatment professionals determine that

such placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such treatment, and the

placement can be reasonably accommodated.” 527 U.S. at 607. Here, the county’s

treatment professionals—Dr. Jorgenson and Dr. McKenna—determined that a less

restrictive community-based treatment was not appropriate for Oyugi. Because the

county’s treatment professionals determined that a less restrictive community-based

treatment was not appropriate, Olmstead does not apply.

III. The district court did not commit reversible error by admitting and
considering certain hearsay evidence and expert witness testimony.

Oyugi lastly makes two evidentiary arguments: (1) that the district court improperly

relied on unreliable hearsay and (2) that the district court erred by admitting inadmissible

expert testimony. We review the decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. In

re Civ. Commitment of Spicer, 853 N.W.2d 803, 813 (Minn. App. 2014). Even if evidence

was wrongly admitted, we will not reverse unless the error was prejudicial. See Minn. R.

Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); In re Civ. Commitment of Turner, 950

N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2020) (applying rule 61).

A. Hearsay Evidence

Oyugi argues that, at both the initial commitment hearing and the indeterminate

commitment hearing, the district court prejudicially erred by relying on unreliable hearsay

evidence. We disagree.

Under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act, at a commitment hearing,

the district court “may admit all relevant, reliable evidence, including but not limited to the

15
respondent’s medical records, without requiring foundation witnesses.” Minn. Spec. R.

Commit. & Treat. Act 15. Further, the Act provides that “[t]he court shall admit all relevant

evidence at the hearing” and that “[t]he court shall make its determination upon the entire

record pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.” Minn. Stat. § 253B.08, subd. 7 (2022).

First, Oyugi argues that the warning label on the can of bear mace stating that bear

mace can cause “irreversible physical eye damage” was unreliable hearsay that should not

have been admitted into evidence at the initial commitment hearing without support from

a medical expert witness. But, even if the bear mace label was unreliable hearsay, in its

findings of fact and conclusions of law after the initial hearing, the district court did not

reference the warning label or the statement about “irreversible physical eye damage.”

Even if there was an error in admitting this evidence, Oyugi has not demonstrated prejudice

warranting reversal.

Second, Oyugi argues that the district court erred by relying on Dr. McKenna’s

opinion at the indeterminate commitment hearing because it was based on records

containing unreliable hearsay. The district court did not abuse its discretion by relying on

Dr. McKenna’s opinion because she, as an expert, was allowed to review and rely on all of

the county’s proposed exhibits regardless of their potential admissibility. See In re Civ.

Commitment of Williams, 735 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn.

Sept. 26, 2007).

Third, Oyugi argues that the district court erred by admitting the police reports

regarding the 2020 incident and taking judicial notice of the police reports regarding the

2023 incidents at the indeterminate commitment hearing because they contained unreliable

16
hearsay. He contends that the police reports detailing his assault on his sister in 2020 are

unreliable because they conflict with his mother’s testimony about how his sister had

described the incident to her, which the mother understood to be a “pushing match.” But

Oyugi does not adequately explain why the conflict between the police reports and the

testimony of a witness who did not observe the incident is a reason to doubt the reliability

of the police reports.

Oyugi also contends that the police reports regarding the 2020 incident are

unreliable because they used words like “‘bashed’ and ‘slammed’ to exaggerate the

seriousness of the conduct” that resulted in no injury to the sister, and they were

inconsistent because one officer said the sister hit her head on the floor, another officer

said the sister hit her head on the wall, and another officer stated that Oyugi “pushed” the

sister. Similarly, Oyugi asserts that the police reports about the April 21, 2023 incident

were unreliable because some officers used the term “aerosol” and others used “bear

mace.” But these word choices and differences in the reports are negligible and do not

provide a basis to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by admitting them. 5

B. Expert Witness Testimony

Oyugi argues that Dr. Jorgenson’s testimony at the initial commitment hearing as to

whether an action or substance was capable of causing “serious physical injury” “amounted

5
Oyugi also appears to challenge, as an evidentiary matter, the county’s characterization
during its closing argument of how he held a bat during one of the incidents. It is unclear
how Oyugi is challenging the county’s argument as inadmissible evidence. In any event,
the district court did not mention the county’s characterization in its findings of fact and
conclusions of law and thus Oyugi has again failed to show how he was prejudiced by any
error. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61.

17
to unfounded expert testimony” that should have been excluded under Minnesota Rule of

Evidence 702. But the district court did not cite this particular testimony by Dr. Jorgenson

in its findings of fact or conclusions of law after the initial hearing, and Oyugi has failed

to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by any error. See id.

We discern no reversible error in the district court’s evidentiary decisions.

Affirmed.

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