State of Minnesota v. Laron Lovell Brown

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1848

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Laron Lovell Brown,
Appellant.

Filed September 30, 2024
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-22-9331

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Reilly,

Judge. ∗

Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant
∗

to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

Laron Lovell Brown pleaded guilty to two offenses pursuant to a plea agreement.

He argues that his guilty pleas are invalid on the ground that he did not understand the

terms of the plea agreement. We conclude that Brown’s guilty pleas were intelligently

entered. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

In May 2022, the state charged Brown with multiple offenses. According to the

complaint, a state trooper observed a vehicle driving on a section of interstate highway 94

in Minneapolis that was closed for road construction. The trooper stopped the vehicle,

which was being driven by Brown. Brown told the trooper that he did not have a valid

driver’s license. The trooper directed Brown to exit the vehicle, but Brown drove away.

The trooper pursued him. Approximately one minute later, Brown crashed the vehicle he

was driving, which had been reported stolen, and fled on foot. The trooper chased Brown

on foot and apprehended him. A nearby security camera captured Brown removing

something from his pocket and tossing it during the chase. Law-enforcement officers

searched the area where Brown had run and found two baggies containing approximately

19 grams of a white substance that field-tested positive for cocaine.

The state charged Brown with five offenses. In January 2023, the parties entered

into a plea agreement. Brown pleaded guilty to third-degree controlled substance crime,

in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.023, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), and fleeing a peace officer in a

motor vehicle, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.487, subd. 3 (2020). In exchange, the state

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dismissed the three other charges. The state also agreed to recommend a downward

dispositional departure at sentencing if Brown satisfied several conditions, including the

condition that he continue to participate in a drug-treatment program. Brown was released

pending sentencing.

In May 2023, the department of corrections issued a warrant for Brown’s arrest

because he was on supervised release for a prior conviction and was not complying with

all conditions of his release. In June 2023, Brown failed to appear for a sentencing hearing

in this case. Brown was arrested one month later. In August 2023, Brown filed a motion

to withdraw his guilty pleas on the grounds that he “did not fully understand the plea

agreement” and that “he is chemically dependent and was not in his right frame of mind at

the time he entered his plea.”

The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in September 2023. At the outset

of the hearing, the district court considered and denied Brown’s motion to withdraw his

guilty pleas. The prosecutor asked the district court to impose a presumptive prison

sentence on the drug charge. Brown’s attorney stated that Brown had been “kicked out of

treatment” because he continued to use controlled substances and acknowledged that the

state no longer was obligated to recommend a downward dispositional departure. Brown

nonetheless requested that the district court order a downward dispositional departure and

place him on probation based on his expressed willingness to participate in another drug-

treatment program. The district court denied Brown’s request and imposed a presumptive

sentence of 39 months of imprisonment on the drug offense and executed the sentence.

The district court imposed a stayed sentence of 15 months on the fleeing offense but

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executed that sentence at Brown’s request and ordered the two sentences to run

concurrently. Brown appeals.

DECISION

Brown argues that his guilty pleas are invalid on the ground that they were not

intelligently and voluntarily entered. Specifically, Brown argues that he did not understand

what he was required to do to satisfy the condition of the plea agreement that required him

to continue participating in a drug-treatment program and did not understand that he could

be sentenced to prison if he did not satisfy that condition.

In response, the state initially argues that Brown forfeited his argument by not

presenting it to the district court in his motion to withdraw his plea. In his reply brief

Brown makes clear that he is not challenging the district court’s denial of his plea-

withdrawal motion but, rather, is arguing that his guilty pleas are invalid based on the

record of the plea hearing. Because a defendant is permitted to challenge the validity of

his guilty pleas for the first time on direct appeal, Brown’s argument is not forfeited. See

Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989); State v. Arola Johnson, 999 N.W.2d

103, 108 (Minn. App. 2023).

A guilty plea is valid if it is “accurate, voluntary and intelligent.” State v. Ecker,

524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994) (citing State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn.

1983)). If a guilty plea does not satisfy any of these three requirements, the plea is invalid.

State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). This court applies a de novo standard

of review when determining the validity of a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90,

94 (Minn. 2010).

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 Brown argues that his guilty pleas are both unintelligent and involuntary. The

supreme court has explained the difference between the two concepts:

The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to insure that
the defendant is not pleading guilty because of improper
pressures. The purpose of the requirement that the plea be
intelligent is to insure that the defendant understands the
charges, understands the rights he is waiving by pleading
guilty, and understands the consequences of his plea.

Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251. Brown does not argue that he pleaded guilty as a result of

“improper pressures.” See id. Consequently, Brown’s argument implicates only the

intelligence requirement. “Whether a plea is intelligent depends on what the defendant

knew at the time he entered the plea . . . .” Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn.

2017).

The record of the plea hearing does not support Brown’s argument that he did not

understand what he was required to do to comply with the plea agreement and did not

understand that he could receive a prison sentence if he did not comply. At the plea

hearing, Brown’s attorney expressly stated that the plea agreement required Brown to

“continue in his current treatment.” The prosecutor reiterated that the plea agreement

required Brown “to continue to stay in treatment and comply with all of the

recommendations.” The prosecutor later questioned Brown directly and confirmed his

understanding that “if you do well at treatment . . . , the state will agree to place you on

probation instead of sending you to prison.” The prosecutor also sought to confirm

Brown’s understanding that “if you leave treatment or fail at treatment, then the state can

argue for something other than placing you on probation.” When asked if he understood

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that consequence of not continuing in the treatment program, Brown responded, “Yes, I

do.”

The record makes clear that Brown understood that the plea agreement required him

to remain in his drug-treatment program. Because he did not complete a drug-treatment

program, he did not satisfy all conditions of the plea agreement. The record also makes

clear that Brown understood the consequences of violating the plea agreement. Because

he did not satisfy all conditions of the plea agreement, the state was not required to

recommend a downward dispositional departure. Accordingly, Brown’s guilty pleas were

intelligently entered. Thus, Brown’s guilty pleas are not invalid.

Affirmed.

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