State of Minnesota v. Demarcius Maurice Payton

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A23-1854

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Demarcius Maurice Payton,
Appellant.

Filed November 18, 2024
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-21-7047

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Lyndsey M. Olson, St. Paul City Attorney, Maria DeWolf, Assistant City Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bjorkman,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

Appellant Demarcius Maurice Payton challenges his conviction for third-degree test

refusal on the basis that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress

evidence obtained from a traffic stop. See Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2020). On
appeal, Payton argues the district court clearly erred when it found his vehicle crossed a

white-dashed centerline without signaling, giving a police officer reasonable, articulable

suspicion to stop his vehicle because he violated a traffic law. Because the district court’s

findings are not clearly erroneous, we conclude the district court correctly denied the

motion to suppress and affirm.

FACTS

The following facts were elicited at a hearing on Payton’s motion to suppress. On

December 13, 2021, at 6:15 p.m., a St. Paul police officer responded to a report that a black

sport utility vehicle was blocking the entrance to a store. The report indicated that an

individual was seated in the driver’s seat and asleep or unconscious. When the officer

arrived, he noticed an unoccupied vehicle with a similar description in a parking space in

the store’s parking lot. The officer “cleared the call,” but remained at the scene to observe

the vehicle. The vehicle eventually left the parking lot, and the officer followed the vehicle

with his dash camera recording. The vehicle traveled south on Hamline Avenue, which

has two southbound lanes of traffic separated by a white-dashed centerline. While

following the vehicle, the officer observed the driver swerve 6-12 inches over the white-

dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet before recentering the vehicle in the

appropriate lane. Based on his observation, the officer conducted a traffic stop.

During the traffic stop, the officer identified Payton as the driver, noticed signs of

impairment, directed Payton to perform field sobriety tests, and arrested Payton for driving

under the influence of a controlled substance. The officer secured a search warrant for a

2
blood or urine test. After the officer read Payton the search warrant and informed Payton

that refusing to submit to testing was a crime, Payton refused to submit to testing.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Payton with three counts: (1) third-degree

driving while impaired (refusal to test), pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2);

(2) fourth-degree driving while impaired (operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

a controlled substance), pursuant to Minn. Stat. 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2020); and (3) driving

after revocation, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 2 (2020). Payton moved to

suppress the evidence obtained from the traffic stop, arguing the officer lacked reasonable,

articulable suspicion to perform the traffic stop and the expansion of the stop was

unreasonable. The district court denied the motion to suppress.

The parties agreed to a stipulated-evidence trial under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01,

subd. 4, preserving Payton’s right to appeal the district court’s decision to deny the motion

to suppress. The district court adjudicated Payton guilty of third-degree driving while

impaired (refusal to test), dismissed the remaining counts, and imposed a probationary

sentence.

Payton appeals.

DECISION

Payton challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion to suppress the

evidence obtained from the traffic stop. Specifically, Payton contends the district court

clearly erred when it found the officer credibly testified that Payton crossed the white-

dashed centerline without signaling. See Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1) (2020).

3
 When reviewing a district court’s decision to deny a pre-trial suppression motion,

we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal determinations

de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We “will not conclude

that a factfinder clearly erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney,

963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted); State v. Thompson, 988 N.W.2d

149, 158 (Minn. App. 2023) (applying Kenney), rev. denied (Minn. June 20, 2023). When

applying the clear-error standard, we fully perform our duty when we have “fairly

considered all the evidence and . . . determined that the evidence reasonably supports the

decision.” Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 222.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee individuals the right to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I,

§ 10. A police officer may, however, initiate a limited investigatory stop without a warrant

if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the

particular intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts

which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that

intrusion.” Id. at 21. These facts are judged by an objective standard. Id. Even a minor

traffic-law violation can establish a particularized, objective basis for an investigatory stop.

State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997).

Here, the officer testified that he initiated a traffic stop because he observed Payton

swerve 6-12 inches over the white-dashed centerline, without signaling, for 20-30 feet

4
before recentering the vehicle in the appropriate lane. The officer indicated his belief that

this conduct violated Minn. Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1), which states, “When any roadway

has been divided into two [lanes] . . . a vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable

entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first

ascertained that the movement can be made with safety.” The officer testified that he

“clear[ly]” observed the violation and indicated exactly when the violation occurred in the

dash-camera video. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible, and we defer

to the district court’s credibility determinations. 1 See State v. Smith, 448 N.W.2d 550, 555-

56 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 29, 1989). Based on this evidence, the

district court found that Payton’s vehicle “swerve[d] and cross[ed] the dashed white line

separating the two lanes without signaling.” We conclude that the evidence amply supports

the district court’s finding that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without

signaling.

Payton disagrees, arguing the district court clearly erred when it found he crossed

the white-dashed centerline. Payton relies on his assertion that the dash-camera video does

not support the officer’s testimony. But contrary to Payton’s argument, though dark and

poor quality, the dash-camera video does not contradict the officer’s testimony. While the

1
Payton challenges the district court’s credibility determination because he presented
evidence that the officer had previously been demoted and had two prior reprimands for
improper procedures. But Payton presented this evidence to the district court and, despite
that evidence, the district court found the officer credible. “Because the weight and
believability of witness testimony is an issue for the district court, we defer to [the district]
court’s credibility determinations.” State v. Miller, 659 N.W.2d 275, 279 (Minn. App.
2003).

5
white-dashed centerline does not appear in the dash-camera video, the dash-camera video

plainly captures Payton’s vehicle veering slightly to the right at the time the officer testified

that Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline. Although not dispositive, the dash-camera

video bolsters the officer’s testimony that a traffic violation occurred.

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not clearly err when it found

Payton crossed the white-dashed centerline without signaling and, thereby, violated Minn.

Stat. § 169.18, subd. 7(1). As such, the district court correctly determined the officer had

the requisite particularized and objective basis for conducting the traffic stop and,

therefore, the investigatory stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion. See

George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. We, therefore, affirm the district court’s decision to deny

Payton’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

6