State of Minnesota v. Abdirashid Ahmed Hassan

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0042

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Abdirashid Ahmed Hassan,
Appellant.

Filed November 18, 2024
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-20-8009

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Slieter,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction of third-degree criminal

sexual conduct, appellant argues that (1) his guilty plea was inaccurate because the factual

basis failed to establish the force element of the offense, and (2) the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a downward-dispositional departure. Because his

guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual basis and the district court acted within

its discretion by imposing a guidelines sentence, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Abdirashid Ahmed Hassan with

third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c)

(2020). The case proceeded to a jury trial, but Hassan pleaded guilty before jury selection

was complete. During his plea colloquy, Hassan acknowledged that on December 25,

2020, he was at an apartment with A.T., led her into a bedroom, and “forced penetration.”

The district court accepted Hassan’s plea.

Hassan moved for a downward-dispositional departure, arguing that he was

particularly amenable to probation. The district court denied the motion and imposed a

guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. Hassan appeals.

DECISION

I. Because Hassan’s guilty plea is accurate, no manifest injustice exists, and he is
not entitled to withdraw the plea.

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” State

v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). But a defendant must be allowed to withdraw

a guilty plea if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Id. “A manifest injustice

exists if a guilty plea is not valid.” Id. at 94. To be valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate,

voluntary, and intelligent. A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid.

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Assessing the validity of a plea presents a question of law that we review de novo.” Id.

(citations omitted).

Hassan does not dispute that his plea was voluntary and intelligent. He instead

focuses his claim solely on its accuracy.

“Accuracy requires that the plea be supported by a proper factual basis, that there

must be sufficient facts on the record to support a conclusion that defendant’s conduct falls

within the charge to which he desires to plead guilty.” State v. Schwartz, 957 N.W.2d 414,

418 (Minn. 2021) (quotation and citation omitted). This requirement “protects a defendant

from pleading guilty to a more serious offense than that for which he could be convicted if

he insisted on his right to trial.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. It is the district court’s

responsibility to “ensure that an adequate factual basis has been established in the record.”

State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Although district courts generally elicit

the proper factual basis by asking the defendant to explain what happened, “a defendant

may not withdraw [their] plea simply because the court failed to elicit proper responses if

the record contains sufficient evidence to support the conviction.” Rosendahl v. State, 955

N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. App. 2021) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at

94). “Even if an element to an offense is not verbalized by the defendant, a district court

may nevertheless draw inferences from the facts admitted to by the defendant.” Id. at 299

(emphasis omitted).

Hassan claims that his guilty plea was inaccurate because the factual basis

supporting the plea did not establish that he used force to accomplish penetration. See

Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(c).

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 During the plea hearing, Hassan stated that he “forced penetration.” Following two

off-the-record discussions, Hassan’s attorney asked him: “You physically used your body

to force your penis into her vagina; is that true?” Hassan answered: “Yes.”

Hassan admitted that he “forced penetration” and “raped” A.T. He agreed that he

“physically used [his] body to force [his] penis into her vagina,” and that he “pushed her

down when [he] inserted [his] penis into her vagina.” These acknowledgments by Hassan

demonstrate that he committed the offense using force. See Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d

852, 861 (Minn. 2016) (observing that “before a plea of guilty can be accepted, the trial

judge must make certain that facts exist from which the defendant’s guilt of the crime

charged can be reasonably inferred.”) Hassan’s plea colloquy demonstrated a sufficient

factual basis to establish his guilt of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, and, therefore,

he is not entitled to a plea withdrawal.

II. The district court acted within its discretion by imposing a guidelines sentence.

A district court must impose a sentence within the Minnesota Sentencing

Guidelines’ presumptive range unless it finds substantial and compelling circumstances to

depart. See State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d 257, 270 (Minn. 2020). “Substantial and

compelling circumstances” are circumstances that make the facts of a particular case

distinct from a typical case. Taylor v. State, 670 N.W.2d 584, 587 (Minn. 2003). If a

district court finds such circumstances exist, it may, but is not required to, depart from the

presumptive sentence. See Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775, 781 (Minn. App. 2013), rev.

denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 2014). The district court is not required to give an explanation

when it considers reasons for departure but nevertheless imposes a presumptive sentence.

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See State v. Musse, 981 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Minn. App. 2022), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 28,

2022). We will affirm a presumptive sentence if the record demonstrates that “the

sentencing court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information presented before

making a determination.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013)

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). “When the record contains

evidence of factors supporting departure, which could have been, but were not, considered

by the district court, we may remand for consideration of those factors.” Id. at 925-26. We

review a district court’s decision not to depart from the sentencing guidelines for an abuse

of discretion. State v. Oberg, 627 N.W.2d 721, 724 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn.

Aug. 22, 2001).

Hassan claims that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

a downward-dispositional departure, claiming his particular amenability to probation

provides a substantial and compelling reason to depart.

A dispositional departure modifies whether a prison sentence is stayed or executed.

Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 1.B.5.a (2022). “A dispositional departure typically focuses on

characteristics of the defendant that show whether the defendant is particularly suitable for

individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623

(Minn. 2016). Because dispositional departures are based on the characteristics of the

offender, the focus is on “several factors that can be relevant to determining if a defendant

is particularly amenable to probation, including ‘the defendant’s age, his prior record, his

remorse, his cooperation, his attitude while in court, and the support of friends and/or

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family.’” State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 310 (Minn. 2014) (quoting State v. Trog, 323

N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982)).

The memorandum accompanying Hassan’s departure motion opined that Hassan is

particularly amenable to probation. It noted Hassan’s young age at the time of the offense,

lack of criminal history, and community support as reasons to depart. The memorandum

addressed the concern that Hassan harbors sexist views of women, noting that he “grew

up . . . with very different culture gender-norms than in the United States.” The

memorandum opined that “sex offender treatment would provide education to modify” his

“sexist views of women.”

However, Hassan denied guilt during his interview as part of the presentence

investigation (PSI) and during his psychosexual evaluation. The PSI recommended an

executed guidelines sentence. The psychosexual evaluator observed that Hassan “appears

to harbor significant sexist views of women which likely supported his acting out

behaviors,” and opined that he “has a high need for services” because “he denies his offense

behavior and does not take responsibility for his actions.”

At the start of the sentencing hearing, the district court noted that it had received

and reviewed Hassan’s departure motion and memorandum, PSI, and psychosexual

evaluation. And, after allowing the state to make its argument, Hassan’s attorney provided

the district court with letters from Hassan’s mother and family friend. The district court

heard from A.T. who described struggling with depression and post-traumatic stress

disorder following the incident. Hassan also spoke at sentencing and apologized to A.T.

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Hassan disputed the claim that he holds sexist views towards women, noting that he has

three sisters, supports his family, and is an active member of his community.

The district court reiterated that it reviewed the PSI and “adopt[ed] the factual

statements contained in the . . . report.” The district court stated, “I’ve read everything

possible that I can about you to try to get a sense of what happened here.” While

acknowledging that Hassan apologized to A.T. at sentencing, the district court expressed

concern about his refusal to take responsibility for his actions. The district court denied

Hassan’s motion stating that it “can’t find that [Hassan is] particularly amenable to

treatment or probation.”

The record shows that the district court considered factors for and against departure

and, therefore, acted within its discretion by imposing a guidelines sentence. Johnson, 831

N.W.2d at 925.

Affirmed.

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