State of Minnesota v. Jeremy Jyrone White

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-0653

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeremy Jyrone White,
Appellant.

Filed April 28, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-6144

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Peter R. Marker, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jenna Yauch-Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Bond,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his convictions of attempted second-degree murder and first-

degree assault, arguing that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. And he

asserts additional claims in a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
 FACTS

In the early morning hours of October 19, 2022, appellant Jeremy Jyrone White

picked up H.B.—with whom he was romantically involved—from a friend’s house in

Bloomington. White and H.B. drove around the Twin Cities metro area for a few hours.

At some point, White asked H.B. to turn off the location data on her cell phone and give

the phone to him; H.B. complied. White and H.B. then began to argue about an unknown

matter.

As they argued, White drove into a St. Paul alley, pulled out a handgun, and shot

H.B. in the face. The bullet entered through H.B.’s left jaw and exited through her right

cheek. H.B. jumped out of White’s car and began screaming for help. White drove away,

taking H.B.’s cell phone with him.

H.B. began knocking on doors of surrounding residences in search of help.

Eventually, a resident called 911, reporting that she had heard a man and woman fighting

followed by a gun shot, and that the woman was now screaming, crying, and banging on

her front door. Officers responded and located H.B., who—despite her injury—informed

them that White shot her and took her cell phone. Police were unable to apprehend White

that evening but continued to investigate the incident.

Pursuant to a search warrant, police officers obtained cell-site-location information

(CSLI) for both White’s and H.B.’s cell phones. The officers then worked with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to use the CSLI to analyze the movement of White’s and

H.B.’s phones on the night of the shooting. The results aligned with H.B.’s account of

what happened.

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 Respondent State of Minnesota charged White with one count of attempted second-

degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2022), and one count of first-degree

assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.221, subd. 1 (2022). But White continued to evade

apprehension for several weeks. On November 10, he was finally located by the Missouri

State Patrol while traveling southbound through the state. When Missouri officers

attempted to apprehend him, White fled, leading officers on a high-speed chase that

reached 130 miles per hour. On December 22, White appeared in district court in

Minnesota and demanded a speedy trial, and a pretrial hearing was scheduled for January

18, 2023.

During the January 18 hearing, White’s public defender informed the district court

that she was “concerned about [her] ability to rationally consult” with White and requested

a Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01 competency evaluation. The district court ordered the

evaluation, noting its own observations of White and counsel’s request. The court also

determined that the evaluation was “good cause to continue” the trial.

On March 1, White appeared before the district court with a different public

defender and was found competent to stand trial. White renewed his demand for a speedy

trial, and a pretrial hearing was scheduled for later that month. At that pretrial hearing, the

district court, acting sua sponte, found good cause to continue White’s trial-management

conference to May 25 to allow the second public defender (the public defender) time to get

familiar with the case and prepare for trial.

The trial-management conference occurred as scheduled, and White’s trial was set

to begin five days later. But during those five intervening days, White retained private

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counsel. On the May 30 trial date, private counsel appeared with White and the district

court discharged the public defender. Private counsel moved for a continuance to allow

him adequate time to prepare; White agreed to suspend his speedy-trial demand

accordingly. The district court granted the motion and scheduled a trial-management

conference for July 6, with trial set to begin on July 10.

On July 6, private counsel requested another continuance to accommodate personal

health issues and the availability of a potential defense witness. Again, White agreed to

suspend his speedy-trial demand in line with private counsel’s request. The district court

continued the trial, setting another trial-management conference for August 17.

At that conference, private counsel informed the district court that he had disclosed

a witness and noticed the prosecution of a new alibi defense after the deadline set by the

court in its pretrial order. This late disclosure prompted the state to seek a continuance to

allow it to investigate the newly disclosed alibi witness’s testimony. The district court

granted the continuance, reasoning that—although it had “every basis” to preclude the alibi

witness on procedural grounds—there was good cause to delay the trial to ensure White

the most effective defense.

On September 23, the state moved to disqualify private counsel due to multiple

conflicts of interest. Following a hearing, the district court granted the state’s motion.

On October 2—the date the trial had been scheduled to begin—White reasserted his

speedy-trial demand. The district court reappointed the public defender and scheduled a

follow-up hearing for October 16. At that hearing, the public defender advised the court

that White was “really concerned” about his mental health and safety while residing in jail.

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He reported that White was taken off his antidepressant and denied other mental-health

services. The district court acknowledged these concerns and asked the public defender to

monitor the situation and keep the court informed.

White’s five-day jury trial began on November 28. H.B. testified consistent with

the facts presented above. The state presented the CSLI evidence through an FBI agent,

and testimony from several police officers who were involved in the investigation and

apprehension of White. White did not testify or present any evidence. The jury found

White guilty as charged, and the district court sentenced him to 240 months in prison on

the attempted second-degree murder offense.

White appeals.

DECISION

I. White’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the

right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6. This right protects

defendants against “undue and oppressive” pretrial incarceration, minimizes the “anxiety

and concern accompanying public accusation,” and prevents lengthy delays that impair

“the ability of the accused to defend himself.” State v. Jones, 977 N.W.2d 177, 190 (Minn.

2022) (quotations omitted). Whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated

is a constitutional question, which we review de novo. Id.

When assessing a speedy-trial claim, we apply the four-factor balancing test first

articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311,

315 (Minn. 1999). These factors include (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the

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delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of their right, and (4) any prejudice to the defendant.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. No single Barker factor is necessary or sufficient to establish a

speedy-trial violation. State v. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d 230, 245 (Minn. 2021). Instead, we

balance the factors within the context of the case to determine whether the delay

“endanger[ed] the values that the right to a speedy trial protects.” State v. Paige, 977

N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

White argues that consideration of the Barker factors demonstrates that his right to

a speedy trial was violated. We analyze each factor in turn.

Length of Delay

The first Barker factor serves as a “triggering mechanism which determines whether

further review is necessary.” Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315 (quotation omitted). A delay of

more than 60 days after a defendant’s speedy-trial demand is presumptively prejudicial.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09(b); Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 246. If the length of a delay is

presumptively prejudicial, the remaining Barker factors must be analyzed. Windish, 590

N.W.2d at 315-16. That is the situation here. White first demanded a speedy trial on

December 22, 2022. His trial began on November 28, 2023—341 days later. Even

accounting for the 80-day period during which White suspended his speedy-trial demand,

the nearly nine-month trial delay warrants analysis of the remaining Barker factors.

Reason for Delay

The second Barker factor requires us to determine which party was responsible for

the delay and assign weight to the delay based upon the reason for its occurrence. Paige,

977 N.W.2d at 838. Deliberate efforts to hamper the defense are weighed heavily against

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the state, while state negligence and delay related to court congestion weigh less heavily.

Jones, 977 N.W.2d at 191. When good cause exists for a delay, it is not held against the

state. Id. And when a delay is caused by a defendant’s actions or the actions of defense

counsel, there is no speedy-trial violation. Id.

White contends that this factor is neutral because “some delay is attributable to each

party.” The state asserts that all delays are attributable to the defense. We agree with the

state.

The first delay was occasioned by defense counsel’s request for a rule 20.01

competency evaluation. White concedes that this delay is attributable to him but argues it

should not weigh against him. In doing so, he urges us to apply to defense delays the

principle that good-cause delays are not weighed against the state. See id. We decline this

invitation. The state—not the defendant—bears the burden of bringing a case to trial.

Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 244. Accordingly, defendants are free to prioritize time-consuming

pretrial matters as they wish. Barker, 407 U.S. at 526-28. Indeed, “[d]elay is not an

uncommon defense tactic.” Id. at 521. On this record, the delay caused by defense

counsel’s competency-evaluation motion weighs against White. See State v. Hahn, 799

N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2011) (providing that “[d]elays caused by defense motions

generally weigh against the defendant”), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011); see also State

v. DeRosier, 695 N.W.2d 97, 109 (Minn. 2005) (applying that principle to a motion for a

“Rule 20 evaluation”).

The second delay occurred when the district court ordered a 56-day continuance

after appointing the second public defender. While the public defender did not expressly

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request a continuance, they advised the district court that the discovery in the case was “on

the larger side,” and they had “limited time to review it.” In other words, the district court’s

decision to continue the trial was premised on the public defender’s expressed lack of

preparedness for trial. This delay weighs against White.

The third delay followed the state’s motion for a continuance to allow it to

investigate the late-disclosed alibi witness. 1 The prosecutor explained that they were

otherwise prepared for trial but were “ethically obligated” to investigate potentially

exculpatory evidence. Although the state sought this continuance, its need to do so was

based entirely upon the actions of private counsel. This delay weighs against White, not

the state.

The final delay occurred when the state moved to disqualify private counsel due to

multiple conflicts of interest. Specifically, the state had learned that (1) private counsel

had agreed to represent the victim, H.B., in a separate matter; and (2) recorded jail phone

calls between White and the alibi witness strongly suggested that the witness only agreed

to testify because private counsel had promised to represent her in another matter. Again,

while the state’s motion prompted the delay, the motion was made necessary by private

counsel’s actions and rooted in good-cause concern for ensuring that White receive a fair

trial. This delay weighs against White, not the state.

1
We do not analyze the delay caused by the two continuances sought by and granted to
private counsel because White affirmatively suspended his speedy-trial demand during that
time.

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 In short, our review of the record demonstrates that actions taken by the defense

were the catalyst for every delay in bringing White’s case to trial. Accordingly, the reason-

for-the-delay factor weighs against White.

Assertion of the Right

The third Barker factor asks whether and how the defendant asserted their right to

a speedy trial. Mikell, 960 N.W.2d at 252. “The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial

right is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being

deprived of the right.” State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 629 (Minn. 2017) (quotation

omitted). But in assessing whether a speedy-trial demand is “serious,” we may consider

accompanying actions that “undermine the ability for the trial to occur.” Paige, 977

N.W.2d at 841 (quotation omitted).

White asserted his speedy-trial right on December 22, 2022, and reiterated it several

times thereafter. But he also opted to change counsel several times, including retaining

private defense counsel just five days before his trial was set to begin. On balance, this

factor weighs only slightly in White’s favor.

Prejudice

When analyzing the fourth Barker factor—whether the delay prejudiced the

defendant—we consider three interests: “(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration;

(2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility

that the defense will be impaired.” Jones, 977 N.W.2d at 192 (quotation omitted).

Impairment of the defense is the “most serious” interest. Id. (quotation omitted).

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 White argues that his pretrial incarceration was oppressive and caused him

unusually severe anxiety and concern because he was denied antidepressant medication

and mental-health treatment. This argument is unavailing.

It is true that White experienced a lengthy pretrial incarceration. But, as described

above, all of the trial delays were ultimately attributable to him and any resulting prejudice

is therefore “ameliorated by [his] acquiescence to the delay.” Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 632;

see also State v. Johnson, 498 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Minn. 1993) (“[A]lthough [a] defendant’s

incarceration might have been unfortunate, the fact that much of the responsibility for that

situation was his own weighs against his claim.”). And White has not demonstrated that

the alleged denial of mental-health services was the result of trial delay. Osorio, 891

N.W.2d at 631 (stating that the prejudice a defendant suffers must be due to the delay). To

the contrary, the record reflects that White links the alleged treatment denial to a

preexisting conflict with jail staff that arose during a prior, unrelated period of

incarceration. 2 And, most importantly, White does not even claim that the most significant

indicator of prejudice—impairment of his defense—is present here. Overall, the prejudice

factor weighs against White.

Balancing

Upon balancing all four Barker factors, we conclude that the nine-month trial delay

did not “endanger the values that the right to a speedy trial protects.” Paige, 977 N.W.2d

at 843. Every trial delay—even those requested by the state—was occasioned by defense

2
We note White first raised the treatment issue 43 days before trial commenced.

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counsel’s actions, and White’s defense was not thereby impaired. On this record, we

discern no violation of White’s right to a speedy trial.

II. White’s pro se arguments do not warrant relief.

In a pro se supplemental brief, White argues that (1) the district court erred by

ordering a competency evaluation, (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) the

district court abused its discretion in its evidentiary determinations, and (4) there is

insufficient evidence in the record to support his convictions. We address each argument

in turn.

Rule 20.01 Competency Evaluation

Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(a), requires defense counsel to request a

competency evaluation if they, “at any time before or after conviction, doubt[] the

defendant’s competency to proceed.” A defendant is competent if they have “sufficient

present ability to consult with [their] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding and ha[ve] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings

against [them].” Bonga v. State, 797 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).

If the district court determines there is a reasonable basis to doubt the defendant’s

competency, it must order a competency evaluation. Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(b).

White asserts that the district court erred when it ordered a rule 20.01 competency

evaluation because there was “no factual basis for [its] decision.” 3 The record defeats this

3
White also argues that defense counsel’s rule 20.01 motion constitutes “attorney
abandonment.” This argument is unavailing. Defense counsel must make a competency
motion if they have any doubt regarding a defendant’s competency to stand trial. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 20.01, subd. 3(a).

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argument. As noted above, the district court’s findings cite both defense counsel’s

expressed concerns and the court’s own observations of White’s behavior as the factual

basis for ordering a competency evaluation. See Bonga, 797 N.W.2d at 720 (providing that

a defendant’s “irrational behavior” and demeanor are relevant to the court’s determination

of whether there is reason to doubt their competency). We see no error by the district court.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that

“(1) [their] counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and

(2) that a reasonable probability exists that the outcome would have been different but for

counsel’s errors.” Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013) (describing the test

first laid out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). We presume that

counsel’s performance was reasonable, id., and generally do not review ineffective-

assistance claims that are based on trial strategy, State v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 592

(Minn. 2017).

White contends that his public defender was ineffective because they (1) failed to

call his alibi witness and (2) did not obtain an expert to rebut the state’s CSLI evidence. 4

Because both arguments relate to trial strategy, they are not legally sufficient to satisfy the

Strickland requirements. See Allwine v. State, 994 N.W.2d 528, 538 (Minn. 2023)

4
Additionally, White contends that the record is inadequate and requests a remand to
present evidence of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. While postconviction proceedings
are generally a better forum for determining ineffective-assistance claims, when, as here,
the record is sufficient to decide the claim, we may do so. Andersen, 830 N.W.2d at 10.

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(providing that the choice of “which witnesses to call, including expert witnesses, is trial

strategy”).

Moreover, White has not demonstrated that any claimed ineffectiveness impacted

the outcome of the trial. As described above, White’s alibi witness had significant

credibility issues. And the presentation of an additional expert would “merely call into

question the certainty” of the state’s expert’s findings; it would not affirmatively prove

them wrong. Id. at 539. This record, including the strong evidence of White’s guilt,

persuades us that there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome of White’s trial

would have been different absent defense counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

Evidentiary Rulings

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v. Ali,

855 N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). White argues that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting evidence of a previous domestic incident between White and H.B.

and the CSLI evidence. 5 Neither argument persuades us to reverse.

First, the record shows that the district court admitted evidence of the prior domestic

incident as relationship evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024), which states that

“[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct . . .

is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

5
White also challenges the district court’s admission of evidence that he led the arresting
officers on a high-speed chase. Because he does not provide supporting legal authority, he
has forfeited this argument. See State v. Montano, 956 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2021)
(“Claims in a pro se supplemental brief that are unsupported by either arguments or citation
to legal authority are forfeited.” (quotation omitted)).

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prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury.” White’s assertion that evidence

of his prior domestic incident involving H.B. constitutes inadmissible “propensity

evidence” under Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) is unpersuasive. Minnesota law clearly

distinguishes evidence offered under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), and

the challenged evidence falls squarely within the parameters of Minn. Stat. § 634.20. State

v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 159-61 (Minn. 2004) (explaining that the “history of the

relationship between an accused and a [domestic-violence] victim” differs from “collateral

[other-acts] evidence” (quotation omitted)); see also State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 639

(Minn. 2006) (noting the “distinctions” made between rule 404(b) evidence and section

634.20 evidence).

Second, White’s argument that the CSLI evidence is inadmissible because the FBI

agent was not “proven to be an expert,” and the evidence lacked foundational reliability, is

not convincing. The sufficiency of an expert’s qualifications rests within the “sound

discretion” of the district court. State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. 1990). Here,

the FBI agent testified at length regarding his training, experience, and credentials related

to CSLI analysis. See Minn. R. Evid. 702 (providing that an expert may be qualified based

upon “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education”). We are likewise not

persuaded that the district court abused its discretion with respect to foundational

reliability. In State v. Berry, the supreme court concluded that CSLI evidence had

foundational reliability because there was extensive FBI-agent testimony explaining why

cell-phone companies maintain CSLI, describing how CSLI analysis works, and

underscoring its reliability. 982 N.W.2d 746, 757 (Minn. 2022). This is exactly the type

14
of testimony that was offered here. Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion related

to the CSLI evidence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The test we apply to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence depends on whether

the state relied on direct or circumstantial evidence at trial. State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142,

155 (Minn. 2024). Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or

observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v.

Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence

is “evidence from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did

not exist.” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). When an

“element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone,” the direct-evidence standard

governs. Id. at 500 (quoting State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016)). The direct-

evidence standard requires us to determine “whether the evidence, when viewed in a light

most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict

which they did.” See Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40.

White suggests that the circumstantial-evidence standard applies to his conviction

and that the evidence was insufficient to establish an “inference of guilt.” We disagree.

H.B.’s testimony that White assaulted her and shot her in the face is direct evidence that—

by itself—establishes all the elements of the charged offenses. White’s sufficiency-of-the-

evidence argument fails.

In sum, we conclude that none of White’s pro se arguments entitle him to relief.

Affirmed.

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