State of Minnesota v. Frank John Rakowiecki

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1040

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Frank John Rakowiecki,
Appellant.

Filed March 23, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Jesson, Judge *

Isanti County District Court
File No. 30-CR-23-310

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Tara Reese Duginske, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey Edblad, Isanti County Attorney, Cambridge, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ede, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Jesson, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JESSON, Judge

In this appeal from convictions for first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC)

following a jury trial, we must decide whether the district court abused its discretion when

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
it denied appellant Frank John Rakowiecki’s motion to introduce alternative-perpetrator

evidence related to his brother, John Meryl Rakowiecki, who is the victim’s father (father).

The jury found Rakowiecki guilty as charged of three incidents of sexual penetration of his

niece, a child under 13. We also must determine whether the district court erred in

sentencing by imposing three sentences, related to the three counts of CSC, for a sentence

totaling 648 months.

We conclude that the district court appropriately rejected Rakowiecki’s proposed

alternative-perpetrator evidence and correctly imposed three sentences. But because the

648-month sentence exaggerates his criminality, we reverse and remand with instructions

to impose a sentence not exceeding 504 months. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand.

FACTS

In early 2023, the Chisago County Sheriff’s office was notified of a child-protection

matter involving allegations of sexual abuse against a child perpetrated by her father. The

office conducted a forensic interview of three of father’s daughters. M.R., the complainant

in this case, reported that her uncle, Frank John Rakowiecki, was “way more abusive” than

father. M.R. stated that Rakowiecki raped her about “once a week” for two years while he

was babysitting her, beginning in September 2015. M.R. also stated that father had once

groped her breasts over her clothing and engaged in sexual talk with her sometime in 2020

or 2021. During their respective interviews, M.R.’s sisters stated that father had sexually

abused them at the family home while sitting on the “special spot” on a couch in the family

living room.

2
 Following the interview, respondent State of Minnesota charged Rakowiecki with

three counts of first-degree CSC arising from the allegations that he sexually abused M.R.

over a period of two years, when she was 10 to 11 years old. The charged acts focused on

allegations that, while babysitting M.R. and her siblings at the family home, Rakowiecki

“forced his penis into [M.R.’s] vagina” in her bedroom. The state’s initial complaint

included a single count of first-degree CSC but later amended the complaint to add two

other counts of first-degree CSC. The complaint was amended a second time to clarify the

timing of each count.

Central to this appeal are two pretrial motions by Rakowiecki, both denied by the

district court. First, Rakowiecki moved to admit evidence of an alternative perpetrator.

Rakowiecki’s theory was that father sexually abused M.R. and that evidence of father’s

abuse of M.R. would support an alternative-perpetrator defense. Rakowiecki’s proffer

included evidence that father had sexually assaulted M.R. several years after the events in

this case, was in the family home during the time frame relevant to M.R.’s allegations and

had allegedly sexually abused M.R.’s sisters. 1 The district court denied Rakowiecki’s

motion.

Rakowiecki also moved to sever the charges, which the state opposed. The state

argued that Rakowiecki would not be prejudiced by joining the three charged offenses,

resulting in a single trial, because the evidence of each offense would be admissible at each

1
In a separate court file, the state charged father with three counts of first-degree CSC and
three counts of second-degree CSC for the sexual abuse he allegedly perpetrated against
M.R. and two of her sisters.

3
trial. The state did not argue that the counts constituted a single behavioral incident. The

district court denied Rakowiecki’s motion because, for joinder purposes, it concluded that

the three offenses are related under Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.03,

subdivision 3(1). The district court also concluded that trying the three charges together

would not prejudice Rakowiecki.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury returned guilty verdicts, and the district

court entered judgments of conviction for each count. At sentencing, the district court

imposed a top-of-the-box 2 guidelines sentence on count 1, and presumptive guidelines

sentences on counts 2 and 3, totaling 648 months. 3

Rakowiecki appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
Rakowiecki’s proffer did not inherently tend to connect father with the
charged offenses.

The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions both

guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to present a complete defense. U.S. Const. amend.

XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. This right includes “the right to introduce evidence showing

that an alternative perpetrator committed the crime.” State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114, 123

(Minn. 2024). The purpose of this evidence is to create a reasonable doubt that the

2
“Each box in the Sentencing Guidelines grid contains a presumptive range and a
presumptive duration. The longest and shortest terms in the presumptive range are
commonly called the ‘top of the box’ and the ‘bottom of the box.’” State v. Morgan, 968
N.W.2d 25, 28 n.2 (Minn. 2021) (citations omitted).
3
The jury found aggravating factors on two of the counts but the district court declined to
increase the guidelines sentences “because of the overall length of the sentence.”

4
defendant is guilty of the crime charged. State v. Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d 584, 590 (Minn.

2009).

But the right to present a complete defense “is not absolute.” Id. at 589. In

State v. Hawkins, the supreme court established a two-step process to determine the

admissibility of alternative perpetrator evidence. 260 N.W.2d 150, 158-59 (Minn. 1977).

We review a district court’s ruling, following this process, for an abuse of discretion.

Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 123.

Our review begins with the first step in the Hawkins test, under which a defendant

must offer foundational evidence that has “an inherent tendency to connect” the alternative

perpetrator with the charged conduct. 260 N.W.2d at 159 (emphasis added) (quotation

omitted). To undertake this analysis, we “focus on the evidence, not the assertions,

contained in the proffer.” State v. Woodard, 942 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Minn. 2020) (quotation

omitted). And we view the proffer as a whole. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 124.

Rakowiecki’s proffer included the following evidence: father “was present in the

home where M.R. lived during the time in which she alleges [Rakowiecki] was the

perpetrator”; the allegations made by M.R.’s sisters about what father did to them “are

similar to what [Rakowiecki] is alleged to have done to M.R., including removing the

victim’s clothing, rubbing their bodies with his hands, and inserting hands or his penis into

their vaginas”; father “moved from one daughter to another and continued to use the same

types of tactics to abuse his daughters, such as having them sit in the ‘special spot’ on the

couch”; and M.R. alleged that father “sexually abuse[d] her and described over the clothing

touching of her breasts.”

5
 The district court denied Rakowiecki’s request to present broad statements from

M.R. and her sisters about father’s conduct. The court noted that Rakowiecki’s proffer

“undoubtedly present[s] facts tending to prove [father’s] guilt for the offenses with which

he is charged in [a separate court file], and contain similarities regarding time, location,

and manner of the abuse [M.R.] alleges [Rakowiecki] committed against her.” But the

district court concluded that the proffered evidence fell “short of showing an inherent

connection between [father] and this offense” because “other than the allegations against

[father] involving the other children there is no evidence connecting him to the acts alleged

to have been committed by . . . Rakowiecki in this case.” To provide context for M.R.’s

allegations against Rakowiecki arising from the forensic interview, however, the state was

allowed to present evidence that father lived in the same house as M.R. between September

2015 and January 2017 and M.R.’s allegations that father groped her breasts and engaged

in inappropriate sexual talk with her.

This conclusion—that there was no inherent tendency to connect father to the

charged offenses here—was not an abuse of discretion. Certainly, Rakowiecki offered

evidence that father was present in the home during the same time frame in which M.R.

alleges Rakowiecki abused her. But father’s presence at the home during the same time is

not enough to inherently connect him to the commission of the charged offense.

See Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 591-92 (concluding that evidence of the alternative

perpetrator’s location at the scene of the crime connected him only to the location of the

crime, not the crime itself); State v. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d 211, 227 (Minn. 2010) (stating

that the defendant’s evidence “at most established that [the alleged alternative perpetrator]

6
was present [at the crime scene] at some point on the night of the charged crime” but did

not connect him to the crime).

And while the allegations made by M.R.’s sisters about what father did to them are,

as the district court noted, “similar to what [Rakowiecki] is alleged to have done to M.R.,”

that father allegedly committed a similar crime against M.R.’s sisters—complainants in a

different court file—does not inherently tend to connect father to the commission of this

charged offense against M.R. See Huff v. State, 698 N.W.2d 430, 440-41 (Minn. 2005)

(affirming a district court’s decision to exclude evidence that an alleged alternative

perpetrator murdered a different person, but not the victim, because the murders were

dissimilar). And, aside from Rakowiecki’s assertions, there is no evidence that father

sexually assaulted M.R. in the same way and at the same time that father is alleged to have

sexually assaulted M.R.’s sisters. See Woodard, 942 N.W.2d at 142 (stating that analysis

of alternative-perpetrator evidence focuses on the proffered evidence, not assertions).

Nor does the allegation that father sexually abused M.R at a later time in a different

house inherently connect him to the charges here. M.R. alleged during her forensic

interview and her testimony at trial that father perpetrated two incidents of sexual abuse

against her: he groped her breasts over her clothing and engaged in sexual talk with her.

Both incidents allegedly occurred in 2020 or 2021 when the family lived with a family

friend. In contrast, the conduct underlying the charges against Rakowiecki occurred

between September 2015 and January 2017, making Rakowiecki’s proffer appear like a

“bare assertion[] as to what could have happened” based on father’s later conduct. See

State v. Nissalke, 801 N.W.2d 82, 102 (Minn. 2011). Accordingly, the district court’s

7
determination that Rakowiecki’s proffer on this point “[fell] short of showing an inherent

connection between [father] and this offense” was not an abuse of discretion.

In sum, while the district court acknowledged the overlap and similarities between

father’s conduct against M.R.’s sisters, it concluded that the timing of events weakened

Rakowiecki’s proffer and ultimately did not inherently tend to connect him to the

commission of the charged offenses here. This conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

As explained above, neither father’s presence in the same location during the time that

M.R. was abused, nor M.R.’s sisters’ allegations against father, considered as a whole,

inherently tend to connect father to the commission of this crime against M.R. 4

To convince us otherwise, Rakowiecki contends that the district court applied the

incorrect standard for admitting alternative-perpetrator evidence by requiring him to

conclusively prove that father sexually abused M.R., rather than establish that the proffered

evidence has an inherent tendency to connect father to the charged crime. He points to the

following phrase, where the court stated that the proffered evidence, especially evidence

indicating that Rakowiecki and father “lived under the same roof with the alleged

victims, . . . do not ‘create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt’ as they do nothing

4
We note that the state maintained at oral argument before this court that we may consider
all the evidence—not just what is included in the proffer—in assessing whether
Rakowiecki’s proffer inherently tends to connect father to the charged offenses. This
would include M.R.’s consistent identification of Rakowiecki as the perpetrator.
Rakowiecki disagrees, arguing that we are limited to the proffer presented in the district
court. We need not resolve this issue here. The district court did not rely on M.R.’s
consistent identification in deciding the motion below. But certainly, were we to agree
with the state, M.R.’s consistent identification of Rakowiecki as the perpetrator would
further buttress the district court’s decision here.

8
to negate the specific claims advanced by [M.R.].” (Emphasis added.) Rakowiecki argues

that, with this sentence, the district court elevated the standard. The interpretation of our

caselaw is a legal question that we review de novo. State v. Robideau, 796 N.W.2d 147,

150 (Minn. 2011).

Certainly, the purpose of introducing evidence of an alternative perpetrator is not to

establish the alternative perpetrator’s guilt. The purpose is to “create a reasonable doubt

as to the defendant’s guilt.” Atkinson, 774 N.W.2d at 590. But upon reading the district

court’s order in its entirety, we conclude that the district court cited and applied the correct

standard. The district court quoted Atkinson when it observed that Rakowiecki’s proffer

does “not ‘create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.’” The district court

continued by stating that the proffer does “nothing to negate the specific claims advanced

by [M.R.].” See id. We acknowledge that, read in isolation, the district court’s phrasing—

that Rakowiecki’s proffer does “not ‘create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt’”

because the evidence “do[es] nothing to negate the specific claims advanced by [M.R.]”—

suggests the district court required Rakowiecki to prove the connection between father and

the charged conduct. See Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 124 (stating that the first step of the Hawkins

test does not demand “a definite and unequivocal connection to the commission of the

crime”). But, in reading the whole of the district court’s order, we conclude that the district

court properly applied the Hawkins “inherent tendency to connect” standard. The court

observed that there are “similarities regarding time, location, and manner” between father’s

conduct (for which he was charged in a separate court file) and the conduct M.R. alleged

against Rakowiecki. But the district court concluded that, to find an inherent connection

9
between father and the charged offenses, the proffer rested on assumptions about M.R.’s

credibility that were not part of the proffer. In sum the district court applied the correct

standard under the first step in Hawkins.

Rakowiecki also argues that the proffered evidence is stronger than the

circumstantial proffered evidence accepted as sufficient proof in Carbo, and as a result, his

proffer meets the first step of the Hawkins “inherent tendency” test. He points out that

here, father did not just think about sexually assaulting M.R.; “he actually sexually

assaulted M.R. (and her sisters).” But this case is distinguishable from Carbo. In Carbo,

a first-degree murder case, the proffer contained evidence directly tying the alleged

alternative perpetrator to the underlying conduct in the charged offense. The alleged

alternative perpetrator was with the victim the night that she was killed; an eyewitness

observed a vehicle (driven by the alleged alternative perpetrator) near where the victim was

found around the time the victim’s screams were heard; hair consistent with the alleged

alternative perpetrator was found in the victim’s bedroom, where her body was found; and

the alleged alternative perpetrator uttered a semi-inculpatory statement about killing the

victim (that he “often wondered whether he woke up in the middle of the night and killed

[the victim]”). Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 123-24. The supreme court concluded that this

evidence “clearly has an inherent tendency to connect [the alleged alternative perpetrator]

with the actual commission of the crime” under Hawkins. Id. at 124 (quotation omitted).

But here, Rakowiecki’s proffer does not connect father to the charged conduct.

Instead, Rakowiecki’s proffer seems to amount to other-acts or pattern evidence suggesting

that father is a bad person because he sexually abused M.R. years after the events in this

10
case, sexually abused M.R.’s sisters, and was present in the family home during the time

M.R. was sexually abused. Rakowiecki’s proffer does not include an eyewitness account

tying father to the charged offenses, forensic evidence linking father to the assaults against

M.R., or any inculpatory statements. Rather, the only overlap between this situation and

Carbo is that both alternative perpetrators were in close proximity to the victim (though

for differing reasons) when the conduct underlying the charged offenses occurred. See id.

And simply being present at a crime scene is insufficient to satisfy the first Hawkins step.

Troxel v. State, 875 N.W.2d 302, 308-09 (Minn. 2016). 5

Finally, at oral argument, Rakowiecki’s appellate counsel suggested this case was

analogous to Jenkins and State v. Ferguson, 804 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. 2011). Both cases

are distinguishable. In Ferguson, the proffer included the following: the alleged

alternative perpetrator had the same initials as the person identified as the perpetrator,

drove a car that was similar to the getaway car observed at the scene of the crime, shared

some physical similarities with the perpetrator, was listed as a contact on the victim’s

phone, and “was not in police custody on the date of the shooting.” 804 N.W.2d at 591.

The supreme court concluded that this proffer was sufficient because it placed the alleged

5In Carbo, the supreme court also emphasized that the concern over a “quagmire of matters
wholly collateral to the charged offense” was “conspicuously absent” there because the
alternative perpetrator was also an identified suspect with concrete links to the crime
(highlighted above). 6 N.W.3d at 125. That concern—of a mini-trial within the trial—is
present here because father is not a suspect with concrete links to this crime. Instead,
M.R.’s allegations against Rakowiecki originated from an investigation into allegations by
M.R.’s sisters against father. During the investigation, M.R. separately alleged that
Rakowiecki was “way more abusive” than father, and she has consistently identified
Rakowiecki as the assailant.

11
alternative perpetrator at the scene of the crime and also connected the alleged alternative

perpetrator to the victim and to the crime itself. Id. at 592. Here, Rakowiecki offered no

evidence tying father to these charged offenses against this victim. There is no evidence

that father was in M.R.’s bedroom, where the penetrations occurred; just that father lived

in the family home during the same period of time. Cf. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d at 124 (noting

that hair that could have come from the alternative perpetrator was found in the victim’s

bedroom, where the body was found). We are not convinced that Ferguson is sufficiently

analogous.

In Jenkins, the supreme court held that the district court did not err when it ruled

that the defendant’s proffer of an alternative perpetrator did not meet the Hawkins

foundational requirement. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 228. The defendant there sought to

present evidence of four alternative perpetrators. Id. at 224. Essentially, the proffered

evidence tying these alleged alternative perpetrators to the charged offense was that they

were each present at the scene of the crime at some point in time on the night the murders

occurred. Id. at 226-27. The supreme court held that this “evidence of mere presence does

not satisfy the foundational requirement.” Id. at 227. Rakowiecki’s argument seems to be

that his proffer contained more evidence than that presented in Jenkins. While it may be

true that Rakowiecki proffered more evidence than the defendant in Jenkins, Rakowiecki’s

proffer still distills down to two points: father was present in the family home during the

period M.R. alleges she was abused, and father sexually abused M.R.’s sisters during this

time period. Rakowiecki does not tie father’s general presence in the home to presence at

the scene of the crime, let alone presence during any of the penetration events.

12
 In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

determined that Rakowiecki did not satisfy the foundational requirement for the admission

of alternative-perpetrator evidence. And because Rakowiecki did not satisfy the first

Hawkins step, we need not consider the second step, as to whether the evidence in question

is admissible under the rules of evidence. Jenkins, 782 N.W.2d at 224. We therefore hold

that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to admit

Rakowiecki’s alternative-perpetrator evidence.

II. The district court did not err when it imposed three sentences.

Rakowiecki argues that the district court erred by imposing multiple sentences for

crimes committed during what the court earlier found, when denying his motion to sever

the charges, was a single behavioral incident. The district court was correct in its pretrial

analysis regarding what constituted a single behavioral incident, Rakowiecki contends, and

judicial estoppel should bar the district court from taking differing positions when deciding

the motion to sever and at sentencing.

Here, the district court, in denying the pretrial motion to sever, found that the three

offenses occurred during a single behavioral incident because they were allegedly

“perpetrated against the same minor victim in the same house within the same general

timeframe” rather than “wholly distinct acts which just happened to take place . . . under

nearly identical circumstances.” At sentencing, however, the district court imposed a

sentence for each offense. The district court explained that, after “receiving the entirety of

the evidence at trial and the verdicts of the jury, . . . the trial evidence

was . . . clear . . . . There was a first incident. There was a last incident. And there were a

13
number of incidents in between.” Regarding its pretrial decision not to sever the charges,

the district court stated that it “ha[d] a question about” the wisdom of the earlier decision.

Nevertheless, the district court imposed one sentence for each offense.

Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1 (2014), except under

circumstances that do not apply here, “if a person’s conduct constitutes more than one

offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only one of the

offenses.” The supreme court has explained that “the law generally prohibits multiple

sentences, even concurrent sentences, for two or more offenses that were committed as part

of a single behavioral incident.” State v. Bakken, 883 N.W.2d 264, 270 (Minn. 2016)

(quotation omitted). To decide if two intentional crimes constitute a single behavioral

incident, we evaluate the incident’s timing and location, and whether the conduct aimed to

achieve a single criminal objective. State v. Bauer, 792 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Minn. 2011).

We review de novo whether a sentence violates section 609.035, subdivision 1.

State v. Branch, 942 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Minn. 2020).

Rakowiecki argues that the three instances of conduct against M.R. constituted a

single behavioral incident and, because the district court stated as such for purposes of its

severance analysis, the district court should be judicially estopped from determining that

the three instances of conduct against M.R. constituted three behavioral incidents for

sentencing purposes. Rakowiecki’s trial counsel noted this issue to the district court. 6

6
While the state noted at oral argument before this court that it did not argue during the
pretrial severance hearing that the three offenses constituted a single behavioral incident,
it certainly supported the court’s denial of the severance motion premised on that analysis.

14
 We are not convinced that the district court, at sentencing, is bound by its earlier

decision to join the charged offenses. Certainly, we acknowledge that, as part of the

severance analysis, the district court must determine whether the charged offenses are

related and that this analysis is the same inquiry used to decide whether to impose multiple

sentences. State v. Ross, 732 N.W.2d 274, 278 (Minn. 2007). But we find our recent

decision in State v. Danberry persuasive on the judicial-estoppel issue. 7 No. A22-0856,

2023 WL 5838826, at *9-10 (Minn. App. Sept. 11, 2023), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16,

2024).

In Danberry, we concluded that the district court did not err by imposing multiple

sentences after the district court denied Danberry’s request to sever charges but then

sentenced him on each charge. Id. at *9-10. Danberry argued that the district court’s

pretrial severance ruling should prevent the district court from imposing multiple

sentences. Id. at *9. We rejected Danberry’s argument for two reasons. First, we declined

to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Id. Judicial estoppel “is intended to prevent a

party from assuming inconsistent or contradictory positions during the course of a lawsuit.”

State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 507 (Minn. 2005). We stated that, because the

supreme court has declined to adopt the judicial-estoppel doctrine, we declined to do so

there as well. Danberry, 2023 WL 5838826, at *9

7
We cite this case for its persuasive authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd.
1(c) (stating that nonprecedential decisions are not binding authority but may be cited as
persuasive authority).

15
(citing Ryan Contracting Co. v. O’Neill & Murphy, LLP, 883 N.W.2d 236, 248-49

(Minn. 2016)). Likewise, we decline to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel here. 8

Second, we stated that “our caselaw has consistently recognized that multiple,

separate incidents of criminal sexual conduct involving a single victim are separate

behavioral incidents under section 609.035,” subdivision 1. Id. The same is true here:

Rakowiecki was convicted of multiple, separate incidents of criminal sexual conduct

against M.R. Consistent with our precedent, we conclude that the criminal sexual conduct

in this case does not constitute a single behavioral incident requiring one sentence under

Minnesota Statutes section 609.035, subdivision 1. See State v. Barthman, 938 N.W.2d

257, 265-67 (Minn. 2020) (holding that two instances of child sexual abuse against the

same victim that occurred at separate times were not part of a single behavioral incident);

State v. Suhon, 742 N.W.2d 16, 24 (Minn. App. 2007) (concluding that three offenses of

child sexual abuse that occurred “in many different rooms and at different times” did not

constitute a single behavioral incident), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008).

To convince us otherwise, Rakowiecki argues that Danberry does not authorize the

district court to impose multiple sentences. First, he argues that Danberry is

nonprecedential and therefore not binding. While our nonprecedential cases are not

8
We note that Rakowiecki contends that the district court is judicially estopped by its
pretrial severance decision. But the doctrine of judicial estoppel appears applicable only
to decisions made by parties, not the district court itself. See, e.g., Thoresen v. State, 965
N.W.2d 295, 308-09 (Minn. 2021) (declining to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel but
presenting three conditions that must be met, two involving the party’s positions). Because
we decline to adopt the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we need not address this potential
issue here.

16
binding, we cite Danberry for its persuasive value. Second, Rakowiecki contends that the

record in Danberry is distinct from the record here. In Danberry, the district court denied

Danberry’s motion to sever because joining the charges would not prejudice him.

Danberry, 2023 WL 5838826, at *9. According to Danberry, the district court’s decision

was an “implicit[]” finding that “all the charged offenses were related.” Id. But we did

not delve into the nuances of the district court’s severance order in Danberry. Rather, in

upholding the district court’s decision to impose multiple sentences, we declined to adopt

the doctrine of judicial estoppel and relied on our caselaw authorizing the imposition of

multiple sentences for multiple, separate incidents of criminal sexual conduct against a

single victim. Id.

Finally, Rakowiecki contends that our rejection of the judicial-estoppel doctrine in

Danberry was incorrect because, according to Rakowiecki, we already adopted the

doctrine, pointing to Bauer v. Blackduck Ambulance Association, 614 N.W.2d 747, 749-

50 (Minn. App. 2000), and Port Authority of City of St. Paul v. Harstad, 531 N.W.2d 496,

500 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. June 14, 1995).

We acknowledge that we applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel nearly 30 years

ago in the cases Rakowiecki cited. But the supreme court, as recently as 2021, expressly

stated that the doctrine has not yet been adopted. Thoresen, 965 N.W.2d at 308; see also

State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 462 (Minn. 1999) (declining to adopt the judicial estoppel

doctrine). In cases following Bauer and Harstad, but before Thoresen, we have also noted

that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has not been recognized in Minnesota and that it is not

this court’s “mandate to adopt it.” State v. Hahn, 799 N.W.2d 25, 39 (Minn. App. 2011),

17
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 24, 2011). Accordingly, we decline to recognize the doctrine of

judicial estoppel. 9

III. The district court abused its discretion by imposing a 648-month sentence.

Rakowiecki finally argues that his 648-month aggregate sentence is unreasonable,

noting that it is, as of the date of briefing, the longest authorized by any Minnesota appellate

decision in a case involving sexual offenses against a child. 10

We will interfere with the district court’s decision on sentencing only when the

sentence is “disproportionate to the offense or unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the

defendant’s conduct.” State v. Ali, 895 N.W.2d 237, 247 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted);

see also Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2(b) (2024) (permitting appellate review of sentence

to determine if it is “unreasonable” or “excessive”). We review the district court’s

sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303, 322

(Minn. 2009). In assessing whether the district court abused its discretion, we “look to past

sentences received by other offenders,” id., and rely on our “collective, collegial experience

in reviewing a large number of criminal appeals from all the judicial districts,”

State v. Norton, 328 N.W.2d 142, 146-47 (Minn. 1982).

9
We note, however, that Rakowiecki’s counsel highlighted the change in the district
court’s reasoning between its severance decision before trial and at sentencing. But the
district court did not explain what changed, except that “the entirety of the evidence at trial
and the verdicts of the jury” made it clear to the district court that there were three separate
incidents. While we hold that the district court is not necessarily bound, at sentencing, by
its earlier single-behavioral-incident analysis, it would behoove district courts to explain
in more detail what occurred at trial that caused it to depart from the earlier decision.
10
The state has not identified a case in which a longer sentence was affirmed on appeal.
Nor has our research revealed one.

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 Here, the district court imposed consecutive sentences resulting in an aggregate term

of 648 months (54 years). Rakowiecki was sentenced to 360 months for count 1, with a

criminal-history score of 9; a permissive consecutive sentence of 144 months for count 2,

with a criminal-history score of zero; and a permissive consecutive sentence of 144 months

for count 3, with a criminal-history score of zero.

We acknowledge the depth and seriousness of the offenses committed by

Rakowiecki and the consequential harm inflicted on his niece, M.R. But we conclude that

the aggregate 648-month sentence is excessive when measured against sentences imposed

in comparable cases involving a single victim and multiple instances of criminal sexual

conduct.

Recent and earlier decisions provide useful benchmarks. We recently concluded, in

Danberry, that an aggregate sentence of 712 months for four counts of first-degree CSC

was excessive and remanded with instructions to impose an aggregate sentence of 504

months’ imprisonment. State v. Danberry, No. A25-0925, 2025 WL 3511906, at *3 (Minn.

App. Dec. 8, 2025). In Doan-Hanson, we concluded that an aggregate sentence of 688

months (over 57 years) for four first-degree CSC convictions was excessive and

exaggerated the criminality of the defendant’s conduct. State v. Doan-Hanson, No. A24-

1214, 2025 WL 1924036, at *9-10 (Minn. App. July 14, 2025). We reversed and remanded

for resentencing. Id. at *10. In Barthman, we determined that a 704-month aggregate

sentence for multiple convictions of CSC was excessive and remanded for resentencing.

State v. Barthman, No. A21-1121, 2022 WL 1073225, at *5 (Minn. App. Apr. 11, 2022),

rev. denied (Minn. June 29, 2022). In Perleberg, which involved repeated assaults over

19
hundreds of occasions, we affirmed an aggregate sentence of 432 months for six CSC

convictions. State v. Perleberg, 736 N.W.2d 703, 704-05 (Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied

(Minn. Oct. 16, 2007). And in Kellogg, we reversed as excessive a 717-month (nearly 60

years) aggregate sentence for six CSC convictions and other child sexual abuse convictions

and modified it to 537 months. State v. Kellogg, No. A03-0016, 2004 WL 422703, at *4-5

(Minn. App. Mar. 9, 2004), rev. denied (Minn. May 18, 2004).

With these benchmark cases in mind, we conclude that Rakowiecki’s 648-month

sentence for three first-degree CSC convictions is unreasonable. The district court’s

sentencing yields an aggregate term that exceeds sentences deemed excessive in other cases

involving a single child victim and is thus out of line with our earlier decisions. Further,

decisions like Perleberg, which included hundreds of assaults across many years, and

Suhon, which concerned over 800 acts of sexual abuse against a single child victim, also

support our conclusion that Rakowiecki’s sentence is excessive. Perleberg, 736 N.W.2d at

704-05; Suhon, 742 N.W.2d at 25. In both of those cases, the length of abuse against the

child victim was longer than that perpetrated against M.R.

Horrible acts were perpetrated against M.R. Nevertheless, in light of the decisions

discussed above, we reverse Rakowiecki’s sentences and remand for the imposition of

sentences as follows: 360 months on count 1, the top of the presumptive guidelines

sentencing range using a criminal-history score of nine points; a concurrent sentence of

144 months on count 2, using a criminal-history score of zero points; and a consecutive

sentence of 144 months on count 3, using a criminal-history score of zero points, for a total

20
of no more than 504 months. We conclude these sentences are the appropriate upper limit

of the district court’s sentencing discretion on remand.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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