State of Minnesota v. Romaine Anthony Reid

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1128

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Romaine Anthony Reid,
Appellant.

Filed January 26, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Stearns County District Court
File No. 73-CR-23-1368

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janelle P. Kendall, Stearns County Attorney, Kyle R. Triggs, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SMITH, TRACY M., Judge

In this appeal from the final judgment of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual

assault following a stay for postconviction proceedings, appellant Romaine Anthony Reid

makes two arguments. Reid argues, first, that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was
invalid because it was not knowing and intelligent and that he is therefore entitled to a new

trial. Second, Reid argues, in the alternative, that the district court erred by denying him a

postconviction evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because

he alleged specific facts that, if taken as true, could entitle him to relief. We reject Reid’s

argument that the waiver of his jury-trial right was invalid, but we agree that the district

court erred by denying an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further postconviction

proceedings.

FACTS

In February 2023, Reid was charged by respondent State of Minnesota with one

count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct against A.O. in violation of Minnesota

Statutes section 609.342(d) (2022).

At his first-appearance hearing, Reid was not represented by counsel because his

public defender application was denied on the ground that he was not financially eligible.

During the hearing, the district court identified the charge and explained that it was a

felony-level offense that carried a maximum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment and/or a

$40,000 fine. Reid confirmed that he had received a copy of the state’s complaint and

declined the district court’s offer to read the complaint aloud. Also during the hearing, the

prosecutor stated that the presumptive sentence was imprisonment for 156 months or “even

more if Blakely is found for multiple forms of penetration.” On February 21, 2023, the state

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filed a Blakely motion seeking an upward aggravated sentencing departure based on the

alleged aggravating factor of multiple forms of penetration. 1

By February 23, 2023, when Reid appeared for a domestic-violence-court-

eligibility hearing, Reid had retained counsel. At that hearing, the prosecutor again noted

that Reid faced a presumptive prison sentence of 156 months for criminal sexual conduct

and could be facing “well and above the 156 months” based on an alleged aggravating

factor. In April 2023, the state filed an amended Blakely motion to include the additional

alleged aggravating factor that the victim was particularly vulnerable because her children

were present at the residence during the offense.

On February 5, 2024, in a hearing the day before the scheduled trial in the matter

(the waiver hearing), Reid orally waived his right to a jury trial and the district court

accepted his waiver. An excerpt of the waiver colloquy appears in Section I below. The

matter proceeded to a bench trial, and the district court found Reid guilty of first-degree

criminal sexual conduct. The district court imposed a prison sentence of 240 months—an

upward durational departure from the presumptive guidelines sentence of 144 months. The

district court relied on its findings of two aggravating factors: multiple forms of

penetration, and A.O. was particularly vulnerable at the time of the incident because her

children were in the home.

1
Under Blakely v. Washington, a criminal defendant has the right to a jury trial on
aggravating facts asserted to support an upward sentencing departure. 542 U.S. 296, 303
(2004); see also State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn. 2004) (applying Blakely
in Minnesota).

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 Reid appealed, and we granted his motion to stay the appeal while he filed a petition

for postconviction relief in the district court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In

his petition, Reid claimed that he provided his trial counsel with audio recordings

establishing that A.O. admitted that the sex was consensual, that A.O. told the police that

the sex was nonconsensual only because that was the story the police wanted, and that A.O.

did not want to pursue charges against Reid. Reid alleged that his trial counsel did not

review, investigate, or introduce this evidence at trial, constituting ineffective assistance of

counsel. The postconviction court denied Reid’s request for an evidentiary hearing. We

then reinstated this appeal.

DECISION

I. The district court did not err by accepting Reid’s jury-trial waiver as valid.

Reid argues that the district court erred by not obtaining a valid jury-trial waiver

before proceeding to a court trial. He contends that the district court failed to ensure that

Reid’s waiver was knowing and intelligent—specifically, that Reid understood both the

charge and the potential punishment that he faced. The argument is unconvincing.

A district court’s decision to accept a jury-trial waiver is reviewed de novo. State v.

Kuhlmann, 806 N.W.2d 844, 848-49 (Minn. 2011). The United States and Minnesota

Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to a jury trial. U.S. Const. art. III,

§ 2, cl. 3, amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. 1, § 6. For a jury-trial waiver to be constitutionally

valid, it must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v. Ross, 472 N.W.2d 651, 653

(Minn. 1991).

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 Pursuant to the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure,

[A] defendant, with the approval of the court, may waive a jury
trial on the issue of guilt provided that the defendant does so
personally, in writing or on the record in open court, after being
advised by the court of the right to trial by jury, and after
having had an opportunity to consult with counsel.

Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(2)(a). When a defendant looks to waive their right to a

jury trial on the record in court, the district court must accompany its advisory with

searching questions to ensure the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. State v.

Osborne, 715 N.W.2d 436, 442 (Minn. 2006). The defendant does not need to have

exhaustive knowledge of the strategic benefits and disadvantages of a jury trial compared

to a bench trial. Ross, 472 N.W.2d at 654. In determining whether a jury-trial waiver is

valid, the focus is on whether a defendant understands the basic elements of a jury trial. Id.

During the waiver hearing, both parties’ counsel asked questions regarding Reid’s

understanding of the right to a jury trial and the waiver as follows:

[REID’S COUNSEL]: Mr. Reid, have you had enough time to
speak with me about your case?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: Do you believe that I’ve represented
your interests and fully advised you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: Do you understand that you have an
absolute right to a trial before a jury of 12 people and if you
were to choose the jury trial all 12 jurors would have to agree
that you were guilty in order for you to be convicted, correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: You also know that you have the
option to waive this right to a jury trial and instead have your
trial before a judge sitting alone?

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: And if you were to waive jury trial then
[the] judge could decide all issues of guilt or innocence, right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: There was quite a few times over the
last (inaudible) that you’re comfortable with your decision to
waive your right to a jury trial?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[REID’S COUNSEL]: Is that sufficient, Judge?
THE COURT: [Counsel for the state], do you have any
follow-up?
[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: I do.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: Sir, have you talked to your
attorney about the fact that there is what is filed in this case as
– referred to as Blakely?
[REID’S COUNSEL]: And, sir, if I could remind you those
are the special questions that the judge would have to answer
if your sentence were to be enhanced. That’s called Blakely.
Do you remember talking about that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: And you understand that you have
the right to a jury determination not only on whether you’re
guilty or not guilty of the crime itself but also on whether or
not those additional factors would apply. Do you understand
that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: And you understand that by
waiving your right to a jury trial you’re going to ask the Court
not only to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty but
in fact if the Court were to find you guilty on whether or not
those questions of yes or no would apply to what I was
referring to as Blakely. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: Do you need any more time to
talk to your attorney about the rights that you’re giving up
today?

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 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma’am.

[COUNSEL FOR STATE]: And knowing that the Court
would make that determination on both the factual question if
you’re found guilty and whether or not you’re guilty or not
guilty you still want to waive your right to a jury trial here
today?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.

Reid argues that this colloquy did not satisfy the requirements for a knowing and

intelligent waiver because it did not include discussion of the charges and the possible

punishment that he faced. The state counters that the colloquy was sufficient under the

supreme court’s decision in Ross and because Reid was informed of both pieces of

information.

In Ross, the supreme court concluded that the defendant had made a valid waiver of

his right to a jury trial when he was advised that he had a right to a jury of 12 persons and

he confirmed that he had had adequate time to discuss the matter with counsel. Id. The

supreme court decided that Ross “was advised by the court of the essential characteristics

of a jury trial,” even though he was not told that the jury’s decision had to be unanimous.

Id. Here, Reid was advised of his right to a trial by jury of 12 people, that the 12 jurors

would have to agree to find him guilty, and that, if he waived his right, the judge would

decide all issues of guilt or innocence. Reid also acknowledged that he had had enough

time to speak with his lawyer about his case. And, because the state was seeking an

aggravated sentence, Reid also was asked and acknowledged that he was waiving a right

to have a jury finding aggravating facts. As the state argues, this case is analogous to Ross.

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 Reid argues, though, that a valid waiver required a specific discussion of the

criminal charge that he was facing and the possible sentence that he could receive if he

were convicted. Reid relies on State v. Little, 851 N.W.2d 878 (Minn. 2014). In Little, the

supreme court held that, when a new charge is added after a defendant waives their right

to a jury trial, the district court must obtain a renewed waiver. 851 N.W.2d at 883. Reid

urges us to interpret Little to mean that a jury-trial waiver must always include the specific

charge and the punishment that the defendant faces. The argument is unpersuasive.

In Little, the defendant was initially charged with third- and fourth-degree criminal

sexual conduct. Id. at 880. He waived his right to a jury trial following a colloquy that

established his understanding that he was entitled to a trial by 12 jurors who had to be

convinced of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, that he understood that his case would

be heard only by the judge, and that he had consulted with his attorney about waiving his

right. Id. at 881. Thereafter, the state amended the complaint to add a charge of first-degree

criminal sexual conduct. Id. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, and, after his conviction,

Little appealed, arguing that his right to a jury trial was violated because he had not

personally waived the right to a jury trial after the new charge was added. Id. The supreme

court agreed. It explained that “a jury-trial waiver only applies to issues formed at the time

of the waiver and not to issues added after the waiver.” Id. at 882. It reasoned that, in

deciding whether to waive their jury-trial right, defendants consider the merits of their case,

trial strategy, and the likely sentence and that, to do so, they have to know the charges that

they face. Id. at 883. The supreme court concluded: “[W]hen the State amends the

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complaint after a defendant’s jury-trial waiver, the district court must obtain a renewed

waiver of the defendant’s right to a jury trial on the newly added charge.” Id.

Here, there was no change to Reid’s charge or to his potential punishment after he

waived his jury-trial right. Reid’s first-degree criminal sexual conduct charge was the only

charge that he faced, and it remained consistent from the original complaint. So, too, did

the presumptive sentence and the possibility of an enhanced sentence based on aggravating

factors. There were no “issues added” after the waiver. The rule from Little does not apply.

Moreover, at the time of his waiver, Reid had the information he needed to consider

the merits of his case, trial strategy, and a potential sentence. The record demonstrates that

Reid was aware of the charge and potential punishment that he faced. At the waiver

hearing, Reid acknowledged that he had had enough time to consult with counsel and that

he believed his lawyer had fully advised him about his case. And a year earlier, during his

first-appearance hearing, when he was not yet represented by counsel, Reid was informed

of the charge he faced, was provided a copy of the complaint, and was informed that he

faced a presumptive prison sentence of 156 months, which could increase based on an

aggravating factor. In addition, during another hearing that was held shortly thereafter—

by which time Reid was represented by counsel—the prosecutor discussed the presumptive

sentence and the possibility of an enhancement based on an aggravating factor. On this

record, at the time of his waiver, Reid understood the basic elements of a jury trial,

including how those elements related to his charge and potential sentence. As such, the

district court did not err by accepting Reid’s jury-trial waiver as valid.

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II. The district court abused its discretion by summarily denying Reid’s
postconviction petition.

Reid argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his

postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing because he alleged facts that, if true,

may entitle him to postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellate courts review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, including

the denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State,

784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010). A district court “abuses its discretion when its decision

is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.”

Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). Appellate courts review a district court’s

legal conclusions de novo. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013).

When a defendant files a petition for postconviction relief, the district court must

hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the

proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.

§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2018). A district court “may summarily deny a petition without holding

an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient

to grant the requested relief.” Davis v. State, 15 N.W.3d 635, 642 (Minn. 2025) (quotation

omitted). In determining whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the district court must

consider “the facts alleged in the petition as true and construe[] them in the light most

favorable to the petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018). Any

doubts about whether an evidentiary hearing should be conducted is to be resolved in favor

of the defendant seeking relief. Opsahl v. State, 677 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004). But

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the allegations in a postconviction petition “must be more than bald assertions or

conclusory allegations without factual support.” Berg v. State, 403 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn.

App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. 1987).

Reid’s postconviction petition was based on his claim that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. To obtain an evidentiary hearing on his claim, Reid was required to

allege facts that, if proved by a preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the two-prong

Strickland test. See Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Minn. 2012) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Strickland requires a defendant to show “that counsel’s

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and, if it did, “that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Davis, 15 N.W.3d at 644.

In his postconviction petition, Reid alleged:

Prior to trial, [Reid] provided his attorney with multiple
pieces of evidence, including audio, video, emails, and text
messages that supported his defense that A.O.’s testimony was
not credible and that the sex was consensual. This evidence
included, but was not limited to, recorded statements by A.O.
where she admitted: (1) that she was not claiming that the sex
was nonconsensual; (2) that she only told police that the sex
was nonconsensual because that is the story that police wanted;
and (3) that she did not want to pursue charges against [Reid].
[Reid’s] attorney did not present any of this evidence at
[Reid’s] trial.

Reid also alleged that “his attorney did not review the evidence, investigate the evidence,

or introduce the evidence at trial.”

The district court denied Reid’s petition without an evidentiary hearing because it

determined that Reid’s allegations were, quoting the supreme court’s decision in Fratzke

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v. State, “too generalized to warrant an evidentiary hearing.” 450 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Minn.

1990). The district court took issue with the fact that Reid did not provide the dates

associated with the alleged evidence, did not attach any of that evidence to the petition, and

did not present “any specific allegations of showing that evidence to his attorney or how

his attorney reacted to that evidence.” The district court concluded that Reid’s claims were

bare allegations, stating “if they sufficed to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing,

no evidence at all would be required to get a hearing.”

Reid argues that the district court erred, and we agree. While the allegations in his

petition were certainly minimal, they did allege that there are recorded statements in which

A.O. denied that the sex was nonconsensual, that Reid shared the recordings with his

lawyer before trial, and that his lawyer did not take action to review, investigate, or

introduce the recordings. It is true that the petition did not include dates, but it did allege

that the recordings were shared with counsel before trial. And, although the alleged

recorded statements themselves were not produced, the petition did allege who made the

statements and what the contents of the statements were. When the petition’s allegations

are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to Reid, the petition does not

“conclusively show” that Reid is entitled to no relief under Strickland. Minn. Stat.

§ 590.04, subd. 1.

To convince us otherwise, the state points to Fratzke and Berg. In Fratzke, the

supreme court affirmed the summary denial of a postconviction petition alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel when “[t]he petition allege[ed] that trial counsel did not

properly handle hearsay and inconsistent testimony and ‘coached’ the accomplice, who

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testified for the state.” 450 N.W.2d at 102. The supreme court concluded that these

allegations—made without any further elaboration by the defendant or his postconviction

counsel—were “too generalized” to require an evidentiary hearing. Id. Here, in contrast,

Reid alleged that he provided his trial counsel recordings of statements by the complainant

that undermine that the sex was nonconsensual and that his counsel did not act on them.

This was a factual allegation that, taken as true, could satisfy the Strickland standard.

Berg, too, is different from this case. In Berg, we affirmed the district court’s

summary denial of a petition for postconviction relief because the petition relied on vague

and conclusory allegations that the defendant’s attorneys persuaded cellmates to steal his

legal notes without identifying the cellmates, describing the notes taken, or explaining how

the alleged misconduct affected his conviction. 403 N.W.2d at 318. Here, Reid’s petition

was more specific in detailing that the evidence was in the form of audio recordings and

describing the contents.

In sum, we conclude that the district erred by summarily denying Reid’s petition for

postconviction relief. We therefore reverse that decision and remand for an evidentiary

hearing.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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