State of Minnesota v. Justice King Whitelaw

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1376

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justice King Whitelaw,
Appellant.

Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Sherburne County District Court
File No. 71-CR-22-1032

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Dawn R. Nyhus, Sherburne County Attorney, George R. Kennedy, Assistant County
Attorney, Elk River, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Laura G. Heinrich, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Bond,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BOND, Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for theft, appellant argues that

the evidence is insufficient to prove that he intentionally and without claim of right
withdrew $25,000 from his former partner’s bank account and that the bank owned the

funds. Alternatively, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his petition for postconviction relief seeking a new trial based on ineffective

assistance of counsel without an evidentiary hearing. Because the evidence is sufficient to

sustain appellant’s conviction and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

appellant’s postconviction petition, we affirm.

FACTS

In August 2022, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Justice King

Whitelaw with felony theft in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), for

taking and retaining money from his former partner’s bank account. The following

evidence was received at Whitelaw’s jury trial.

Whitelaw and J.W. began dating in December 2021. Soon after, Whitelaw moved

into J.W.’s home and J.W. added Whitelaw to the deed of his house and the title of his car.

In February 2022, J.W. added Whitelaw as a joint-account holder on J.W.’s Old National

Bank checking account. On March 18, J.W. opened an account at Minnco Credit Union.

When J.W. opened the Minnco account, he authorized Whitelaw to be a debit-card holder

but did not make Whitelaw a joint-account holder because he wanted to limit Whitelaw’s

access to the money in the Minnco account. Shortly after opening the Minnco account,

J.W. transferred $35,000 from the Old National account to the Minnco account.

On March 29, Whitelaw met with a Minnco employee to sign a member-services

agreement giving Whitelaw debit-card-holder status. Whitelaw wanted to be added as an

account holder, but the employee told him that J.W. had only authorized Whitelaw to be a

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debit-card holder. The Minnco employee told Whitelaw that he had a $750 daily limit for

ATM withdrawals and a $1,500 daily limit for point-of-sale transactions. The Minnco

employee went over these restrictions three times and starred and circled these limitations

on the member-services agreement, which Whitelaw signed. The employee testified that

Whitelaw did not have any questions about the paperwork and, although Whitelaw was on

his cellphone and appeared distracted during their meeting, he said, “[m]m-hmm, mm-

hmm, yeah,” indicating that he understood.

By April 8, J.W. and Whitelaw had ended their relationship. That day, Whitelaw

withdrew the entire balance from the Old National account. Whitelaw then went to the

Minnco drive-up window and asked a teller how much money he could withdraw from

J.W.’s account. The teller asked Whitelaw to come inside the bank to process his request.

Once inside, Whitelaw provided his identification and filled out a withdrawal slip

requesting $25,000 in cash, for the purpose of buying a vehicle. The teller checked

Minnco’s online system and, finding no restrictions on Whitelaw’s ability to withdraw

funds from J.W.’s account, provided the cash to Whitelaw.

Later that day, J.W. received a text message from Whitelaw and a notification from

Minnco of the withdrawal. J.W. testified that, in the text message, Whitelaw told him that

“he feels half of everything is his and he’s going to take it.” When J.W. informed Minnco’s

branch manager that Whitelaw was not supposed to have access to that much money, the

branch manager realized that Minnco’s computer system erroneously listed Whitelaw as

an authorized signer with no withdrawal limits on J.W.’s account. The branch manager

called Whitelaw and requested that Whitelaw return the $25,000 to Minnco, explaining

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that he was not entitled to the money because “[t]he cash withdrawal that you got from

[Minnco] was not supposed to happen. You weren’t authorized to be able to get that

money.” J.W. also called Whitelaw and told him that he needed to return the money.

Whitelaw retained the money, refusing to return it to J.W. or Minnco. Minnco reimbursed

J.W. $25,000 and the bank manager testified that, in so doing, Minnco “suffered the loss”

of the $25,000.

The police investigator testified that, based on what he learned from J.W. and the

branch manager, he believed Whitelaw “was aware that he took money he was not entitled

to.” The investigator also testified that, because Minnco reimbursed $25,000 to J.W.,

Minnco “became the victim[]” of the theft. The final jury instructions identified Minnco

as the owner of the money Whitelaw allegedly took or retained.

The jury found Whitelaw guilty. The district court granted Whitelaw’s motion for

a downward dispositional departure and sentenced him to five years of probation with 19

months stayed and 120 days in jail. After Whitelaw filed a direct appeal, this court granted

Whitelaw’s motion to stay the appeal and remand to the district court for postconviction

proceedings. On remand, Whitelaw filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing he

received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The district court denied Whitelaw’s

petition without an evidentiary hearing. This court then dissolved the stay and reinstated

the appeal.

This appeal follows.

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 DECISION

I. The evidence is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Whitelaw
committed theft by taking or retaining the money in the Minnco account.

Whitelaw argues that his conviction should be reversed because the state’s evidence

fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft. In determining whether

the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we “carefully examine the record to

determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn from them would permit

the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin, 887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn.

2016) (quotation omitted). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict

and assume the fact-finder believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved contrary

evidence. Id.

Due process requires the state to prove every element of a charged crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d

361, 366 (Minn. 1988); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. To

convict Whitelaw of theft, the state was required to prove that he “intentionally and without

claim of right [took], use[d], transfer[red], conceal[ed] or retain[ed] possession of movable

property of another without the other’s consent and with intent to deprive the owner

permanently of possession of the property.” Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1).

“‘Intentionally’ means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result

specified or believes that the act performed by the actor, if successful, will cause that

result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(3) (2020). Additionally, “the actor must have

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knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make the actor’s conduct criminal and

which are set forth after the word ‘intentionally.’” Id.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

conviction, our standard of review depends on whether the state relied on direct or

circumstantial evidence to prove the offense. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn.

2018). Direct evidence is “evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation

and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895

N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence

from which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.”

Id. (quotation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to

prove a fact that is not required with direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501

(Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted).

Whitelaw challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on two elements. First,

Whitelaw argues that the state failed to prove that he intentionally took or retained funds

without a claim of right. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). The supreme court has

defined “claim of right” to mean that a person has a reasonable belief of license or

permission. See State v. Brechon, 352 N.W.2d 745, 748 (Minn. 1984) (analyzing meaning

of “claim of right” in trespass statute); State v. Cubbage, No. A04-1411, 2005 WL 468640,

at *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 1, 2005) (applying Brechon’s claim-of-right analysis to theft

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statute), rev. denied (Minn. May 25, 2005). 1 “If the defendant has a claim of right, he lacks

the criminal intent which is the gravamen of the offense.” Brechon, 352 N.W.2d at 749.

“Because intent involves a state of mind, it is generally established

circumstantially.” State v. Pederson, 840 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Minn. App. 2013); see also

State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 422 (Minn. 2007) (stating that a defendant’s state of mind

is “generally proved circumstantially—by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words

and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances” (quotation omitted)). We agree

with the parties that the circumstantial-evidence standard of review applies to the

sufficiency of the evidence that Whitelaw acted intentionally and without claim of right.

Second, Whitelaw argues that the state failed to prove that Minnco was the “owner”

of the money that Whitelaw took or retained from J.W.’s account. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52,

subd. 2(a)(1). The parties dispute the standard that applies to our review of the evidence

proving the “ownership” element. We assume without deciding that this element relies on

circumstantial evidence and, accordingly, apply the circumstantial-evidence standard of

review to both contested elements.

Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of review, we first identify the

circumstances proved, “defer[ring] to the [fact-finder’s] acceptance of the proof of [the]

circumstances and rejection of evidence in the record that conflicted with the circumstances

proved by the State.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013) (quotation

omitted). This means that “we consider only those circumstances that are consistent with

1
We cite nonprecedential opinions for their persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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the verdict.” Id. at 599. Next, we independently determine whether the circumstances

proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that

of guilt, giving “no deference to the fact finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.”

Id. (quotation omitted). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view

of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude

beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer,

788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). When evaluating the inferences

that may be drawn from the circumstances proved, reviewing courts do not “analyze and

parse each fact in a piecemeal fashion to conclude that a hypothesis is reasonable” and may

not set aside a verdict based on speculation. State v. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d 145, 150

(Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted).

Intentionally and Without Claim of Right

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the circumstances

proved relevant to whether Whitelaw knew he lacked a claim of right to take or retain the

money from the Minnco account are as follows. Shortly after J.W. and Whitelaw began

dating, J.W. added Whitelaw to the deed of his house and to the title of his car, and made

Whitelaw a joint-account holder of his Old National Bank account. In March 2022, J.W.

opened an individual bank account at Minnco and made Whitelaw a debit-card holder on

the account. When Whitelaw signed a member-services agreement giving him debit-card-

holder status on the Minnco account, the Minnco employee told him that, as a debit-card

holder, Whitelaw had a daily ATM withdrawal limit of $750 and a daily point-of-sale limit

of $1,500. The employee starred and circled these restrictions on the member-services

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agreement, which Whitelaw signed. Whitelaw was distracted and on his phone during the

meeting but also gave the teller verbal cues he understood what she was saying, such as

saying, “[m]m-hmm, mm-hmm, yeah.”

In late March, J.W. moved a large sum of money from his Old National Bank

account, an account to which Whitelaw had unlimited access, to the Minnco account. On

April 8, after the relationship had ended, Whitelaw emptied the Old National Bank account.

That same day, Whitelaw went to the Minnco drive-through window and asked the teller

how much money he could withdraw through the window. After being directed to come

into the bank, Whitelaw provided his identification, filled out a withdrawal slip, and

requested $25,000 in cash for the purpose of buying a vehicle. Because of a computer

error, Minnco’s online system did not show any restrictions on Whitelaw’s ability to take

funds out of J.W.’s account and the teller gave Whitelaw $25,000 in cash. Later, the branch

manager asked Whitelaw to return the money, telling him he was not “authorized to be able

to get that money.” J.W. also called Whitelaw and asked him to return the money.

Whitelaw did not return the money.

We conclude that, viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with

the rational hypothesis that Whitelaw took or retained the money in the Minnco account

intentionally and without a claim of right and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis

other than guilt. Whitelaw argues that the circumstances proved support a reasonable

inference that, although he knew he had ATM and point-of-sale limitations, he did not

know he was limited in the amount he could withdraw at the bank. Whitelaw points out

that he was a joint-account holder on the Old National account, which had no withdrawal

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restrictions, and he was on the deed to the house and the title to the car. Whitelaw also

asserts that his retention of the money after the branch manager and J.W. asked him to

return it “does not turn his conduct into a knowing criminal act” because the branch

manager did not explain why Whitelaw needed to return the money and Minnco “never

sent a demand letter” to Whitelaw.

In determining the reasonableness of inferences, we must consider the

circumstances proved not in isolation, but as a whole. Colgrove, 996 N.W.2d at 150;

Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. Whitelaw’s alternate hypothesis is not reasonable in light of

the circumstances proved as a whole. The circumstances proved include that, before

April 8, J.W. took steps to limit Whitelaw’s access to his finances by moving money from

the Old National account to the Minnco account, an individual account where Whitelaw

was a debit-card holder rather than a joint-account holder. The bank had informed

Whitelaw about his limited debit-card-holder status and withdrawal limits. Significantly,

when Whitelaw withdrew $25,000 from J.W.’s Minnco account, Whitelaw and J.W. were

no longer in a relationship. Immediately before withdrawing money from the Minnco

account, Whitelaw withdrew all the money from J.W.’s Old National Bank account.

Whitelaw refused to return the money he took from the Minnco account, even after being

told by Minnco and J.W. that the cash withdrawal he received “was not supposed to

happen” because he “[wasn’t] authorized to be able to get that money.” These

circumstances proved are inconsistent with any reasonable inference that Whitelaw

believed he had a claim of right to retain the money he took from the Minnco account.

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 Viewed in their entirety, the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational

hypothesis that Whitelaw took or retained the money in the Minnco account intentionally

and without a claim of right and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.

Ownership

Whitelaw challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on a second element, arguing

that the state failed to prove that Minnco, the identified victim, owned the money he took

or retained. See Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). The state argues that, although “the

money Whitelaw withdrew from J.W.’s account belonged to J.W., [Whitelaw] ended up

retaining money that belonged to Minnco Credit Union after it reimbursed J.W. and told

Whitelaw to return the money.”

The relevant circumstances proved are that J.W. was the account holder of the

Minnco account and Whitelaw had debit-card-holder status. Whitelaw took $25,000 from

J.W.’s Minnco account on April 8. Both Minnco and J.W. informed Whitelaw that he did

not have authority to take that amount of money and told Whitelaw to return the money.

Whitelaw refused to return the money and Minnco later reimbursed J.W. $25,000. The

investigating officer testified that, by reimbursing J.W., Minnco became the victim of the

theft and the bank manager testified that Minnco ultimately “suffered the loss” of the

$25,000.

Viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved are consistent with the rational

hypothesis that Whitelaw took or retained money owned by Minnco and inconsistent with

any rational hypothesis other than guilt. Whitelaw emphasizes that J.W. was the owner of

the Minnco account when Whitelaw withdrew the money on April 8. But the theft statute

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prohibits taking or retaining property of another intentionally and without claim of right

“with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of the property.” Minn. Stat.

§ 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). While Whitelaw attacks the branch manager’s testimony that

Minnco became the victim when it reimbursed J.W. as a “conclusion” that fails to explain

“why Minnco was the owner of the funds when it was J.W.’s account,” the absence of

evidence is not a circumstance proved. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 473-74 (Minn.

App. 2019). Whitelaw fails to point to any circumstance proved supporting an inference

that Minnco, having become the victim of the theft upon reimbursing J.W. the $25,000

Whitelaw took from the account, was not the owner of the money that Whitelaw retained.

See State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 330 (Minn. 2010) (stating that a reviewing court

“will not overturn a conviction based on circumstantial evidence on the basis of mere

conjecture” (quotation omitted)); Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d at 480 (stating that a theory is

not “conjecture or speculation” when a defendant “points to evidence in the record that is

consistent with a rational theory other than guilt” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, the

circumstances proved are consistent with the rational hypothesis that Minnco owned the

money that Whitelaw took or retained and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other

than guilt.

Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Whitelaw’s theft conviction.

II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whitelaw’s
postconviction petition without a hearing.

Whitelaw contends that the district court erred in summarily denying his

postconviction petition, arguing that he alleged sufficient facts to show that he received

12
ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to investigate the

impact Whitelaw’s alleged traumatic brain injury (TBI) had on his ability to understand

that he was not entitled to take or retain the money in the Minnco account. We generally

review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Nicks, 831 N.W. 2d 493, 503 (Minn. 2013). But we “review

the denial of postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

de novo because such claims involve mixed questions of law and facts.” State v. Sardina-

Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 602 (Minn. 2024).

A person may petition for postconviction relief if a conviction violates their

constitutional or statutory rights. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2024). A postconviction

petitioner is entitled to a hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the

proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat.

§ 590.04, subd. 1 (2024). A district court must consider the facts alleged in the petition as

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Andersen v. State, 913

N.W.2d 417, 424 (Minn. 2018). “Although doubts about whether to conduct an evidentiary

hearing are resolved in favor of the petitioner, a district court need not hold a hearing when

the petitioner alleges facts that, if true, are legally insufficient to grant the requested relief.”

Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 602-03 (quotations omitted).

The right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed to all criminal defendants

by the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const.

art. I, § 6; Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). To be entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on a postconviction claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the

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petitioner “must allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would

satisfy the two-prong test” articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Chavez-Nelson v. State, 948 N.W.2d 665, 671

(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). Under Strickland, a petitioner must show that:

(1) counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and

(2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quotations omitted). “The reviewing

court considers the totality of the evidence . . . in making this determination[, and] need

not address both the performance and prejudice prongs if one is determinative.” State v.

Rhodes, 657 N.W.2d 823, 842 (Minn. 2003) (citation omitted).

We conclude that, even if Whitelaw proved the facts alleged in his petition by a

preponderance of the evidence, he would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law because

the facts alleged fail to establish a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would

have been different but for his counsel’s failure to investigate his TBI. First, as the district

court found, if Whitelaw’s trial counsel had sought to admit evidence that Whitelaw’s TBI

negated his intent, the district court likely would have properly excluded the evidence as a

diminished-capacity defense. See State v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 237 (Minn. 2010)

(“Minnesota does not recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity or diminished

responsibility.”); see also State v. Engel, 18 N.W.3d 540, 554 (Minn. App. 2025) (affirming

the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony “that the symptoms [defendant]

experienced on the date of the incident were consistent with his PTSD diagnosis and related

to his prior trauma responses” because such testimony would “lead the jury to consider

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whether [defendant] had diminished capacity, which is not a defense recognized in

Minnesota”), rev. granted (Minn. June 17, 2025).

Second, Whitelaw’s claim focuses on his ability to comprehend “in the moment

when he was distracted” during the March 29 Minnco meeting and he argues that evidence

of Whitelaw’s TBI “related to the element that the state had to prove—whether [Whitelaw]

knew he did not have a claim of right to the funds he withdrew.” But the jury heard

evidence that Whitelaw was distracted and not paying attention when the Minnco employee

explained during the March 29 meeting that he was a debit-card holder, not a joint-account

holder, and Whitelaw’s trial counsel highlighted this evidence during closing argument.

Third, as we have explained, the theft statute criminalizes the intentional taking or

retaining of property without claim of right. Minn. Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(a)(1). The

evidence at trial showed that Whitelaw retained the $25,000 he took from J.W.’s Minnco

account even after being told by J.W. and by Minnco that he was not authorized to

withdraw the money and needed to return it. Whitelaw’s postconviction petition does not

allege that the effects of a TBI impeded his ability to understand J.W. and Minnco when

they told him that he had improperly received the money due to the bank’s computer error,

he was not entitled to retain the money, and he needed to return it.

Because Whitelaw fails to establish that there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of his trial would have been different but for his counsel’s failure to investigate

his TBI, the district court did not abuse its discretion by summarily denying his petition.

See Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d at 602.

Affirmed.

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