Derek Alexander Knapp v. Commissioner of Public Safety

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1440

Derek Alexander Knapp, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Appellant.

Filed May 19, 2025
Reversed
Ede, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CV-23-859

Robert M. Christensen, Robert M. Christensen, P.L.C., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Nicholas R. Moen, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Ede, Judge; and Bentley, Judge.

SYLLABUS

1. Under Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App.

2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018), the Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety

satisfies their prima facie burden to establish that DataMaster DMT-G (DMT) evidentiary

breath-test results are admissible by introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator

administered the test and that diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was

in working order.
 2. It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT test

results are unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely on

evidence of an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that the

driver ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the

observation period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function

affected the test results.

OPINION

EDE, Judge

In this appeal from the district court’s order rescinding the revocation of

respondent’s driving privileges, appellant argues that the court abused its discretion by

determining that appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for the admission of

chemical breath-test results and by determining that the test results were unreliable.

Because appellant met their prima facie burden of reliability to introduce the test results

and respondent failed to provide evidence that the test was unreliable, we conclude that the

district court abused its discretion and therefore reverse.

FACTS

Appellant Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety revoked respondent Derek

Alexander Knapp’s driving privileges after law enforcement stopped Knapp’s car in

February 2023. Knapp challenged the license revocation. The undisputed facts summarized

below stem from the record of the implied-consent hearing and the district court’s order

rescinding revocation.

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Arrest, DataMaster DMT-G (DMT) Test, and Revocation

Law enforcement stopped Knapp to investigate an equipment violation, observed

indicia of impairment, and called a deputy to the scene to help investigate further. The

deputy asked Knapp to perform field sobriety tests. Knapp did not exhibit signs of

impairment during two of the tests, but did exhibit such signs during the horizontal gaze

nystagmus test. To confirm the signs of impairment that he had observed, the deputy

requested that Knapp complete a preliminary breath test, and Knapp agreed. The

preliminary breath test results showed that Knapp had an alcohol concentration of 0.09.

The deputy arrested Knapp and transported him to jail to conduct an evidentiary breath test

using the DMT device.

When the deputy and Knapp arrived at the jail, they were asked to wait in the

deputy’s squad car while another individual exited the intake area. During that time, the

deputy was sitting in the driver’s seat and Knapp was in the back passenger seat. There was

a Plexiglass partition between them that had an opening in the middle. As they waited to

enter the jail, the deputy asked Knapp to open his mouth and flip his tongue.

At midnight, while still in the squad car, the deputy read Knapp an advisory about

the breath test. At 12:02 a.m., the deputy finished reading the advisory. Afterward, the

deputy and Knapp walked into the intake area. Once inside, the deputy told a correctional

officer “that he wanted a test conducted at 12:15 [a.m.] on the dot, as the observation period

had commenced.” While Knapp was searched, the deputy walked over to a computer in the

same room as Knapp and the correctional officer.

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 The correctional officer administered the DMT test to Knapp. Before collecting a

breath sample from Knapp, the DMT testing device successfully completed a diagnostic

test, four air-blank tests, and a control-sample check. Knapp then provided two breath

samples. The breath test results reflected an alcohol concentration of 0.08. On that basis,

the commissioner revoked Knapp’s driving privileges. 1

Implied-Consent Hearing

Knapp petitioned the district court for judicial review of the revocation decision. He

requested that his driving privileges be reinstated because, among other things, the testing

method “was not valid or reliable, or the test result obtained was not accurately evaluated.” 2

At the implied-consent hearing, Knapp’s counsel clarified that Knapp was challenging the

admissibility of the DMT test results—not the validity of the test—and that Knapp’s

argument focused on the lack of an adequate observation period. The district court heard

testimony from the deputies involved in Knapp’s arrest and from the correctional officer

who administered the DMT test to Knapp.

The deputy testified as follows. Before a driver can submit to a DMT test, law

enforcement must conduct a 15-minute observation period. During this period, an officer

looks for burping, belching, or vomiting. The officer can perform a mouth check, during

which the officer opens the driver’s mouth to make sure there is no vomit or other

obstruction “in the mouth that could retain alcohol.” The officer must watch the driver the

1
See Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (2024).
2
See Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)(10) (2024).

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entire time and be within earshot of them. Officers are trained that they should not be

distracted during this time. The deputy did not recall the length of the pretest observation

period in this case, but noted that his training guidelines require a 15-minute observation

period “at minimum.” During the observation period, the deputy listened to Knapp and

looked at him through the rearview mirror. The deputy did not observe any burping,

belching, or vomiting.

The correctional officer testified that she is a trained and certified DMT operator.

She received her training from the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension and, on

the date of the incident, her DMT certification was current. The correctional officer stated

that the DMT testing device successfully completed a diagnostic test, four air-blank tests,

and a control-sample check. Following this testimony, the commissioner moved for the

admission of the DMT test results into evidence. Knapp’s counsel objected. The district

court acknowledged counsel’s objection, but still received the exhibit.

Post-Hearing Arguments and District Court Decision

After the hearing, both parties submitted written arguments to the district court.

Knapp asserted that the DMT test results were inadmissible because the commissioner had

“failed to establish a prima facie case that the test is reliable and that its administration

conformed to the procedures necessary to ensure reliability.” He maintained that the

deputy’s body-camera footage contradicts the deputy’s testimony that the deputy properly

observed Knapp during the 15-minute pretest observation period because the footage

shows that the deputy was not close enough to Knapp to detect burping or belching, that

Knapp’s face was shielded from the deputy’s view, and that the deputy could not see

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Knapp’s mouth because the deputy was facing away from Knapp “in the front seat of his

darkened squad car with a seat partition between.”

The commissioner contended that their prima facie burden to establish the

admissibility of the DMT test results was met. Quoting Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub.

Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262, 273 (Minn. App. 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2018), the

commissioner argued that caselaw requires only a showing “that a certified DMT operator

administered the test and that the diagnostic tests showed the DMT to be in working order.”

Because the commissioner introduced evidence to meet that standard, the commissioner

maintained that they had met their prima facie burden to establish that the DMT test results

were admissible. The commissioner also asserted that, even if there were a deficiency in

the observation period, such a deficiency would only go to the weight of the test-results

evidence, not its admissibility.

The district court filed an order rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s driving

privileges. Reasoning that the evidence about the observation period raised “questions as

to the reliability of the test results,” the district court determined that “[t]he record, which

includes video evidence, does not establish that [the deputy] continuously observed

[Knapp] for the duration of the observation period beginning at 12 a.m.” The district court

found that the deputy was facing away from Knapp in the squad car, that the deputy had to

rely on his rearview mirror, that the deputy’s perspective was limited by the Plexiglass

partition, and that the deputy’s location relative to Knapp was unclear after they entered

the jail. Based on those findings, the district court ruled that the commissioner had not

established that the deputy had been “able to observe burping or belching 15 minutes prior

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to the administration of the DMT test.” Determining that the commissioner had “failed to

demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the test conformed to the

procedures necessary to ensure reliability” and that the DMT test results were therefore

unreliable, the district court rescinded the revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges.

The commissioner appeals.

ISSUE

Did the district court abuse its discretion by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s

driving privileges?

ANALYSIS

The commissioner challenges the district court’s order rescinding the revocation of

Knapp’s driving privileges, arguing that the court abused its discretion because the

commissioner met their prima facie burden of establishing that the DMT test results are

admissible and because Knapp did not introduce any evidence to counter their prima facie

case.

“Rulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the district court

and will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Vondrachek, 906

N.W.2d at 272 (quoting In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings, 816 N.W.2d 525, 537

(Minn. 2012)). The abuse-of-discretion standard also applies to our review of the district

court’s substantive decision to rescind or sustain the revocation of driving privileges. See

Thordson v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 10 N.W.3d 310, 315 (Minn. App. 2024) (explaining

that, “in reviewing a district court’s compliance with statutory requirements and evaluation

of evidence—which presents a mixed question of law and fact—we have traditionally

7
applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review,” and that, “[b]ecause the abuse-of-

discretion standard encompasses correction of clearly erroneous findings of fact, this

approach is consistent with our clear-error review of a district court’s factual findings

underlying an implied-consent decision”); see also Short v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 422

N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 1988) (applying an abuse-of-discretion standard of review in

affirming a district court’s order sustaining the revocation of driving privileges). “A district

court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is

against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736

(Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted).

Before turning to the merits, we acknowledge the commissioner’s additional

contention that “[t]he district court abused its discretion in suppressing the DMT test

[results] because the district court’s decision was contrary to established law and

precedent.” (Emphasis added.) During the implied-consent hearing, however, the district

court “note[d] [Knapp’s] arguments . . . that [he was] challenging the observation period,

but . . . receive[d] [the DMT test results] into evidence.” (Emphasis added.) And in its

order, the district court reiterated that it had “received into evidence from [the

commissioner] . . . the DMT test [results].” (Emphasis added.) Thus, we do not analyze

whether the district court abused its discretion by “suppressing” the DMT test results

because the court did not do so—rather, it received the DMT test results into evidence.

That said, despite the district court’s repeated statements that it had received the

DMT test results into evidence, the court also wrote in its order that the commissioner had

“failed to demonstrate a prima facie case that the administration of the test conformed to

8
the procedures necessary to ensure reliability.” The district court’s reasoning appears to

have conflated the admissibility of the DMT test results with the court’s substantive

evaluation of the test results’ weight. In the interest of clarity and because the

commissioner’s prima facie burden relates to admissibility, we first (A) review whether the

district court abused its discretion in determining that the commissioner did not meet that

burden. We then review the district court’s substantive evaluation of the weight of the DMT

test-results evidence, analyzing (B) whether the court abused its discretion by determining

that the test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s

driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.

A. The district court abused its discretion in determining that the
commissioner had not met their prima facie burden to demonstrate the
admissibility of the DMT test results.

The commissioner argues that the district court abused its discretion in determining

that they failed to meet their prima facie burden of proving admissibility, despite evidence

that “the test was administered by a trained and certified DMT operator,” and evidence that

“the instrument was functioning correctly as demonstrated by its successful completion of

the diagnostic test.” Knapp responds that the district court correctly determined that the

commissioner did not meet the burden of proving that the test was reliable because the

deputy did not conduct a complete pretest observation period. We agree with the

commissioner.

“Admissibility of a chemical test result depends upon ‘prima facie proof of the

trustworthiness of the test’s administration.’” Vondrachek, 906 N.W.2d at 272 (quoting

State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 568 (Minn. 1977)). “The commissioner must make a prima

9
facie case that the test is reliable and that its administration in the particular instance

conformed to the procedure necessary to ensure reliability.” Id. (quotation omitted). In

Vondrachek, we reaffirmed our holding in Kramer v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 706 N.W.2d

231 (Minn. App. 2005), that the commissioner meets their prima facie burden of reliability

“by showing that a certified [DMT] operator administered the test and that diagnostic

checks showed that the [DMT] machine was in working order and the chemicals used were

in proper condition.” Vondrachek, 906 N.W.2d at 272 (alteration in original) (quoting

Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236). 3

During the implied-consent hearing in this case, the commissioner elicited

testimony about the correctional officer’s training and the condition of the machine. The

correctional officer testified that she is a trained and certified DMT operator and that, at

the time of the test, her DMT certification was up to date. And the correctional officer

testified that the machine successfully completed the diagnostic check, the four air-blank

tests, and the control-sample test. Faced with similar facts in Vondrachek, we concluded

that the commissioner had met their prima facie burden. 906 N.W.2d at 273.

In Vondrachek, the officer who administered the test was a properly trained and

certified DMT operator. Id. Before appellant driver provided a breath sample, the DMT

testing device performed a diagnostic check and ran air-blank tests, which produced results

within acceptable limits. Id. at 267, 273. On those facts, we concluded that the

commissioner “met its burden by showing that [the officer who administered the test] was

3
See also Minn. Stat. § 634.16 (2024).

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a certified operator and that the machine was in working order.” Id. at 273. In Kramer, we

similarly held that the commissioner met their prima facie burden when they demonstrated

“that a certified Intoxilyzer operator administered the test” and provided evidence “that

diagnostic checks showed that the Intoxilyzer machine was in working order and the

chemicals used were in proper condition.” 4 Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236; see also State,

Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Habisch, 313 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Minn. 1981) (stating that the supreme

court has held that “testimony of the reading obtained by a Breathalyzer test conducted by

a certified operator may be admitted without antecedent expert testimony if it is established

that the machine was in proper working order and the chemicals in proper condition”

(citing State, City of St. Louis v. Quinn, 182 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1971))).

Knapp nonetheless insists that the commissioner did not meet their prima facie

burden because the deputy did not conduct a complete pretest observation period. But we

have “consistently indicated that a deficiency in observation of the subject does not of itself

invalidate the test.” Melin v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 474, 476 (Minn. App.

1986). Several of our cases illustrate this point.

For example, in Falaas v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, we reversed the district court’s

decision to rescind the revocation of respondent’s driving privileges based on an

inadequate observation period because the commissioner had met their prima facie burden.

388 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Minn. App. 1986). Likewise, in Melin, we held that the district court

4
Both the Intoxilyzer and the DMT are approved methods of determining the alcohol
concentration of a breath sample and both employ infrared technology to measure alcohol
concentration. See Minn. R. 7502.0425, subp. 1-3 (2023).

11
“erred in requiring the Commissioner to show a continuous 15-minute period of

observation in order to make a prima facie showing of reliability.” 384 N.W.2d at 476. And

in State v. Wickern, we agreed with the state’s argument that the district court “erred in

suppressing the [breath] test because an alleged deficiency in the observation period goes

solely to the weight to be given to the test by the trier of fact, and does not preclude the

admissibility of the test results.” 411 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Minn. App. 1987). We therefore

disagree with Knapp’s argument that the commissioner must introduce evidence of a

proper pretest observation period to meet their prima facie burden of reliability and

admissibility for DMT test results. 5

Instead, we hold that, under Vondrachek, the commissioner satisfies their prima

facie burden to establish that DMT evidentiary breath-test results are admissible by

introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator administered the test and that

diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was in working order. Here, because

the commissioner introduced evidence that the correctional officer was a certified DMT

5
During oral argument before this court, Knapp referred to a recent North Dakota Supreme
Court opinion, asserting without further citation that the decision supports his contention
that the commissioner must introduce evidence of a proper pretest observation period to
meet their prima facie burden. “Arguments are forfeited if they are presented in a summary
and conclusory form, do not cite to applicable law, and fail to analyze the law when
claiming that errors of law occurred.” State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 477 (Minn. App.
2019) (quotation omitted). And even absent forfeiture, while such extraterritorial state
appellate authority may be persuasive, it is not binding. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d
684, 695 (Minn. App. 2021) (holding that “a precedential opinion of this court is binding
authority for this court”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 10, 2021); see also Citizens for a
Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003)
(explaining that this court is bound by decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court).

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operator and that the DMT testing device was functioning properly, we conclude that the

district court abused its discretion by determining that the commissioner failed to meet

their prima facie burden.

B. The district court abused its discretion by determining that the DMT
test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of
Knapp’s driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect
pretest observation period.

The commissioner maintains that the district court abused its discretion by

determining that the DMT test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the

revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges. More specifically, the commissioner asserts that

it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to rely solely on evidence that the deputy

did not continuously observe Knapp throughout the pretest observation period, given that

Knapp did not offer any evidence to counter the commissioner’s prima facie case. The

commissioner’s argument is persuasive.

As explained above, the commissioner meets their prima facie burden by

introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator administered the test and that

diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was in working order. “Once

reliability is established, the driver must produce evidence suggesting why the test was

untrustworthy.” Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42. “Specifically, the driver must present some

evidence beyond mere speculation that questions the trustworthiness of the” DMT test

results. Kramer, 706 N.W.2d at 236.

“Establishing that some impropriety or irregularity occurred during the observation

period which would render the test result invalid is . . . a proper basis for challenging the

13
test’s reliability.” Id. at 237. Yet “a deficiency in observation of the subject does not of

itself invalidate the test”—it “merely gives the driver an opportunity to suggest why such

a failure makes the test results unreliable.” Melin, 384 N.W.2d at 476; see also Kramer,

706 N.W.2d at 236 (explaining that an inquiry into the trustworthiness of the DMT test

results “affects the weight of the [results], not its admissibility”). “The argument that

something may have occurred during observation to affect the test result is speculation and

should not be used without supporting evidence as the basis for rescinding a revocation.”

Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42. A driver must prove that he ingested or regurgitated something

that affected the test results. Id.; see also Hounsell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 401 N.W.2d

94, 96 (Minn. App. 1987) (“Even if a driver can prove that he had something in his mouth,

he must also demonstrate that the substance actually affected his test results.”). We

therefore hold that it is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT

test results are unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely

on evidence of an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that

the driver ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the

observation period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function

affected the test results.

Our careful review of this record leads us to conclude that Knapp presented no

evidence to contradict the commissioner’s prima facie case. There is no evidence that

Knapp ingested something, regurgitated, burped, belched, or vomited. Instead, the record

reflects that the deputy did not observe any burping, belching, or vomiting, and that the

deputy checked whether anything was inside Knapp’s mouth before the correctional officer

14
administered the DMT test. Thus, even if Knapp had challenged the validity of the DMT

test results after the district court received that evidence—which he did not, given that he

specifically challenged only the admissibility of the DMT test results—he presented no

evidence to suggest that something occurred during the observation period that affected the

test results. We therefore conclude that the district court abused its discretion by

determining that the DMT test-results evidence was unreliable and by rescinding the

revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges based solely on evidence of an imperfect pretest

observation period, without evidence that Knapp had ingested something or otherwise

experienced a bodily function during the observation period that affected the test results.

See Falaas, 388 N.W.2d at 42; see also Hounsell, 401 N.W.2d at 96.

DECISION

The commissioner satisfies their prima facie burden to establish that DMT test

results are reliable and admissible by introducing evidence that a certified DMT operator

administered the test and that diagnostic checks showed that the DMT testing device was

in working order. Because the commissioner adduced evidence that the correctional officer

was a certified DMT operator and that the DMT testing device was functioning properly,

the district court abused its discretion by determining that the commissioner failed to meet

their prima facie burden.

It is an abuse of discretion for a district court to determine that DMT test results are

unreliable and to rescind the revocation of driving privileges based solely on evidence of

an imperfect or improper pretest observation period, without evidence that the driver

ingested something or otherwise experienced a bodily function during the observation

15
period and without evidence that the driver’s ingestion or bodily function affected the test

results. Because Knapp did not produce evidence that he had ingested something or

otherwise experienced a bodily function during the observation period that affected the

DMT test results, the district court abused its discretion by determining that the test results

were unreliable and by rescinding the revocation of Knapp’s driving privileges based solely

on evidence of an imperfect pretest observation period.

Reversed.

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