State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Jermale Jerome Leonard, Appellant

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1638

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Jermale Jerome Leonard,
Appellant.

Filed October 6, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-23-10182

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bond, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of second-degree sale of a controlled substance

in a school zone, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty

verdict. Because the state did not prove that the sale occurred in a school zone, we reverse

and remand.
 FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Jermale Jerome Leonard by

amended complaint with two counts of second-degree sale of a controlled substance in a

school zone, two counts of third-degree sale of a controlled substance, three counts of fifth-

degree possession of a controlled substance, and one count of possessing a pistol without

a permit in a public place. The charges were tried to a jury.

Evidence at trial showed that on May 15, 2023, near 16th Street East and 1st Avenue

South in Minneapolis, a plainclothes investigator observed a woman enter Leonard’s

vehicle and exit soon after. The investigator believed that Leonard and the woman had

conducted a “hand-to-hand transaction.” Soon after, officers arrested Leonard. A search

of Leonard’s vehicle revealed cocaine, methamphetamine, pills containing fentanyl, two

scales, and a firearm.

An officer testified that Leonard’s vehicle was stopped on the same block as Rayito

de Sol, which the officer described as a “Spanish early [immersion] school for children

approximately six weeks to six years old.” The prosecutor asked the officer if Rayito de

Sol was an “early education center,” and the officer replied, “Correct.”

The jury found Leonard guilty on all counts. The district court entered judgment of

conviction for second-degree sale of fentanyl in a school zone and sentenced Leonard to

serve 41 months in prison.

Leonard appeals.

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 DECISION

Leonard contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty

verdict for the offense of conviction. Specifically, Leonard argues that the state failed to

prove that his sale of a controlled substance occurred in a school zone.

As a threshold matter, the state argues that Leonard waived his school-zone

argument by failing to raise it at trial. The state is wrong. The state must prove every

element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Paige, 256 N.W.2d

298, 303 (Minn. 1977). But a defendant may waive his right to a jury trial on an element

of an offense by “judicially admit[ting] the existence of that element, thereby removing the

issue from the case.” State v. Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1984). Leonard

did not provide such a waiver, so the state was required to prove that the sale occurred in a

school zone.

When analyzing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, our standard of review

depends on whether the fact-finder reached its conclusion based on direct or circumstantial

evidence. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). Here, the state relied on direct

evidence—the officer’s testimony regarding the location of Rayito de Sol and the service

it provides—to prove that Leonard’s acts occurred in a school zone. See State v. Horst,

880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (observing that witness testimony “is direct evidence

when it reflects a witness’s personal observations and allows the jury to find the defendant

guilty without having to draw any inferences”). “[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently

proven by direct evidence alone, . . . it is the traditional standard, rather than the

circumstantial-evidence standard, that governs.” Id. at 39. “When reviewing the

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sufficiency of direct evidence, we painstakingly review the record to determine whether

that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient to permit the

jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 155 (Minn. 2024)

(quotation omitted).

Here, Leonard’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge depends on the meaning of

a statute. “In such cases, we first determine the meaning of the statute, which presents a

question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.” State v. Metcalfe, 13 N.W.3d

704, 711 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 21, 2025). “Once we construe the

statute, we then apply that meaning to the facts to determine whether there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the conviction.” Id. (quotation omitted).

In interpreting a statute, we try to “effectuate the intention of the legislature, reading

the statute as a whole.” Hagen v. Steven Scott Mgmt., Inc., 963 N.W.2d 164, 169 (Minn.

2021) (quotation omitted). We look at the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute’s words

and phrases to see if the language is ambiguous, meaning it is “subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). If the language is unambiguous, we

simply enforce it as written. Id. If the language is ambiguous, “then we may apply the

canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432

435 (Minn. 2017). “If a word is defined in a statute, that definition controls.” State v.

Morgan, 968 N.W.2d 25, 30 (Minn. 2021).

Leonard was found guilty and convicted under Minn. Stat. § 152.022, subd. 1(7)(i)

(2022), which makes it a crime for a person to sell “any amount of a Schedule I or II

narcotic drug” in a “school zone.” Leonard does not dispute that the substances found in

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his vehicle satisfy the statute. Rather, he focuses on whether the sale occurred in a school

zone. A school zone is defined by statute as follows:

(1) any property owned, leased, or controlled by a
school district or an organization operating a nonpublic school,
as defined in section 123B.41, subdivision 9, where an
elementary, middle, secondary school, secondary vocational
center or other school providing educational services in grade
one through grade 12 is located, or used for educational
purposes, or where extracurricular or cocurricular activities are
regularly provided;
(2) the area surrounding school property as described in
clause (1) to a distance of 300 feet or one city block, whichever
distance is greater, beyond the school property; and
(3) the area within a school bus when that bus is being
used to transport one or more elementary or secondary school
students.

Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 14a (2022). And under Minn. Stat. § 123B.41, subd. 9 (2022),

a nonpublic school is defined as follows:

any school, church or religious organization, or home school
wherein a resident of Minnesota may legally fulfill the
compulsory instruction requirements of section 120A.22,
which is located within the state, and which meets the
requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Public
Law 88-352). It does not mean a public school.

In closing argument at trial, the state argued that a school zone “can be property

controlled by an organization . . . operating as a school providing educational services.”

The state makes the same general argument on appeal, asserting that, because the statute

uses the disjunctive word “or,” a “‘school zone’ includes any property” that is “used for

educational purposes.” The state argues that, because it presented evidence that Rayito de

Sol was a Spanish immersion school which provides education services, the state proved

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that Rayito de Sol was within a “school zone” within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 152.01,

subd. 14a(1).

The plain language of the statute limits a “school zone” to only two types of

properties: “any property owned, leased, or controlled by a school district or an

organization operating a nonpublic school, as defined in section 123B.41, subdivision 9.”

Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd. 14a(1). The language that follows, which begins with the word

“where,” further limits a “school zone” to properties that are used for certain purposes. See

Larson v. State, 790 N.W.2d 700, 705 (Minn. 2010) (stating that “the grammatical rule of

the last antecedent . . . instructs that a limiting phrase . . . ordinarily modifies only the noun

or phrase that it immediately follows”).

In sum, a school zone requires a particular type of property that is used for a

particular purpose. Both requirements must be met. Thus, a “school zone” within the

meaning of the statute does not exist unless it includes a property that is owned, leased, or

controlled by a school district or by a nonpublic school as defined in statute, even if the

property is otherwise used for one of the required purposes.

On appeal to this court, the state notes that at trial, “the state did not argue that

Rayito de Sol was a nonpublic school.” Instead, the state argued that “Rayito de Sol was

operating as a school providing educational services.” However, under that theory and the

plain language of the statute, the state was also required to prove that Rayito de Sol was a

“property owned, leased, or controlled by a school district.” Minn. Stat. § 152.01, subd.

14a(1). But the state did not offer any evidence regarding the ownership of Rayito de Sol.

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Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that Leonard was guilty

of selling a controlled substance within a school district.

Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict on the

offense of conviction, we reverse and remand for the district court to enter a judgment of

conviction and sentence on one of the remaining guilty verdicts that does not depend on

proof that the crime occurred in a school zone. As set forth in State v. LaTourelle:

[T]he proper procedure to be followed by the [district] court
when the defendant is convicted on more than one charge for
the same act is for the court to adjudicate formally and impose
sentence on one count only. The remaining conviction(s)
should not be formally adjudicated at this time. If the
adjudicated conviction is later vacated for a reason not relevant
to the remaining unadjudicated conviction(s), one of the
remaining unadjudicated convictions can then be formally
adjudicated and sentence imposed, with credit, of course, given
for time already served on the vacated sentence.

343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).

Given this outcome, it is unnecessary to address Leonard’s argument that the district

court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury regarding the statutory definition of a

nonpublic school.

Reversed and remanded.

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