State of Minnesota v. Justin Bradley Camp

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1686

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Justin Bradley Camp,
Appellant.

Filed October 27, 2025
Affirmed
Bond, Judge

Clearwater County District Court
File No. 15-CR-23-615

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Lisa Lodin, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Karin Hughes, Clearwater County Attorney, Bagley, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Gina D. Schulz, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bond, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BOND, Judge

In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for kidnapping and assault,

appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion or plainly erred by admitting

inadmissible hearsay evidence in the form of (1) the victim’s video-recorded statement to

responding police officers after she reported the assault, (2) the victim’s statement to police
the following day, (3) the victim’s statement to police several months later about the

assault, (4) the victim’s 911 call, (5) the victim’s medical records, and (6) the victim’s text

messages with appellant. Appellant also argues that the district court plainly erred by

failing to sua sponte grant a mistrial, provide a curative instruction, or take other

unspecified measures in response to a prospective juror’s statement during jury selection,

and that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. We affirm.

FACTS

On December 27, 2023, C.A. called 911 to report that appellant Justin Bradley

Camp had assaulted her. C.A. stated that she had sent Camp, with whom she was in a

relationship, to the market, he had “just left,” and that she needed to “act quick before he

comes back.” Leech Lake Tribal Police Officer Nelson and a second officer responded to

C.A.’s home. Officer Nelson observed that C.A. had significant bruising and swelling on

her face, large bruises on her upper left arm, and multiple red marks on her neck.

Officer Nelson took a statement from C.A. which was captured in a 19-minute body-

worn-camera recording (December 27 statement). In the December 27 statement, C.A.

stated that she and Camp were in a car together the previous night when Camp became

jealous that C.A. was speaking to other men and he “just snapped.” Camp hit C.A. several

times in the face, causing C.A. to momentarily lose consciousness. Camp then drove for

approximately an hour before stopping on a secluded dirt road. Camp punched C.A. in the

face and stomach and strangled her three separate times. C.A. feared she would die and

pleaded for Camp to stop. Camp eventually drove C.A. home, staying with her all night.

2
C.A. explained that she had just been able to “get him away from the house” so that she

could call the police.

That evening, C.A. went to the emergency room. C.A. was examined and her

injuries were photographed but she did not require medical treatment. C.A.’s medical

records reflect that C.A. reported to the medical provider that, the previous night, Camp hit

her in the face while they were in a vehicle, took her against her will to a rural location

where she thought she would be killed, and “continued to hit about abdomen, head, and

face with strangulation.”

On December 28, Officer Nelson took a follow-up recorded statement from C.A.

over the phone (December 28 statement). In the December 28 statement, C.A. again

described the assault, stating that she and Camp were in the car when he “snapped” and

backhanded her “more and more” until blood was coming from her nose and her mouth

and she passed out. After Camp drove for about an hour, he stopped the car on a small dirt

road and continued to hit and strangle C.A. until she could not breathe. C.A. stated that,

because Camp had taken her phone during the assault, she could not call the police when

they finally got back home. C.A. spent that night trying to figure out a plan to leave. She

eventually told Camp that she was hungry and asked if he could go to the store. As soon

as Camp left, C.A. was able to call 911.

On March 27, 2024, Investigator Yocum took another recorded statement from C.A.

over the phone (March 27 statement). Investigator Yocum asked C.A. about any medical

treatment she received as a result of the assault, and C.A. explained that she did not sustain

any broken bones or internal bleeding. C.A. told Investigator Yocum that she was afraid

3
of Camp, believed that he could hurt her again in the same way, and was shaking and

nervous just talking about it. She explained that she had to “play [a] part” to keep Camp

calm and protect herself and her kids.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Camp with kidnapping in violation of

Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3) (2022), third-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 609.223, subd. 1 (2022), felony fifth-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.224,

subd. 4(b), (2022), and felony domestic assault by strangulation in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 609.2447, subd. 2 (2022). The case proceeded to a jury trial.

At trial, the state called Officer Nelson, Investigator Yocum, and C.A. as witnesses.

Officer Nelson testified that he responded to C.A.’s home on December 27 and he

described C.A.’s demeanor and injuries. The district court received into evidence the video

recording of the December 27 statement, the December 28 statement, and photographs of

C.A.’s injuries taken by Officer Nelson. 1 During Investigator Yocum’s testimony, the

district court received into evidence the March 27 statement, C.A.’s medical records from

her December 27 emergency-room visit, and text messages between Camp and C.A. from

January 4, 2024, in which Camp said that he was “eternally sorry” and C.A. stated that she

had “PTSD from that night among other times.”

C.A. testified that Camp was her fiancé, she had been in a relationship with him on

December 26, 2023, and that she had been in communication with him since that date.

C.A. testified that she did not recall making the 911 call, but she acknowledged that it was

1
We discuss the nature and extent of Camp’s objections to the admissibility of this
evidence below.

4
her voice on the call. C.A. subsequently invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against

self-incrimination and, upon being granted use-immunity, testified she could not recall how

she got the injuries, any details of the offense, or her statements to police. 2 The district

court received into evidence C.A.’s 911 call and it granted the state’s requests to publish

to the jury the 911 call, the December 27 statement, and the December 28 statement.

Camp waived his right to testify. The jury found Camp guilty of the four charges

and found facts supporting the aggravating factor that the offenses were committed with

particular cruelty. The district court sentenced Camp to 100 months in prison for

kidnapping, an upward durational departure, and a consecutive year-and-a-day sentence

for third-degree assault.

Camp appeals.

DECISION

I. The district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err in admitting
allegedly inadmissible hearsay evidence.

Camp argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting inadmissible

hearsay evidence. Specifically, Camp challenges the admission of (1) the December 27

statement, (2) the December 28 statement, (3) the March 27 statement, (4) the 911 call,

(5) C.A.’s medical records, and (6) C.A.’s text message to Camp in which she stated she

2
Upon a prosecutor’s request, a district court may grant use-immunity under Minn. Stat.
§ 609.09, subd. 1 (2024), to a prospective witness in a criminal case who invokes their right
against self-incrimination. Once the court grants use-immunity and orders the witness to
testify, “no testimony or other information compelled under the order, or any information
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information may be used against
the witness in any criminal case.” Id.

5
had PTSD from the incident. Appellate courts review a district court’s evidentiary rulings

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d 730, 736 (Minn. 2020). “A

district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the

law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The state urges us to apply a different standard of review because Camp did not

object to the majority of the challenged evidence based on hearsay grounds. In general, a

defendant must raise evidentiary issues in the district court to preserve them for appellate

review. State v. Williams, 525 N.W.2d 538, 544 (Minn. 1994). Further, “[a] defendant’s

objection to the admission of evidence preserves review only for the stated basis for the

objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.” State v. Vasquez, 912

N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018); see also Minn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) (providing that “[e]rror

may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits . . . evidence unless . . . a timely

objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if

the specific ground was not apparent from the context”).

We review the unobjected-to admission of evidence for plain error. State v.

Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Minn. 2002). Under the plain-error standard, a

defendant must establish (1) error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected the defendant’s

substantial rights. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 277 (Minn. 2017). An error is “plain”

when it clearly or obviously contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. State v.

Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn. 2017). If the three plain-error requirements are

met, this court may only correct the error if it “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

6
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356

(Minn. 2022).

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
December 27 statement as an excited utterance.

Camp first challenges the district court’s ruling admitting the December 27

statement under the excited-utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay is an out-of-

court statement, made by a declarant, that is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.

Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay statements are inadmissible, unless an exception

applies. Minn. R. Evid. 802.

A statement is admissible under the excited-utterance exception to the general

hearsay rule if the statement “relat[es] to a startling event or condition made while the

declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Minn. R.

Evid. 803(2). “The rationale for this exception stems from the belief that the excitement

caused by the event eliminates the possibility of conscious fabrication, and insures the

trustworthiness of the statement.” State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 366 (Minn. 1999)

(quotation omitted). To be admissible, an excited utterance must meet three requirements:

(1) “there must be a startling event or condition,” (2) “the statement must relate to the

startling event or condition,” and (3) “the declarant must be under a sufficient aura of

excitement caused by the event or condition to insure the trustworthiness of the statement.”

State v. Daniels, 380 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 1986).

Camp’s argument focuses on the third requirement. In determining whether the

declarant was under a sufficient aura of excitement, district courts consider “the length of

7
time elapsed, the nature of the event, the physical condition of the declarant, and any

possible motive to falsify.” State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023) (quotation

omitted). “No strict temporal guidelines exist for admitting an excited utterance . . . .” Id.

(quotation omitted); see also State v. Hogetvedt, 623 N.W.2d 909, 913 (Minn. App. 2001)

(“The lapse of time between the startling event and the out-of-court statement is not always

determinative.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 2001). “It is for the [district] court, in the

exercise of its discretion in making evidentiary rulings, to determine whether the declarant

was sufficiently under the aura of excitement.” State v. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d 911, 914

(Minn. 1992) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d 846, 850

(Minn. 1985) (deferring to the district court’s determination that the declarant was under a

sufficient aura of excitement).

Camp argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting the

December 27 statement as an excited utterance because the statement’s length, its timing

in relation to the assault, and C.A.’s demeanor and actions as depicted on Officer Nelson’s

body-worn-camera recording show that C.A. was not under an aura of excitement. The

state disagrees, arguing that Camp’s argument rests on facts not submitted to the district

court at the time of its admissibility decision.

After the jury was selected but before the state began its case-in-chief, the parties

learned that C.A. intended to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination. Camp objected to admission of the December 27 statement on hearsay

grounds. The state argued that the December 27 statement was admissible as an excited

8
utterance and, as an offer of proof, called Officer Nelson to testify outside the presence of

the jury.

Officer Nelson testified that, when he arrived at C.A.’s home on December 27 in

response to her 911 call, C.A. “had bruises all over her face and arms” and seemed afraid.

C.A. was “very shaken up” and was “very upset, shaking, smoking a cigarette.” C.A.’s

primary concern was that she had been assaulted the previous evening, about 12 hours ago.

C.A. “was able to get [Camp] to leave the residence temporarily so she could report it” and

had called 911 as soon as Camp left, but she was concerned that Camp would be coming

back to the home. Officer Nelson testified that Camp drove by the home while he was still

speaking with C.A., at which point Officer Nelson followed him and placed him under

arrest. Neither the state nor Camp submitted the video recording of the December 27

statement for the district court or asked the district court to review it.

After hearing arguments from counsel, the district court determined that C.A.’s

December 27 statement was admissible as an excited utterance, finding that the statement

related to a startling event and that C.A. was still under the stress of the event. The district

court analogized to Bauer, a case in which the excited-utterance exception applied to a

declarant who was “very upset,” “extremely agitated,” and “very afraid.” 598 N.W.2d at

366. The district court also relied on the fact that, while the assault occurred roughly 12

hours before C.A. made the statement, Camp was with her during that time.

The record reflects that the district court based its evidentiary ruling on Officer

Nelson’s testimony describing his interaction with C.A. on December 27. Camp did not

ask the district court to review the video recording of the December 27 statement for

9
purposes of its evidentiary decision. Yet on appeal, Camp bases his argument, in part, on

the events visually depicted on the video recording. Specifically, Camp asserts that,

contrary to Officer Nelson’s testimony in the state’s offer of proof, the video shows that

“C.A. appeared calm throughout the interview” and “talked at a moderate pace.” Camp’s

argument essentially asks us to make factual findings about the content of the video

recorded statement, something appellate courts cannot do. Lumpkin v. N. Cent. Airlines,

Inc., 209 N.W.2d 397, 401 (Minn. 1973) (stating that “an appellate court is not empowered

to make or modify findings of fact”). We therefore decline to address evidence neither

presented to nor considered by the district court when deciding whether to admit the

December 27 statement in the first instance. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83

(Minn. 1988) (“An appellate court may not base its decision on matters outside the record

on appeal, and may not consider matters not produced and received in evidence below.”).

We now turn to the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when

it determined, based on Officer Nelson’s proffered testimony about C.A.’s December 27

statement, that C.A. was under a sufficient aura of excitement to ensure the trustworthiness

of her statement. Camp concedes that “the nature of the alleged event would be startling,

stressful or upsetting and that the record does not contain any evidence of a specific motive

to falsify.” But Camp argues that “[a] statement made approximately 12 hours after a

startling event is not an excited utterance.”

While we recognize there was a relatively lengthy period between the assault and

C.A.’s statement, there are no “strict temporal guidelines” for an excited utterance. Tapper,

993 N.W.2d at 438. In Tapper, police responded to a 911 call and found the victim locked

10
out of her apartment. Id. at 434-35. The victim gave a statement that was recorded on an

officer’s body-worn camera. Id. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to

exclude part of the recording, reasoning that the statements were not excited utterances

because, although the victim was “downcast and sad, [she] was not ‘agitated, shaky, or

afraid,’ and enough time had passed since the alleged assault . . . for [the victim] to

‘conjecture that [the defendant] may have fallen asleep.’” Id. at 436-38. The supreme

court held that the record supported the district court’s determination that the excited-

utterance exception did not apply based on the victim’s unexcited demeanor and the

passage of time. Id. at 438; see also State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 224 (Minn. 2000)

(concluding that the district court acted within its discretion by determining that a statement

did not qualify as an excited utterance when the statement was given “many hours after the

startling event” and there was no evidence of excitement).

Here, in contrast, the district court credited Officer Nelson’s testimony that C.A.

was shaking and upset. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d at 439 (recognizing that “precedent supports

that a physical manifestation of stress will often be a key indicator of an aura of

excitement”). In addition, the district court considered of the length of time that had

elapsed. Id. (stating that factors to consider when determining whether the declarant was

under an aura of excitement include the length of time elapsed). But it recognized that

Camp’s continued presence at C.A.’s home between the assault and her 911 call

contributed to C.A.’s aura of excitement from the assault. Particularly in light of Officer

Nelson’s testimony that C.A. called 911 as soon as she was able to get Camp out of the

house and, at the time she gave the statement, she was worried that Camp would return, we

11
do not discern an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that C.A. was

under a sufficient aura of excitement from the assault when she made the December 27

statement. 3

Under the highly deferential standard of review that applies to our review of a

district court’s excited-utterance determination, we conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the December 27 statement under the excited-utterance

exception to the hearsay rule. Edwards, 485 N.W.2d at 914; Berrisford, 361 N.W.2d at

850.

B. The district court did not plainly err in admitting clear or obvious
hearsay in the form of C.A.’s remaining out-of-court statements, her
medical records, 911 call, and text messages.

Camp challenges the district court’s admission of the December 28 statement, the

March 27 statement, the 911 call, C.A.’s medical records, and C.A.’s text message to

Camp, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Because the parties dispute

whether Camp preserved these issues for appellate review and which standard of review

guides our analysis, we begin by setting out the relevant proceedings in the district court.

Before trial, Camp moved in limine to exclude evidence of (1) prior consistent

statements unless the state demonstrated the statements were helpful to the trier of fact

under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), (2) past domestic conduct between Camp and C.A.

3
Camp also argues that C.A.’s statement is “simply not the kind of ‘utterance’
contemplated by [the excited utterance] exception to the hearsay rule.” Camp cites no legal
authority for this argument. Insofar as Camp’s argument relies on evidence from C.A.’s
video-recorded statement that was not considered by the district court, we decline to
consider it for the reasons we have already explained.

12
under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024) and under Minn. R. Evid. 403 because such evidence

was prejudicial and risked confusing or misleading the jury, (3) relationship evidence under

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) because the state had not provided notice, and (4) the March 27

statement because it was taken after Camp was charged and was inadmissible under Minn.

Stat. § 634.20 and Minn. R. Evid. 403.

At a pretrial hearing, the district court reserved its ruling on Camp’s first request—

admissibility of C.A.’s prior consistent statements under Minn. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)—

because it did not know what testimony would be offered and whether the offered

testimony was consistent with the prior statements. The district court also reserved its

ruling on the admissibility of C.A.’s March 27 statement under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and

Minn. R. Evid. 403, Camp’s fourth request. The district court denied Camp’s motions to

exclude relationship evidence and evidence of past domestic conduct.

On the first day of trial, the district court reaffirmed that it was reserving ruling on

admissibility of prior consistent statements until C.A. testified. And the district court

addressed Camp’s fourth motion in limine, ruling that the redacted March 27 statement,

which the state was offering to show C.A.’s consent to the investigator obtaining her

medical records and C.A.’s “current feelings of fear,” was admissible under Minn. Stat.

§ 634.20.

After the jury was selected but before the state began its case-in-chief, the state

learned that C.A. intended to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify. At that

time, Camp raised a general hearsay and Confrontation Clause objection to admission of

the December 27 and 28 statements. After the parties and the district court addressed

13
admissibility of the December 27 statement as an excited utterance, see supra, the state

then moved to admit the December 28 statement under Minn. R. Evid. 807. 4

The state argued that C.A.’s December 28 statement had circumstantial guarantees

of trustworthiness because C.A. had not been in contact with Camp in the two days between

the assault and the statement and thus felt safe to provide a fuller statement. The district

court determined that the December 28 statement was not admissible under Minn. R. Evid.

807 because the state had not provided notice. 5

After additional discussion about rule 807, the district court observed that it was still

unknown whether C.A. would actually invoke the Fifth Amendment. The state explained

that it intended “to have Officer Nelson submit the exhibit and then I was not going to play

the exhibit until [C.A.] is on the stand.” The district court stated, “[s]o, I guess, then I’ll

let him lay the foundation to the extent he can and then we’ll pick up the rest.” Officer

Nelson laid foundation during his testimony and the state then moved to admit the

4
The residual-hearsay exception in Minn. R. Evid. 807 provides:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness, is not excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court
determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will
best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
5
A statement may not be admitted under the residual-hearsay exception unless the
proponent provides notice of “the proponent’s intention to offer the statement and the
particulars of it, including the name, address and present whereabouts of the declarant.”
Minn. R. Evid. 807.

14
December 28 statement. The district court asked if the defense had any objection, and

counsel responded, “No, Your Honor.” The district court received the December 28

statement.

During C.A.’s testimony, the state moved to admit C.A.’s 911 call and her medical

records. Camp did not object, and the district court received both pieces of evidence.

Without objection from Camp, the state published to the jury the 911 call, the December

27 statement, and the December 28 statement during C.A.’s testimony.

During Investigator Yocum’s testimony, the state moved to admit the March 27

statement. Camp objected on the “same [basis] as . . . before.” The district court noted

Camp’s objection and received the March 27 statement. The state published the March 27

statement and C.A.’s medical records. Camp objected to publication of the medical records

on cumulative grounds. The district court overruled Camp’s cumulative objection.

Finally, the state offered C.A.’s text messages with Camp. Camp objected, citing

his previous objection that evidence post-dating the assault lacked probative value and was

prejudicial and confusing. The district court overruled Camp’s objection and received the

text messages.

With that procedural history in mind, we now turn back to Camp’s arguments on

appeal. Camp asserts that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the December

28 statement, March 27 statement, 911 call, medical records, and text messages because

they were inadmissible hearsay. As the above recitation makes clear, however, Camp did

not object to admission of C.A.’s 911 call or medical records. Camp objected to the

March 27 statement and text messages, but his grounds for objection at trial were different

15
from the hearsay argument he now raises on appeal. See Vazquez, 912 N.W.2d at 649 (“A

defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence preserves review only for the stated

basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.”).

As to the December 28 statement, while the district court initially ruled that the

December 28 phone call was not admissible under the residual-hearsay exception, it then

allowed the state to lay the foundation for the phone call because it was unclear whether

C.A. would testify. Camp did not object when the state later offered the December 28

phone call into evidence. We have held that “evidentiary objections should be renewed at

trial when an in limine or other evidentiary ruling is not definitive but rather provisional or

unclear, or when the context at trial differs materially from that at the time of the former

ruling.” State v. Word, 755 N.W.2d 776, 783 (Minn. App. 2008). Accordingly, “when [a

party] is unsure whether evidence offered at trial violates an evidentiary ruling, [the party]

should renew an objection or seek clarification or reversal of a prior ruling.” Id. After

careful review, we conclude that, given the absence of an objection or further discussion

on the record at the time the state offered the December 28 statement into evidence, Camp

has not preserved his hearsay objection to the December 28 statement. We therefore review

admission of the December 28 statement, the March 27 statement, the 911 call, the medical

records, and text messages for plain error.

It is particularly difficult to review hearsay issues for plain error. “The number and

variety of exceptions to the hearsay exclusion make objections to such testimony

particularly important to the creation of a record of the [district] court’s decision-making

process in either admitting or excluding a given statement.” State v. Manthey, 711 N.W.2d

16
498, 504 (Minn. 2006). A defendant’s failure to object at trial deprives the state of the

opportunity to establish a statement’s admissibility under a hearsay-rule exception. Id.

Because of the “complexity and subtlety” of the hearsay rule and its numerous exceptions,

admission of a hearsay statement rarely constitutes plain error. Id.

Here, with the exception of the December 28 statement, Camp did not object on

hearsay grounds to the evidence he challenges on appeal. Consequently, the state did not

have the opportunity to demonstrate that one of the hearsay exceptions applies and the

district court did not have the opportunity to consider the admissibility of the evidence

under the various evidentiary rules. See id. (concluding admission of statements did not

constitute plain error because “the state was not given the opportunity to establish that some

or all of the statements were admissible under one of the numerous exceptions to the

hearsay rule”); State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131, 138-39 (Minn. App. 2012) (following

Manthey and concluding that, when defendant did not object, district court did not commit

plain error by admitting hearsay statements), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 2013).

On this record, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred because the

challenged evidence is “clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay.” See Manthey, 711

N.W.2d at 504. 6 For example, because the state referred to the March 27 statement as

evidencing C.A.’s “current feelings of fear,” that statement might have been admissible

6
Camp’s reply brief alludes to prosecutorial misconduct for knowingly eliciting
inadmissible evidence. To the extent that Camp raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
for the first time in his reply brief, we decline to consider it. See Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 128.02, subd. 3 (stating that a reply brief must be confined to new matter raised in
respondent’s brief); State v. Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 558 (Minn. 2009).

17
under the present-sense-impression exception to the rule excluding hearsay. Minn. R.

Evid. 801 (d)(1)(D). C.A.’s medical records may have been admissible as “[s]tatements

made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Minn. R. Evid. 803(4) (providing

that hearsay statements are not excluded if they are “made for purposes of medical

diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain,

or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof

insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment”). The 911 call, like the

December 27 statement, could have been admissible as an excited utterance. Minn. R.

Evid. 803(2). And the parties’ extensive disagreements in their briefs as to whether the

district court admitted the December 28 statement under the residual exception to the

hearsay rule and, if so, whether the statement contains circumstantial guarantees of

trustworthiness firmly convinces us that we cannot conclude that the December 28

statement was clearly inadmissible hearsay. 7 Because the challenged evidence is not

7
Under rule 807, a district court looks “at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether [a] hearsay statement has circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” State v.
Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 292 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “Specifically, the
district court must examine the circumstances actually surrounding the making of the
statements,” which can include
whether the statement was given voluntarily, under oath, and
subject to cross-examination and penalty of perjury; the
declarant’s relationship to the parties; the declarant’s
motivation to make the statement; the declarant’s personal
knowledge; whether the declarant ever recanted the statement;
the existence of corroborating evidence; and the character of
the declarant for truthfulness and honesty.
Id. (quoting State v. Griffin, 834 N.W.2d 688, 693 (Minn. 2013)). “Overall, evaluating the
admissibility of a statement under Rule 807 requires a district court to carefully balance all

18
“clearly or obviously inadmissible hearsay,” see Manthey, 711 N.W.2d at 504, the district

court did not commit plain error and we need not consider the remaining prongs of the

plain-error analysis, Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d at 785. 8

III. The district court did not commit plain error by failing to sua sponte provide
a cautionary instruction or other relief in response to the prospective juror’s
comment during jury selection.

Camp next argues that the district court committed reversible error by failing to give

a curative instruction, grant a mistrial, or take other steps to ensure that the jury pool was

not tainted by a prospective juror’s answer during jury selection that Camp had failed an

employment background check. Camp concedes that he did not request a mistrial,

cautionary instruction, or other relief in the district court. Accordingly, our review is for

plain error. 9

of the relevant circumstances surrounding the making of the statement at issue, while also
considering each of the three prongs set forth within the language of the rule.” Id. at 294.

8
Even if Camp preserved his hearsay objection to the admission of the December 28
statement, we are not convinced that he would be entitled to reversal. We review an
objected-to evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. Vangrevenhof, 941 N.W.2d at
736. To establish an abuse of discretion, Camp must establish that the district court’s ruling
was against logic or the facts in the record. Id. Camp argues only that, because C.A.
testified that she did not recall the December 28 phone call, the audio recording of the call
cannot be considered “trustworthy.” Camp cites no legal authority for this proposition.

9
Camp appears to argue separately that the district court abused its discretion by
“allowing” the juror to answer the question, which “functionally overruled” Camp’s
objection. But Camp again cites no authority for this argument. We do not consider
inadequately briefed issues. See Melina v. Chaplin, 327 N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982)
(concluding an issue not briefed is deemed forfeited).

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 During jury selection, a prospective juror stated that Camp had applied for a job at

his company but was denied employment after a background check. The following

exchange occurred:

JUROR: [H]e had recently applied for employment through
our company and after extensive background check, ah, and
after him having to—
COUNSEL: Objection, your Honor, this is getting a little too
personal. I believe—
THE COURT: I don’t—
COUNSEL: —this to be—
THE COURT: I don’t—
COUNSEL: —prejudicial to my client.
THE COURT: —understand what your objection is. I’ve
asked him a question—
COUNSEL: Okay.
THE COURT: —under oath, so help me understand. Oops.
JUROR: After a thorough background—
THE COURT: Okay.
JUROR: —we had to deny—
THE COURT: Okay.
JUROR: —the employment.

Later, the district court questioned the prospective juror outside the presence of the

rest of the jury. The juror offered further details about the juror’s employment, Camp’s

background check, and information the juror had received from Camp about the

“accusations and charges.” The juror stated he could follow the court’s instruction to only

consider evidence that came in during trial and to not tell the other jurors what he knew

about Camp from the background-check process. At multiple points during jury selection,

the district court instructed the jury pool on the presumption of innocence, burden of proof,

and the requirement that any verdict must be reached only by considering evidence

presented in the courtroom during trial.

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 Defense counsel moved to strike the juror for cause but, after conferring with Camp,

withdrew the motion. The juror was seated on Camp’s jury.

Camp argues that the district court’s failure to sua sponte “give a curative

instruction, grant a mistrial, convene a new jury venire, or take . . . other steps to ensure

that the extraneous information did not impact the verdict” was a “clear and obvious” error

under State v. Marchbanks, 632 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. App. 2001). See Lilienthal, 889

N.W.2d at 785 (stating that, for purposes of plain-error review, an error is “plain” when it

clearly or obviously contravenes caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct). In Marchbanks,

a prospective juror was asked if she agreed that certain people should not possess firearms.

632 N.W.2d at 729. In response, the juror was asked if the defendant was prohibited from

possessing a firearm because he was a felon. Id. The prosecutor responded: “I cannot

answer the question.” Id. The defendant objected, the prosecutor proceeded with

questioning, and the juror was later struck. Id. At the completion of jury selection, the

defendant moved for a mistrial, arguing that the exchange alerted the other jurors that the

defendant was a felon. Id. The district court denied the motion for a mistrial, determining

that the prosecutor’s actions minimized any prejudice to the defendant. Id. We affirmed,

concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s

mistrial motion. Id.

Marchbanks is readily distinguishable. There, the defendant moved for a mistrial,

allowing the district court to consider whether the prospective juror’s comments rose to the

21
level of prejudice requiring a mistrial. 10 In this case, Camp did not move for a mistrial or

request any other curative action to address the prospective juror’s comments. And,

significantly, Camp appears to have personally objected to his counsel’s efforts to remove

the prospective juror for cause.

Under these circumstances, Camp has not established that the district court clearly

and obviously erred by failing to take action to address alleged taint to the jury pool that

Camp did not bring to the court’s attention. Because Camp has not demonstrated an error

that is plain, we do not consider the remaining prongs of the plain-error analysis. Lilienthal,

889 N.W.2d at 785.

IV. Camp is not entitled to a new trial based on cumulative error.

Lastly, Camp argues that the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of

a fair trial. “An appellant may be entitled to a new trial in rare cases where the errors, when

taken cumulatively, have the effect of denying the appellant a fair trial.” Fraga, 898

N.W.2d at 278 (quotation omitted). “When considering a claim of cumulative error, we

10
Camp also relies on two nonprecedential cases. Nonprecedential opinions of this court
are not binding authority. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Further, the cases
cited by Camp are factually distinguishable because, in those cases, the defendants moved
for mistrials. State v. McHan, No. A14-1396, 2015 WL 4507825, at *3 (Minn. App. July
27, 2015) (affirming the district court’s denial of a mistrial motion based on its
determination that a prospective juror’s comments about being aware of the appellant’s
“past history” through “court reports” was too generic to be prejudicial); State v. Swan, No.
A06-644, 2007 WL 2101988, at *1 (Minn. App. July 24, 2007) (concluding that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial after determining that the
prospective juror’s comments did not “rise to the level” of prejudice warranting mistrial).
Accordingly, McHan and Swan are not persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01,
subd. 1(c).

22
look to the egregiousness of the errors and the strength of the [s]tate’s case.” Id. This is

not the “rare case[]” requiring reversal on the basis of cumulative error. For the reasons

discussed above, the district court did not abuse its discretion or plainly err. Therefore,

there are not cumulative errors, and a new trial is not warranted.

Affirmed.

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