In the Matter of the Appeal by Hawa Abdulle, Ayan Home Health Care, LLC, and Hawa Abdulle Adult Foster Care of the ...

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1899

In the Matter of the Appeal by Hawa Abdulle, Ayan Home Health Care, LLC, and Hawa
Abdulle Adult Foster Care of the Order of License Revocation.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Minnesota Department of Human Services
File No. 39249

Jason Steck, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota (for relators Hawa Abdulle and Ayan Home
Health Care)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, R.J. Detrick, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this certiorari appeal, relators challenge the revocation of their adult-foster-care

licenses. Relators argue that (1) respondent Minnesota Department of Human Services

(the department) erroneously relied on its own definition of “primary residence” without
promulgating the definition as a rule 1 and (2) the department’s decision was arbitrary and

capricious. 2 We affirm.

FACTS

Relators Hawa Abdulle and Ayan Home Health Care LLC were licensed to provide

adult-foster-care services (AFC) and home and community-based services (HCBS) at an

address on Ashland Drive in Rochester. Abdulle is the AFC license-holder. Ayan Home

Health Care is the HCBS license-holder. Abdulle is the authorized agent and sole

controlling individual of Ayan Home Health Care. 3

In December 2021, Abdulle requested to change the AFC license address from the

home on Ashland Drive to a home on Arctic Fox Road in Rochester. The department

granted the request, and Arctic Fox Road became the residence where Abdulle was licensed

to provide AFC and HCBS services. Under Minnesota law, the AFC license-holder must

live in the licensed residence as their “primary residence.” Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f

(2024); see also Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 7 (2024) (licensing moratorium). If the AFC

1
Abdulle initially argued in her brief that the department erred as a matter of law because
it based its decision to revoke her license on a definition of “primary residence” that arose
from unpromulgated rulemaking. Abdulle conceded during oral argument that the
department did not create or enforce its own definition of “primary residence” as an
unpromulgated rule. Therefore, we need not address this issue in our opinion.
2
Abdulle also argues that the department’s license revocations in Olmsted County are
racially motivated. Abdulle concedes that she failed to raise this argument before the
administrative-law judge (ALJ), therefore forfeiting the issue. See Thiele v. Stich, 425
N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating that appellate courts generally address only those
questions previously presented to and considered by the district court).
3
Relators will generally be referred to as “Abdulle” throughout this opinion.

2
license-holder does not maintain the licensed residence as their “primary residence,” the

department is required to revoke the AFC license. Minn. Stat. § 245A.03, subd. 7. As the

AFC license-holder, Abdulle was required to live at Arctic Fox Road as her primary

residence.

In February 2021, the department issued a guidance document to all county

licensors. This guidance document set forth a non-exclusive list of 12 factors (guidance

factors) that licensors could consider in determining a license-holder’s primary residence.

In January 2023, the department conducted a license review of Arctic Fox Road.

Present at the review was Abdulle; her son, M.A., who served as Ayan’s designated

coordinator and manager 4; and a staff member from Ayan. The department primarily spoke

with M.A. throughout the review. 5 During the review, M.A. told the department that “they”

4
Designated coordinator and manager are statutorily defined positions. See Minn. Stat.
§ 245D.081 (2024). Under Minnesota Statutes section 245D.081, subdivision 2, a
designated coordinator must supervise, support, and evaluate individual service delivery,
including oversight of support-plan responsibilities; facilitating progress toward outcomes;
providing or delegating staff instruction and competency assessment; and evaluating the
effectiveness of services and methodologies. The coordinator must be competent through
education, training, and relevant work experience and must meet the minimum statutory
qualification pathways outlined in subdivision 2(b). Id., subd. 2. Under Minnesota Statutes
section 245D.081, subdivision 3, a designated manager must ensure program-wide
compliance with licensing requirements; fulfillment of coordinator duties; implementation
of corrective action and required internal reviews; evaluation of satisfaction and protection
of persons’ rights; assurance of staff competency, orientation, and training; compliance
with commissioner-ordered corrective actions and license conditions; and development
and implementation of ongoing program improvements. The designated manager must
meet required competency, educational, training, and supervisory-experience criteria. Id.,
subd. 3.
5
The department primarily spoke with M.A. during the review as he seemed fluent in
English. Abdulle’s native language is Somali, and she is not fluent in English.

3
had another home across the street. The home M.A. was referring to was Ashland Drive,

the previous address listed on Abdulle’s AFC license. M.A. spontaneously indicated that

all his family members, including Abdulle, lived at the “family home.” 6 Abdulle then

interjected, speaking to M.A. in Somali. M.A. then changed his prior statement, explaining

that Abdulle was at Arctic Fox Road “around the clock.” The department did not ask

Abdulle if Arctic Fox Road was her primary residence. During the review, the department

observed and photographed the room that M.A. identified as belonging to Abdulle. The

room contained clothing, a television, a videogame system, a bed, an additional mattress,

and other personal effects. The department documented that the bedroom arrangement

appeared “strange” and “odd,” noting that individuals were apparently sharing a room

despite the presence of unoccupied bedrooms in the basement at the time of the review.

In April 2023, the department issued an order revoking Abdulle’s AFC and HCBS

licenses. In May 2023, the department amended the revocation order to correct certain

statements made in the original order and to rescind a violation that was erroneously cited.

Relying on its guidance factors, the department concluded that Arctic Fox Road was not

Abdulle’s primary residence. The department based its decision on M.A.’s statements

during the license review, overall observations of Arctic Fox Road, and Abdulle’s driver’s

license, homestead declaration, and background-study submissions.

Abdulle filed an administrative appeal, and the matter was heard by an ALJ during

a contested-case hearing in January 2024. The ALJ concluded that the revocation of

6
M.A. further explained that he called Ashland Drive the “family home” because it was
the first home his family purchased.

4
Abdulle’s AFC license was improper, finding that Abdulle proved by a preponderance of

the evidence that Arctic Fox Road was her primary residence. Accordingly, the ALJ

recommended that the department rescind the license revocation order and instead placed

Abdulle on a conditional license.

The commissioner of human services rejected the ALJ’s recommendation and

affirmed the revocation of Abdulle’s licenses. The commissioner determined that the

evidence demonstrated that Arctic Fox Road was not Abdulle’s primary residence and

rejected the ALJ’s characterization of Abdulle’s driver’s license, background study, and

homestead documentation. The commissioner also found that M.A.’s initial, spontaneous

statement that Abdulle did not live at Arctic Fox Road was more credible than his later

testimony and concluded that both Abdulle’s and M.A.’s claims that Abdulle lived at Arctic

Fox Road were not credible. Additionally, the commissioner determined that other

witnesses’ observations of Abdulle at Arctic Fox Road did not outweigh other evidence

that it was not her primary residence, given the timing and circumstances of those visits.

The commissioner further concluded that revocation of the AFC license required

revocation of the HCBS license under Minnesota Statutes section 245A.04,

subdivision 7(d) (2022). 7 Based on the 19 violations identified during the license review,

7
Minnesota Statutes section 245A.04, subdivision 7(d) was amended effective July 2023
to allow the commissioner not to revoke a license based on a prior revocation only when,
in addition to another requirement, the license is in substantial compliance with applicable
laws and rules. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 61, art. 7, § 1, at 2420-21. Because the changes to
the statute became effective in 2023, after the issuance of the commissioner’s order, we
review the commissioner’s decision under the former statute.

5
the commissioner independently determined that revocation of both the AFC and HCBS

licenses was appropriate.

Abdulle appeals.

DECISION

I. The department’s decision to revoke Abdulle’s licenses was not arbitrary and
capricious.

An agency’s decision is considered “arbitrary and capricious” if the agency relies

on factors not intended by the legislature, fails to consider important aspects of the

problem, offers an explanation that is contrary to the evidence, or makes a decision that “is

so implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of an

agency’s expertise.” Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006). An agency’s conclusions are not arbitrary

and capricious so long as there is a “rational connection between the facts found and the

choice made.” In re Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment of Charges for All Elec. &

Gas Utils., 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009) (quotation omitted). “Unless the

Commissioner’s decision is arbitrary and capricious and without substantial support in the

record, we shall affirm. When reviewing questions of law, however, we are not bound by

the agency’s decision, and we need not defer to the agency’s expertise.” Dozier v. Comm’r

of Human Servs., 547 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Minn. App. 1996) (citation omitted), rev. denied

(Minn. July 10, 1996).

Abdulle argues that the revocation of her AFC and HCBS licenses was arbitrary and

capricious because (A) the department applied its guidance factors inconsistently, (B) the

6
department relied on factors not intended by the legislature, (C) the department’s decision

was not supported by substantial evidence, (D) the department disregarded Abdulle’s

plausible, innocent explanations for the address listed on her driver’s license, homestead

declaration, and background-study submissions, and (E) the department rejected the ALJ’s

credibility determinations without adequate explanation. We address each argument in

turn.

A. The department did not apply its guidance factors inconsistently.

First, Abdulle argues that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously because the

agency “abandoned its relatively consistent focus in recent cases where the AFC license-

holder spent her time in favor of a new and ad hoc focus on statements purportedly made

in official documents.”

Abdulle relies on several ALJ decisions from unrelated matters to support this

proposition that the department has shifted its analysis from determining where a license-

holder actually resides to relying solely on official documentation. See In re the Appeal by

Yeboah, OAH 22-1800-38540, 2023 WL 4892358, at *2 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs. July 27,

2023); In re the Appeal by Geyer, OAH 60-1800-38715, 2023 WL 4080284, at *5 (Minn.

Off. Admin. Hrgs. June 13, 2023); In re the Appeal by Iddris, OAH 71-1800-39461, 2024

WL 576332, at *7 (Minn. Off. Admin. Hrgs. Feb. 5, 2024). 8 The facts in these matters do

not support Abdulle’s position. In Yeboah, the ALJ considered where the licensee actually

8
Yeboah, Geyer, and Iddris are nonprecedential, administrative decisions that are not
binding authority on our court.

7
slept but also relied on additional evidence—including court filings by the licensee listing

a different residential address. 2023 WL 4892358, at *13-14. In Geyer, the licensee

expressly acknowledged that she did not reside in the AFC home, a fact that materially

distinguishes that case from the one at hand. 2023 WL 4080284, at *6. In Iddris, the ALJ

relied on evidence that the licensee had attested, under penalty of perjury in a court filing,

that he lived at a different residence and identified the AFC home as his workplace. 2024

WL 576332, at *7. In each of these cases, contrary to Abdulle’s assertion, the department

did not rely solely on where the licensee physically resided. Rather, it considered that

information alongside other evidence, including representations made in government

filings. As in those matters, the department here properly considered information beyond

Abdulle’s statements on official documents in determining that Arctic Fox Road was not

Abdulle’s primary residence.

Similarly, in In re Yusuf, No. A24-0430, 2024 WL 4814785, at *1 (Minn. App.

Nov. 18, 2024), we upheld the department’s revocation of Yusuf’s AFC license after it

concluded that the AFC residence was not Yusuf’s primary residence. 9 The department

observed that the home “had a sterile environment with nothing on the walls other than

instructional and facility signs,” that the bathroom contained no personal toiletries, that

Yusuf’s bedroom held only “roughly five articles of clothing and a small suitcase,” and

that the bed and desk in the room “were covered with boxes, office items, and cleaning

9
This opinion is nonprecedential and, therefore, not binding. We cite Yusuf as persuasive
authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c) (“Nonprecedential
opinions . . . are not binding authority . . . but nonprecedential opinions may be cited as
persuasive authority.”).

8
supplies that appeared to have been unmoved for a while.” Yusuf, 2024 WL 4814785, at

*2. Additionally, a resident of the AFC home informed the department that “Yusuf did not

stay in the foster-care home most overnights.” Id. Yusuf argued that the department

inconsistently applied its guidance document when revoking the license. Id. at *4. We

rejected that argument because Yusuf did not support his argument with any evidence or

authority. Id.

Abdulle argues that our decision in In re Casterton, No. A21-1393, 2022 WL

2912152 (Minn. App. July 25, 2022), reflects the department’s current enforcement

practice. In Casterton, the department revoked the license after determining that the AFC

residence in Finlayson was not the licensee’s primary residence. 2022 WL 2912152, at *4.

Casterton was not home when the department arrived to conduct an unannounced licensing

visit . Id. at *1. The department further observed that Casterton did not have a bedroom

at the home, kept no personal items there—such as a toothbrush or deodorant—and

frequently carried an overnight bag when staying at the residence. Id. We concluded that

the commissioner’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at *4. We noted that

“[o]n this record, a reasonable mind could conclude that the Finlayson home was not

Casterton’s primary residence, and there is a rational connection between the facts found

and conclusions drawn from them.” Id.

Like in Yusuf and Casterton, the department did not inconsistently apply its

guidance factors in revoking Abdulle’s license. Nor did the department solely rely on the

addresses listed on Abdulle’s government documents to determine her primary residence.

In fact, the department weighed other factors, including Abdulle’s bedroom, her clothing

9
and personal items, and where her children lived and spent time. We are also unpersuaded

by Abdulle’s argument that in prior cases, the department only focused on where a license-

holder spent their time.

Contrary to Abdulle’s argument that the department had developed an investigative

framework focused on where a license-holder actually resides, in both Yusuf, 2024 WL

4814785, at *2 and Casterton, 2022 WL 2912152, at *4, the department considered

additional factors, including the condition of the license-holder’s bedroom and the presence

or absence of personal items.

Accordingly, we conclude that the department did not apply its guidance factors

inconsistently.

B. The department did not rely on factors that were unintended by the
legislature. 10

Next, Abdulle argues that the legislature did not intend for a license-holder’s

primary residence to be determined by the department’s guidance factors, mainly the

license-holder’s driver’s license or homestead declaration. Abdulle asserts that the

10
Initially, Abdulle argued that the commissioner’s decision to revoke her license was
based on an unlawful procedure, arising from reliance on an unpromulgated rule defining
“primary residence.” However, at oral argument, Abdulle conceded that, while non-
precedential, the reasoning in In re Petition of Minn. Ass’n of Residential Servs. Homes,
No. A24-1562, 2025 WL 1922283, at *6 (Minn. App. July 15, 2025) (MARSH) (holding
that the department’s guidance document was not being enforced as a duly adopted rule)
was persuasive, and she withdrew this argument. We rely on MARSH as persuasive
authority only. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). We agree that the reasoning
in MARSH is persuasive as it interprets the same department guidance document at issue
here. We also agree that the department’s use of its guidance document does not constitute
enforcement of an unpromulgated rule.

10
department selected a definition of “primary residence” that suited their needs. We

disagree.

Minnesota law requires adult-foster-care license-holders to maintain the licensed

facility as their “primary residence.” Minn. Stat. § 245A.02, subd. 6f. The statute does not

define “primary residence,” nor does any other provision in chapter 245A supply a

definition applicable to adult-foster-care settings. In the absence of a statutory definition,

the department issued a guidance document to clarify the meaning of this requirement. See

MARSH, 2025 WL 1922283, at *3-6 (holding that the department did not enforce an

unpromulgated rule when articulating the “primary residence” and “primary caregiver”

requirements for adult-foster-care programs). The department is required to provide

counties with technical assistance to ensure that applicable rules and statutes are enforced

uniformly throughout the state. Minn. Stat. § 245A.16, subds. 5, 6 (2024). “Interpretive

guidelines do not have the force and effect of law and have no precedential effect but may

be relied on by . . . the Department of Human Services . . . . ” Minn. Stat. § 245A.09,

subd. 9 (2024).

Here, the department developed a non-exclusive list of factors “to try to help

licensors understand what things to consider when determining whether a person is residing

in a[n] [adult-foster-care] home as their primary residence.” Licensors consider factors

such as whether a person owns more than one residence, where they spend the majority of

their time, whether they have a spouse or children, and if so, where they primarily reside,

the address listed on a person’s driver’s license, property records, and tax records.

Therefore, because the department has authority to develop and rely on its guidance factors

11
as interpretive guidelines, the department did not rely on factors not intended by the

legislature. Next, we turn our analysis to whether the department’s decision was supported

by the record.

C. The department’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

The department’s decision to revoke Abdulle’s licenses was sufficiently supported

by evidence in the record. Abdulle’s driver’s license and background-study submissions

identify Ashland Drive as her address. Abdulle’s homestead declaration also lists Ashland

Drive as her residence. Additionally, testimony from the administrative hearing indicates

that M.A. referred to Ashland Drive as the “family home” in which Abdulle lives.

Abdulle’s repeated representations during the license review indicated that her primary

residence was Ashland Drive rather than Arctic Fox Road. M.A. also made statements that

demonstrated that Ashland Drive was Abdulle’s primary residence. The department relied

on photographic evidence and observations showing individuals apparently sharing a

bedroom at Arctic Fox Road despite the availability of unoccupied rooms at the time of the

review. In addition, the department cited inconsistencies between the testimony of Abdulle

and M.A. concerning the purported sleeping arrangements at Arctic Fox Road. We

recognize that there were factors that would support an ALJ’s conclusion that Arctic Fox

Road was Abdulle’s primary residence, such as a bedroom containing Abdulle’s clothing

and sentimental personal effects. Abdulle’s presence at Arctic Fox Road is also

corroborated. Family members of the adult-foster-care residents personally observed

Abdulle in the residence at all times, and department licensors who conducted

unannounced visits found Abdulle to be present.

12
 Abdulle contends that the department “cherry-picked” its definition of “primary

residence” from unrelated statutory provisions. This argument is unpersuasive. Under any

reasonable definition of “primary residence,” the record supports the order revoking the

AFC license. Abdulle concedes that, regardless of the definition applied, an individual

must actually live in the home claimed as their primary residence. The evidence supports

the commissioner’s determination that she did not reside at Arctic Fox Road. Her driver’s

license, background study, and tax records all listed a different address, and M.A. informed

DHS licensors that Abdulle lived with him at the Ashland Drive address identified on those

documents. Accordingly, irrespective of how this court interprets the statutory term

“primary residence,” substantial evidence supports the revocation decision.

We also recognize that the department could have taken additional steps to

investigate Abdulle’s residency. For instance, when conducting Abdulle’s license review,

the department could have provided Abdulle an interpreter and not used M.A.to

communicate with her in a different language. The department could also have asked

Abdulle directly whether Arctic Fox Road was her primary residence but did not do so.

And the department could have asked the residents or their legal representatives about

Abdulle’s presence at Arctic Fox Road. But fact-finding is not our responsibility. Rather,

our task is to determine whether the record adequately supports the department’s decision.

We conclude that it does.

Because the department’s determination that Arctic Fox Road was not Abdulle’s

primary residence is supported by evidence in the record, we conclude that the

13
department’s reliance on its guidance factors as interpretive guidelines was not arbitrary or

capricious.

D. The department did not disregard Abdulle’s plausible, innocent
explanations for the address listed on her drivers’ license, homestead
declaration, and background-study submissions.

Abdulle argues that the department improperly relied on Abdulle’s driver’s license,

homestead declaration, and background-study submissions, and “completely disregarded”

Abdulle’s plausible explanations for the use of the Ashland Drive address on those

government documents. We disagree.

“With respect to factual findings made by the agency in its judicial capacity, if the

record contains substantial evidence supporting a factual finding, the agency’s decision

must be affirmed.” In re Excelsior Energy, Inc., 782 N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. App. 2010)

(quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and it requires more than a scintilla,

some, or any evidence.” In re NorthMet Project Permit to Mine Application, 959 N.W.2d

731, 749 (Minn. 2021) (quotations omitted). In evaluating whether an agency’s decision

satisfies this standard, we consider whether the agency has “adequately explained how it

derived its conclusion and whether that conclusion is reasonable on the basis of the record.”

Id. (quotation omitted). “Appellate courts defer to an agency’s expertise in fact-finding

and will affirm the agency’s decision so long as it is lawful and reasonable.” In re City of

Owatonna’s NPDES/SDS Proposed Permit Reissuance, 672 N.W.2d 921, 926 (Minn. App.

2004).

14
 The department found that when Abdulle renewed her driver’s license in 2022, she

listed Ashland Drive as her address, despite changing the AFC license address to Arctic

Fox Road a year prior. The department concluded that Abdulle’s driver’s license renewal

was direct evidence that Ashland Drive was Abdulle’s primary residence. With respect to

Abdulle’s homestead declaration, the department found that Abdulle’s homestead was

registered to Ashland Drive. Homestead is defined as “the dwelling occupied as [a

person’s] principal residence.” Minn. Stat. § 290A.03, subd. 6 (2024). The department

found Abdulle’s homestead was evidence that Ashland Drive was her primary residence.

Lastly, Abdulle’s background-study submission identified Ashland Drive as her residence.

An individual who is the subject of a background study must provide the department with

their current home address, city, and state of residence. Minn. Stat. § 245C.05,

subd. 1(a)(2) (2024). By listing Ashland Drive on the background-study submissions, the

department concluded that Ashland Drive was Abdulle’s primary residence.

We conclude that the department adequately explained the basis for its

determination and that substantial evidence supports its finding that Abdulle’s primary

residence was not Arctic Fox Road.

E. The department did not reject the ALJ’s credibility findings without
adequate explanation.

Abdulle argues that the department’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because

it disregarded the ALJ’s credibility findings without adequate explanation and it ignored

the ALJ’s positive credibility findings of M.A. We disagree.

15
 The commissioner is “not required to treat the ALJ’s recommendation with the same

deference an appellate court must accord the findings of a trial court.” In re Excess Surplus

Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Minn. 2001).

“Rejection of the ALJ’s recommendations without explanation . . . may suggest that the

agency exercised its will rather than its judgment and was therefore arbitrary and

capricious. Id. at 278. But an agency’s decision is not arbitrary and capricious if the

commissioner articulates “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.” Id. at 277 (quotation omitted).

“It is well-established that appellate courts generally defer to credibility

determinations made by an agency’s fact-finder . . . .” In re Thompson, 935 N.W.2d 147,

156 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 2019). In doing so, “[w]e defer to an

agency’s conclusions regarding conflicts in testimony, the weight given to expert testimony

and the inferences to be drawn from testimony.” In re Excess Surplus, 624 N.W.2d at 278.

But when an agency departs from the ALJ’s credibility findings, the court reviews the

agency’s findings “more critically.” In re Occupational License of Hutchinson, 440

N.W.2d 171, 176 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 9, 1989).

We conclude that the commissioner’s decision adequately explained how she

reached her credibility determinations. The commissioner modified the ALJ’s findings

regarding the testimony of three witnesses: M.A.; S.A., the mother and legal representative

of a resident at Arctic Fox Road; and E.T., an Olmsted County investigator.

The commissioner found M.A. not credible because he changed his prior

statement—originally reporting that Abdulle lived at the “family home” on Ashland

16
Drive—to testifying that Abdulle lived “around the clock” at Arctic Fox Road after

speaking with Abdulle in Somali. The commissioner gave more weight to M.A.’s initial

statement that Abdulle lived at Ashland Drive because it was “spontaneous.” The

commissioner also noted inconsistencies between M.A.’s testimony and Abdulle’s

testimony. M.A. testified that Abdulle lived at Arctic Fox Road with her three minor

children and that the children shared one bedroom, leaving a basement bedroom unused.

Abdulle testified that she shared a bedroom with her youngest child while another child

occupied the basement bedroom. Because these accounts conflicted, the commissioner

concluded that M.A.’s statements regarding Abdulle’s primary residence were not credible.

The commissioner also discounted the testimony of S.A., who stated that Abdulle

was always present at Arctic Fox Road when S.A. visited her son. The commissioner found

this testimony unreliable because S.A. notified Abdulle of her visits in advance, making it

“more likely than not that [relator] Abdulle ensured she was present . . . during those visits

because she knew of the visits in advance.”

Finally, the commissioner rejected the testimony from E.T., the Olmsted County

investigator, as irrelevant. Although E.T. testified that Abdulle was present during both of

her visits to Arctic Fox Road and appeared to live there, those visits occurred two years

before the license review and again months after it. The commissioner concluded that

E.T.’s testimony did not bear on whether Arctic Fox Road was Abdulle’s primary residence

during the January 2023 license review.

Because the commissioner adequately explained her modifications to and rejections

of the ALJ’s credibility findings, her decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Moreover,

17
because this court defers to the commissioner’s credibility determinations, we affirm the

commissioner’s decision.

For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the commissioner’s decision was

neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Affirmed.

18