Renee Hogendorf, Respondent, vs. James J. Green, Jr., et al., Appellants

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-1981

Renee Hogendorf,
Respondent,

vs.

James J. Green, Jr., et al.,
Appellants.

Filed September 15, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CV-22-678

William A. Cumming, Laura H. Lindsay, William M. Florek, Hessian & McKasy, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cara C. Passaro, Stephen P. Couillard, Stich Angell, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Connolly,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

1. The state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a released

hazardous substance does not preclude a claim under the Minnesota Environmental

Response and Liability Act (MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-.20 (2024).

2. As it appears in the definition of “release” under Minn. Stat. § 115B.02,

subd. 15(b)(4), the term “residue” does not include “rinsate” as defined by Minn. Stat.

§ 18B.01, subd. 25 (2024).
 3. Whether damages awarded under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04 are “reasonable and

necessary” is a factual determination for the district court.

4. A party may be awarded damages for the diminution of value of their

property under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05.

OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

Appellants challenge the district court’s entry of judgment and award of damages

in favor of respondent under the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act

(MERLA), Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01-.20, based on appellants’ discharge of contaminating

substances from their commercial landscaping workshop onto respondent’s neighboring

property. Appellants assert that the district court erred under MERLA’s definitions by

(1) concluding that disposal of pesticide rinsate is a “release . . . of a hazardous substance,”

(2) determining that appellant James J. Green Jr. was a “responsible person,” (3) awarding

damages that were not “reasonable and necessary,” and (4) awarding diminution-of-value

damages. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Green and respondent Renee Hogendorf are neighboring landowners in

the City of Andover in Anoka County. Green owns and operates appellant Well Groomed

Lawns Inc. (WGL), a landscaping business, on his property. This litigation stems from

Hogendorf’s discovery of a pipe that carried rinsate from WGL’s workshop on Green’s

2
property and discharged onto Hogendorf’s property. Hogendorf sued WGL and Green 1

under MERLA and obtained a damages judgment following a bench trial. Appellants

challenge both the district court’s determination of liability under MERLA and its award

of damages. The following summarizes the facts relevant to the resolution of this appeal,

based on the evidence presented at trial and viewed in the light most favorable to the

judgment. See Rogers v. Moore, 603 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999).

In May 2021, Hogendorf was walking on her property when she saw something

white sticking out of the ground. Hogendorf spotted a four-inch pipe covered in dirt and

vegetation and observed fluid streaming from the pipe. The fluid “had a horrible, foul

stench to it.” Hogendorf contacted Landmark Environmental, an environmental consulting

firm, and it collected soil samples from her property around the discharge pipe. The

samples revealed the presence of many contaminating substances in Hogendorf’s soil,

including triclopyr, 2,4-D, and dicamba—chemicals found in common pesticides.

Landmark then notified the state, and an environmental health inspector for Anoka County

scheduled a visit to Hogendorf’s and Green’s properties.

Green owns property next to Hogendorf’s from which he operates WGL. Green

built a garage workshop on his property for WGL and ran a pipe from the floor of the

workshop to a drain field that he constructed on his property; WGL used this pipe for about

20 years until it became clogged. When it became clogged, Green directed WGL’s general

1
Green and WGL each had their own counsel, but throughout most of the proceedings in
district court and in most of the district court’s order, they are treated as one. In this
opinion, we address them together as appellants unless explicitly differentiated.

3
foreman to install a new pipe that discharged near the property line. Green told the foreman

where on his property to place the pipe. The new pipe extended approximately 47 feet past

the property line onto Hogendorf’s property. Inside the workshop, WGL performed

mechanical repairs and maintenance on its mowers and the tools it used to apply various

chemicals, including pesticides and herbicides. WGL also cleaned its vehicles, mowers,

and tools in the garage, washing the chemicals and grime from them down the drain and

through the pipe that ultimately discharged rinsate onto Hogendorf’s property.

After the environmental health inspector’s visits to Hogendorf’s and Green’s

properties, the Minnesota Department of Agriculture (MDA) issued a notice of violation

to WGL and later issued a special order for compliance, requiring WGL to conduct a

remedial investigation and take corrective action as to the areas that had been affected by

WGL’s actions. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) also issued a notice of

violation to WGL and ordered WGL to remove or seal the pipe and develop plans to

investigate and remove the contamination. Notwithstanding these orders, WGL did not

change its practices and continued to allow its discharge to flow onto Hogendorf’s

property. Eventually, WGL hired an environmental consultant, Pinnacle Engineering,

which drafted an investigation-and-work plan for the contamination. The parties, the

MDA, and the MPCA agreed that Landmark would assist in the investigation of and

planning to remove the contamination from Hogendorf’s property.

Pinnacle’s investigation began more than a year after Hogendorf discovered the

discharge pipe on her property and took several months to complete. During and after the

investigation, Pinnacle and Landmark collaborated to develop a work plan to remove the

4
contamination from Hogendorf’s property and manage appellants’ continued discharge of

rinsate. The MDA ultimately approved the plan. Data from soil samples established that

a large quantity of soil would need to be removed to a depth of nine feet in some places

and replaced in the area where the pipe discharged. At some point during the fall of 2023,

Pinnacle completed its work under the work plan, and in 2024, both the MDA and the

MPCA issued approval letters to Green and WGL.

Hogendorf filed her initial complaint in February 2022 and an amended complaint

in March 2023. Hogendorf brought a MERLA claim, common-law claims for negligence,

negligence per se, nuisance, and trespass, and various equitable claims. Appellants moved

for summary judgment on Hogendorf’s MERLA claims, arguing that the claims were

superfluous after the state became involved in the investigation that there was no release

of a hazardous substance. Hogendorf opposed the motion, and the district court denied it.

The matter proceeded to a bench trial, after which the district court ordered judgment

against appellants on the MERLA claim. The district court determined that appellants

owned and operated the workshop and the pipe. The district court further determined that

WGL’s employees regularly rinsed pesticides containing 2,4-D and dicamba from the

equipment and vehicles at the workshop and that Green directed WGL’s employees to

install the pipe in the location where it discharged the resulting rinsate onto Hogendorf’s

property. Thus, the district court determined that appellants were responsible for the

release of hazardous substances from their facility onto Hogendorf’s property.

Based on its determination that, under MERLA, Green and WGL were responsible

for the contamination of Hogendorf’s property, the district court awarded Hogendorf

5
declaratory relief, monetary damages for economic loss totaling $331,295.84, and

reasonable attorney fees as the prevailing party. The district court did not decide

Hogendorf’s common-law claims because Hogendorf had succeeded in her MERLA

claims and MERLA does not permit double recovery. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.13.

This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Does the state’s involvement in investigation or cleanup of a hazardous substance

after a release preclude a MERLA claim?

II. Did the district court err in making its liability determinations under the definitions

in MERLA, including that there was a “release,” the release was of a “hazardous

substance,” and Green was a “responsible person”?

III. Did the district court err in awarding damages, including by determining that

Hogendorf’s environmental-consultant costs were “reasonable and necessary” and

that diminution-of-value damages were permitted by MERLA?

ANALYSIS

We begin with an explanation of MERLA, which was enacted by the Minnesota

Legislature in 1983 for three reasons: “(1) to impose strict liability on those responsible for

harm caused by the release of hazardous substances; (2) to allow the state to clean up

contamination and collect costs later; and (3) to fund state cleanup activity.” Musicland

Grp., Inc. v. Ceridian Corp., 508 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. App. 1993), rev. denied (Minn.

Jan. 27, 1994). MERLA was adapted, in part, from the federal Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). State ex

6
rel. Hatch v. Emps. Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 824, 830 (Minn. App. 2002), rev.

denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2002). Because MERLA “provides a cause of action for the

recovery of damages for personal injury and economic losses caused by the release of

hazardous chemicals into the environment,” it provides broader protection for individuals

affected by contamination than CERCLA. Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 529.

The objective of MERLA is to go beyond being a “cleanup statute” to “protect the

public health and minimize the harmful effect of hazardous substances in the environment.”

Id. at 530. To that end, MERLA protects against not only actual releases of chemicals but

threatened releases. Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1 (“[A]ny person who is

responsible for a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility is

strictly liable . . . .” (emphasis added)). “MERLA is a remedial statute and should therefore

be broadly construed in favor of the government in order to effectuate its remedial

objectives.” Hatch, 644 N.W.2d at 829; see Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 531-32 (broadly

construing both “release” and “facility” as defined in MERLA).

The agencies that administer MERLA are the MDA and the MPCA (collectively,

the agencies). Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 3. The MDA has jurisdiction under MERLA

when the hazardous substances involved are agricultural chemicals, including pesticides

and fertilizers. Id., subds. 3, 3a. Any other hazardous substance falls under the MPCA’s

jurisdiction. Id., subd. 3. Under MERLA, the agencies have authority to “impose a legal

obligation” on property owners and may seek a civil judgment “to compel the [owner] to

conduct the clean up or to compel reimbursement of [the agencies’] expenses in cleaning

up the contamination.” Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d

7
175, 183 (Minn. 1990); see also Minn. Stat. § 115B.18 (listing relief available to state for

noncompliance). MERLA did not create a new scheme for liability to address

contamination from pollution; rather, it updated the remedies available under previous

statutes and the common law. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 183.

“On appeal from judgment following a court trial, this court reviews whether the

district court’s findings were clearly erroneous and whether the district court erred as a

matter of law.” In re Distrib. of Attorney’s Fees, 855 N.W.2d 760, 761 (Minn. App. 2014),

aff’d, 870 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 2015). Appellate courts “review a district court’s

application of the law de novo.” Harlow v. State, Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561,

568 (Minn. 2016). A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, requiring

that there be reasonable evidence in the record to support these findings. Rasmussen v.

Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013). When reviewing the findings

of fact, appellate courts “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict” and

will not determine that the findings are clearly erroneous unless the reviewing court is “left

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotations

omitted).

With these legal standards in mind, we address appellants’ arguments. Appellants

argue that the district court erred (1) when it determined that Hogendorf’s claim was not

superfluous to the agencies’ actions; (2) when it determined that appellants were liable to

Hogendorf under MERLA; (3) when it determined that Green was personally liable as a

“responsible person” under MERLA; and (4) in its calculation of Hogendorf’s damages.

We address these arguments in turn.

8
I. The state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a hazardous
substance after a release does not preclude a private cause of action under
MERLA.

We first consider appellants’ argument that Hogendorf’s MERLA claim became

superfluous after the agencies took action under the statute. They reason that MERLA acts

as a “whistleblower statute” and that, because the act of notifying the state satisfied the

purpose of bringing a MERLA claim, it was unnecessary and not allowed for Hogendorf

to file a claim under MERLA once the state was notified of the release. We review the

district court’s determination that, “[b]ased upon the unambiguous language of the statute,

[Hogendorf] is entitled to all reasonable and necessary removal costs” and that agency

action does not preclude a private cause of action under MERLA. Statutory interpretation

is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo. Cocchiarella v. Driggs,

884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016).

Appellants’ argument directly conflicts with the plain language of MERLA. First,

the purpose of MERLA is to provide any injured party, not only the state, with a cause of

action to recover the costs incurred because of the liable party’s release of a hazardous

substance. See Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1(2) (permitting recovery of “all reasonable

and necessary removal costs incurred by any person” (emphasis added)); Musicland,

508 N.W.2d at 529 (explaining that MERLA “provides a cause of action for the recovery

of damages for personal injury and economic losses caused by the release of hazardous

chemicals into the environment”). Second, because the agencies investigated the report

and participated in developing the work plan for the environmental consultants to

investigate and remediate the damage to her property, the state’s involvement caused

9
Hogendorf to incur some of the specific removal costs she seeks to recover in this lawsuit.

We thus hold that the state’s involvement in the investigation or cleanup of a hazardous

substance after a release under MERLA does not preclude a private cause of action under

MERLA or make one superfluous.

Next, we turn to appellants’ arguments based on the district court’s interpretation of

MERLA and its determinations that appellants are liable under it.

II. The district court correctly determined that, under MERLA’s definitions, a
release of a hazardous substance occurred and Green was a responsible person.

Appellants challenge the district court’s determinations that appellants were liable

under the definitions in MERLA.

To succeed in recovering damages for a claim brought under MERLA, Hogendorf

needed to prove four elements: (1) appellants were responsible (2) for the release (3) of a

hazardous substance (4) from a facility. See Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1, .05, subd. 1.

MERLA defines the terms it uses in each of these elements. Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.02,

subd. 5 (“facility”), subd. 8 (“hazardous substance”), subd. 15 (“release”), .03

(“responsible person”). The district court determined that appellants owned and operated

the workshop and the pipe. The district court further determined that WGL’s employees

regularly rinsed pesticides containing 2,4-D and dicamba from the equipment and vehicles

at the workshop and that Green directed WGL’s employes to install the pipe in the location

where it discharged the resulting rinsate onto Hogendorf’s property. Thus, the district court

determined that appellants were responsible for the release of hazardous substances from

their facility onto Hogendorf’s property.

10
 Appellants challenge the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on

each element except the finding and conclusion that appellants’ workshop on Green’s

property and the pipe from it discharging rinsate onto an area of Hogendorf’s property is a

“facility” within the meaning of MERLA. We first consider whether there was a “release”

of a “hazardous substance,” and then we consider whether Green was a “responsible

person.”

A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
appellants’ discharge of pesticide rinsate was a “release” of a
“hazardous substance” under MERLA and did not fall within the
agricultural exception.

To address appellants’ argument that Hogendorf failed to prove that the discharge

onto her property was a “release” of a “hazardous substance,” we must interpret MERLA.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law that appellate courts review de novo.

Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 624.

MERLA defines “release” to mean “any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,

emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into

the environment which occurred at a point in time or which continues to occur.” Minn.

Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(a). This definition includes a number of exceptions. The parties

ask us to interpret clause (b)(4) (the agricultural exception), which excepts “any release

resulting from the application of fertilizer or agricultural or silvicultural chemicals, or

disposal of emptied pesticide containers or residues from a pesticide as defined in section

18B.01, subdivision 18.” Id., subd. 15(b)(4). Chapter 18B relates to pesticide control and

includes a definition of “pesticide”: “a substance or mixture of substances intended to

11
prevent, destroy, repel, or mitigate a pest, and a substance or mixture of substances

intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant.” Minn. Stat. § 18B.01,

subd. 18 (2024).

The parties do not dispute the district court’s findings that the pipe from appellants’

workshop discharged rinsate created by the rinsing of pesticides from appellants’

equipment and vehicles and that the pesticide rinsate contained substances that are defined

as “hazardous substances” under MERLA. 2

Instead, appellants contend that pesticide rinsate from their landscaping equipment

and vehicles falls within the agricultural exception to MERLA’s definition of a “release,”

which exempts the “disposal of emptied pesticide containers or residues from a pesticide.”

Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4). Relying on a definition in chapter 18B, appellants

assert that rinsate is created from the disposal of residues of pesticide within the agricultural

exception, id., because “rinsate” is “a dilute mixture of a pesticide or pesticides with water,

solvents, oils, commercial rinsing agents, or other substances, that is produced by or results

from the cleaning of pesticide application equipment or pesticide containers,” Minn. Stat.

§ 18B.01, subd. 25. Hogendorf argues that appellants’ contention equates “rinsate” from

one chapter of the Minnesota Statutes with “residue” from another, which is contrary to

2
MERLA incorporates as hazardous substances the hazards and pollutants identified by
the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2018), and the chemicals identified
by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (2018).
Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 8. Minnesota Statutes section 115B.02, subdivision 8, refers
to the FWPCA, much of which, including section 1321, has been recodified as part of the
Clean Water Act (CWA). Dicamba and 2,4-D, which are chemicals found in common
pesticides, are included in the list of hazardous substances identified by the CWA and
incorporated into MERLA. 40 C.F.R. § 116 (2025).

12
the terms’ distinct meanings and statutory contexts. She also argues that the disposal of

pesticide “residue” within the agricultural exception cannot be so broadly interpreted as to

include appellants’ discharge of pesticide rinsate from cleaning their equipment and

vehicles.

“The object of all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention

of the Legislature,” and if the statute is unambiguous, appellate courts “interpret it

according to the plain meaning of its text.” Pfoser v. Harpstead, 939 N.W.2d 298, 310

(Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 953 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 2021). When a term

is defined in a statute, appellate courts apply the definition provided by the legislature, and

if there is no statutory definition, courts may consider dictionary definitions to determine

the word’s plain meaning. Wayzata Nissan, LLC v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279,

286 (Minn. 2016). The interpretation of a statute cannot be “inconsistent with the manifest

intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.” Minn. Stat. § 645.08

(2024). Therefore, the “specific meaning of a word depends on how it is being used in

context.” Buzzell v. Walz, 974 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts consider a statute to be ambiguous “only if, as applied to the facts

of the particular case, [the words of the statute are] susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation.” State v. Moore, 10 N.W.3d 676, 680 (Minn. 2024). When a statute is

ambiguous, courts turn to the canons of construction to determine the meaning of the

13
statute. State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017). To determine the

legislative intent, courts may consider, among other things, the following:

(1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the
circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to
be remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law,
if any, including other laws upon the same or similar subjects;
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the
contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) legislative and
administrative interpretations of the statute.

Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024); see Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Minn.

2013) (stating that, if a statute is ambiguous, we “may consider the factors set forth by the

[l]egislature for interpreting a statute.” (quotation omitted)). Additionally, when

interpreting an ambiguous statute, courts presume that the legislature did not intend “a

result that is absurd,” but intended for “the entire statute to be effective” and “to favor the

public interest as against any private interest.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (2024). An appellate

court need not fully define an ambiguous term to resolve an appeal. See Moore, 10 N.W.3d

at 681.

Returning to the parties’ arguments, we observe that their disagreement on the

meaning of “residue” as used in the agricultural exception focuses on the origin or quantity

of pesticide contemplated by the term. Appellants’ argument imports limitations from

another chapter of the Minnesota Statutes to assert that any pesticide rinsate that results

from the cleaning of pesticide application equipment or pesticide containers falls within

the agricultural exception as the disposal of pesticide residue; Hogendorf argues that

appellants’ limitation cannot be correct because it does not come from the language or

context of MERLA and that the agricultural exception for disposal of pesticide residue is

14
for a de minimis amount of pesticides and not as broad as the definition of rinsate. The

parties’ arguments in their primary briefs implicitly agree that some limitation on the term

“residues” is necessary for a reasonable interpretation of the agricultural exception. The

term “residues” is not defined in MERLA; we therefore look to dictionary definitions to

determine its plain meaning. See Wayzata Nissan, LLC, 875 N.W.2d at 286.

Dictionary definitions of the term “residue” are nearly uniform: it is “[t]he

remainder of something after removal of parts or a part.” The American Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 1494 (5th ed. 2018); accord Black’s Law Dictionary

1569 (12th ed. 2024); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1060 (11th ed. 2003).

This is a broad definition that, alone, does not provide a limitation on the origin or quantity

of pesticide contemplated by the word “residues.” It could reasonably accommodate the

limitations appellants offer from the definition of rinsate; but it could also reasonably

accommodate stricter limitations that exclude rinsate, as Hogendorf urges. Because the

text of the agricultural exception does not clearly limit the term “residues” with respect to

origin or quantity of pesticide, it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation

and thus is ambiguous.

Because the statute is ambiguous, we consider canons of construction and other

tools to identify the legislative intent of the agricultural exception. When construing

statutory language, we ascertain legislative intent by considering, among other things, the

legislative history of the act under consideration, the subject matter as a whole, the purpose

of the legislation, and the objects intended to be secured thereby.” Staab v. Diocese of St.

Cloud, 853 N.W.2d 713, 718 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

15
 By reviewing the legislative history and purpose of MERLA as a whole, we can

determine the legislature’s intent with respect to the term “residues.”

Recall that MERLA was enacted by the Minnesota Legislature in 1983 for three

reasons: “(1) to impose strict liability on those responsible for harm caused by the release

of hazardous substances; (2) to allow the state to clean up contamination and collect costs

later; and (3) to fund state cleanup activity.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 529. MERLA was

passed subsequent to other similar legislation Minnesota adopted in the 1970s.

In 1974, the legislature enacted a law directing the MPCA to develop a

comprehensive regulatory system for the storage, transport, treatment, and disposal of

hazardous waste. 1974 Minn. Laws ch. 346, at 582 (codified at Minn. Stat. §§ 116.01-.45

(1982)). Then, in 1978, the legislature established the Joint Legislative Committee on

Solid and Hazardous Waste, 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 728, at 800, which led to the enactment

of the Waste Management Act of 1980, 1980 Minn. Laws ch. 564, at 786. But neither of

these developments addressed or resolved the issue of legal responsibility for harm caused

by the disposal of hazardous substances that would become the central focus of MERLA.

See id.; 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 728, at 800.

Throughout the two and a half years that the legislature considered the bill that

would become MERLA, the liability sections were consistently debated, and these debates

highlight themes that the legislature considered while crafting MERLA.

The legislature focused on holding responsible the user of the hazardous substance

by preventing the user from avoiding liability for harm resulting from the disposal of the

hazardous substance. Proposed amendments to MERLA that would have allowed people

16
using hazardous substances to limit or avoid liability by arguing that their conduct was

reasonable were defeated. State of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 72nd Sess. 4713-14,

4731-32 (Mar. 10, 1982). Even a proposal to lower the standard from strict liability for

certain classes of users, including farmers and small business owners, was defeated. State

of Minnesota, Journal of the Senate, 73rd Sess. 1758, 1760-61 (Apr. 26, 1983).

The drafters of MERLA were motivated to make recovery for plaintiffs easier.

When determining how an injured party would prove causation under MERLA, the

legislature rejected a requirement that the injured party establish a certain amount and

duration of exposure to prove causation, instead adopting an amendment that required a

plaintiff to show that they were “exposed to the hazardous substance” and that, “under all

the circumstances, the release could reasonably have resulted in plaintiff’s exposure to the

substance in the amount and duration experienced by plaintiff.” State of Minnesota,

Journal of the Senate, 73rd Sess. 266 (Feb. 28, 1983). We see no indication that a minimal

exposure requirement was adopted.

Given the legislature’s reason for enacting MERLA and the themes that are evident

in its debates while drafting MERLA, we determine that the interpretation of “residues”

put forth by Hogendorf is more consistent with the legislative intent. Interpreting

“residues” to exclude rinsate is consistent with the legislature’s concerns at the time of

MERLA’s passage about pollution stemming from the improper disposal of hazardous

substances and its desires to increase access to recovery for plaintiffs by not imposing

quantity requirements for their claims under MERLA. In addition, appellants’

interpretation of “residue” is at odds with MERLA’s objective of imposing liability on the

17
party responsible for contaminating the environment. Under their interpretation, rinsate,

which they suggest is the mixture of pesticide residue with water or another liquid, can be

dumped into the environment at any volume without liability. This would contravene the

objectives and themes illustrated by MERLA’s legislative history.

Based on our statutory interpretation, we hold that the term “residue” as it appears

in the definition of “release” under Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4), does not include

rinsate as defined by Minn. Stat. § 18B.01, subd. 25. Because pesticide rinsate from

cleaning equipment or vehicles is not within the agricultural exception to a release, the

exception does not apply to appellants’ discharge onto Hogendorf’s property, and we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that appellants’

discharge of pesticide rinsate was a “release” of a “hazardous substance” as defined by

MERLA. 3

B. The district court did not err by finding that Green is a “responsible
person” under MERLA.

Green challenges the district court’s determination that he is a “responsible person”

as defined by MERLA in Minn. Stat. § 115B.03.

3
Appellants’ challenge to the “hazardous substance” element for liability under MERLA
depended on the exemption of the pesticide chemicals 2,4-D and dicamba under the
agricultural exception. Accordingly, we need not reach their arguments with respect to
other substances found on Hogendorf’s property.

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 “We review a district court’s application of the law de novo.” Harlow, 883 N.W.2d

at 568. MERLA states that a person is a “responsible person” if they owned or operated

the facility

(i) when the hazardous substance, or pollutant or
contaminant, was placed or came to be located in or on the
facility;
(ii) when the hazardous substance, or pollutant or
contaminant, was located in or on the facility but before the
release; or
(iii) during the time of the release or threatened release.

Minn. Stat. § 115B.03, subd. 1(1).

Green argues that the district court erred by determining that he was a responsible

person under MERLA because it improperly considered him and WGL as a single entity

when reaching this conclusion. He also argues that the district court did not consider the

provision of MERLA that establishes when a property owner may be liable and that, as a

property owner, he bears no liability under MERLA. Hogendorf argues that the record

supports a determination that Green was involved in the release of hazardous substances,

that he was the sole owner of WGL, and that, regardless of whether he is considered a

facility owner or property owner for purposes of the MERLA analysis, he is liable under

MERLA as a responsible person.

“The question of whether [a person] is an ‘owner or operator’ under MERLA hinges

on whether [the person] was in a position of control over the treatment of the hazardous

substances at the time of their release.” Musicland, 508 N.W.2d at 533. A person “could

be found to be an ‘owner or operator’ of the facility from which the hazardous substances

were released if [they] exerted an ample degree of control over the facility.” Id.

19
 Green satisfies MERLA’s definition of a responsible person as an “owner or

operator” of the facility. Green exercised ample control over the workshop and pipe at the

time the substances were released. The district court found, and appellants do not

challenge, that “Green admitted being responsible for ordering the installation of the pipe”

and that, at Green’s direction, WGL’s general foreman oversaw the installation of the pipe,

including its placement out to the property line, which ended up extending several feet onto

Hogendorf’s property. Because we conclude that these undisputed facts adequately

establish that Green “was in a position of control over the treatment of the hazardous

substances at the time of their release,” id., the district court did not err by determining that

Green is a responsible person under MERLA as the “owner or operator” of the facility.

Accordingly, we need not reach whether Green is also a responsible person as the owner

of real property.

In conclusion, the district court did not err in finding appellants liable under

MERLA. To succeed on a claim brought under MERLA, Hogendorf needed to prove that

(1) appellants were responsible (2) for the release (3) of a hazardous substance (4) from a

facility. See Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1, .05, subd. 1. Appellants did not challenge

the district court’s finding that the workshop and pipe are a “facility.” As to the first

element, the evidence in the record supports the district court’s determination that Green

was a responsible person as the operator of the facility. As to the second and third elements,

interpreting MERLA reveals that the district court correctly determined that the agricultural

exception to the definition of “release” that applies to pesticide “residue” does not include

pesticide “rinsate” and, therefore, that there was a release of hazardous substances.

20
Because we conclude that the district court did not err by determining that appellants were

liable under MERLA, we now consider appellants’ arguments about the district court’s

damages award to Hogendorf.

III. The district court did not err in awarding damages based on its determinations
that Hogendorf’s environmental-consultant costs were “reasonable and
necessary” and that diminution-of-value damages are permitted by MERLA.

Appellants argue in the alternative that, even if the district court correctly concluded

that they were liable under MERLA, the district court erred in its calculation of damages.

MERLA authorizes the recovery of damages under sections 115B.04 and 115B.05. Under

section 115B.04, subdivision 1(2), a party may recover damages for costs associated with

removing the contamination, so long as the costs are “reasonable and necessary.” Under

section 115B.05, subdivision 1(1), a party may recover “all damages for actual economic

loss” to real property. The district court awarded Hogendorf damages under each section,

and appellants challenge both awards. We address each in turn.

A. The district court did not err by awarding damages under
section 115B.04, subdivision 1, after finding that the costs Hogendorf
incurred for Landmark’s work were reasonable and necessary removal
costs.

As to the damages awarded pursuant to section 115B.04, appellants argue that the

district court erred because the costs were not “reasonable and necessary removal costs”

recoverable under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1(2). Specifically, appellants challenge the

damages award allowing Hogendorf to recover costs for the work completed by

Landmark—her environmental consultant—asserting that Landmark’s work was merely

supervisory of removal work by other entities and thus was not reasonable and necessary.

21
Hogendorf responds that the district court did not err because it correctly determined that

Landmark’s work was not merely supervisory, based on the court’s specific findings that

Landmark’s work was necessary to hold Green’s environmental consultant, Pinnacle,

accountable.

First, we review the district court’s determination that Landmark’s work fell within

MERLA’s definition of removal. “We review a district court’s application of the law de

novo.” Harlow, 883 N.W.2d at 568. To the extent appellants challenge the district court’s

related findings of fact, we review those “for clear error, requiring that there be reasonable

evidence in the record to support” them. Rasmussen, 832 N.W.2d at 797.

MERLA defines “removal” as

(1) the cleanup or removal of a released hazardous
substance, or a pollutant or contaminant, from the
environment; . . .
(3) actions necessary to monitor, test, analyze, and
evaluate a release or threatened release of a hazardous
substance, or a pollutant or contaminant;
(4) disposal or processing of removed material; or
(5) other actions necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or the
environment, which may otherwise result from a release or
threatened release.

Minn. Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 17(a). The district court received evidence that included

Landmark’s notes describing the work it performed on Hogendorf’s property. The notes

explain that Landmark acquired and analyzed soil and water samples, coordinated with the

state and county to conduct inspections, identified and investigated other signs of

contamination, proposed cleanup and management options, and reviewed and provided

input on work plans from the agencies and Pinnacle. The district court determined that

22
Landmark’s work fell within the scope of “removal” and that “Landmark’s involvement in

the investigation was necessary, reasonable, and justifiable,” reasoning that

Landmark safeguarded [Hogendorf] during the process by
holding Pinnacle accountable; it provided thoughtful input and
critiques throughout the process in a collaborative manner,
which produced better results overall. This finding
contemplates that Landmark’s duty is to its client,
[Hogendorf], which necessarily colors some of its advice as
biased in favor of its client; the same, however, can be said of
Pinnacle. Moreover, the overall effect of these inherent biases
was largely vitiated through agency oversight because the
MDA and MPCA acted as arbiters or referees whenever a
disagreement occurred with respect to Pinnacle and Landmark.
Thus, the Court has high confidence in the fact that this
adversarial process produced a prudent, fair, and equitable
result that simply would not have occurred without
Landmark’s participation.

The district court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and the facts found are

consistent with the plain language of MERLA’s definition of “removal.” Therefore, we

conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Landmark’s work was

removal as defined in MERLA.

We next consider whether the removal costs were reasonable and necessary. The

phrase “reasonable and necessary” is not defined in MERLA, but caselaw is instructive. In

Musicland, this court interpreted the phrase broadly and reasoned that the costs of an

environmental consultant were reasonable and necessary because its work furthered the

investigation, supported cleanup of the contamination, and did not duplicate other work

being done. 508 N.W.2d at 533. In that case, we affirmed the damages award for costs

resulting from the environmental consultant’s work because the work would “prevent the

contamination from further adversely affecting the environment.” Id.

23
 Our review of the caselaw persuades us to hold that whether damages awarded under

Minn. Stat. § 115B.04 are “reasonable and necessary” is a fact determination. Because it

is a fact determination, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and

require that reasonable evidence in the record supports the findings. See Rasmussen,

832 N.W.2d at 797. We further hold that it is not clear error for a district court to find that

the work of two or more environmental consultants was reasonable and necessary under

MERLA, so long as the record supports the finding.

Applying that standard of review, we are satisfied that the district court did not

clearly err when it found that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work being

done and was not supervisory, and therefore it did not err when it determined that

Landmark’s work was reasonable and necessary under MERLA.

The district court’s finding that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work

is supported by the record. Landmark’s environmental consultant testified at trial about

the scope of Landmark’s work on this project. In addition to the initial testing and

investigation that Landmark completed for Hogendorf after she discovered the discharge

pipe on her property, Landmark communicated with the MDA and the MPCA to request

that the agencies open an investigation of Hogendorf’s property. Landmark also assisted

with the development of the work plan to remove the contamination from Hogendorf’s

property. During one review of the proposed plan, Landmark identified that no monitoring

well had been installed near Hogendorf’s drinking water well, and Landmark suggested

this modification to the MDA. The MDA then required Pinnacle to install a monitoring

well closer to Hogendorf’s drinking water well to conduct more accurate testing and

24
monitoring of possible contamination. In another instance, Landmark disagreed with

Pinnacle’s conclusion that Hogendorf’s deep groundwater 4 was not affected by the

contamination because of what Pinnacle called a confining layer of silty sand and clay.

The MDA did not originally agree with Landmark, and Landmark performed its own

testing of the deep groundwater, consistent with the MPCA’s recommendation, and

discovered that the deep groundwater was contaminated by the hazardous substances. In

response to Landmark’s findings, the MDA required Pinnacle to investigate the deep

groundwater and modify the work plan to address this contamination. An MDA employee

also testified that Landmark’s work was not duplicative of other work being done by

Pinnacle or the agencies. All of these actions are consistent with this court’s reasoning in

Musicland that, if an environmental consultant’s work is not duplicative of other work,

furthers the investigation, and supports cleanup of the contamination, then it is a reasonable

and necessary expense under MERLA. 508 N.W.2d at 533.

The district court’s finding that Landmark did not serve in a supervisory role is also

supported by the record. There were multiple instances in which the agencies disagreed

with or did not adopt Landmark’s recommendations. For example, Landmark

recommended that the agencies conduct further investigation of Green’s property due to

possible contamination consistent with Hogendorf’s, but the MDA chose to remain focused

4
About ten feet below the surface of Hogendorf’s property sits a silty sand and clay layer
of earth that stretches from ten feet to about 36 feet below the surface, below which is
another layer of groundwater. This second layer of groundwater is referred to as the “deep
groundwater.” The presence of contaminants in the deep groundwater increases the
potential future risk to Hogendorf’s drinking water because it demonstrates the migration
of the contaminants further into the property.

25
on Hogendorf’s property. Landmark also recommended that the MDA conduct deep

groundwater testing or direct Pinnacle to do so, but the MDA disagreed and Landmark

conducted the testing itself. An MDA employee who testified also expressed frustrations

with Pinnacle’s work during the project and explained his role to push back against

Pinnacle and ensure that agency requirements were being met. These examples support

the district court’s finding that the agencies supervised the work, not Landmark.

Appellants urge us to follow Kennedy Building Associates v. CBS Corp., a federal

district court decision that limited the recovery of an environmental consultant’s fees for a

MERLA claim. 5 No. 99-CV-1833, 2010 WL 3024714, at *2-3 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2010)

(determining that the costs “incurred to implement the remedy set forth in” the

corrective-action plan were recoverable, but the costs incurred due to “an unhappy

landowner’s unilateral effort to ‘supervise’ the cleanup beyond what [was] required” by

the state were not covered by MERLA). But CBS Corp. is distinguishable, and thus not

persuasive, because the consultant went beyond the corrective-action plan to which the

MPCA agreed, the liable party had already begun enacting the plan, and the environmental

consultant’s continued testing revealed no further contamination for the MPCA to address.

Id. at *3.

5
“Federal caselaw does not bind Minnesota courts,” but when federal courts have
addressed similar issues and facts, they may be persuasive. Hinckley Square Assocs. v.
Cervene, 871 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 2015); see also Hatch, 644 N.W.2d at 830
(stating that federal caselaw interpreting MERLA is persuasive but not binding on this
court).

26
 The district court did not clearly err by determining that Landmark’s work was

consistent with MERLA’s definition of “removal” and that Landmark’s costs were

reasonable and necessary because the record supports the district court’s findings.

Therefore, the district court did not err in awarding Hogendorf damages to recover costs

for Landmark’s work under section 115B.04, subdivision 1(2).

B. The district court did not err in awarding diminution-of-value damages
under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1, or by relying on Hogendorf’s
expert and his appraisal.

In addition to the damages under section 115B.04, the district court awarded

Hogendorf damages under section 115B.05, subdivision 1, which allows an individual to

recover “all damages for actual economic loss” after the release of a hazardous substance.

Specifically, an individual may recover damages for “(i) any injury to, destruction of, or

loss of any real or personal property . . . ; (ii) any loss of use of real or personal property;

[and] (iii) any loss of past or future income or profits resulting from injury to, destruction

of, or loss of real or personal property.” Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1(1). To calculate

Hogendorf’s damages under this section, the district court determined the diminished value

of Hogendorf’s property because of the contamination caused by appellants’ release of

hazardous substances. And the district court calculated the diminished value by relying on

Hogendorf’s expert. Appellants argue that both decisions were erroneous.

1. The district court did not err by calculating damages under
section 115B.05, subdivision 1, using diminution of value.

Appellants argue that MERLA does not contemplate diminution-of-value damages

because they are speculative, conjectural, and remote, and therefore, they cannot be

27
considered “actual economic loss” under the statute. They also argue that, because

Hogendorf does not intend to sell her property, there is no loss. Hogendorf argues that

diminution of value is the standard process used to measure property damages and may be

awarded regardless of a person’s intent to sell their property.

Appellants’ argument requires us to interpret MERLA. Because we provide the

rules for statutory interpretation in section I above, we do not repeat them here. This

section of MERLA allows recovery for “actual economic loss,” Minn. Stat. § 115B.05,

subd. 1(1), but MERLA does not define this phrase. Turning to dictionary definitions to

determine a term’s plain meaning, see Wayzata Nissan, LLC, 875 N.W.2d at 286, we

determine that the definitions provided in Black’s Law Dictionary convey the plain

meaning of the phrase. “Actual” means “existing in fact; real.” Black’s, supra, at 44.

“Actual loss” means “[a] loss resulting from the real and substantial destruction of insured

property.” Id. at 1129. “Loss” means “the disappearance or diminution of value,” and the

entry explains that, “[w]hen the loss is a decrease in value, the usual method of calculating

the loss is to ascertain the amount by which a thing’s original cost exceeds its later selling

price.” Id. “Economic loss” refers to “a type of damages recoverable in a lawsuit.” Id. at

647.

We determine that the phrase “actual economic loss” is not ambiguous under

MERLA and that each word is necessary—none is superfluous. 6 By synthesizing the

6
During oral argument, counsel argued that not all words in this phrase are necessary and
that one or more are superfluous. We note that this is contrary to our caselaw directing
how we interpret statutes, and therefore, we reject this assertion. See Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t

28
definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, we conclude that “actual economic loss” means

the monetary damages that may be recovered from the real and substantial destruction or

diminution of value of property. Diminution-of-value damages are consistent with the

plain meaning of “actual economic loss” because they account for the loss in value of the

property by considering the original value of the property and its later prospective selling

price.

This determination is supported by caselaw. First, diminution of value is the most

common way to measure damages for injury to real property or the interference with a

property right. See Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 422 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Minn. App. 1988)

(“[T]he measure of damages for tortious injury to property is the diminution in value

resulting from the wrongful act and damages proximately flowing from the tort.”); see also

Beer v. Minn. Power & Light Co., 400 N.W.2d 732, 735 (Minn. 1987) (explaining that the

interference with a property right is “measured by the diminution in the market value of

the property,” which “is the difference between the market value of the property before and

after” the interference with the right (quotation omitted)).

Because diminution-of-value damages are the common remedy for tortious injury

to property, awarding these damages is consistent with the supreme court’s explanation

that MERLA updated “the old statutory and common law liabilities” and did not change

the liability or the remedies available. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 457 N.W.2d at 183. In

of Corrs., 8 N.W.3d 224, 233 (Minn. 2024) (“[U]nder the canon against surplusage, we
avoid statutory interpretations that make words or phrases superfluous, void, or
insignificant.”).

29
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing, insurance companies argued that their insurance

policies should not be interpreted to require them to pay for cleanup of the contaminated

property owned by the liable party (the insured) under MERLA. Id. at 178. The supreme

court explained that damages of this nature are not new and therefore should have been

contemplated by the insurance companies when drafting their policies, even before the

passage of MERLA, because they have been consistently recognized under common law:

“Under the common law, damages [to real property] are typically limited to the diminution

in the value of the damaged property if the cost of restoring the property to its original

condition would exceed that value.” Id. at 183. In its opinion, the supreme court identified

the two types of damages that are recognized under common law for injuries to real

property: diminution-of-value damages and damages equal to the cost of restoring the

property to its original condition. Id. The supreme court’s statement in Minnesota Mining

& Manufacturing explained that, under the common law, the liable party would pay the

lower of the two values. Id. However, the plain language of MERLA demonstrates that it

removed the alternative offered by the common law and provided that an injured party may

recover both types of damages: cleanup costs, under Minn. Stat. § 115B.04, subd. 1, and

diminution-of-value damages, under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1.

Because diminution-of-value damages are consistent with the plain meaning of

“actual economic loss” and have long been recognized under common law as a way to

calculate damages for injuries to real property, we hold that a party may be awarded

damages for the diminution of their property’s value under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05,

subd. 1(1).

30
 2. The district court did not err by considering the stigma of
contamination and relying on Hogendorf’s expert and appraisal.

Appellants argue that the district court’s findings of fact in support of its damages

award were clearly erroneous because it relied on Hogendorf’s expert and the expert’s

appraisal. As to the expert, appellants argue that the district court should not have

determined that their expert was less credible than Hogendorf’s because Hogendorf’s

expert considered the stigma of contamination, among other things. 7 As to the damages

awarded, appellants argue that the district court improperly considered the stigma of

contamination when evaluating the property’s value because the property had been cleaned

up and therefore the award of diminution of value was a double recovery. Hogendorf

contends that the district court’s determination that her expert was more credible is

supported by the record because appellants’ expert acted as an advocate rather than a

neutral and her expert acted consistently with expert standards; she further contends that

the diminution-of-value damages were not double recovery.

Appellate courts defer to the fact-finder’s determination of the weight and

credibility of expert-witness opinions. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 192 N.W.2d 432,

440 (Minn. 1971). Because we defer to those determinations as to each expert, we do not

conclude that the district court erred in relying on Hogendorf’s expert and appraisal.

7
Appellants also make a general assertion that Hogendorf’s expert lacked foundational
reliability, but they do not provide any legal authority to support this assertion, and
therefore, it is forfeited. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d 437, 451 (Minn. App.
2017) (explaining that arguments made without supporting authority need not be
considered), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 26, 2017). Because the argument is forfeited, we do
not address it.

31
 Turning to the appraisal’s use of stigma to calculate the diminished value of

Hogendorf’s property, we determine that the district court did not err by considering

stigma. The supreme court has considered damages related to a condemned property and

explained stigma and the difference between clean, remediated, and contaminated

property:

Clean property is property that has never been contaminated.
Remediated property is property that was contaminated but
went through a remediation process to remove the
contamination. Though the contamination is removed, the
stigma of the former contamination may remain. . . . Even if
the contamination is cleaned up and a property is believed to
have been fully remediated, fear of discovering further
contamination and the accompanying liability may reduce the
property’s value. The effect of stigma demonstrates how
remediated property, which is no longer contaminated, is
different from property that has never been contaminated.

Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 883 (Minn. 2010). In an earlier

opinion, the supreme court explained that stigma due to past contamination presents “the

perception of risk of liability, or government imposed restrictions on the use or

transferability of the property, among other concerns.” Dealers Mfg., Co. v. County of

Anoka, 615 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. 2000). Although neither of these opinions involved

MERLA, they demonstrate that, in caselaw, stigma is a consideration for appraisers to use

and district courts to rely on when determining property value. Therefore, we conclude

that the district court did not err by considering the impact of stigma on Hogendorf’s

property when determining the diminution of value to award damages under

section 115B.05, subdivision 1.

32
 As for whether the district court’s award of both diminution-of-value damages and

removal damages constitutes double recovery, the law and record demonstrate that it was

not. First, MERLA allows the injured party to receive both damages awards. See Minn.

Stat. §§ 115B.04, subd. 1(2) (removal costs), .05, subd. 1(1) (actual economic loss). And

second, a federal district court opinion that appellants urge us to follow demonstrates that

the district court’s damages award here is consistent with the statute. In Gopher Oil Co. v.

Union Oil Co. of California, the federal district court considered the issue of double

recovery under MERLA after the injured party requested that it keep the property and

recover damages equal to the cleanup costs and the entire purchase price of the property.

757 F. Supp. 988, 996 (D. Minn. 1990). The court explained that granting all of these

requests would be double recovery or the equivalent of punitive damages, which were not

contemplated by MERLA. Id. The injured party kept the property and recovered its

cleanup costs and the portion of its purchase price that exceeded the actual value of the

contaminated property, but not the entire purchase price. Id. The district court’s order here

is consistent with the outcome of Gopher Oil Co.: the district court awarded damages for

cleanup costs and diminution of value, but from the latter, it subtracted the costs already

expended on the cleanup that would not be transferred to a future owner of the property,

and therefore not borne by Hogendorf in the future sale of her property, preventing

Hogendorf from receiving double recovery.

Because caselaw demonstrates that consideration of stigma is permitted and relevant

when determining a property’s value after contamination and the statute and record

33
demonstrate that the district court did not grant Hogendorf double recovery, the district

court did not err in its damages award issued under Minn. Stat. § 115B.05, subd. 1.

DECISION

The state’s involvement in investigation or cleanup of a hazardous substance after

a release does not preclude the affected property owner from bringing a MERLA claim.

And the term “residue,” as it appears in the definition of “release” under MERLA, Minn.

Stat. § 115B.02, subd. 15(b)(4), does not include “rinsate” as defined in the

pesticide-control chapter, Minn. Stat. § 18B.01, subd. 25. The district court did not err in

determining that Green and WGL had ample control over the release of hazardous

substances onto Hogendorf’s property from their facility by directing rinsate created by the

rinsing of pesticides from equipment and vehicles in their workshop to drain onto

Hogendorf’s property. Therefore, the district court did not err by determining that a release

of hazardous substances occurred and that Green and WGL were responsible persons under

MERLA. Because Hogendorf proved all the elements of a MERLA claim, the district

court’s determination that appellants were liable under MERLA was not erroneous. The

district court did not clearly err in finding that Landmark’s work fell under MERLA’s

definition of “removal” and that its work was “reasonable and necessary,” and therefore,

the district court correctly awarded damages under section 115B.04, subdivision 1.

Additionally, because we determine that MERLA allows for diminution-of-value damages

under section 115B.05, subdivision 1, the district court did not clearly err by awarding

Hogendorf these damages in addition to the damages awarded under section 115B.04,

subdivision 1, or by considering the impact of stigma when awarding damages under

34
section 115B.05, subdivision 1. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order for

judgment in its entirety.

Affirmed.

35