Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau v. GoodRx, Inc.

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2031

Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau,
Respondent,

vs.

GoodRx, Inc.,
Appellant.

Filed September 2, 2025
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-24-9554

Jacob R. Rusch, Zackary S. Kaylor, Johnson Becker, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael J. Wall (pro hac vice), Herzfeld, Suetholz, Gastel, Leniski, and Wall PLLC,
Nashville, Tennessee (for respondent)

Todd Wind, Panhia Vang, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota; and

Gregory Silbert (pro hac vice), Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, New York, New York (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge; and Ede,

Judge.

SYLLABUS

Under the plain and unambiguous language of Minn. Stat. § 325F.784 (2024), a

plaintiff has statutory standing to sue without alleging that they have suffered an injury in

fact.
 OPINION

SLIETER, Judge

Appellant GoodRx Inc. challenges the district court’s denial of its Minn. R. Civ. P.

12.02(a) motion to dismiss this action under Minn. Stat. § 325F.784, arguing that

respondent Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau lacks standing. Because the statute grants

Teamsters standing, we affirm.

FACTS

Because this appeal comes before us on the denial of a motion to dismiss under

12.02(a) for lack of standing, the facts derive from the complaint and are presumed to be

true. Forslund v. State, 924 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. App. 2019).

Minnesota Teamsters Service Bureau is a nonprofit corporation organized under

Minnesota law and based in Minneapolis. It provides a variety of services and benefits to

its members and their families, including “behavioral health services, drug and alcohol

assessment, relationship counseling, financial counseling, retirement planning, elderly care

consultation, legal referrals, and financial assistance.”

GoodRx is a corporation with a registered agent in Minnesota, has business

relationships with pharmacies throughout Minnesota, and offers consumers coupons and

access to discounts on prescription drugs. GoodRx also offers subscriptions that

purportedly give paying members special discounts on prescription-drug purchases.

GoodRx provides consumers with prescription-drug discount cards for use at Minnesota

pharmacies.

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 Teamsters alleges that GoodRx violates Minn. Stat. § 325F.784, which governs

prescription-drug discount cards. More specifically, Teamsters alleges that GoodRx

distributes prescription-drug discount cards that do not comply with the statute because

they do not, in “bold” and “prominent” type, express that GoodRx is not insurance.

Teamsters admits that it “has never used [GoodRx’s] cards.” However, Teamsters claims

that it is “expressly authorized to sue” under the statute. Teamsters commenced this lawsuit

under Minn. Stat. § 325F.784 “to enforce the statute against [GoodRx] and recover

damages that will be used for charitable purposes.”

GoodRx moved to dismiss Teamsters’ claim, primarily asserting a lack of standing,

and the district court denied GoodRx’s motion.

GoodRx appeals. Though motions to dismiss are not generally appealable, such

motions based on lack of standing are immediately appealable under Stone v. Invitation

Homes, Inc., 986 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Minn. App. 2023), aff’d, 4 N.W.3d 489 (Minn. 2024).

ISSUE

Does Teamsters have statutory standing under Minn. Stat. § 325F.784?

ANALYSIS

In relevant part, section 325F.784, subdivision 2, provides:

(a) The attorney general, or an individual or other
person, may maintain an action to enjoin any act in violation
of this section and for the recovery of damages.

....

(2) It is not necessary, except to recover for
actual damages under clause (3), item (ii), that actual damages

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 to the plaintiff be alleged or proved in order to maintain an
action under this section.

Teamsters does not allege actual damages under clause (3), item (ii).

GoodRx argues that Teamsters lacks standing because it has “zero stake in the

controversy.” GoodRx asserts that statutory standing requires “the plaintiff to demonstrate

an interest in the dispute to establish standing, even when the statutory language did not

expressly require it.” Teamsters asserts that Minn. Stat. § 325F.784 does not require any

injury to have standing.

To consider the parties’ arguments, we proceed in three parts. First, we consider

broadly the law on standing. Second, we consider specifically the law on statutory

standing. Finally, we apply the law to these facts and the parties’ arguments.

A.

When a party lacks standing, “a court does not have jurisdiction to hear the matter.”

Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 18

(Minn. App. 2003) (citing Annandale Advoc. v. City of Annandale, 435 N.W.2d 24, 27

(Minn. 1989)). We review de novo a district court’s determination of whether a party has

standing. In re Gillette Children’s Specialty Healthcare, 883 N.W.2d 778, 784 (Minn.

2016). When considering a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, both the district and

appellate courts must “accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must

construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party.” Forslund, 924 N.W.2d at 32

(quotation omitted).

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 “Standing is acquired in two ways: either the plaintiff has suffered some

injury-in-fact or the plaintiff is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting

standing.” Lorix v. Crompton Corp., 736 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Minn. 2007) (quotation

omitted). Standing “focuses on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring a particular

lawsuit.” Hayden v. City of Minneapolis, 937 N.W.2d 790, 799 (Minn. App. 2020)

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14, 2020). Standing requires a party to have

“a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.” State by

Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996). However, in

Minnesota, “[t]he legislature may, by statute, expand the connection between conduct and

injury necessary to permit suit.” Id. at 495.

Therefore, standing is acquired either when a party has suffered an “injury-in-fact”

or when a party is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting standing. Id. at

493, 495. We next consider the law on statutory standing.

B.

We summarize the statutory-standing cases that we review by the legal topic

involved as identified by the particular statute under which a claim was made. These topic

areas are antitrust law, public-interest law, and voting law. And though there are other

topic areas involving statutory standing which have resulted in appellate litigation, some

of which we mention briefly below, the topic areas we consider here encapsulate significant

appellate decisions and provide an instructive summary of statutory-standing law.

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Antitrust Law

In Lorix, the supreme court recognized statutory standing to a consumer of tires who

brought a class-action lawsuit claiming price-fixing by the manufacturer of

rubber-processing chemicals used to make the tires. 736 N.W.2d at 622, 631. The

plaintiff’s claim was based upon Minnesota’s antitrust statute, Minn. Stat. § 325D.57

(2006). This provision related to standing states:

Any person * * * injured directly or indirectly by a
violation of sections 325D.49 to 325D.66, shall recover three
times the actual damages sustained, together with costs and
disbursements, including reasonable attorneys’ fees. In any
subsequent action arising from the same conduct, the court
may take any steps necessary to avoid duplicative recovery
against a defendant.

Id. at 623 (emphasis added) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 325D.57).

The Lorix court pointed out that in 1984 the legislature added the words “directly or

indirectly” when referring to “any person” who was injured by a violation of the statute,

which made clear the legislative intent that, contrary to federal antitrust law, indirect

purchasers who were harmed may recover under the Act. Id. at 623, 626-27. The court in

Lorix then referenced the only previous case involving a substantive discussion of antitrust

standing since this 1984 amendment, Humphrey, in which the supreme court explained that

the antitrust law “contains an ‘expansive grant of standing’ designed to protect Minnesota

citizens from ‘sharp commercial practices.’” Id. at 627 (quoting Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d

at 496-97). And though in Lorix the supreme court declined to “define the outer limits of

standing in Minnesota,” it determined that the consumer’s situation “falls well within

them.” Id. at 631.

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 As noted from the Lorix opinion, the supreme court had a previous opportunity to

consider statutory standing in Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 495-97. The court considered

whether Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota had standing to sue Philip Morris and

other tobacco companies pursuant to, among other statutes, the Minnesota antitrust statute.

In citing the same language later considered in Lorix—“injured directly or indirectly”—it

concluded that “[it] is clear that this expansive grant of standing reaches the injuries

suffered by Blue Cross.” Humphrey, 551 N.W.2d at 492, 495-96.

Public-Interest Law

In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Minnesota Department of Labor &

Industry, the supreme court considered whether the Minnesota Public Interest Research

Group (MPIRG) was an “interested person” authorized by Minn. Stat. § 182.655 (1976)

“to request a hearing on proposed standards regulating the use of certain toxic substances

pursuant to the Minnesota Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973.” 249 N.W.2d 437,

437 (Minn. 1976).

The specific statutory language the supreme court considered in Minnesota Public

Interest Research Group provided that an “interested person” may submit written data or

comments on any rules proposed by the department. Id. at 438; see also Minn. Stat.

§ 182.655, subd. 2. The department of labor and industry argued “that only employers and

employees directly affected by the proposed standards” are “interested persons.” Minn.

Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 249 N.W.2d at 439. Though the statute did not define “interested

person,” the supreme court completed an “analysis of various provisions of the Minnesota

[Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973]” which revealed “a legislative intent that

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such term be broadly construed.” Id. It then concluded that, because MPIRG had a

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, it was an “interested person” that may

provide comment to the department by requesting a hearing and accordingly “had standing

to seek judicial review of the promulgated standards” that the department enacted after

denying MPIRG’s request for a hearing on those proposed standards. Id. at 438, 442.

Voting Law

We now consider a trio of cases, heavily cited by the parties though for differing

purposes, all three of which consider statutory standing to bring a claim under Minnesota’s

election law, Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a) (2024). 1 These cases are: Clifford v. Hoppe, 357

N.W.2d 98 (Minn. 1984); League of Women Voters Minnesota v. Ritchie, 819 N.W.2d 636

(Minn. 2012); and Growe v. Simon, 2 N.W.3d 490 (Minn. 2024).

The supreme court’s consideration in all these election-law cases applies statutory

standing as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a), which states that “[a]ny individual may

file a petition in the manner provided in this section for the correction of any of the

following errors, omissions or wrongful acts which have occurred or are about to occur.”

See Clifford, 357 N.W.2d at 99; League of Women Voters Minn., 819 N.W.2d at 645 n.7;

Growe, 2 N.W.2d at 499.

Though standing was not contested in Clifford, the supreme court stated in a

footnote that: “J.B. Clifford’s assertion that he is a registered voter of Minnesota’s Third

Congressional District is uncontroverted. A registered voter has a sufficient interest in the

1
We cite the most recent version of Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 because there have been no
substantive changes to the relevant provision.

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election to raise the issue presented in this case.” 357 N.W.2d at 100, 100 n.1 (quotation

omitted).

In League of Women Voters Minnesota, the parties did not contest standing, but an

amicus curiae did. 819 N.W.2d at 645 n.7. In that case, the petitioners sought, under

section 204B.44, to correct alleged errors in the preparation of the ballot for the general

election. Id. at 640. The supreme court explained the following in a footnote: “Because

petitioners have properly filed a petition for the correction of an error in the placement of

a question on an official ballot, within the legislative grant of standing in Minn. Stat.

§ 204B.44, we conclude that all petitioners have standing in the present dispute.” Id. at

645 n.7.

And recently, the supreme court in Growe directly resolved an issue of standing

contested by the parties to that election lawsuit. Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, the

petitioners in Growe sought to declare that placing the name of then-former President

Donald J. Trump’s name on the 2024 presidential ballot was an error. 2 N.W.3d at 496.

After reiterating the terms of the statute that “[any] individual may file a petition,” the court

in Growe stated that “[here], petitioners allege that they are registered voters in Minnesota

who intend to vote.” Id. at 499 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a)). It then cited from the

footnote in Clifford stating that a “voter had a ‘sufficient interest’ in the election to bring a

claim” under this provision and concluded that the petitioners had standing. Id. (quoting

357 N.W.2d at 100 n.1).

At the outset, we note a common thread involving statutory standing from this

overview of supreme court caselaw. Each of the decisions involved an application of the

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facts before it to the specific language of the statute which confers standing. And our

review of additional caselaw regarding other statutes conferring standing—including cases

that the parties have cited tangentially—reveal this common thread. See, e.g., Citizens for

a Balanced City, 672 N.W.2d at 18 (evaluating whether parties can challenge zoning

decisions as “aggrieved persons” under Minn. Stat. § 462.361, subd. 1 (2002)); Grp. Health

Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 2001) (requiring a person to be

injured to bring an action pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subd. 3a (2000)).

The other observation we make is that, contrary to all the other cases that we have

reviewed involving statutory standing, the statute we consider—section 325F.784,

subdivision 2—contains an explicit statement that “[i]t is not necessary . . . that actual

damages to the plaintiff be alleged or proved in order to maintain an action under this

section.” (Emphasis added.)

With this review of supreme court caselaw involving statutory standing, we now

consider its application to the parties’ arguments.

C.

GoodRx’s central claim of error by the district court is that, “[b]ecause [Teamsters]

disclaims any injury or connection to the matter of the dispute,” it has no interest in this

matter and, therefore, has no standing. As support for this argument, GoodRx identifies

eight supreme court decisions and claims that, in “all eight, the Court required the plaintiff

to demonstrate an interest in the dispute to establish standing, even when the language did

not expressly require it.” We have summarized above the key cases among those eight.

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 We first address GoodRx’s recitation, purportedly supporting its argument, of a

principle commonly repeated in caselaw. This principle is exemplified in Growe, which

states that, in Minnesota “[a] party can obtain standing in two ways: (1) if it has suffered

some injury in fact, or (2) if it is the beneficiary of some legislative enactment granting

standing.” 2 N.W.3d at 499 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). GoodRx asks that we

focus our attention on the first type of standing to the exclusion of the second type. This,

we cannot do.

It is undisputed by the parties that the sole basis upon which Teamsters claims

standing is through a legislative grant. Nevertheless, GoodRx argues that Teamsters is

required to have a “sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy in order to bring a lawsuit.”

For the reasons we next explain, we believe that this argument conflates statutory standing

with injury-in-fact standing, and it misreads the statutory-standing caselaw.

GoodRx leans heavily on Lorix for its argument that Teamsters does not have

standing because it has no stake in its claim. In particular, GoodRx relies on the statement

in Lorix that “[s]tanding under Minnesota antitrust law must be defined by some prudential

limits . . .; otherwise, almost any antitrust violation would provide almost any citizen with

a cause of action.” 736 N.W.2d at 631. However, as we noted in our discussion of Lorix,

the Minnesota antitrust statute specifically requires a claim of injury, either directly or

indirectly. The issue which confronted the supreme court was whether the consumer was

the beneficiary of standing based upon her indirect claim of injury. Id. And though the

court in Lorix stated that there may be other cases in which a claim of indirect harm may

be too remote to qualify under the antitrust statute, it determined the consumer in that case

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had standing. Id. Most importantly for our analysis, the statute we consider here explicitly

disclaims the need for “actual damages” in order to bring a claim. Minn. Stat. § 325F.784,

subd. 2(c)(2).

For the same reason, GoodRx’s argument that the supreme court’s decision in

Humphrey—which held that Blue Cross possessed the “necessary interest” to bring its

action—suggests that Teamsters must also demonstrate such an interest in this action is

unpersuasive. 551 N.W.2d at 492. Humphrey involved the same antitrust statute involved

in Lorix and, as we note, the statute we consider here explicitly obviates the need to show

damage to have standing.

GoodRx also directs our attention to the three voting-law cases—Clifford, League

of Women Voters Minnesota, and Growe—and points out that the statutory grant of

standing by the statute there is “even broader than the one considered in Lorix” because

that statute is silent as to requiring an interest, and yet the supreme court “examined

whether the petitioners had the necessary interest” to bring the claim. However, we do not

discern, upon our careful review of these voting cases, that the supreme court added a

standing requirement other than that which is identified by the statute—“any individual.”

We first consider Growe. When discussing whether the petitioners had standing,

the supreme court recited the statutory language that “[a]ny individual may file a petition.”

Growe, 2 N.W.3d at 503 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 204B.44(a)). It additionally stated, after

citing Clifford and League of Women Voters Minnesota, that the “petitioners intend to vote

in the general election and at least one of the petitioners specifically intends to vote in the

Republican Party presidential nomination primary.” Id. at 499. However, nowhere in the

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Growe decision did the supreme court require that a petitioner must intend to vote to be

conferred standing by the statute, which includes no such requirement.

Likewise, in a footnote in Clifford, the supreme court stated that a “registered voter

has a sufficient interest in the election” to have standing. 357 N.W.2d at 100 n.1. But

nowhere does Clifford hold that the petitioner must vote to be conferred standing.

And finally, in League of Women Voters Minnesota, the supreme court again

addressed standing in a footnote, stating that, “[b]ecause petitioners have properly filed a

petition for the correction of an error in the placement of a question on an official ballot,

within the legislative grant of standing in Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, . . . all petitioners have

standing in the present dispute.” 819 N.W.2d at 645 n.7. Notably, nowhere in this footnote,

which discusses standing by nonprofit organizations, did the supreme court reference the

need that they intend to vote. Instead, the supreme court reasoned that, because nonprofit

organizations are “‘individual[s]’ within the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 204B.44,” and they

properly filed a petition pursuant to the statute, they have standing. Id.

In sum, contrary to GoodRx’s claim, when the statute conferring standing is silent

in terms of whether an individual must have an injury, caselaw does not require that an

individual possess such an injury in order to have statutory standing.

Finally, we consider GoodRx’s argument that Teamsters must have some stake in

its claim because the legislature “surely did not intend for anyone in the world to enforce

Minnesota’s rules for prescription drug discount cards covered by the statute.” We are

unpersuaded.

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 We interpret the language of statutes de novo, Findling v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc.,

998 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2023), and we do so “to ascertain and effectuate the intention of

the legislature,” Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2024). Neither party argues that section 325F.784,

subdivision 2(c)(2), is ambiguous and we conclude that it is not. “[W]hen the statutory

text is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain language.” Cambria Co. v. M&M

Creative Laminants, Inc., 11 N.W.3d 318, 323 (Minn. 2024). In doing so, we do not “go

beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the legislature.” Minn.

Voters All. v. County of Ramsey, 971 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted).

Applying these principles, we are not persuaded by GoodRx’s concerns as to the

breadth of the statutory language. We instead hold that, under the plain language of section

325F.784, a plaintiff has statutory standing to sue without alleging that they have sustained

actual injury.

DECISION

The district court properly determined that Teamsters has statutory standing under

Minn. Stat. § 325F.784. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying GoodRx’s

motion to dismiss.

Affirmed.

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