State of Minnesota v. Kent Randall Meyer

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A24-2043

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kent Randall Meyer,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Anoka County District Court
File No. 02-CR-24-2593

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brad Johnson, Anoka County Attorney, Carl E. Erickson, Assistant County Attorney,
Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, John Donovan, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

Appellant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction of refusal to submit to a chemical test of blood or urine as required by a search

warrant. We affirm.

FACTS

The following facts are taken from the trial evidence and viewed in the light most

favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Marth, 25 N.W.3d 911, 923 (Minn. App. 2025)

(“Appellate courts evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence . . . view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict.” (quotation omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29,

2025).

In the early hours of April 19, 2024, a police officer saw a vehicle traveling down

the highway and discovered it was registered to an individual whose license was canceled

as inimical to public safety. The officer pulled the car over and saw appellant Kent Randall

Meyer in the driver’s seat. After appellant demonstrated six signs of impairment during

the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the officer brought appellant to the police station.

There, the officer obtained a search warrant for a blood or urine sample from appellant.

The officer transported appellant to the hospital, where he requested appellant submit to a

blood test and repeatedly reminded appellant that refusal to submit to testing was a crime.

The officer also offered appellant the alternative option of submitting to a urine test.

Appellant refused the urine test.

2
 An emergency-department technician at the hospital attempted to draw appellant’s

blood from his left arm. He successfully pierced appellant’s skin but failed to obtain a

blood sample. The technician testified that he intended to try to draw blood from

appellant’s other arm. But before he could try, appellant stated: “Okay, that’s one man.

That’s it. That’s it. I done, I did my part.” The technician made no further attempts to

draw blood. After the failed blood draw, the officer offered appellant the opportunity to

provide a urine sample instead of a blood sample, but appellant again refused the urine test.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant with one count each of: refusal to

submit to a chemical test in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2) (2022); 1 driving

while impaired in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2022); driving after

cancellation of a driver’s license or driving privileges in violation of Minn. Stat. § 171.24,

subd. 5 (2022); and driving in violation of license restrictions in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 171.09, subd. 1(f)(1) (2022). Appellant pleaded guilty to the latter two charges and went

to trial on the former two charges.

At appellant’s jury trial, the state presented the officer’s body-camera footage as

well as testimony from the officer and the technician. The jury found appellant guilty of

test refusal and not guilty of driving while impaired. The district court sentenced appellant

to concurrent sentences of 75 months in prison for the test-refusal conviction and 364 days

each for the two convictions to which he pleaded guilty before trial. This appeal follows.

1
The original complaint listed this charge as refusal to submit to a breath test in violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(1) (2022). The state amended the criminal complaint
twice to clarify that the charge concerned refusal to submit to a chemical test and that
appellant had been convicted previously of a felony under the same statute.

3
 DECISION

Appellant argues that the state presented insufficient evidence at trial to support his

conviction of refusing to submit to a blood or urine test as required by a search warrant.

We are not persuaded.

“In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction, we painstakingly review

the record to determine whether that evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

verdict, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict that they did.” State v.

Hassan, 977 N.W.2d 633, 639-40 (Minn. 2022). We “assume that the jury disbelieved any

evidence that conflicts with the verdict.” State v. Bahtuoh, 840 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn.

2013). “The verdict will be upheld if the fact finder, giving due regard to the presumption

of innocence and to the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could

reasonably have found the defendant guilty of the offense charged.” State v. Thomas, 590

N.W.2d 755, 757-58 (Minn. 1999).

To find a defendant guilty of test refusal, a jury must find that the state has proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant refused to submit to a chemical test as

required by a search warrant. Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2(2). “[R]efusal to submit to

chemical testing includes any indication of actual unwillingness to participate in the testing

process, as determined from the [defendant’s] words and actions in light of the totality of

the circumstances.” State v. Ferrier, 792 N.W.2d 98, 102 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied

(Minn. Mar. 15, 2011). This court has rejected a reading of the test-refusal statute that

would “permit[] a driver to verbally agree to testing and then frustrate the testing process.”

Id.; cf. Stevens v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 850 N.W.2d 717, 721-22 (Minn. App. 2014)

4
(stating, in context of license revocation, “[i]f a driver expresses verbal agreement to

submit to chemical testing but does not provide an adequate sample, [their] conduct may

be deemed a refusal to submit to chemical testing”).

Appellant appears to frame his argument under the standard of review this court

applies when the state relied on direct evidence at trial. “[D]irect evidence is evidence that

is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without

inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation

omitted); see, e.g., State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (stating that, for murder

conviction, defendant’s statement, “‘I want him dead,’ was direct evidence of her mens

rea”). Witness testimony “is direct evidence when it reflects a witness’s personal

observations and allows the jury to find the defendant guilty without having to draw any

inferences.” Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40. A video may also be direct evidence of what it

shows. State v. Blevins, 10 N.W.3d 29, 39-40 (Minn. 2024).

Direct evidence supports appellant’s refusal to submit to a blood test in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 169A.20, subdivision 2(2). When the technician removed the

needle from appellant’s arm, thereby concluding the first attempt to draw blood, appellant

stated, “Okay, that’s one man. That’s it. That’s it. I done, I did my part.” Both the officer

and the technician testified that they interpreted his words as refusal to submit to a blood

draw. For that reason, the technician did not follow the typical practice, and his intention,

to attempt to draw blood from appellant’s other arm. No inference is required to find that

appellant indicated “actual unwillingness to participate in the testing process.” Ferrier,

792 N.W.2d at 102.

5
 Appellant argues that he submitted to the blood test but that the needle simply did

not draw blood. But test refusal focuses on the volitional acts and words of the defendant,

not the efficacy of the testing process. And, as noted above, appellant’s volitional acts and

words indicated his unwillingness to participate in any further attempts to draw blood and

“frustrate[d] the testing process.” Id. at 101. The video shows appellant grunting and

curled into a half-fetal position. In addition, the technician told him to “lighten up for me,

just so you’re not moving around too much” and repeatedly asked him to hold still. And

appellant’s statement following the end of the attempted blood draw are direct evidence

that appellant would not submit to further testing. See Horst, 880 N.W.2d at 40. We

conclude that the state presented sufficient direct evidence to support appellant’s

conviction.

Affirmed.

6