Cole Marie Carlson v. Cory Ross Holte

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0002

Cole Marie Carlson,
Respondent,

vs.

Cory Ross Holte,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-HA-CV-24-990

Cole Marie Carlson, Champlin, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

Cory Ross Holte, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Bentley, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Larson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WHEELOCK, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of a former romantic partner’s petition

for a harassment restraining order (HRO) against him. Because the district court did not

clearly err in its findings and did not abuse its discretion in determining that there were

reasonable grounds to believe that appellant’s behavior constituted harassment, we affirm.
 FACTS

In September 2024, respondent Cole Marie Carlson petitioned for an HRO against

appellant Cory Ross Holte after Holte continued to contact her despite her repeated requests

that he stop. After the district court issued an ex parte HRO, Holte filed a motion to dismiss

Carlson’s petition and requested a hearing. The district court denied the motion to dismiss,

and a referee held an evidentiary hearing at which both Holte and Carlson presented

evidence.

Carlson testified that she and Holte had been in a romantic relationship for several

months beginning around September 2023; however, between January and September

2024, Holte read Carlson’s private journal, called her derogatory names, continued to

contact her despite her repeated requests for him to stop, and showed up to her house

uninvited. In the social-media and text messages Holte sent Carlson, he said she looked

like an “absolute skank” and was “the most broken person [he’s] ever met,” and he

repeatedly used foul language and called Carlson names such as “slut” and

“blonde . . . bimbo.” At the hearing, Carlson presented screenshots of these messages. She

testified that Holte’s contacts with her via social media and text quickly escalated to

occurring every night and became completely inappropriate and emotionally abusive.

Holte also read Carlson’s private journal, texted her a picture of it, and called her “a liar to

[her] core,” which she described as “a huge invasion of privacy.”

At some point during their relationship, Carlson became pregnant. Carlson testified

that Holte’s behavior was causing a lot of stress on her pregnancy and that her blood

pressure was an issue during the pregnancy. Carlson explained that her health concerns

2
were a reason she told Holte to stop contacting her and blocked Holte’s phone number. In

May 2024, after Carlson had not communicated with Holte for several months, he showed

up at her house uninvited. She testified that this incident was very scary and that the police

were called to remove him from the property.

In August, Holte messaged Carlson more than a dozen times with no response from

Carlson. Also during the month of August, Carlson notified Holte that their child had been

born, after which they became involved in a paternity case and Holte sent dozens more

texts. Carlson did not respond to many of the messages, and when she did respond, she

consistently directed Holte to communicate with her through the court process in the

paternity case. Carlson also explained why she unblocked Holte’s phone number on her

cell phone, stating that it was because she anticipated needing to have contact with him at

some point to discuss their child and she wanted to know if his harassment would stop or

if she needed to obtain a restraining order.

Holte testified that he never intended to harass Carlson and argued that, if Carlson

did not want to hear from him, she knew how to block him and could have had him blocked

at the times he contacted her that she referenced in her petition and testimony. He further

testified that, because she had previously threatened to block him, but then contacted him

again, he did not view her requests to stop as sincere.

3
 The district court adopted the referee’s recommendations in full and issued an HRO

based on its determination that Holte engaged in harassment. 1

Holte appeals.

DECISION

If a respondent has exercised their right to request a hearing in response to a

petitioner’s properly served petition for an HRO, a district court may issue an HRO if it

finds, after a hearing, that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has

engaged in harassment.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(b) (2024). In relevant part, the

statute defines harassment to include “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts,

words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial

adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship

between the actor and the intended target.” Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1) (2024).

Harassment is conduct that “goes beyond an acceptable expression of outrage and civilized

conduct, and instead causes a substantial adverse effect on another’s safety, security or

privacy.” Kush v. Mathison, 683 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn.

Sept. 29, 2004). The HRO statute “requires both objectively unreasonable conduct or

intent on the part of the harasser and an objectively reasonable belief on the part of the

person subject to harassing conduct.” Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 567 (Minn. App.

2006), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).

1
The district court confirmed the referee’s findings and order, at which point they became
the findings and order of the district court. See Griffis v. Luban, 601 N.W.2d 712, 715
(Minn. App. 1999); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“The findings of a referee, to the
extent adopted by the court, shall be considered as the findings of the court.”).

4
 We review a district court’s grant of an HRO for abuse of discretion. Kush,

683 N.W.2d at 843. In doing so, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear

error and defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. Id. at 843-44; see Minn.

R. Civ. P. 52.01 (“Findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and

due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the

witnesses.”). When reviewing factual findings for clear error, appellate courts (1) view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, (2) do not find their own facts, (3) do

not reweigh the evidence, and (4) do not reconcile conflicting evidence. In re Civ.

Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-22 (Minn. 2021); see Wilson v. Wilson,

11 N.W.3d 331, 337 (Minn. App. 2024) (citing Kenney in an HRO appeal), rev. denied

(Minn. Dec. 17, 2024).

Holte argues the district court clearly erred when it found that he engaged in

harassment. Specifically, he asserts that the record does not support two findings: (1) that

his communication with Carlson was intrusive or unwanted and (2) that his conduct had,

or was intended to have, a substantial adverse effect on Carlson’s safety, security, or

privacy.

I. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Holte’s communication
with Carlson was intrusive or unwanted.

Holte first argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that his

communications to Carlson were unwanted. The district court found that “adequate notice

for noncommunication was requested by [Carlson and] wasn’t followed by [Holte],” and

5
it referenced several exhibits that show Holte continued to contact Carlson after she asked

him not to.

The record evidence supports that Holte’s conduct was intrusive or unwanted.

Carlson told Holte to stop sending her harassing text messages and to stop communicating

with her. One exhibit shows that Holte texted Carlson five times between 2:00 a.m. and

3:30 a.m., calling her “my nightmare” and a “blonde . . . bimbo” and saying he cannot

“f-cking believe” she is the mother of his child. The exhibit also shows Carlson’s response

that she had to block him but was praying for him. Another exhibit shows that Carlson

directed Holte to communicate through the court system and stated that, if Holte were to

send more harassing texts, Carlson intended to block him again. Holte’s responses include:

“I left you a voice[]mail,” and “I don’t care if you block me.” In another text chain, after

Carlson told Holte, “I respectfully ask you not to contact me anymore,” Holte texted her at

least eight more times over the following week.

Holte’s argument seems to stem in part from his view that, if the communication

was “really unwanted,” Carlson could have kept his phone number and accounts blocked.

But the fact-finder is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we

do not reweigh the evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23. Carlson testified that

she unblocked Holte at times to see if the harassment would stop, in anticipation of needing

to communicate about their child. When it did not stop, she blocked him again. Based on

this evidence, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that

Carlson’s desire not to receive harassing communications from Holte was genuine.

6
 It is undisputed that, even when Carlson blocked Holte’s phone number and

accounts and had not communicated with him in months, Holte showed up at her house

uninvited. Carlson was afraid, the police were called, and the police told Holte to leave.

This occurred after Holte invaded Carlson’s privacy by reading her journal, texted her a

picture of her journal and accused her of lying to him, and sent her numerous text messages

in which he called her derogatory names and used foul language. Carlson repeatedly

requested that the communication stop, but Holte ignored her requests. Holte’s conduct in

continuing to contact Carlson in the manner he did after she was clear in her requests to

Holte to stop the harassing communication was objectively unreasonable. See Dunham,

708 N.W.2d at 567. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err when it found that

Holte’s communication constituted repeated incidents of intrusive and unwanted acts,

words, or gestures; indeed, it is strongly supported by the record. 2

II. The district court did not clearly err by finding that Holte’s communication
with Carlson had a substantial adverse effect, or was intended to have a
substantial adverse effect, on her safety, security, or privacy.

Holte argues that the district court clearly erred when it found that his conduct had

a substantial adverse effect, or was intended to have a substantial adverse effect, on her

safety, security, or privacy because he was merely expressing frustration in his

communications or trying to speak with Carlson to resolve their conflicts.

2
In his principal brief, Holte asserts that he has evidence not presented to the district court
that we should consider. But we may not consider evidence that was not received and
considered by the district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The documents filed
in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute
the record on appeal in all cases.”).

7
 The record provides ample support for the district court’s finding. The record

includes Carlson’s testimony that the impact of Holte’s conduct—the significant volume

of social-media and text messages containing vulgar language and insults—increased

Carlson’s blood pressure and caused stress on her and her pregnancy. Although Holte

argued to the district court that he was merely expressing his frustration, the district court

did not find Holte to be credible. We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations

and do not reweigh the evidence. See Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-23.

Because the record supports the district court’s finding that these repeated incidents

of intrusive and unwanted acts had a substantial adverse effect on Carlson’s safety,

security, or privacy, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Holte harassed

Carlson.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the HRO.

Affirmed.

8