State of Minnesota v. Mark John Jenni

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0111

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mark John Jenni,
Appellant.

Filed January 5, 2026
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge *

Hubbard County District Court
File No. 29-CR-23-1267

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John A. Olson, Hubbard County Attorney, Park Rapids, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Peter H. Dahlquist, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and

Halbrooks, Judge.

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HALBROOKS, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of insurance fraud, arguing that the prosecutor

committed misconduct that constituted reversible plain error by (1) soliciting evidence

regarding the prevalence and cost of insurance fraud and (2) arguing in closing and rebuttal

that the costs of insurance fraud are passed on to the county’s insurance customers. We

affirm.

FACTS

In July 2023, appellant Mark John Jenni applied for a homeowner’s insurance policy

with Liberty Mutual Insurance for a residence located in Park Rapids, Hubbard County.

Jenni’s application represented that (1) the property was his primary residence; (2) he

purchased the residence in 2023; (3) it was not under construction or undergoing significant

renovations; (4) it had not been subject to an insurance claim or loss within the previous

five years; and (5) no other insurance coverage on the property had been canceled or denied

in the past year.

Approximately one month after obtaining the policy, Jenni filed a claim with Liberty

Mutual, reporting a burglary loss valued at more than $80,000 in stolen tools and property

damage. Jenni did not report the burglary to the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office, although

he called the sheriff’s office to report trespassers. A responding sheriff did not observe

any signs of burglary.

Liberty Mutual denied coverage, citing exclusions for theft from dwellings under

construction and noting Jenni’s acknowledgment to an adjuster that he was living

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elsewhere while the home was being renovated. Shortly after denying Jenni’s claim,

Liberty Mutual notified the Minnesota Commerce Fraud Bureau about its suspicions

regarding Jenni’s insurance application. At the time, a special agent with the bureau was

already investigating Jenni regarding a 2022 claim he made to a different insurance

company for water and fire damage to the property. That claim had been denied, and the

policy was canceled.

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Jenni with one count of insurance fraud

under Minn. Stat. § 609.611, subd. 1(a)(1) (2022), and he was convicted following a jury

trial. The district court sentenced Jenni to 12 months in prison, stayed for five years of

probation, and ordered him to serve 75 days in the county jail.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Jenni contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct that requires reversal by

(1) eliciting irrelevant testimony about the prevalence and cost of insurance fraud and

(2) stating during closing and rebuttal arguments that those costs are passed on to insurance

customers. Jenni did not object during trial to this testimony or argument.

We review unobjected-to claims of prosecutorial misconduct under a modified

plain-error standard. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). Under this

standard, the burden is on the appellant to prove that the prosecutor’s conduct constituted

(1) error and (2) that the error was plain. Id. If the appellant makes that showing, the

burden then shifts to the state to show that the plain error did not affect the appellant’s

substantial rights. Id. A prosecutor’s conduct constitutes error when it “was, in fact,

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erroneous.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 248 (Minn. 2023). That error is plain if it

“contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. A

prosecutor’s “statement must be read in context,” and we look at “the closing argument as

a whole, rather than to selected phrases and remarks.” Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19-20

(Minn. 2004).

During direct examination, the prosecutor asked a fraud investigator for Liberty

Mutual a series of questions about his role in investigating insurance fraud. In one instance,

the prosecutor asked the investigator about the general costs of insurance fraud. The

investigator replied, “[A]pproximately ten percent [of] . . . claim payments are . . . not

meritorious . . . . [A]s far as dollar figures, . . . it’s in the billions.” The prosecutor then

asked the investigator, “[D]o you know how the insurance companies deal with that loss?”

The investigator replied, “Well, in the simplest terms, it . . . get[s] passed on [to] the

consumer.” Jenni contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting this

testimony because it was irrelevant, and thus inadmissible, and did not bear directly on an

element of the crime of insurance fraud. As previously noted, appellant did not object to

this testimony.

I. The prosecutor did not err in eliciting testimony regarding insurance fraud or
by stating during his closing argument and rebuttal that the costs of insurance
fraud are passed to customers.

A. The investigator’s testimony.

A prosecutor errs by eliciting inadmissible testimony. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300.

But “brief” and “unsolicited” inadmissible statements do not constitute prosecutorial

misconduct. State v. Patzold, 917 N.W.2d 798, 807 (Minn. App. 2018) (quotation

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omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 27, 2018). Relevant evidence is admissible, unless

another rule or law prohibits it. Minn. R. Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has “any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”

Minn. R. Evid. 401. Rule 401 “adopts a minimal relevancy approach.” State v. Provost,

490 N.W.2d 93, 99 (Minn. 1992). “A fact is relevant if, when taken alone or in connection

of other facts, [it] warrants a jury in drawing a logical inference assisting, even though

remotely, the determination of the issue in question.” State v. Schulz, 691 N.W.2d 474,

478 (Minn. 2005).

We disagree with Jenni that the admission of the investigator’s testimony that

insurance fraud costs the insurance industry billions of dollars was an error. The

prosecutor’s question does not appear to be an attempt to elicit inadmissible or prejudicial

evidence, but rather a logical question following the investigator’s testimony about how an

applicant’s claim history can affect the assessment of the applicant’s risk. Further, the

testimony appears only once in the investigator’s testimony. In the context of the

prosecutor’s questioning, the insurance investigator’s brief response about the cost of

insurance fraud to the industry was relevant to establish the investigator’s background

knowledge and to provide context for his subsequent testimony.

The testimony may also be understood as an explanation of the insurance industry’s

interest in asking applicants specific questions designed to minimize its risk. With billions

of dollars at stake, the industry has an interest in investigating fraud. Additionally, the

investigator answered the questions with a variety of information, noting that he has

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worked in the industry for decades; that a recent industry survey indicated that ten percent

of insurance claims are non-meritorious, but the industry investigates only three percent of

those non-meritorious claims; and finally, that the cost of fraud on the industry is “in the

billions.”

Even though we do not find these statements to be error, we address the second

prong of the modified-plain-error standard. For an error to be plain, it must be “clear or

obvious.” Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302 (quotation omitted). “Usually this is shown if the

error contravenes case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct.” Id. “An error is plain if it

contravenes a principle that is conclusively resolved at the time of appeal.” Portillo, 998

N.W.2d at 250 (quotation omitted). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by the United States Constitution, the State Constitution, statute, by

these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not

relevant is not admissible.” Minn. R. Evid. 402. Stated another way, if evidence is even

minimally relevant, it may be admissible. State v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 299 (Minn.

2019). But relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. R. Evid. 403.

Jenni does not dispute this principle and does not cite an instance in which this court

or the supreme court has called into doubt the basic definition of relevancy. We are also

unable to locate a case from this court or the supreme court supporting Jenni’s argument.

And evidence need not go only to an ultimate fact to be relevant. See Schulz, 691 N.W.2d

at 478 (“Evidence is relevant and has probative value when it, in some degree, advances

the inquiry.”). For example, evidence may be used to challenge witness credibility,

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State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 51 (Minn. 2007), or establish a witness’s bias or

prejudice, Minn. R. Evid. 616. Ultimately, we conclude that it was not plain error for the

prosecutor to elicit the investigator’s testimony about the cost of insurance fraud to the

industry and that the costs are passed to customers.

B. The prosecutor’s closing argument.

Jenni next argues that the prosecutor’s statements during closing argument—that

the costs of insurance fraud are passed on to Hubbard County customers—constituted

misconduct. The prosecutor made the following two statements during his closing

argument:

Insurance fraud affects all of its . . . customers, . . . as
the cost of insurance fraud is pas[s]ed on to the consumer.
That’s why making a material misstatement on an insurance
application and receiving a lower premium rate . . . is a crime.

....

If Liberty Mutual would have paid out, and frankly, the
fact that Liberty Mutual had a policy that was much lower than
it should have been, if they did a policy at all, . . . that loss is to
Hubbard County consumers.

And the prosecutor made the following statement during his rebuttal argument:

“The defendant purposely did what he did in this case to try to fraudulently receive over

80,000 dollars from an insurance company that would be passed on to consumers.”

As previously discussed, to satisfy the first prong of the modified-plain-error test,

Jenni must show that the prosecutor’s statement was, in fact, erroneous. “Prosecutors have

‘considerable latitude’ during closing arguments and are ‘not required to make a colorless

argument.’” Patzold, 917 N.W.2d at 808 (quoting State v. Williams, 586 N.W.2d 123, 127

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(Minn. 1998)). But a prosecutor’s argument must adhere to the evidence presented during

trial and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. State v. DeWald,

463 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. 1990). The prosecutor must avoid statements that are

“calculated to inflame the passions of the jury or prejudice the jury against the [appellant].”

Id. at 744-45. When misconduct is alleged, the appellant cannot rely on a few isolated

statements; the misconduct must be considered in the context of the parties’ arguments and

the entire trial. State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 679 (Minn. 2003).

Here, the prosecutor’s statement adhered to the evidence presented at trial. And that

statement was not “calculated to inflame the passions of the jury or prejudice the jury

against the [appellant].” DeWald, 463 N.W.2d at 744-45. In our review, we consider the

context of the statements and the overall theme of the prosecutor’s closing argument and

rebuttal. In the first statement, the prosecutor did not argue that the jury should convict

Jenni because the cost of insurance fraud is passed on to customers. Instead, his argument

was that lying on an insurance application is criminalized as fraud because it drives up

insurance costs for everyone. That is a reasonable inference from the evidence, as the

insurance investigator stated as much during direct examination.

In his second statement, the prosecutor referred to the location of the insurance

fraud—Hubbard County. The district court instructed the jury to determine whether the

insurance fraud had occurred in Hubbard County. And Jenni’s jail text messages that were

in evidence suggested that he was not in Hubbard County when he completed the insurance

application. But, as the prosecutor argued with respect to the jurisdictional issue, whether

Jenni was physically in Hubbard County did not change the fact that he made

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misstatements on his insurance application concerning a Hubbard County property. In

order to distinguish and contextualize that the property’s location mattered, the prosecutor

stated:

[T]he fact that the residence is in Hubbard County means that
it happened in Hubbard County. The loss is in Hubbard
County. If Liberty Mutual would have paid out, . . . that loss is
to Hubbard County consumers . . . . [I]t is a Hubbard County
case because the property is in Hubbard County.

Reviewing the closing and rebuttal arguments in their entirety, we conclude that, while

close, the prosecutor did not urge the jurors to convict Jenni because they were members

of Hubbard County and would bear the cost of his fraudulent conduct. Further, the

statement does not urge the jury to convict Jenni to protect society, State v. Duncan, 608

N.W.2d 551, 556 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), nor does it urge

the jury to hold Jenni accountable for his alleged conduct, State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d

815, 819 (Minn. 1993). The theme of the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal argument is

also relevant to this analysis. Upon our review of the trial transcripts, the prosecutor

seemed focused on reiterating the evidence presented at trial that supports a finding that

Jenni intentionally made multiple material misstatements on his insurance application.

II. The prosecutor’s alleged misconduct did not affect Jenni’s substantial rights.

Having concluded that Jenni has not established plain error with respect to the

alleged misconduct, we need not address the third prong of the plain-error test regarding

whether the error affected his substantial rights. We nevertheless address this prong for

the sake of completeness. To show that the alleged misconduct did not affect the

appellant’s substantial rights, “the state must prove ‘that there is no reasonable likelihood

9
that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the

verdict.’” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 640 (Minn. App. 2010) (quoting Ramey,

721 N.W.2d at 302), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). To assess the impact of the

misconduct on the jury’s verdict, we “consider the strength of the evidence against the

[appellant], the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the [appellant] had

an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Davis, 735

N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn. 2007).

Jenni contends that he lacked an opportunity to rebut the testimony, that the

prosecutor’s conduct was pervasive, and that the evidence against him was weak. We are

not persuaded. Jenni had at least three opportunities to rebut the alleged improper

testimony and argument. First, the investigator’s testimony occurred about halfway

through direct examination; Jenni’s attorney did not object. Second, Jenni’s attorney did

not address the testimony on cross-examination or on recross-examination. Third, Jenni’s

attorney did not object to the statements during the prosecutor’s closing or in his own

closing argument. The fact that Jenni’s attorney had several opportunities to “rebut the

improper suggestions,” but failed to utilize them negates Jenni’s argument. Id.

Further, the prosecutor’s statements were not pervasive. The prosecutor’s statement

that insurance fraud costs companies billions of dollars and that the costs are passed on to

the customers occupied only a few lines during the insurance investigator’s testimony,

which covered 50 pages in the trial transcript. The statement that insurance fraud costs are

passed on to consumers was not mentioned again until the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal

argument. In those arguments, which totaled approximately ten pages, the prosecutor’s

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statement occupied approximately four sentences. See State v. Epps, 964 N.W.2d 419, 424

(Minn. 2021) (stating that four sentences in 28 pages of closing argument was “brief and

not repeated”); Davis, 735 N.W.2d at 682 (noting that the prosecutor’s improper

suggestions were not pervasive because they covered “less than one of the 64 pages of the

transcript containing [the witness’s] testimony”).

Finally, the evidence against Jenni was strong. The Liberty Mutual application,

which Jenni electronically signed, represented that the property was: his primary

residence; purchased in 2023; not under construction or significant renovation, and in good

repair; and that he had not had a claim denied or a policy canceled and had not filed other

claims within the previous five years.

The state introduced evidence that several of these representations were false when

made and that Jenni knew or had reason to know they were false. Evidence presented to

the jury during trial showed that in 2022, Jenni had filed an insurance claim with another

insurance provider for more than $10,000 in alleged fire and water damage on the same

property and that the claim was denied and Jenni’s insurance policy was canceled. That

evidence flatly contradicts Jenni’s “no prior claim/no cancellation” response on the Liberty

Mutual application. As to ownership and occupancy, both the special agent and an

investigator with the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office (the county investigator) testified

that Jenni’s business partner, not Jenni, owned the residence in July 2023 and that Jenni

did not live there. 1 A neighbor also testified that no one lived in the house during the

1
Jenni disputes a witness’s credibility and argues that, based on an order in a civil case, he
owned the residence in July 2023 when he completed the insurance application. But we

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relevant period and that Jenni appeared only during the day on some weekends. Jenni’s

own jail text messages acknowledged that the house was not yet in his name, that he held

only a constructive-trust interest, and that he was trying to obtain legal title in his name,

reinforcing the jury’s ability to conclude that he understood he was not the owner when he

represented on the application that he had purchased the residence in 2023 and that it was

his primary home.

The record also contains evidence that the property’s condition and use did not

match Jenni’s representations and that he was aware of that inaccuracy. Jenni’s business

partner’s mother described the condition of the house as “unlivable” in mid-2023: the

bathrooms were “tor[n] to pieces,” there was evidence of fire damage around the furnace

and extensive water and mold damage, no running water, and no working kitchen. The

county investigator testified that, based on his investigation and interviews with neighbors,

the property had been in serious disrepair since at least late 2022. And yet, on the

application, Jenni denied any major repairs, denied that the dwelling was under

construction or renovation, and he presented that the property was an ordinary, occupied

principal residence. From this evidence of long-standing damage and Jenni’s 2022 claim

for similar damage, the jury could reasonably infer that he knew the actual condition of the

do not question witness credibility. State v. Pendleton, 759 N.W.2d 900, 909 (Minn. 2009).
And the civil order was not introduced at trial and is not part of the record on appeal, so we
may not consider it. State v. Marth, 25 N.W.3d 911, 916 n.1 (Minn. App. 2025) (“The
general rule is that this court will not consider evidence outside the record.” (quotation
omitted)), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2025).

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house and nonetheless chose to describe it otherwise for purposes of obtaining insurance

coverage.

Finally, Jenni’s post-application conduct provided a basis for the jury to infer an

intent to defraud. Within approximately a month of the policy’s effective date, Jenni

submitted two claims, seeking over $80,000 for alleged burglary losses and property

damage at the residence. But despite the size of the loss, Jenni never reported any burglary

or theft to the Hubbard County Sheriff’s Office, even when he called law enforcement to

complain about people on the property and request that they be charged with trespass.

In response to Liberty Mutual’s denial letter and explanatory email citing policy

exclusions related to dwellings under construction and his own statement that he was living

with his uncle during renovations, Jenni wrote, “If I don’t get a check[,] . . . my lawyer will

be calling”—language the jury could view as reflecting an insistence on payment despite

his awareness of the property’s condition and policy terms. His jail texts about obtaining

insurance so that he would be “ok” if something happened to the house, coupled with his

efforts to later secure title and sell the home, further support an inference that the

misstatements on the application were part of a broader plan to extract insurance proceeds

as opposed to innocent mistakes.

In sum, the record contains multiple evidentiary avenues for the jury to convict

Jenni: documentary evidence of false statements in the application, independent testimony

and records contradicting those statements, Jenni’s admissions in emails and text messages,

and circumstantial evidence of motive in the form of the timing related to the quickly filed

claim and lack of a police report following the alleged burglary. The district court later

13
characterized the evidence as “overwhelming,” and the jury deliberated for approximately

40 minutes before reaching a verdict. Apart from any challenged testimony or arguments

by the prosecutor, the full record amply supports the jury’s decision to convict Jenni of

insurance fraud. Given the strength of the evidence, the investigator’s brief testimony and

the prosecutor’s isolated reference to that testimony during closing do not constitute

reversible misconduct.

Affirmed.

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