State of Minnesota v. Lee Daniel Kruger

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0232

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lee Daniel Kruger,
Appellant.

Filed December 1, 2025
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Douglas County District Court
File No. 21-CR-24-124

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Chad M. Larson, Douglas County Attorney, Alexandria, Minnesota (for respondent)

Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Schmidt,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this direct appeal challenging his 67-month executed sentence for felony

possession of child pornography, appellant argues that the district court abused its

discretion by denying his motion for a downward dispositional departure because there
were substantial and compelling circumstances to support a departure, including his

particular amenability to probation. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it imposed the presumptive guidelines sentence, we affirm.

FACTS

In January 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Lee Daniel

Kruger with three counts of felony possession of child pornography, in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(b)(1)-(3) (2022). The complaint alleged

that law enforcement identified numerous child-sex-abuse-material videos associated with

Kruger’s cellphone and cloud account.

Under a plea agreement, Kruger pleaded guilty to all three counts as charged in the

complaint. As part of the resolution, the parties agreed that Kruger could argue for a

downward dispositional departure at sentencing. If a sentence was executed, the state

would not seek more than the bottom of the presumptive guideline sentencing range.

Kruger moved for a downward dispositional departure. He asserted that he was

particularly amenable to probation and to a specific treatment program, was employed such

that the circumstances that led to the offenses were unlikely to reoccur, was engaged in

mental-health counseling, and had the support of family and friends. Kruger also filed six

letters of support, submitted by his employer, wife, coworker, aunt and uncle, wife’s friend,

and his mother-in-law and father-in-law. Probation completed a presentence investigation

(PSI), which recommended that the district court impose the presumptive sentence. It also

included a victim-impact statement from an advocacy organization describing how

Kruger’s offenses affected Douglas County.

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 At sentencing, two therapists from Kruger’s treatment program, N.S. and A.B.,

testified on his behalf. N.S. testified that Kruger had been participating in a weekly group

for approximately eight months and believed that he could be successful. N.S. stated that

Kruger “appears very empathetic towards his fellow group members and routinely offers

support as well as suggestions or ideas to his fellow group members, and he also has done

a really nice job in presenting assignments.” N.S. believed that Kruger had “made progress

in terms of getting more connected, [and] gaining more support for this issue.”

A.B. testified that Kruger was referred to her after he reached out to the program

seeking treatment, and that they had been meeting for individual therapy for approximately

nine months. She described Kruger as “really engaged and motivated.” She stated that

Kruger has been open and honest about his compulsive sexual behaviors, and that she has

seen progress in how Kruger reaches out to his support system and expresses his emotions.

A.B. also noted that Kruger “has a lot of insight around [his compulsive sexual behaviors]

and has now a clear kind of understanding of where he’s been and the impact . . . that these

behaviors have had . . . [and] where he wants to go from here.”

Kruger acknowledged that his actions were wrong, and apologized “to the victims

involved, to the public, to [his] family, and to everyone else.” He described benefitting

from his treatment and his weekly meetings, and that he is “learning to open up and

communicate with everyone honestly.” He described his relationships with his sponsor,

wife, employer, friends, and family and promised to “do everything in [his] power by

working on [his] mental health, support systems, professional and personal life, [and] to

never be [in court] again.”

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 Kruger’s attorney argued that the district court should grant the motion for a

dispositional departure because Kruger was particularly amenable to an individualized

treatment program as he sought treatment before being charged, made substantial progress,

and was projected to successfully complete the program. He also noted that Kruger

successfully completed probation in the past with no violations, took responsibility for all

charges in the complaint despite the impact on his criminal-history score, had community

support, and was “very up front with his employer, [and] with his family members, about

his struggles with sexual addiction.” Kruger’s attorney further argued that the district court

should analyze Kruger’s case as analogous to other addictions, such as drugs or alcohol,

and noted that research “shows a difference between those individuals that are doing this

type of offending online and possessing these works [and] those individuals that are

reaching out to individuals . . . that are real, and gaining information, or trying to solicit

minors.”

The state opposed the departure and requested that the district court impose the

presumptive 67-month executed sentence on count three, followed by a 15-year

conditional-release period. The state argued there were no substantial and compelling

reasons to depart, highlighting Kruger’s “history of having previously been convicted for

the same crime.”

After reviewing the record and listening to the testimony and arguments, the district

court denied Kruger’s motion. The district court determined that there were no substantial

and compelling reasons for departure, finding that (1) probation did not support a

departure; (2) the legislature intended to punish possession of pornographic work involving

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minors and intended to punish subsequent offenses more seriously; (3) Kruger “relapsed

and reoffended in the not too distant future”; and (4) based on the PSI, “it was an intentional

course of conduct, and [Kruger] w[as] aware that there were potential consequences.”

Consistent with the plea agreement, the district court sentenced Kruger to an

executed sentence of 67 months, the minimum guidelines sentence. At the request of

Kruger, the district court executed the presumptive stayed guidelines sentences on counts

one and two, which allowed all three sentences to be served concurrently.

Kruger appeals.

DECISION

Kruger argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

a downward dispositional departure and by imposing the executed guidelines sentence

because there were substantial and compelling reasons for a probationary sentence, namely

that he is particularly amenable to treatment.

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines prescribe a sentence or range of sentences

that is “presumed to be appropriate.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (2022); see also State

v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014) (citing this provision of the sentencing

guidelines). The sentencing guidelines also provide for dispositional and durational

sentencing departures. State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). As relevant

here, a downward dispositional departure is “when the presumptive guidelines sentence

calls for imprisonment but the district court instead stays execution or imposition of the

sentence.” Id.

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 We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a downward departure for an

abuse of discretion. Id. Generally, we will not disturb the district court’s decision to

impose a presumptive guidelines sentence. State v. Delk, 781 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn.

App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. July 20, 2010). We will uphold the district court’s

sentencing decision if the record shows that the district court carefully evaluated all of the

information and testimony before making its decision. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251,

255 (Minn. App. 2011); State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Minn. App. 1985).

The district court may only depart from the guidelines sentence if there are

substantial and compelling reasons to do so. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308; see also Minn.

Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1. “Substantial and compelling circumstances are those

circumstances that make the facts of a particular case different from a typical case.” State

v. Peake, 366 N.W.2d 299, 301 (Minn. 1985). But departures are discouraged, as the

“sentencing guidelines seek to ‘maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and

predictability in sentencing’ of felony crimes.” Solberg, 882 N.W.2d at 623 (quoting Minn.

Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2014)); see State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. 2008)

(“To maintain uniformity and proportionality, departures from the presumptive guidelines

sentence are discouraged.”).

The sentencing guidelines contain a “nonexclusive list” of factors that the district

court may consider as reasons for a departure. Minn. Sent’g Guidelines cmt. 2.D.203

(2022). One mitigating factor that may provide a substantial and compelling reason for a

downward dispositional departure is the defendant’s particular amenability to probation.

See State v. Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d 660, 668 (Minn. 2006) (“A defendant’s particular

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amenability to probation justifies a district court’s decision to stay the execution of a

presumptively executed sentence.”); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.3.a(7) (2022).

A defendant’s particular amenability to probation can be demonstrated by factors such as

the defendant’s age, prior record, remorse, cooperation while in court, and the support of

friends and family (Trog factors). State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).

“[M]erely being amenable to probation—as opposed to being particularly amenable to

probation”—does not justify a departure. Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308.

First, Kruger argues that the district court abused its discretion because it failed to

consider all of the Trog factors. We are unpersuaded.

The district court need not address all the Trog factors on the record before denying

a departure motion and imposing the presumptive guidelines sentence. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d

at 254. Here, the district court considered some of the Trog factors on the record, including

Kruger’s prior record and support of family and friends, but elected to impose the

guidelines sentence. This was a proper exercise of its discretion because, even if a district

court finds the existence of one or more Trog factors based on the record, the district court

is not required to depart from the guidelines sentence. See Wells v. State, 839 N.W.2d 775,

781 (Minn. App. 2013) (stating that district court has discretion to impose presumptive

sentence when Trog factors supporting a probationary sentence are present), rev. denied

(Minn. Feb. 18, 2014); Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 253-54 (stating that district court is not

required to grant departure, even if mitigating circumstances are present).

Second, Kruger argues that the district court abused its discretion because it

“erroneously interpreted the child pornography statute . . . as directing district courts to

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deny dispositional departure requests for repeat offenders.” This argument is not supported

by the record.

The record establishes that the district court did not conclude that it was prevented

from departing. Instead, it inferred from the language of the statute that Kruger’s offense

was a victim-based offense, that the legislature intended to punish possession of child

pornography, and that the legislature intended to punish subsequent offenses more

severely. The district court considered these inferences alongside evidence in the record,

such as Kruger’s criminal history—which resulted in a presumptive 67-month executed

sentence—and his counsel’s argument that possession of child pornography should be

treated similarly to offenses related to other addictions. On this record, the district court

did not abuse its discretion when it determined that “given the legislature’s intent that

consequences are to increase on subsequent offenses, I really don’t find anything atypical

about this situation.”

Lastly, Kruger disagrees with how the district court weighed some of the evidence.

He argues that the district court improperly weighed his statement in the PSI about his

reasons for reoffending and relied too heavily on his prior child-pornography offense and

“probation’s unexplained recommendation for a prison sentence.” These arguments are

unavailing.

The record demonstrates that the district court carefully evaluated the evidence.

After hearing from Kruger, the state, and the witnesses who testified on Kruger’s behalf,

and after reviewing the documents in the record, the district court acknowledged that

Kruger’s attorney made “a good and valid argument,” that Kruger was amenable to

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probation, and that there would be an impact to Kruger’s wife, family, friends, and

coworkers. But the district court also considered Kruger’s stated reasons for reoffending,

his relapse after completing treatment, and probation’s recommendation. It then concluded

that Kruger’s case was not atypical and that he was not particularly amendable to

treatment. See Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309 (“By requiring a defendant to be particularly

amenable to probation, therefore, we ensure that the defendant’s amenability to probation

distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and

compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.”).

While the record demonstrates that several mitigating factors were present,

including Kruger’s remorse, cooperation, community support, and engagement in

treatment, this did not prevent the district court from imposing the guidelines sentence.

State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009). And “the record demonstrates

that the district court carefully considered circumstances for and against departure and

deliberately exercised its discretion” Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255. Under these

circumstances, we do not reweigh the evidence and interfere with the district court’s

deliberate exercise of its “great discretion in the imposition of sentences.” Soto, 855

N.W.2d at 307 (quotation omitted); see also Bertsch, 707 N.W.2d at 668 (holding that

district court acted within its discretion when it denied dispositional departure, noting

probation department recommended executed sentence and district court’s decision was

supported by the record).

In sum, our careful review of the record shows that the district court evaluated the

information and evidence presented at sentencing and properly exercised its discretion

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when it denied Kruger’s motion for a downward dispositional departure and imposed the

minimum presumptive guidelines sentence.

Affirmed.

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