State of Minnesota v. Robert Jon Hill

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0235

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Robert Jon Hill,
Appellant.

Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Harris, Judge

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-23-8852

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Evan Ottaviani, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and

Florey, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

In this appeal from a final judgment following a jury trial, appellant challenges his

convictions of domestic assault, arguing that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his

convictions of domestic assault-fear and domestic assault-harm, (2) the district court

abused its discretion by issuing a domestic-abuse no-contact order (DANCO) during his

sentencing hearing and by naming R.H. as a protected victim, and (3) the district court

violated appellant’s substantive and procedural due-process rights by not holding a separate

DANCO hearing, and prohibiting all contact between Hill and his minor daughter.

Applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient to support Hill’s conviction of domestic assault-fear. However, the district court

violated Hill’s procedural due-process rights by issuing a DANCO naming R.H. as a

protected person. The district court also erred by entering convictions for two offenses

arising from a single criminal act, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.04,

subdivision 1 (2022). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Robert Jon Hill with one count of

domestic assault-fear and one count of domestic assault-harm under Minnesota Statutes

section 609.2242, subdivisions 1(1) and 1(2) (2022) 1. The charges arose from a July 2023

1
The state also charged Hill with threats of violence under Minnesota Statutes section
609.713, subdivision 1 (2022). He was later found not guilty of that charge.

2
incident in which Hill physically assaulted L.L. The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The

following facts summarize the trial evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.

June 2023 Domestic Assault

In June 2023, an argument between Hill and L.L., who were in a relationship, arose

after Hill discovered that L.L. had eaten a donut that Hill wanted for himself. L.L. was in

their bedroom watching television when Hill confronted L.L. Unbeknownst to Hill, L.L.

began recording the argument. Hill began yelling at her and threw his cellphone at her leg.

L.L. then moved to the living room where their minor daughter, R.H. was present. 2 Hill

began hitting L.L.’s dogs and chased the dogs with a broomstick. When L.L. told him to

stop, Hill replied, “You’re done. Do you understand me? You better fear me.” (Emphasis

added.) Hill then said, “I’m threatening you. I ain’t threatening you, I’m promising you

. . . . I’ll go after your farm. I’ll go after you. I’ll go after every f-cking thing you got. Try

me. It ain’t a f-cking threat. I’ll bury your ass.” Hill then approached L.L. where she sat

on the couch beside R.H., leaned over L.L., and spat in her face.

During the argument, Hill threatened to destroy an heirloom doll that L.L. received

from her father. Hill opened the cabinet where the doll was located, and L.L. tried to stop

him. Hill then hit her in the face, saying, “Don’t you grab me by my f-cking hair, don’t

you grab me by my f-cking hair and think you’re not going to get f-cking touched back.”

2
The couple’s 17-year-old son, J.H. was also in the house during the argument. J.H. could
hear yelling and loud noises from his room in the basement but could not hear the specific
words being said. J.H. observed the bruises on L.L. after she had been hit by Hill.

3
When the altercation ended, Hill directed his attention to R.H., who was present during the

altercation, and said to her:

Please take your drink and go on and go to bed. Mom and I
are done. I’m not going to talk to her. She’s not going to talk
to me. But I want you to go in your room because this is
volatile, and this is something that you shouldn’t be a part of.
All that said, I’m going in there to go to bed, and your mom
can sit out here and cry and wallow in her own shit. Because
she’s a f-cking fat pig, she doesn’t give a f-ck about nobody.

Hill then leaned close to L.L. and whispered, “F-ck off and kill yourself. I pray that you

die.”

Hill’s Arrest

That evening, L.L. sent the audio recording of the altercation to a family member,

who turned the recording in to the police. Five days later, police officers began monitoring

Hill’s residence. The officers observed Hill and L.L. leave their home and enter Hill’s car.

As Hill began to drive away, the officers conducted a routine traffic stop of Hill’s car for

an inoperable passenger-side brake light and missing rear license plate. Officers arrested

Hill after discovering his driver’s license was canceled as inimical to public safety. During

the traffic stop, L.L. was visibly frightened and refused to speak with the officers.

Eventually, L.L. exited the vehicle and officers observed a bruise over her left eye and

bruising on her legs. The officers asked L.L. how she got the bruises, and L.L. told the

officers that Hill had hit her. The officers then cited Hill for driving with a canceled

driver’s license and, later, formally charged him for domestic assault-fear and domestic

assault-harm.

4
 At Hill’s first appearance, the district court issued a pretrial domestic-abuse no-

contact order (DANCO) prohibiting Hill from contacting L.L. and their minor daughter,

R.H. The district court did not conduct a separate hearing specifically addressing the

DANCO, as required under Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(4)(c) (2024).

Although the DANCO that was issued prohibited Hill from having contact with R.H., the

transcript of the hearing reflects that the district court informed Hill that the DANCO

applied to L.L. only and that he was permitted to have contact with their minor daughter,

R.H. With respect to the DANCO, the following exchange occurred between Hill and the

district court at the first appearance:

THE COURT: [ . . . ] I’ll hear from the State, please, on conditions.

THE STATE: Your Honor, State is asking for . . . no contact
with the victim or kids. I would ask the Court to sign a
DANCO in this matter . . . . The victim’s initials are L.L.

THE COURT: Okay.

....

THE COURT: . . . Mr. Hill, did you hear the - sorry. Yeah.
Do we have a DANCO for him? . . . All right. Mr. Hill, did
you hear the terms, the bail conditions that the State has asked
me to impose?

HILL: I heard that there was no contact with L.L., but I didn't
hear, there was another part prior to that. If you could repeat
that.

THE COURT: Yeah. So the State has asked that I set bail at
$30,000 bond or $3,000 cash alternative, subject to the
conditions that you have . . . no contact with the alleged victim,
L.L. Do you know who that is?

5
HILL: I do. It’s a little difficult when we have kids together
and I live with her.

THE COURT: Okay. I would sign a domestic abuse no contact
order that would prevent you from having any contact with L.L.
or from going to the residence there . . . . Anything that you’d
like to say before I set the conditions?

HILL: Just, if you could explain the condition of how I get my
vehicle, some clothes.

....

THE COURT: Yeah. The domestic abuse no contact order, I
would check a box that would say that you can go back to the
house once with a sheriff or police escort to get any personal
belongings that you might need in the short term, okay.

HILL: Okay. Yes, Your Honor. I understand.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else you’d like to tell me, sir?

HILL: Not at this time.

THE COURT: No? Okay. So I’m going to set bail as follows:
I am going to set $30,000 bond or $3,000 cash, subject to the
conditions that I mentioned . . . . no contact with the alleged
victim, L.L. . . . . we’re going to give to the deputy through the
slot a, the domestic abuse no contact order . . . . And, sir, just
want to verify that you received a, the copy of the domestic
abuse no contact order that prohibits you from having contact
with L.L. or going back to that residence . . . . So, Mr. Hill, just
want to verify that you were served with a copy of the domestic
abuse no contact order, correct?

HILL: Yes . . . . I do have one question, Your Honor . . . .
Before I’m excused . . . . And that is, I do have children in this
case, and I’d like to be able to see my daughter, and so I’d like
to know how that works.

6
 THE COURT: Yeah. There’s no prohibition on you seeing the
children in the domestic abuse no contact order, but you can’t
go to the house.

HILL: I understand, Your Honor. Thank you.

The pretrial DANCO was to remain in effect until the disposition of the criminal

case or until further order or modification. At multiple subsequent hearings, Hill was

provided inconsistent and conflicting information concerning the scope of the pretrial

DANCO.

October 2024 Jury Trial

At trial, the state presented testimony from L.L., the couple’s son, J.H., and three

police officers who observed L.L. on the day of Hill’s arrest. The state also played the

audio recording to the jury. On direct examination, L.L. testified about the events that

occurred leading up to the assault. L.L. testified that Hill began yelling at her and that the

yelling lasted for roughly 20 minutes. L.L. testified that she became increasingly afraid

that Hill would hit her as the argument escalated. J.H. testified that after the assault, L.L.

came down the stairs and he observed that her left eye was swollen and puffy and noticed

the bruising on her leg. The police officers also testified that they observed the bruises on

L.L.’s left eye and legs following Hill’s arrest. The jury found Hill guilty of domestic

assault-fear of immediate bodily harm or death and domestic assault-harm but found him

not guilty of threats of violence.

January 2025 Sentencing Hearing

In January 2025 the parties appeared for a sentencing hearing. The district court

began the hearing by asking the parties if there were any additions or corrections to the

7
presentence investigation. The state requested a two-year probationary DANCO, noting in

part that, “Mr. Hill has some serious anger problems that I do believe require supervision,

and I want the DANCO to be in place as long as possible.” The district court then asked

the state if it had any communication or statement from the victim. The state responded

that it had communication with the victim and stated, “She still wants a DANCO, she

doesn’t want any communication with Hill.”

The district court then turned to Hill’s counsel for a response. He insisted on a one-

year probationary period, as recommended by the presentence investigation. He also

stated, “The other issue that we have is related to the issue of a probationary DANCO. Mr.

Hill would request that the Court issue a limited probationary DANCO allowing him

contact with the victim as to coordinating visits or communication with his child, and

allowing him contact with his child.” Hill’s counsel discussed the current custody case

pending in tribal court and Hill’s lack of contact with his daughter. He ultimately requested

that the district court issue a limited DANCO allowing contact with the victim as it related

to his daughter. When the district court elicited comments from Hill, he discussed missing

his daughter and his desire to see her.

The district court entered convictions on both counts but sentenced only on count 2,

domestic assault-fear. The warrant of commitment reflects that the district court entered

convictions on both count 2 domestic assault-fear and count 3 domestic assault-harm.

However, at the sentencing hearing, the district court stated, “In regard to count three, the

same course of conduct, essentially a lesser included, and so I am going to not sentence

you on that file.” On count two, the district court stayed imposition of the sentence

8
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 609.135 (2022), placed Hill on two years of

supervised probation, ordered that he serve 36 days in the Scott County Jail, and that he

complete domestic-abuse treatment. As it related to the DANCO, the district court stated

that Hill must “have no contact with the victim L.J.L. and the minor child, R.M.H.” The

district court further stated that Hill must “comply with all the terms of any active DANCO,

Order for Protection, or Harassment Restraining Order.” The district court stated, “There

is an active DANCO, so I expect you fully to comply with the DANCO.” The district court

did not independently impose a probationary DANCO.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

I. The evidence is sufficient to support Hill’s domestic assault-fear conviction
because the circumstances proved are not consistent with a reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt. 3

Hill argues that his domestic assault-fear conviction is not supported by sufficient

evidence under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 1(1). More specifically,

Hill argues that the circumstances proved are consistent with the reasonable inference that

Hill “only intended to make L.L. fear that he would take away her property.” We are not

persuaded.

3
Hill also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the guilty verdict on his
domestic assault-harm conviction. We do not address this challenge because the district
court should not have adjudicated this. As explained below, it was error to enter a
conviction on that count. See State v. Ashland, 287 N.W.2d 649, 650 (Minn. 1979)
(declining to address sufficiency of evidence for jury’s guilty verdict on offenses of which
defendant was not formally adjudicated guilty and for which defendant was not sentenced).

9
 A. Legal Standard

To prove that Hill committed domestic assault-fear, the state must prove, in relevant

part, that Hill committed “an act with intent to cause fear in another of immediate bodily

harm or death.” Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1). Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime,

as evidenced by the legislature’s use of the words “with intent to.” State v. Fleck, 810

N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. 2012). “‘With intent to’ or ‘with intent that’ means that the actor

either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified or believes that the act, if

successful, will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 9(4) (2022). Therefore, in

order to prove domestic assault-fear, the state needed to prove that Hill acted with the

purpose to cause L.L. to fear immediate bodily harm or death.

“[I]ntent is a state of mind that is usually proved with circumstantial evidence.”

State v. Balandin, 944 N.W.2d 204, 217 (Minn. 2020); State v. Smith, 825 N.W.2d 131,

136 (Minn. App. 2012) (“Intent is a state of mind that is generally proved by using

circumstantial evidence by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in

light of the totality of the circumstances.” (quotation omitted)); accord State v. Johnson,

616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. 2000) (“A state of mind generally is proved circumstantially,

by inference from words and acts of the actor both before and after the incident.”). Here,

the state proved intent using circumstantial evidence. Because intent is a state of mind, it

is generally proved by considering a defendant’s actions “in light of all the surrounding

circumstances.” State v. Thompson, 544 N.W.2d 8, 11 (Minn. 1996).

If circumstantial evidence is used to prove an element of the conviction challenged

on appeal, we apply “a heightened two-step standard” of review to the sufficiency of the

10
evidence. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017); see also State v. Silvernail,

831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we must “identify the circumstances proved,”

disregarding evidence inconsistent with the verdict. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 601

(Minn. 2017). We “construe conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict.” State v. Tscheu, 758 N.W.2d 849, 858 (Minn. 2008). Second, we must

“determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent

with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (quotation

omitted); see also State v. Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. App. 1998) (“[F]or a

conviction requiring specific intent to stand, such intent must be the only reasonable

inference when the evidence as a whole is viewed in the light most favorable to the state.”).

“We give no deference to the jury’s choice between reasonable inferences.” Harris, 895

N.W.2d at 601. We consider the circumstantial evidence “as a whole” when completing

this step of the analysis. Id.; see also State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2010)

(“[W]e do not review each circumstance proved in isolation. Instead, we must consider

whether the circumstances presented are consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on the

whole, with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” (quotation omitted)).

B. Circumstances Proved

We begin by identifying the circumstances proved. When viewing all questions of

fact in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we are left with the following subset

of facts as circumstances proved by the state: (1) Hill began yelling at L.L. after discovering

that she ate his donut; (2) Hill confronted L.L. in their bedroom; (3) Hill possessed a cell

phone when he confronted L.L. in their bedroom; (4) Hill threw the cell phone at L.L.’s

11
leg; (5) L.L. moved to the living room where R.H. was present; (6) Hill leaned over L.L.

and spat in her face; (7) Hill stated that he would make L.L.’s life “a living hell”; (8) Hill

told L.L. he would call the city and get rid of her dogs; (9) When the dogs started barking,

Hill stated, “Don’t shut [the dog] up and see what I do”; (10) Hill began to hit L.L.’s dogs

and chased them with a broomstick; (11) Hill told L.L., “You’re done. Do you understand

me? You better fear me”; (12) Hill told L.L., “I’m threatening you”; (13) Hill told L.L.

“I’m going to get rid of your house”; (14) Hill told L.L., “I’ll go after your farm”; (15) Hill

stated, “I’ll go after you”; (16) Hill stated “I’ll go after every f-cking thing you’ve got”;

(17) Hill stated, “It [isn’t] a f-cking threat, I’ll bury your -ss”; (18) Hill told L.L. that he

would destroy her heirloom doll, stating “I might crush that [doll] with a hammer . . . better

yet, I’ll do it right in front of you”; (19) Hill stated, “It’s time for me to f-ck with you”;

(20) Hill stated, “If you f-ck my sh-t over one more f-cking time, I’m going to break your

sh-t”; (21) Hill stated, “I’m going to bust that TV that’s right behind me”; (22) Hill stated,

“I’m going to break all your sh-t right in front of you”; (23) Hill hit L.L. in the face, stating,

“Don’t you grab me by my f-cking hair and think you’re not going to get f-cking touched

back. How do you like it?”; (24) Hill stated, “I’m going to go after everything of yours”;

(25) Hill leaned in and whispered to L.L., “F-ck off and kill yourself. I pray that you die.”

These circumstances proved are consistent with a reasonable inference that Hill

acted with intent to cause L.L fear of immediate bodily harm or death. Hill made multiple

threats towards L.L., including, “You better fear me,” and “It’s time for me to f-ck with

you” and “It [isn’t] a f-cking threat, I’ll bury your -ss.” Hill’s words were also coupled

with actions of a physical assault. The natural and probable result of Hill’s actions in

12
throwing and hitting L.L with a cell phone and then hitting her in the eye caused L.L. to

fear immediate bodily harm and potentially further violence by showing he could take

physical action against her.

L.L.’s emotional reaction may also be used as evidence of intent. Smith, 825

N.W.2d at 136-37. The jury heard testimony that five days after the incident, when police

conducted a routine traffic stop on Hill’s vehicle, Hill prevented police from speaking

directly with L.L. Police testified that when they eventually spoke with L.L. about the

incident, L.L. was “very timid.” “She wouldn’t look at me. She would look at the ground

. . . It was almost like she was trembling. Very, very scared.” When police asked L.L.

about the bruises they observed on her body, police testified that, “[L.L.] was very reluctant

for a while . . . it took a while for her to start to talk to us.” See State v. Andrews, 388

N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. 1986) (“Events both before and after,” as well as during the

offense, “are relevant to the totality of the circumstances” from which an inference of intent

may be drawn).

Now that we have identified the circumstances proved, we must examine “the

reasonabless of all inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved.”

Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599.

C. Reasonable Inferences Other Than Guilt

The second step of the analysis is to determine whether the circumstances proved

are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with a reasonable alternative hypothesis of

innocence. Id. Hill argues that the evidence is insufficient because the circumstances

proved are consistent with a finding that Hill “only intended to make L.L. fear that he

13
would take away her property.” The state maintains that the entire interaction demonstrates

Hill’s intent to cause L.L. fear of immediate bodily harm. We agree with the state.

Hill’s principal evidence in support of his alternative hypothesis is his statement,

“I’ll bury your -ss,” which he contends referred only to his intent to take a farm L.L.

inherited. We are not persuaded. Hill’s argument isolates a single statement and fails to

account for the totality of the circumstances proved. The audio recording contains

approximately sixteen minutes of Hill yelling at L.L., repeatedly using derogatory language

and issuing numerous threats in various ways. During the recording, Hill stated that he

would make L.L.’s life “a living hell,” that she “better fear” him, that he was “threatening”

her, that it was “time for [him] to f-ck with” her, and that he prayed she would die. Viewed

collectively, these statements demonstrate an intent to cause L.L. fear of immediate bodily

harm or death. When the record is considered as a whole, the circumstances proved do not

support a rational hypothesis that Hill intended only to cause L.L. fear of losing her

property. See Andersen, 784 N.W.2d at 332 (explaining that circumstantial evidence must

be viewed as a whole and not examined in isolation).

Thus, viewing the circumstances proved in the light most favorable to the verdict,

and applying the circumstantial-evidence standard, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence to convict Hill of domestic assault-fear because the circumstances proved are

“consistent with [Hill’s] guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of

guilt.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at 599 (citation omitted).

14
II. The district court erred by issuing a DANCO against Hill during his sentencing
hearing and naming R.H. as a protected party because it violated Hill’s
procedural due-process rights. 4

Hill also contends that his procedural due-process rights were violated because the

district court failed to hold a separate hearing before issuing the probationary DANCO

under Minnesota Statute section 629.75 (2024). 5 The United States and Minnesota

Constitutions guarantee the right to due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1;

Minn. Const. art. 1, § 7. “The Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Minnesota

Constitutions require that a party receive adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard

before being deprived of life, liberty, or property.” Christopher v. Windom Area Sch. Bd.,

781 N.W.2d 904, 911 (Minn. App. 2010). Whether procedural due-process rights have

been violated is a question of law that we review de novo. Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes,

823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). In evaluating a procedural due-process claim, we first

4
Hill also argues that (1) the district court abused its discretion because it failed to issue
the DANCO in a separate proceeding as required by Minnesota Statutes section 629.75,
subdivision 1(c), (2) the district court abused its discretion by naming R.H. as a protected
victim under the DANCO because his relationship with R.H. was not reasonably related to
the purpose of his sentence, and (3) naming R.H. as a protected victim under the DANCO
violates his substantive due-process rights because it places an unreasonable restriction on
his fundamental right as a parent to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and
control of R.H., and because the DANCO was not narrowly tailored to advance the
government’s interest because it prohibited all contact with R.H. for two years and did not
rule out less restrictive alternatives. Because we reverse the issuance of the DANCO on
behalf of R.H. on procedural-due-process grounds, we need not address these arguments.
5
Section 629.75, subdivision 1(1), provides that “[a] domestic abuse no contact order is an
order issued by a court against a defendant in a criminal proceeding . . . for domestic abuse
as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2.” Minnesota Statutes section 518B.01,
subdivision 2(a)(2) (2022) (the Domestic Abuse Act), defines domestic abuse as “the
infliction of fear or imminent physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.”

15
“identify whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected life, liberty,

or property interest” and, if so, determine next whether the procedures used were

constitutionally adequate. Id. “The procedures afforded by the government must provide

an individual with notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Hill relies on State v. Ness, 834 N.W.2d 177 (Minn. 2013), to support his contention

that he was denied procedural due process because the district court did not issue the

DANCO in a separate proceeding. In Ness, the supreme court rejected the argument that

the DANCO statute is facially unconstitutional for failing to provide adequate notice and

an opportunity to be heard under the Due Process Clauses of the United States and

Minnesota Constitutions. Id. at 182-83. The supreme court concluded that the statute is

not unconstitutional in all of its applications because it expressly requires that a DANCO

hearing be held “immediately following” a proceeding in which any pretrial release or

sentencing issues are decided.” Id. at 183. The court explained that this requirement

ensures that a defendant receives notice and an opportunity to be heard through the pretrial-

release hearing before the district court imposes a DANCO. Id. The supreme court further

acknowledged the possibility of an as-applied due-process challenge to the statute, stating

that “[t]he issue of whether a particular defendant received sufficient notice is more

appropriately resolved in an as-applied challenge in which we can assess the contours of

due process against a fully-developed record.” Id. at 183 n.4.

As an initial matter, the parties agree that by naming R.H. as a protected party in the

probationary DANCO, the order deprives Hill of the care, custody, and control over R.H.,

16
which is a liberty interest. See Rew v. Bergstrom, 845 N.W.2d 764, 785 (Minn. 2014)

(stating that generally, a parent has a liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his

or her children).

Here, Hill raises an as-applied challenge, arguing that the district court violated his

procedural due-process rights by failing to comply with the separate hearing requirement

set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 629.75, subdivision 1(c). Specifically, Hill contends

that he was not provided constitutionally sufficient notice of the conditions imposed by the

DANCO because the district court did not conduct a DANCO hearing, did not announce

the terms of the order on the record, and did not explain the factual or legal basis for issuing

a probationary DANCO protecting R.H. We agree.

Hill was not afforded constitutionally sufficient notice or an opportunity to be heard

before the district court imposed a probationary DANCO on behalf of R.H. The state

argues that the notice requirement was satisfied because Hill requested a limited DANCO

allowing contact with his minor daughter, demonstrating that he “knew it was an issue to

be addressed.” This argument mischaracterizes the record.

Nothing in the sentencing record indicates that the state or the district court ever

suggested that R.H. could, should, or would be protected by a probationary DANCO. To

the contrary, the record reflects that all discussion concerning a DANCO related to L.L.,

the victim. During sentencing, the district court invited the state’s comments. The state

requested a two-year probationary DANCO, asking that it “be in place as long as possible,”

but did not specify whom the order was intended to protect. When the district court asked

whether the state had communicated with L.L., the state responded that “[s]he still wants a

17
DANCO, she doesn’t want any communication with Mr. Hill,” reinforcing that the

requested order concerned L.L., not R.H.

When defense counsel was given an opportunity to respond, counsel stated: “The

other issue that we have is related to the issue of a probationary DANCO. Mr. Hill would

request that the Court issue a limited probationary DANCO allowing him contact with the

victim as to coordinating visits or communication with his child and allowing him contact

with his child.” This statement reflects an understanding that the proposed DANCO

concerned the victim, L.L., and that any limitation would permit communication with her

solely for purposes related to R.H. Nothing in this exchange suggests that Hill was on

notice that the district court was considering imposing a separate DANCO protecting R.H.

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that Hill was to

“have no contact with the victim L.J.L. and the minor child, R.M.H.” The court further

ordered Hill to “comply with all the terms of any active DANCO, Order for Protection, or

Harassment Restraining Order,” and added, “There is an active DANCO, so I expect you

fully to comply with the DANCO.” At that time, the only DANCO in effect was the pretrial

DANCO, which by its terms remained in effect until disposition of the criminal case or

further order of the court.

Critically, the district court never stated on the record that it was issuing a

probationary DANCO, never identified R.H. as a protected party under such an order, never

announced the specific terms of any probationary DANCO, and never explained the

reasons for imposing one. As a result, Hill had no meaningful notice that a probationary

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DANCO protecting R.H. was under consideration and no opportunity to be heard on its

necessity or scope.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court violated Hill’s procedural due-

process rights as-applied by imposing a probationary DANCO for the protection of R.H.,

and remand to the district court to vacate the portion of the DANCO prohibiting Hill from

having contact with R.H.

III. The district court erred by entering convictions for two offenses that were
committed during a single behavioral incident, in violation of Minnesota
Statutes section 609.04, subdivision 1.

Finally, we address sua sponte the lawfulness of the district court’s entry of two

convictions under section 609.04, subdivision 1. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11;

State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 161 (Minn. 2024) (considering an issue not raised on

appeal); State v. Cruz, 997 N.W.2d 537, 556 (Minn. 2023) (same); State v. Hannuksela,

452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (addressing an issue not briefed or raised at oral

argument, emphasizing “it is the responsibility of the appellate courts to decide cases in

accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted by counsel’s oversights,

lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant authorities” (quotation

omitted)). Here, the warrant of commitment reflects that convictions were entered on

count 2, domestic assault-fear of immediate bodily harm, and count 3, domestic assault-

harm, infliction of bodily harm. Under Minnesota law, a defendant “may be convicted of

either the crime charged or an included offense, but not both.” Minn. Stat. § 609.04,

subd. 1. The proper procedure for district courts “when the defendant is convicted on more

than one charge for the same act is for the [district] court to adjudicate formally and impose

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sentence on one count only,” retaining the guilty verdicts on the remaining charges but not

formally adjudicating them. State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277, 284 (Minn. 1984).

However, “[w]hen [the] official judgment order states that a party has been convicted of or

sentenced for more than one included offense,” we reverse and remand with instructions

to vacate the erroneous conviction. State v. Pflepsen, 590 N.W.2d 759, 767 (Minn. 1999);

State v. Crockson, 854 N.W.2d 244, 248 (Minn. App. 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 16,

2014). Here, Hill should not be convicted of domestic assault-harm because it involves the

same criminal act as the domestic assault-fear count for which we have concluded the

evidence is sufficient. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court to vacate

Hill’s adjudication for count 3 domestic assault-harm but leave the jury’s finding of guilt

intact.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

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