State of Minnesota v. Lue Moua

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0265

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Lue Moua,
Appellant.

Filed January 20, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-23-6139

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Steven P. Russett, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Bond,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

Following a jury trial, appellant Lue Moua challenges his convictions for

kidnapping under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3), deprivation of parental rights under

Minn. Stat. § 609.26, subd. 1(3) (2022), and violation of a domestic-abuse-no-contact order
(DANCO) under Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(b) (2022). First, Moua argues the state

presented insufficient evidence to sustain the kidnapping conviction because the state failed

to prove that he removed his biological child from the child’s grandparents’ house with the

intent to terrorize the child’s mother. Second, Moua asserts that he is entitled to a new trial

on all the charges because the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the state

to present relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2024). Because the state

presented sufficient evidence to prove the kidnapping conviction and the district court did

not abuse its discretion when it admitted the relationship evidence, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged Moua by amended complaint with

kidnapping, deprivation of parental rights, and violation of a DANCO. The following

factual summary is based on the evidence received at a jury trial.

Moua and mother were married in 2017 according to Hmong tradition but did not

receive a government-issued marriage certificate. About three months later, the child was

born. Initially, the family lived together, and Moua cared for the child when mother was

at work.

When the child was around five years old, problems emerged in the parents’

relationship. Moua was suspicious that mother wanted to be with someone else and

threatened to “just kill [mother] or kill himself . . . so [mother] could just move on.” At

one point, Moua brandished a knife and threatened to carry out the threats. Eventually, the

threats involved the child, with Moua suggesting that he would make the child “a

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replacement” for mother, “do whatever [he] want[ed] with [the child],” and would even

“sell” the child.

Soon after, Moua and mother ended their relationship. Mother and the child went

to live with mother’s parents (grandparents). Moua and mother did not have court-ordered

custody or a formal parenting-time schedule, but mother agreed to allow Moua to see the

child if he brought the child back to grandparents’ house. Moua continued to threaten

mother after she moved into grandparents’ house. In January 2023, the district court

granted mother’s petition for a harassment restraining order (HRO). The HRO ordered

Moua not to have contact with mother or go to her home, which at the time, was

grandparents’ house. Yet, Moua continued to go to grandparents’ house to see the child.

On August 8, 2023, mother was working, and grandparents were caring for the child.

Moua rode his bicycle to grandparents’ house to take the child swimming. The child got

in a wagon attached to the bicycle. When mother returned from work, Moua had not

returned the child, and mother began to worry. Around 9:00 p.m., mother contacted Moua

and told him to bring the child back to grandparents’ house; Moua refused. Shortly

thereafter, mother called law enforcement. A few hours later, law enforcement located the

child with Moua in a tent near a park. There were various items in the tent, including a

knife. Law enforcement returned the child to mother. Afterward, the child felt pain in

their private parts; mother described that the private parts appeared “hot and red.” The

child never disclosed what caused the pain.

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 Following the August incident, the state charged Moua with violating the HRO. The

district court also issued, and Moua was served with, a DANCO on August 11, 2023. Both

mother and the child were listed as protected persons in the DANCO.

On October 14, 2023, Moua rode his bicycle to grandparents’ house while mother

was at work and, again, retrieved the child in the wagon. 1 Grandparents notified mother,

and mother contacted law enforcement around 6:00 p.m. Mother was “stressed” while she

spoke with law enforcement and told them she was afraid Moua would sell the child. While

the child was gone, mother felt scared and worried that Moua would harm the child. Law

enforcement found the child in the same location as the August incident and returned the

child to mother. Two days later, the state charged Moua with kidnapping and deprivation

of parental rights and later amended the complaint to charge Moua with the DANCO

violation.

Prior to trial, the state filed a motion to admit evidence regarding the August incident

as relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Moua objected, particularly to the

evidence regarding the child’s private parts—arguing the evidence was “so serious, so

extreme” that it would be unfairly prejudicial. The district court overruled the objection,

allowing the state to admit the relationship evidence.

At trial, the state called mother, grandfather, and four responding law-enforcement

officers, who testified consistently with the facts articulated above. Moua testified on his

own behalf, explaining that his intent during both incidents was to spend time with his

1
Grandfather testified that Moua told grandfather he was allowed to take the child, so
grandfather allowed the child to leave.

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child. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. The district court entered

convictions on all three counts and then sentenced Moua to a 48-month prison term on the

kidnapping count. See Minn. Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (Supp. 2023).

Moua appeals.

DECISION

Moua raises two arguments in this appeal. First, Moua asserts the state presented

insufficient evidence to sustain his kidnapping conviction and, accordingly, we must

reverse that conviction. Second, Moua contends the district court abused its discretion

when it admitted the relationship evidence, requiring a new trial. We address each

argument in turn.

I.

Moua first argues the state presented insufficient evidence to prove that he

kidnapped the child under Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3). As relevant here, a person is

guilty of kidnapping if, with the “purpose[]” to “terrorize the victim or another,” they

“remove[] from one place to another, any person . . . under the age of 16 years, without the

consent of the person’s parents or other legal custodian.” Minn. Stat. § 609.25, subd. 1(3).

“Terrorize means to cause extreme fear by use of violence or threats.” See State v.

Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975) (defining “terrorize” for purposes of the

terroristic-threats statute); see also State v. Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. 2009) (using

the same definition of “terrorize” for purposes of the felony-stalking statute).

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 Here, Moua challenges whether the state presented sufficient evidence to prove that

he had the “purpose” to terrorize mother. 2 The supreme court has held that the word

“purpose” is “synonymous with intention.” State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849, 853-54

(Minn. 2013). Accordingly, to sustain the kidnapping conviction, the state needed to prove

that Moua had the specific intent to terrorize mother. See id.

We apply the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard to address Moua’s argument.

See State v. Salyers, 858 N.W.2d 156, 160 (Minn. 2015). To do so, we must first determine

whether the state used direct or circumstantial evidence. See State v. Horst, 880 N.W.2d

24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is “based on personal knowledge or observation and

. . . if true, proves a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d

592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from

which the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

The parties contend, and we agree, that the state relied on circumstantial evidence

to prove Moua intended to terrorize mother. See State v. Clark, 739 N.W.2d 412, 422

(Minn. 2007) (noting that intent is “generally proved circumstantially—by drawing

inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the

circumstances”). Accordingly, we apply the heightened two-step circumstantial-evidence

standard. State v. Ortega, 813 N.W.2d 86, 100 (Minn. 2012). First, we “identify the

2
The state alleged Moua acted with the purpose of terrorizing either mother or the child.
Moua argues that the state failed to prove he intended to cause great bodily harm or
terrorize the child or mother. In its brief, the state argues only that the evidence was
sufficient to prove Moua had the purpose to terrorize mother.

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circumstances proved.” State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). The

circumstances proved are “a subset of facts” identified “by resolving all questions of fact

in favor of the jury’s verdict.” Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. “[W]e defer to the [factfinder’s]

acceptance of the proof of these circumstances” and “assume that the [factfinder] believed

the State’s witnesses and disbelieved the defense witnesses.” Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d at

598-99 (quotations omitted). Second, we determine whether the circumstances proved, in

their entirety, “are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis

except that of guilt,” and “not simply whether the inferences that point to guilt are

reasonable.” Id. at 599 (quotations omitted). During this step, we do not defer “to the fact

finder’s choice between reasonable inferences.” State v. Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329-

30 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted). The circumstantial evidence the state presents “must

form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt

of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other

than guilt.” State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010) (quotation omitted).

Beginning with the first step, as relevant to Moua’s intent, the state proved the

following at trial: (1) Moua and mother were culturally married in 2017; (2) the child was

born during the cultural marriage and Moua is the child’s biological father; (3) Moua and

mother separated when the child was five years old; (4) before and after the separation,

Moua threatened to harm both mother and the child; (5) mother and the child lived with

grandparents after the separation; (6) the district court issued an HRO in January 2023,

prohibiting Moua from going to grandparents’ house; (7) on August 8, 2023, Moua

removed the child from grandparents’ house; (8) Moua refused to return the child and,

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following law-enforcement intervention, the child was found with Moua in a tent near a

park; (9) a knife was found in the tent; (10) after law enforcement returned the child to

grandparents’ house, mother observed the child had pain, and their private parts were “hot

and red”; (11) Moua was charged with violating the HRO; (12) on August 11, 2023, the

district court issued a DANCO, specifically prohibiting Moua from contacting the child or

going to grandparents’ house; (13) on October 14, 2023, Moua removed the child from

grandparents’ house; (14) when mother learned Moua had taken the child, she was worried

for the child’s safety; and (15) law enforcement located the child with Moua at the same

tent near a park.

Moving to the second step, Moua does not contest that the circumstances proved are

consistent with guilt. Instead, Moua asserts that the circumstances proved are consistent

with a rational hypothesis other than guilt—namely, that he only intended to spend time

with the child. We are not persuaded. First, when we analyze the circumstances proved,

we preserve the jury’s credibility findings. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600. Here, Moua

testified that, when he removed the child, he only intended to spend time with them. The

jury’s guilty verdict indicates that they did not find this testimony credible. And even

without this adverse credibility determination, Moua’s prior threatening statements to

mother, the HRO, the DANCO, and mother’s reaction both times Moua took the child from

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grandparents’ house, 3 all support only one reasonable inference—that Moua intended to

terrorize mother when he removed the child.

For these reasons, we conclude the state presented sufficient evidence to prove

Moua had the purpose to terrorize mother, and we affirm the kidnapping conviction.

II.

Moua also argues he is entitled to a new trial because the district court abused its

discretion when it allowed the state to admit evidence that the child had “hot and red”

private parts following the August incident (the private-parts evidence). We review the

district court’s evidentiary decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d

153, 161 (Minn. 2004). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based

on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v.

Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). “[W]e largely defer to

the [district] court’s exercise of discretion in evidentiary matters and will not lightly

overturn a [district] court’s evidentiary ruling.” Dolo v. State, 942 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn.

2020) (quotation omitted). Moua bears the burden to establish that the district court abused

its discretion and that he was prejudiced as a result. State v. Amos, 658 N.W.2d 201, 203

(Minn. 2003).

Here, the district court permitted the state to admit the private-parts evidence under

section 634.20. Evidence offered under section 634.20 is known as “relationship

3
A “victim’s reaction to the threat is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of
intent.” Sykes v. State, 578 N.W.2d 807, 811 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. July
16, 1998).

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evidence.” State v. Zinski, 927 N.W.2d 272, 273 (Minn. 2019). Relationship evidence is

“[e]vidence of similar conduct by the accused against the victim of domestic abuse,” and

it is admissible “unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.

Moua primarily argues that the district court abused its discretion when it admitted

the private-parts evidence because it had little probative value and was unfairly prejudicial.

Moua contends the private-parts evidence lacked probative value because no evidence was

presented that the child’s pain was attributable to him. And, according to Moua, the

testimony is highly prejudicial because the jurors likely inferred, without any evidentiary

basis, that Moua sexually assaulted the child. We are not persuaded.

In deciding to admit the private-parts evidence, the district court determined the

evidence was probative because it would “illuminat[e]” the relationship between Moua and

the child, and “provid[e] context for the situation,” specifically, how Moua’s actions in

October demonstrated an intent to terrorize mother. This determination is consistent with

caselaw. See, e.g., State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010) (“[T]he

rationale for admitting relationship evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the

relationship between the defendant and the alleged victim and to put the alleged crime into

the context of that relationship.”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). And we agree with

the district court that the evidence was probative to show the relationship between the

family members, to demonstrate why mother feared for the child’s safety, and to assist the

jury with evaluating Moua’s credibility. See McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (affirming

admission of relationship evidence that “assisted the jury by providing context with which

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it could better judge the credibility of the principals in the relationship”); see also State v.

Lindsey, 755 N.W.2d 752, 757 (Minn. App. 2008) (recognizing “significant probative

value” of relationship evidence “in assisting the jury to judge witness credibility”), rev.

denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008).

The district court also determined that the probative value of the evidence was not

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. While the district court found

the evidence was “unquestionably prejudicial,” it specifically determined that the evidence

was not “unfairly prejudicial” because it “would [not] tend to persuade by illegitimate

means.” See State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 641 (Minn. 2006) (stating, “unfair prejudice

is not merely damaging evidence, even severely damaging evidence; rather, unfair

prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair

advantage”) (quotation omitted); see also State v. Boswell, 20 N.W.3d 640, 653 (Minn.

App. 2025) (finding no abuse of discretion because admitted testimony of domestic

conduct, in context, fell within the scope of section 634.20 and did not persuade by

illegitimate means). Because the district court weighed the probative value against the

danger of unfair prejudice, the district court properly exercised its discretion.

Further, we have repeatedly concluded that “[t]he likelihood of unfair prejudice

from relationship evidence may be lessened by making a cautionary instruction to the jury.”

Boswell, 20 N.W.3d at 653 (citing State v. Benton, 858 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2015));

see also State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Minn. App. 2017) (observing that

“cautionary instructions lessened any probability that the jury would rely improperly on

relationship evidence”). Here, the district court offered several cautionary instructions to

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the jury to lessen any unfair prejudice. 4 During mother’s testimony, the district court

instructed the jury that the “evidence [was] being offered for the limited purpose of

demonstrating the nature and the extent of the relationship between [Moua] and his family

in order to assist [the jury] in determining whether [Moua] committed the acts with which

he [was] charged” and that the jury was “not to convict [Moua] on the basis of the conduct.”

The district court repeated similar instructions during an officer’s testimony, and during

final instructions to the jury. We presume jurors follow the district court’s instructions.

See State v. Matthews, 779 N.W.2d 543, 550 (Minn. 2010).

For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when it

allowed the state to admit the private-parts evidence under section 634.20.

Affirmed.

4
Moua also argues the district court’s cautionary instructions “exacerbated,” rather than
lessened, the potential for unfair prejudice. As authority for his claim, Moua relies on State
v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 2002) and State v. Fardan, 773 N.W.2d 303 (Minn.
2009). Both cases are distinguishable and do not persuade us that the district court abused
its discretion. In Strommen, the supreme court addressed a curative rather than a cautionary
instruction, 648 N.W.2d at 687, and in Fardan, the evidence was Spreigl evidence, not
relationship evidence under section 634.20, 773 N.W.2d at 317. Moreover, the instructions
in this case were well tailored to Moua’s concern for how the evidence might be used to
persuade by illegitimate means.

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