State of Minnesota v. Rodney Allan Williams

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0299

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Rodney Allan Williams,
Appellant.

Filed February 9, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-24-17485

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Britta Nicholson, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Benjamin J. Butler, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Ede, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

A Hennepin County jury found Rodney Allan Williams guilty of fourth-degree

criminal sexual conduct based on evidence that he touched a woman’s breasts and other

parts of her body without her consent. We conclude that the prosecutor plainly engaged in
misconduct by offering inadmissible and prejudicial character evidence. Therefore, we

reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

On August 1, 2024, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Z.A. called 911 to report that she

had been held “hostage” in a home in Minneapolis since the previous evening by a man

who attempted to force her to engage in sex with him. When officers responded to the call,

Z.A. told them that she had gone to the man’s home to buy drugs, as she had done in the

past. She said that the man asked her to do a taste test of a batch of crack cocaine, which

she did. The man later asked other guests to leave and told Z.A. that, because he had given

her crack cocaine, she needed to do him a sexual favor. Z.A. also told the officers that the

man had taken some of her possessions (including bags, a wallet, credit cards, and an

identification card) and would not give them back.

During this initial conversation with police officers, Z.A. made statements that are

not directly related to the alleged sexual assault, including the following: she said that the

man “basically beats women up all the time” and that there are guns in his home.

Based on the address provided by Z.A., officers went to the man’s home and found

him outdoors. When the officers performed a show-up procedure, Z.A. recognized the

man, later identified as Williams, as “the guy that kept me hostage.” Officers searched

Williams’s home and found items belonging to Z.A.

The next day, a police investigator contacted Z.A. by telephone to ask follow-up

questions. During the call, which was recorded, Z.A. made statements that are not directly

related to the alleged sexual assault, including the following: she said that Williams and

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other men who hang out at his home are “pimps” and that Williams and the other men

“steal . . . IDs and credit cards.”

The state charged Williams with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation

of Minn. Stat. § 609.345, subd. 1(a) (2024), and false imprisonment, in violation of Minn.

Stat. § 609.255, subd. 2 (2024).

The case was tried to a jury on three days in October and November of 2024. The

state called seven witnesses.

The state’s first witness was Z.A., who testified as follows. On July 31, 2024, she

went to Williams’s home to buy drugs from him, as she had done before. Other persons

were at Williams’s home and using drugs that day. Williams offered her a taste of a batch

of crack cocaine, which she tried. Williams told other guests to leave and told Z.A. to go

to the basement. Z.A. attempted to find her belongings, but Williams locked the door to

the basement to keep her “hostage.” While the two of them were in the basement, Williams

continually tried to get Z.A. to have sex with him. He touched her breasts and her groin

area and “all over,” under her clothes. Williams told Z.A. that she “would not be leaving

that house without giving him sex.” She was scared because Williams “said he was going

to kill” her and she “knew there was guns in the house.” When Williams occasionally left

the basement, his nephew watched Z.A. and prevented her from leaving. Z.A. was able to

escape the next day, when Williams “smoked so much weed [that he] fell asleep.” Z.A.

went outside, called 911, and ran away. Z.A. also testified that she had not used illegal

drugs since August 5, 2024, four days after the incident.

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 During the testimony of four police officers, the state introduced unredacted body-

worn-camera (BWC) videorecordings that depicted the officers’ interactions with Z.A.

after they responded to her 911 call. The state also introduced an audiorecording of the

telephone interview of Z.A. on the day after the incident. While the audiorecording was

played, jurors were given a written transcript of the telephone call to aid them in listening

to the audiorecording.

During the second day of trial, deputies removed from the courtroom a man and a

woman who had been sitting in the gallery behind Williams throughout the trial. According

to the deputies, the two persons were “being disruptive on [their] phones, talking, and

eating.” The district court was not aware of the issue until after the persons had been asked

to leave. Deputies later told the two persons that they could return to the courtroom so

long as they followed the rules of decorum, but they did not return.

Later during the second day of trial, the prosecutor informed the district court that

Z.A. had told the prosecutor’s victim-witness advocate that she was “high” when she drove

to court to testify. Both the prosecutor and the advocate attempted to bring Z.A. back to

court so that she could testify further about that issue, but she was uncooperative. The

district court found that Z.A.’s statement to the advocate was material because Z.A. had

testified that she had not used illegal drugs since shortly after the incident. The state offered

to call the victim-witness advocate to testify about her conversation with Z.A. The victim-

witness advocate was called and testified about Z.A.’s statement about being high.

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 Williams did not testify. He called one witness, L.A., who testified that she saw

Z.A. at Williams’s home on three occasions, including August 1, 2024, but that she never

saw anyone touch Z.A. in a sexual way, harm her, or threaten her.

The jury found Williams guilty of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct but not

guilty of false imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of 60 months of

imprisonment and ordered a 10-year term of conditional release. Williams appeals.

DECISION

Williams makes three arguments for reversal and a new trial. First, he argues that

the district court erred by partially closing the courtroom during trial, in violation of his

Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, when deputies told two persons in the gallery to

leave the courtroom. Second, he argues that he received an unfair trial due to the admission

of inadmissible and prejudicial character evidence, which he attributes to prosecutorial

misconduct, district court error, and ineffective assistance of counsel. Third, he argues that

the district court erred by not sua sponte declaring a mistrial after the state disclosed that

Z.A. had admitted to being high on the morning of her testimony despite testifying that she

had not used illegal drugs since shortly after the incident.

We begin by considering Williams’s second argument because it is dispositive. He

challenges the admission of six statements by Z.A., five of which are out-of-court

statements. But one of the challenged statements was not actually admitted into evidence. 1

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Williams challenges Z.A.’s statement during her courtroom testimony that she was
“not the first person” to whom Williams had done “something like this.” Williams
objected, and the district court sustained the objection. The district court instructed the
jury to disregard any testimony for which an objection is sustained.

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Also, one of the six statements does not clearly refer to Williams. 2 Thus, we are concerned

with the four remaining statements:

(1) Z.A.’s statement in a BWC videorecording that
Williams “basically beats women up all the time.”

(2) Z.A.’s statement in a BWC videorecording that
she had seen guns in Williams’s house.

(3) Z.A.’s statement in an audiorecording of the
telephone interview by a police investigator that Williams and
other men who hang out at his home are “pimps.”

(4) Z.A.’s statement in an audiorecording of the
telephone interview that Williams and the other men “steal . . .
IDs and credit cards.”

The parties agree that Williams did not object at trial to the four statements described

above. Accordingly, we review for plain error. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. Under the

plain-error test, an appellant is entitled to relief only if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is

plain, and (3) the error affects the appellant’s substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583

N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998). An error is plain if it clearly or obviously contravenes

caselaw, a rule, or a standard of conduct. State v. Lilienthal, 889 N.W.2d 780, 785 (Minn.

2017). If a prosecutor has engaged in plain misconduct, the plain-error test is modified to

require the state to bear the burden with respect to the third requirement by establishing

that the plain misconduct did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Portillo,

998 N.W.2d 242, 248, 251 (Minn. 2023); State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn.

2
Williams challenges Z.A.’s statements on a BWC videorecording that a man is a
“fugitive” with an active warrant for his arrest. It appears that this statement refers to
Williams’s nephew, not Williams.

6
2006). If the first three requirements of the plain-error test are satisfied, an appellate court

will provide appellate relief if necessary to ensure “the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.” Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248 (applying modified plain-

error test); see also Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022) (applying

unmodified plain-error test).

1.

We begin by considering whether there was an error. See Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at

248-50; Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.

Williams contends that the challenged statements are inadmissible for two reasons:

first, because they are hearsay and, second, because they are other-acts evidence. See

Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), 802. Williams also contends that it was prosecutorial misconduct

for the prosecutor to offer inadmissible evidence. The right to due process includes the

right to a fair trial, and prosecutors have an obligation to ensure a fair trial. State v. Duol,

25 N.W.3d 135, 141 (Minn. 2025); State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2008). “It

is generally misconduct for a prosecutor to knowingly offer inadmissible evidence for the

purpose of bringing it to the jury’s attention.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 801 (Minn.

2014) (quotation omitted).

With respect to the first challenged statement described above, the state contends

that the statement is not hearsay on the grounds that Z.A. merely repeated a statement made

by Williams and that the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. But

there is no indication that Z.A. was repeating a statement made by Williams. Also, the

state did not expressly offer the evidence for the limited purpose described in its appellate

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brief. In addition, the state contends that rule 404(b) does not apply on the ground that the

statement relates only to the allegations against Williams. But the statement refers to other

women and other incidents. The state does not argue that the statement is admissible

pursuant to any exception in rule 404(b).

With respect to the second, third, and fourth challenged statements, the state

contends that the statements do not refer to Williams. But Z.A. said more than once that

she had seen guns in Williams’s home, which implicates Williams. Also, it is clear from

the context that Z.A. referred to both Williams and other men who hang out at his home

when she said that they are “pimps” and that they engage in theft. The state does not

otherwise respond to Williams’s argument that the challenged statements are inadmissible.

Thus, the four challenged statements are inadmissible. See State v. Strommen, 648

N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002) (concluding that district court erred by admitting evidence

that appellant was “person of bad character”). Therefore, the prosecutor should not have

offered the four challenged statements. See Mosley, 853 N.W.2d at 801 (stating that

prosecutor engages in misconduct by knowingly offering inadmissible evidence).

2.

We continue by considering whether the prosecutor’s misconduct and the district

court’s error were plain. See Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 250-51; Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740.

On several occasions, the appellate courts have made clear in precedential opinions

that both prosecutors and district courts have a duty to ensure that audiorecordings and

videorecordings do not contain inadmissible statements and, if they do, to ensure that they

are edited or redacted before being offered and admitted. In State v. Pearson, 775 N.W.2d

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155 (Minn. 2009), the supreme court concluded that the district court erred by admitting a

videorecording that had not been redacted to remove a defendant’s statement in which he

exercised his right to counsel. Id. at 162. In Mosley, the supreme court considered an

argument that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by offering an exhibit depicting text

messages without redacting irrelevant and prejudicial messages “contain[ing] graphic

sexual references and possible references to prostitution.” 853 N.W.2d at 802-03. The

supreme court commented that it was “troubled that the prosecutor chose not to redact” the

irrelevant and prejudicial messages. Id. at 803. In State v. Noor, 907 N.W.2d 646 (Minn.

App. 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 25, 2018), this court concluded that the district court

erred by admitting an unredacted document that stated that the defendant had been

convicted of a crime. Id. at 656-657.

More recently, in State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d 48 (Minn. 2024), the state offered

and the district court admitted a videorecording in which the alleged victim of criminal

sexual conduct called the defendant a “pedophile” and a “pervert.” Id. at 53. The supreme

court stated that “name-calling is character evidence excluded by the Minnesota Rules of

Evidence because of its unfairly prejudicial impact.” Id. at 57. The supreme court added:

That the State offered this clearly inadmissible portion of the
video without redaction in a case alleging sexual assault was a
significant misstep. We expect prosecutors, when seeking
admission of a prior consistent statement—and district courts
when admitting such evidence—to be vigilant in excising
unfairly prejudicial, extraneous material before it is played for
the jury.

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Id. In a separate opinion, the chief justice described “the State’s . . . failure to redact the

video interview to ensure that Bigbear received a fair trial” as “inexplicable.” Id. at 62

(Hudson, C.J., concurring). In her concluding paragraph, the chief justice added that “the

State abused its prosecutorial power by introducing the full 33-minute video.” Id. at 62

(Hudson, C.J., concurring).

In light of these authorities, the prosecutor plainly engaged in misconduct by

offering an unredacted audiorecording and unredacted videorecordings containing

inadmissible character evidence and inadmissible hearsay, and the district court plainly

erred by admitting such evidence.

3.

We continue by considering whether the plain misconduct and the plain error

affected Williams’s substantial rights. See Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 251-55; Griller, 583

N.W.2d at 740. Because the modified plain-error test places the burden on the state with

respect to the third requirement, we seek to determine whether the state has established that

the plain prosecutorial misconduct did not affect Williams’s substantial rights. See

Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 248, 251. To satisfy that burden, the state must “show that there

is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct in question would have had

a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” Id. at 251 (quotation omitted). In

considering that issue, an appellate court may consider “the strength of the evidence against

the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant

had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” Id. at 251-52

(quotation omitted).

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 First, Williams contends that the state’s evidence is not strong enough to overcome

the prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence. He asserts that the jury likely discredited

Z.A.’s testimony, as indicated by the undisputed evidence that she lied in her testimony

and the jury’s acquittal on the false-imprisonment charge. The state’s case depended on

Z.A.’s credibility, but the state’s own evidence shows that Z.A. lied on the witness stand

and did not return to court to explain further. For this reason, the state’s evidence is not

strong enough to overcome the prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence.

Second, Williams contends that the challenged evidence was “presented in a highly

dramatic manner” in videorecordings that showed Z.A. speaking in an excited and

emotional way immediately after her 911 call. Williams also contends that Z.A. used

strong words that made Williams appear to be a dangerous person with a “history of

violence against women and a penchant for committing crimes.” In response, the state

contends that the challenged evidence consists of “fleeting references and passing

comments, many of which were difficult to hear and understand.” It is true that the

recordings were of mediocre quality and contain much background noise. But jurors were

given a written transcript of the audiorecording, in which two of the challenged statements

were introduced, to aid them in listening to and understanding the audiorecording. The

number, variety, and prejudicial nature of the challenged statements are significant, which

makes it more likely that they had a significant impact on the jury.

Third, Williams contends that he could not have rebutted the inadmissible character

evidence “without drawing extra attention to those claims.” In response, the state contends

that the challenged evidence was “countered” by Z.A.’s “multiple statements regarding

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appellant’s good character.” But the state does not identify those purportedly favorable

statements. Williams did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Z.A. about the

challenged statements because the state introduced the audiorecording and the

videorecordings after Z.A. testified. And we agree with Williams that it was not practical

for his defense attorney to attempt to offer evidence that he does not “beat[] women up all

the time,” does not have guns in his house, is not a “pimp,” and does not “steal . . . IDs and

credit cards.” Furthermore, it is notable that the district court gave the jury a cautionary

instruction concerning the evidence that Williams engaged in “drug-related conduct” but

did not give such an instruction related to the prejudicial character evidence Williams

challenges on appeal. In Portillo, the supreme court reasoned that the district court’s jury

instructions “were not sufficient to remedy any prejudice the prosecutor’s erroneous

statement caused” because they “did not contradict or otherwise instruct the jury to ignore”

the evidence admitted because of prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 253-54. Consequently,

Williams did not have an opportunity to rebut or alleviate the prejudicial effect of the

challenged statements.

We note that the state refers to the standard, unmodified plain-error test and

contends that Williams “has not carried his ‘heavy burden’ of establishing a reasonable

likelihood that the alleged character evidence substantially affected the verdict.” (Citing

Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741.) The state does not attempt to argue that it carried its burden

on the third requirement of the modified plain-error test.

On balance, the state’s evidence was not strong, the nature and likely impact of the

challenged evidence is significant, and Williams did not have an opportunity to rebut or

12
alleviate the prejudicial effect of the challenged statements. The state has not satisfied its

burden of showing that there is “no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the

misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” See

Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 254.

Thus, a reasonable likelihood exists that plain prosecutorial misconduct had a

significant effect on the jury’s verdict and, accordingly, affected Williams’s substantial

rights. See id.

4.

We conclude by considering “whether the error should be addressed to ensure

fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” See Portillo, 998 N.W.2d at 255

(quotation omitted).

In Portillo, the prosecutor engaged in plain misconduct by arguing to the jury that

the defendant should not receive the benefit of the presumption of innocence. Id. at 248-

51. The supreme court reasoned that the prosecutor’s misstatement of the presumption of

innocence implicated “bedrock” and “elementary” principles “whose enforcement lies at

the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Id. at 256 (quotations omitted).

The supreme court reasoned further that such errors, if not corrected, “would also have a

substantial and deleterious effect on future trials.” Id.

The same can be said in this case. The supreme court emphatically has said that

prosecutors must “be vigilant in excising unfairly prejudicial, extraneous material before it

is played for the jury,” Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d at 57, and the chief justice has said that a lack

of such vigilance is an abuse of the prosecutorial power, id. at 62 (Hudson, C.J.,

13
concurring). Accordingly, reversal and a new trial in this case is necessary to ensure the

fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.

Thus, Williams is entitled to a new trial because of plain prosecutorial misconduct.

In light of that conclusion, we need not address Williams’s first and third arguments for a

new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

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