Randy Dale Sixta, Appellant, vs. Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office, Respondent
Opinion text
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0304
Randy Dale Sixta,
Appellant,
vs.
Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office,
Respondent.
Filed October 13, 2025
Affirmed
Schmidt, Judge
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Connolly, Judge
Lincoln County District Court
File No. 41-CV-24-15
Zachary Webster, Birkholz & Associates, LLC, Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Madeleine DeMeules, Morgan Alexander, Assistant
Attorneys General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Harris,
Judge.
SYLLABUS
The phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)
(2024) includes individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to
themselves or others.
OPINION
SCHMIDT, Judge
Appellant Randy Dale Sixta challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to
appeal respondent Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office’s denial of a permit to carry a firearm.
Sixta argues the district court erred in determining that he lost his federal firearm rights
because it used the wrong definition of “adjudicated as a mental defective” 1 under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Because the district court used the correct definition, we affirm.
FACTS
In 2018, Sixta attempted to die by suicide by shooting himself with a gun in the
chest. Following a commitment hearing in early 2019, a district court determined that Sixta
“is a mentally ill person as defined by [Minnesota Statutes section 253B.02 (2018)] and
meets the statutory criteria for civil commitment.” In the commitment order, the district
court found that Sixta
has an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric
disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory
which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality, or to reason or understand, which is
manifested by instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty
perceptions and poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm
to self or others.
1
The phrase “a mental defective” carries offensive connotations that further harmful
stereotypes. See, e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1178 (12th ed. 2024) (defining “mental
defective” and noting shortened term “defective” is “considered a callous, derogatory
term”); United States v. Harvey, 609 F. Supp. 3d 759, 763 (D. Neb. 2022) (describing term
as “inartful”). We must use the phrase because the controlling federal statute uses the term
and its definition is the crux of the legal issue before the court.
2
The district court stayed Sixta’s commitment to the custody of the Commissioner of Human
Services for six months and imposed conditions on the stay. After the six months passed
and Sixta satisfied the conditions, the stay of commitment expired in July 2019.
Prior to his 2018 mental-health crisis, Sixta had obtained a permit to carry a firearm.
That permit was suspended due to the commitment proceedings. After the stayed
commitment order expired, the Lincoln County Sheriff reinstated Sixta’s permit.
Sixta applied to renew his permit to carry in 2023. The new Lincoln County Sheriff
denied Sixta’s application, citing to the the 2019 commitment order as the reason for
denying the application.
Sixta filed a petition with the district court under Minnesota Statutes
section 624.714, subdivision 12 (2024), to appeal the Sheriff’s denial of his permit to carry
a firearm. The district court held a hearing at which both Sixta and the sheriff’s office
presented witnesses. Sixta introduced evidence that he had complied with all the
conditions of the stayed commitment order and that he had completed mental-health
treatment and counseling. One of Sixta’s treatment providers testified that Sixta was well-
adjusted, was at a low risk for self-harm, no longer met the criteria for a depressive
disorder, and had no mental-health-related concerns.
After the hearing, the district court rejected Sixta’s appeal. The district court
determined that Sixta was ineligible to possess a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4)
because he had been “adjudicated as a mental defective.” The district court based its
decision on the civil commitment order that determined Sixta met the statutory criteria for
civil commitment under Minnesota Statute section 253B.09 (2018).
3
Sixta requested to file a motion for reconsideration because the district court had
not considered 34 U.S.C. § 40911 (2024). The court denied the request, noting that section
40911—enacted in 2008—was not a new law and, therefore, could have been raised in
Sixta’s original petition. The district court further concluded that Sixta “has not made the
requisite showing that the [district court’s] earlier decision is palpably wrong.”
Sixta appeals.
ISSUES
I. Did the district court err in denying Sixta’s petition to appeal the Lincoln
County Sheriff’s denial of Sixta’s permit to carry a firearm?
II. Did the district court err in rejecting the arguments that Sixta first raised in
his motion for reconsideration?
ANALYSIS
I. The district court did not err in denying Sixta’s petition to appeal the Lincoln
County Sheriff’s denial of Sixta’s permit to carry a firearm.
Minnesota law requires a sheriff to issue a permit to possess a firearm to any eligible
person, unless the individual is prohibited from possessing a firearm under “any federal
law.” 2 Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(b)(4)(ix) (2024). As is relevant to this appeal, federal
law prohibits any person “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been
committed to a mental institution” from possessing a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). The
parties agree that Sixta has never been committed to a mental institution, but they disagree
as to whether Sixta has ever been “adjudicated as a mental defective[.]” Id.
2
The parties do not address whether Sixta is ineligible to possess a firearm under state law.
See Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1 (2024) (listing persons ineligible to possess firearms).
4
“The interpretation of a [federal] statute is a question of law that [appellate courts]
review de novo.” Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016). When
interpreting a statute, we must first determine whether the language of the statute is clear
on its face. Christenson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536 (Minn. 2013). “The purpose of
statutory interpretation is to ascertain the intention” of the Legislative Branch and we must
“interpret words employed in a statute according to their plain meaning.”
Shire v. Rosemount, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Minn. 2016).
A statute is ambiguous, however, if it “is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.” State v. Walton, 14 N.W.3d 840, 843 (Minn. App. 2024). When the
legislature’s “intent is not clearly discernible from the explicit words of the statute, we
must look to other tools to interpret its meaning.” City of Circle Pines v. County of Anoka,
977 N.W.2d 816, 823 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Life Techs. Corp. v.
Promega Corp., 580 U.S. 140, 146-47 (2017) (employing tools to the resolve ambiguity).
A. The phrase “a mental defective” is ambiguous.
The Sheriff’s Office argues that the plain language of the phrase “a mental
defective” includes those with intellectual impairment and mental illness, which, according
to the Sheriff’s Office, includes Sixta due to the prior commitment order. Sixta contends
that there are two reasonable interpretations and, thus, the statutory phrase is ambiguous.
The parties agree that the phrase “a mental defective” encompasses those adjudicated as
having intellectual impairments, which—both parties agree—does not include Sixta. The
parties diverge in their analysis of whether the phrase also includes those who have been
adjudicated to have a mental illness under a state-law commitment proceeding.
5
Congress has not defined the phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective.” When the
legislative branch has not “defined the relevant terms, we may consider dictionary
definitions to determine a word’s common usage.” Walton, 14 N.W.3d at 844 (quotation
omitted); see also Life Techs. Corp., 580 U.S. at 146-47 (analyzing dictionary definitions).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “mental defective” as: “Someone who, as a result
of marked intellectual disability, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease, is
a danger to self or to others, or lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her
own affairs.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1181 (11th ed. 2019) (defining “mental defective”);
see also The Oxford English Dictionary 611 (2d ed. vol. 9 1989) (defining “mental case,
defective, incapable, patient” as “persons suffering from some kind of mental impairment;
persons under medical care for mental illness”). Other dictionaries, however, define
“mental defective” as being specific to intellectual disabilities. See Oxford Dictionary
1107 (3d ed. 2010) (defining “mental defective” as “a person with a mental disability”).
The conflicting dictionary definitions demonstrate that the phrase is subject to more
than one reasonable interpretation. We agree with Sixta that the phrase is ambiguous. We
must, therefore, look beyond the plain language of the statute to decipher Congress’s intent.
B. The conflicting interpretations of the phrase.
The parties offer different paths to resolve the ambiguity. Sixta contends that we
should follow a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit that
interpreted the phrase in 1973. The sheriff’s office asserts that the Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms’ (ATF) definition—promulgated in a 1997 regulation—controls. We address
each argument in turn.
6
1. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted “a mental
defective” as excluding “mentally ill” individuals.
Sixta argues that the district court should have followed the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation of “a mental defective.” We are not bound by federal court decisions—
beyond those issued by the United States Supreme Court—even when those opinions are
“interpreting federal statutes.” Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth Congregational
Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003). Those “federal court opinions are
persuasive and should be afforded due deference.” Id.
In 1973, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed whether a finding that a
defendant is mentally ill—as found by the Board of Mental Health of Lancaster County,
Nebraska—was an adjudication of mental defectiveness within the meaning of a prior
version of the statute. United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973). 3 The
court concluded that “the term ‘mental defective’ as used in the Gun Control Act does not
include mental illness.” Id. The Eighth Circuit employed “the familiar rule that criminal
statutes are to be strictly construed and to give to [the term ‘mental defective’] its narrow
meaning[.]” Id. (quotation omitted). The court of appeals derived its interpretation of the
term, in part, from a doctor’s testimony at trial: “In its plain meaning, the term ‘mental
defective,’ as Dr. Richardson testified, normally designates an individual marked
subnormal intelligence.” Id. at 1124. The Eighth Circuit also looked to a state court
opinion, definitions from a psychiatric dictionary, the Encyclopedia Britannica, and The
3
The Eighth Circuit did not reach the question of “whether the ‘finding’ was an
‘adjudication[.]’” Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1123.
7
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment. Id. Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the definition of “a mental defective” is “a person who has never
possessed a normal degree of intellectual capacity, whereas in an insane person faculties
which were originally normal have been impaired by mental disease.” 4 Id. The court
recognized that some courts have given the term “a more expansive meaning.” Id. at 1125.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision offers one avenue to resolve the
ambiguity. We are not bound by Hansel, but we afford the federal appellate court’s
decision due deference in considering whether to adopt that interpretation. See Plymouth
Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d at 20.
2. The ATF defined “a mental defective” as including those who are
mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.
The sheriff’s office argues that the district court correctly determined that the ATF’s
definition of “adjudicated as a mental defective” should control our analysis. In 1997, the
ATF defined “adjudicated as a mental defective” to mean there was “[a] determination by
a court, board, commission, or other lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked
subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease: (1) Is a
danger to himself or to others; or (2) Lacks the mental capacity to manage his own affairs.”
27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2024) (emphasis added). When proposing the rule, the ATF noted
that “[t]he legislative history makes it clear that Congress would broadly apply the
4
Sixta also cites as supporting his position. In Harvey, the Nebraska federal district court
addressed the ATF’s regulation, but ultimately, as it was compelled to do, followed the
Eighth Circuit’s binding decision in Hansel. 609 F. Supp. 3d at 763. Unlike the Nebraska
federal court, we are not required to follow the Eighth Circuit’s decision. Plymouth
Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d at 20.
8
prohibition against the ownership of firearms by ‘mentally unstable’ or ‘irresponsible’
persons.” Definitions for the Categories of Persons Prohibited from Receiving Firearms,
61 Fed. Reg. 47,095, 47,097 (Sept. 6, 1996) (to be codified at 27 C.F.R. pt. 178).
The sheriff’s office argues that the ATF’s definition in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 is binding
as a “legislative” rule, which has the force and effect of law. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S.
558, 583 (2019). The sheriff’s office contends that Congress granted the ATF authority to
promulgate a legislative rule, 5 and the ATF complied with the notice-and-comment
procedural requirements. 6 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302-03 (1979); Perez
v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (analyzing three-step procedure that
requires agencies to (1) give notice, (2) allow for comments, and (3) include a general
statement of basis and purpose in its final rule); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2024).
But post-Loper Bright, an agency of the executive branch that promulgates a
regulation defining a statutory phrase enacted by the legislative branch is no longer entitled
to deference by the judicial branch. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,
402 (2024). Courts may find the agency’s interpretation of the statute to be persuasive, but
5
Congress granted the Attorney General the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the Gun Control Act of 1968. See 18 U.S.C. § 926(a) (2024). The
Attorney General and Congress delegated administration and enforcement of the Act to the
ATF. See 28 U.S.C. § 599A(b)(1) (2024); 28 C.F.R. § 0.130(a)(1)-(2) (2025). Thus,
Congress has granted the ATF the authority to create a legislative regulation.
6
The ATF gave notice of its intent to amend the federal regulations to provide definitions
for categories of persons prohibited from possessing firearms and allowed 90 days for
interested parties to submit comments. See Definitions for the Categories of Persons
Prohibited from Receiving Firearms, 61 Fed. Reg. at 47,095-98. The ATF also provided a
general statement of basis and purpose of the regulation. Id. at 47,095-96.
9
the regulation is not controlling. Id. (“[A]lthough an agency’s interpretation of a statute
cannot bind a court, it may be especially informative to the extent it rests on factual
premises within the agency’s expertise”) (quotations omitted). Thus, we reject the sheriff’s
office’s argument that the regulation has the full force and effect of law as a legislative rule
that is binding on our judicial interpretation of the phrase.
The sheriff’s office contends that, even if the regulation is not binding, we should
determine that the ATF’s definition is more persuasive than the Eighth Circuit’s definition.
The United States Supreme Court has provided guidance on how, post-Loper Bright, courts
should analyze an agency’s regulation that defines statutory terms. See Bondi v.
VanDerStok, 145 S. Ct. 857 (2025). VanDerStok involved the ATF’s regulation defining
a statutory phrase as applied to parts of guns in a weapon-parts kits. Id. at 864-65. The
Supreme Court analyzed whether the ATF’s regulation defining the statutory term “is
facially inconsistent with the [Gun Control Act].” Id. at 872. In analyzing the regulation,
the Supreme Court provided that, “while ‘courts must exercise independent judgment in
determining the meaning of statutory provisions,’ the contemporary and consistent views
of a coordinate branch of government can provide evidence of the law’s meaning.” Id. at
874 (quoting Loper Bright, 603 U.S. at 394). The Supreme Court noted that the ATF’s
new regulation was consistent with the agency’s long-held views. Id. at 873-74; see also
id. at 876-77 (discussing ATF’s historical and consistent views) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). The Court concluded that the ATF’s new regulation was consistent with the
agency’s past interpretations and regulations, and, thus, the Supreme Court used the ATF’s
definition for the statutory term. Id. at 873-76.
10
Although VanDerStok addressed a different ATF regulation defining a different
statutory term, the decision provides a roadmap for our analysis. Consistent with the
guidance from VanDerStok, we conclude that the district court properly applied the ATF’s
definition to the phrase “a mental defective.” We reach this result for three reasons.
First, as the Supreme Court noted in VanDerStok, Congress has tasked the ATF to
administer the laws surrounding who is eligible to possess firearms. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 926(a); 28 U.S.C. § 599A(b)(1). Given the agency’s specialized knowledge due to
Congress’s grant of authority, we may give the regulation some weight.
Second, ATF’s regulation is consistent with the long tradition of discouraging
firearm possession by people living with mental illness. See generally District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (stating that “nothing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill”); United States v. Veasley, 98 F.4th 906, 912-16 (8th Cir. 2024) (detailing
history of mental-illness-based prohibitions in firearm regulations).
Third, the ATF’s regulation has existed since 1997, nearly a quarter of a century
after the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision in Hansel. See Definitions for the Categories
of Persons Prohibited from Receiving Firearms, 61 Fed. Reg. at 47,095. Before adopting
the definition in the regulation, the ATF examined applicable caselaw. See id. at 47,097
(“With respect to the term, ‘adjudicated as a mental defective,’ [the] ATF has examined
the legislative history of the term, applicable case law, and the interpretation of the term
by other Federal agencies.”) (emphasis added). Given the limited opinions addressing this
issue before the regulation was codified in 1997, we can reasonably assume that the ATF
11
considered the Eighth Circuit’s Hansel opinion when defining the phrase. Cf.
Pecinovsky v. AMCO Ins. Co., 613 N.W.2d 804, 809 (Minn. 2000) (“Courts presume that
the legislature acts with full knowledge of previous statutes and existing caselaw.”), rev.
denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000). The decades-old regulation, implicit rejection of the Eighth
Circuit’s definition, and Executive Branch’s actions since the regulation—without any
objection from Congress—provides persuasive weight that the ATF’s definition should
apply. See generally Kennedy v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2427, 2455 (2025)
(noting Executive Branch’s practice “buttresse[d] the ordinary meaning and natural
interpretation” of a statutory term where the “Executive Branch’s actions for the last 26
years”—during which “relevant government actors” interpreted a statutory term as
authorizing certain appointment powers—“reflected [a] straightforward interpretation of
the statute—without any apparent objection from Congress”). Thus, we hold that the
phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) includes
individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to themselves or others.
Our holding finds support in United States Supreme Court precedent, albeit in dicta.
In Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether an expunction of a state conviction automatically removed the federal
prohibition against possessing firearms. 460 U.S. 103, 117 (1983). In ruling that Congress
did not intend to automatically remove the prohibition against possessing firearms, the
Court looked to section 922(g)(4) as an instructive example. The Supreme Court wrote,
The imposition, by §§ 922(g)(4) and (h)(4), of continuing
disability on a person who “has been adjudicated” a mental
defective or committed to a mental institution is particularly
12
instructive. A person adjudicated as a mental defective may
later be adjudged competent, and a person committed to a
mental institution later may be deemed cured and released. Yet
Congress made no exception for subsequent curative events.
The past adjudication or commitment disqualifies. Congress
obviously felt that such a person, though unfortunate, was too
much of a risk to be allowed firearms privileges.
Id.
Although not binding, the Supreme Court’s analysis in New Banner adds support to
our conclusion. The Supreme Court recognized that “[a] person adjudicated as a mental
defective may later be adjudged competent,” but the individual remains disqualified from
possessing a firearm. Id. Under the Eighth Circuit’s narrow definition, a person of
“subnormal intelligence” 7 could never later be “adjudged competent[.]” Id. In contrast,
the ATF’s definition conforms with the Supreme Court’s reading of the statute because a
person living with a mental illness may be adjudicated incompetent at one point in time,
but later be adjudged competent. Id.
We acknowledge Sixta’s public-policy arguments that a mental-health crisis that
occurred years ago should not have permanent negative legal consequences. There may
be merit to Sixta’s position, considering that he received a stayed civil commitment,
complied with all conditions set by the commitment court, sought therapy and counseling,
was subsequently determined by his treating doctor to be at a low risk for self-harm, and
whose treating doctor testified he no longer met the criteria for a depressive disorder. And
we are mindful of the concerns expressed in the dissent about this federal law defining
7
Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1124.
13
Sixta’s constitutional rights for the rest of his life. But we are not a policymaking court.
Cmty. Cares v. Faulkner, 949 N.W.2d 296, 298 (Minn. App. 2020) (noting that the
Minnesota Court of Appeals does not create public policy), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 17,
2020). We must follow the law as written and as Congress intended. Cf.
Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d 283, 286 (Minn. App. 1987) (“The task of extending
existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”),
rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 18, 1987). The statute reflects a congressional policy decision
consistent with longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by certain people.
Because we conclude that it effectuates the legislative intent, the ATF’s regulation
offers the best interpretation of the antiquated statutory phrase. Since Sixta had been
ajudicated “a mental defective”—which, under the ATF’s definition includes a person with
a mental illness who is a danger to himself or others—the district court did not err in
denying Sixta’s petition to appeal of the sheriff’s denial of his permit to carry a firearm.
II. The district court did not err in rejecting Sixta’s arguments raised for the first
time in Sixta’s motion to reconsider.
Sixta requested permission from the district court to move for reconsideration so the
court could consider a new statutory argument. In ruling on Sixta’s motion, the district
court determined that Sixta’s new statutory argument was not “an intervening legal
development.” The court also determined that Sixta failed to demonstrate that its earlier
decision was palpably wrong. The district court denied Sixta’s request for permission to
bring a motion for reconsideration.
14
We have held that a district court’s denial of a request for permission to move for
reconsideration under Minnesota General Rules of Practice 115.11 “is not an appealable
order.” Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d 435, 442 (Minn. App. 2019); see also Baker v. Amtrack
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 588 N.W.2d 749, 755 (Minn. App. 1999) (noting that denial
of request for reconsideration, even if construed as an order, was not appealable under
Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure 103.03 because the denial “neither
determined Baker’s action nor prevented a judgment from which Baker could appeal”);
Superior Shores Lakehome Ass’n v. Jensen-Re Partners, 792 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Minn. App.
2011) (stating that this court would not consider an issue that was not raised until a request
to file a motion for reconsideration). As such, we do not consider Sixta’s statutory
argument that was raised for the first time in a request for permission to bring a motion to
reconsider. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (noting appellate courts
only consider those issues argued before and considered by the district court).
DECISION
The phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective,” as used in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4),
includes individuals who have been adjudicated mentally ill and a danger to themselves or
others. The district court properly applied the ATF’s definition of that phrase to reject
Sixta’s petition to appeal the sheriff office’s denial of his permit to carry a firearm.
Affirmed.
15
CONNOLLY, Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part)
I concur in part II of the majority opinion that affirms the decision of the district
court to deny appellant Randy Dale Sixta’s request for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration relating to his argument under 34 U.S.C. § 40911 (2024). But I respectfully
dissent from the rest of the decision.
Under the United States Code, it is unlawful for any person “who has been
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution” to
“receive any firearm or ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2024) (emphasis added). I
believe, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Hansel, that the
adjudication of a person as a “mental defective,” means to designate the individual as one
“of marked subnormal intelligence.” 474 F.2d 1120, 1124 (8th Cir. 1973). Appellant here
has never been adjudicated a “mental defective” as that term was defined in Hansel. And,
as the district court found, and counsel for respondent conceded at oral argument, appellant
was never committed to a mental institution. Moreover, as the district court also found,
appellant’s doctor testified that he had no mental-health-related concerns regarding
appellant. Therefore, I would reverse the district court’s decision and order that appellant
be granted a firearm permit.
I begin by noting that Congress never defined the phrase “adjudicated as a mental
defective” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2024). But the Hansel court did in 1973. Id. at
1123-24. In that case, the court recognized that “a distinction has usually been made
between those persons who are mentally defective or deficient on the one hand, and those
who are mentally diseased or ill on the other.” Id. at 1124. The court then stated that it
C/D-1
“must construe [section 922] narrowly and give to ‘mental defective’ its general meaning.”
Id. 1125. The court added that, “[i]f it is the desire of Congress to prohibit persons who
have any history of mental illness from possessing guns, it can pass legislation to that
effect, but we cannot read into this criminal statute an intent to do so.” Id. The Hansel
decision has never been reversed, and the statute has never been amended to define “mental
defective.” See 18 U.S.C. § 922.
Respondent Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office’s entire argument is based on a
regulation that was promulgated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)
in 1997. That regulation is found in the Code of Federal Regulations, and states that
adjudicated as a mental defective means that there was
(a) A determination by a court, board, commission, or
other lawful authority that a person, as a result of marked
subnormal intelligence, or mental illness, incompetency,
condition, or disease:
(1) Is a danger to himself or to others; or
(2) Lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his
own affairs.
27 C.F.R. § 478.11(a) (2024). Since appellant was subject to a stayed civil commitment,
respondent argues that there was such a “determination” and therefore he cannot be granted
a firearm permit. While respondent is certain of its argument, I am not.
I freely admit that the regulation says what it says. But following the Supreme
Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, a federal agency of the executive
branch that promulgates a regulation defining a statutory phrase enacted by Congress is no
longer subject to deference by the judicial branch. 603 U.S. 369, 402 (2024) (stating that,
C/D-2
“even when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical matter, it does not follow that
Congress has taken the power to authoritatively interpret the statute from the courts and
given it to the agency”). As such, the regulation carries only persuasive value. Id.
(“[A]lthough an agency’s interpretation of a statute cannot bind a court, it may be
especially informative to the extent it rests on factual premises within the agency’s
expertise.” (quotations omitted)).
I do not find the regulation persuasive. Instead, in light of the Hansel court’s narrow
construction of section 922, which has never been reversed, I find the Hansel court’s
interpretation of section 922 to be persuasive. See Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth
Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. App. 2003) (instructing that federal
caselaw, while not binding, may be persuasive and should be accorded “due deference”).
I also find Hansel particularly persuasive because Congress has never amended 18 U.S.C.
§ 922 to define the phrase “adjudicated as a mental defective, and other federal circuit
courts, as well as federal district courts within the Eighth Circuit that were decided after 27
C.F.R. § 478.11(a) was adopted, have relied on Hansel, agreeing that is still good law.
For example, in United States v. B.H., the federal district court quoted Hansel and
stated: “‘If it is the desire of Congress to prohibit persons who have any history of mental
illness from possessing guns, it can pass legislation to that effect, but we cannot read into
this criminal statute an intent to do so.’” 466 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (N.D. Iowa 2006)
(emphasis added) (quoting Hansel, 474 F. 2d at 1123, 1125). In B.H., the federal district
court considered the same regulation that is at issue in this case. Id. at 1144. In rejecting
that regulation’s application, the court stated that it was bound by precedent and noted that
C/D-3
the court in Hansel referred to the phrase “mental defective” as a term of art with a long
history in psychology and the law. Id. at 1146 (citing Hansel, 474 F. 2d at 1124 (discussing
treatises and cases from the early 1900s)). The court went on to say that, “[i]t is a well-
settled principle that where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning in the law of this country, they are presumed to have been used in that
sense.” Id. at 1146-47 (quotation omitted).
Similarly, in United States v. Harvey, 609 F. Supp. 3d 759 (D. Neb. 2022), a
different federal district court rejected the application of this regulation. In that case, the
court stated: “It may be true, as the government suggests, that the ATF regulation is a more
modern, ‘better’ definition. But the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Hansel was quite plainly
an exercise in statutory interpretation, and its holding—premised on the statutory text—is
both clear and on point.” Harvey, 609 F. Supp. 3d at 763 (citation omitted).
Of course, a regulation cannot contradict statutory text. See Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 122 (1994). But that is exactly what respondent wants this court to do. I will
not.
Importantly, the Hansel definition of “mental defective” is also not limited to the
Eighth Circuit. In Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals acknowledged that: “we note that § 922(g)(4) does not use the phrase ‘mentally
ill,’ nor does it attempt to prohibit all currently mentally ill persons from firearm
possession. Rather, the statute uses prior judicial adjudications—incompetency and
involuntary commitment—as proxies for mental illness.” 837 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir.
2016) (en banc).
C/D-4
Similarly, in United States v. Rehlander, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the convictions of two defendants for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), because they had
neither been adjudicated as a mental defective nor committed to a mental institution. 666
F.3d 45, 50-51 (1st Cir. 2012). After acknowledging 27 C.F.R. § 478.11, the court reasoned
that,
in section 922, Congress did not prohibit gun possession by
those who were or are mentally ill and dangerous, and such a
free floating prohibition would be very hard to administer,
although perhaps not impossible. This is why, as with the ban
on prior felons, Congress sought to piggyback on
determinations made in prior judicial proceedings to establish
status.
Id. at 50. The court went on to state: “Thus, section 922(g)(4) does not bar firearms
possession for those who are or were mentally ill and dangerous, but (pertinently) only for
any person who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or has been committed to a
mental institution.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
It is also telling that section 922(g)(4) contains the disjunctive “or” meaning that it
is unlawful for a person to “receive any firearm or ammunition” if that person “has been
adjudicated as a mental defective” or that person “has been committed to a mental
institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4). Since people are committed to a mental institution
only if they have a mental illness, it is only logical that Congress meant “mental defective”
to mean something other than mental illness, as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined in Hansel. Otherwise, the “or” contained in section 922(g)(4) would be
rendered superfluous. See Aberle v. Faribault Fire Dep’t Relief Ass’n, 41 N.W.2d 813,
817 (Minn. 1950) (“The word ‘or’ is a disjunctive and ordinarily refers to different things
C/D-5
as alternatives.”). In other words, as appellant points out, the ATF’s definition of
“adjudicated as a mental defective” would entirely subsume the definition of “committed
to a mental institution.” A person could not be committed to a mental institution without
being adjudicated as a mental defective, given the definition of the phrase “mental
defective” contained in the ATF regulation. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369
(1983) (holding that due process in a civil commitment proceeding requires proof that the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous). And that would run contrary to “the elementary
canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not to render one part
inoperative.” Mt. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985)
(quotation omitted). Finally, the ATF’s definition would also presumptively strip anyone
who has been in a temporary guardianship or conservatorship of their Second Amendment
rights—a breadth that would create constitutional concerns.
I also wish to briefly discuss the fundamental unfairness of respondent’s position.
As the district court found, appellant’s treatment provider testified that appellant no longer
has any mental-health-related concerns, yet under respondent’s construction of the federal
regulation, he would never be allowed to possess a firearm. The district court discussed
appellant’s predicament in a footnote in its decision denying the motion for
reconsideration:
The [c]ourt acknowledges that having a federal mental
illness disability for firearms possession as a result of a state
court adjudication puts [appellant] in a difficult position. A
memorandum prepared by Minnesota Senate Counsel
addressing the eligibility of persons with mental illness to
possess firearms explains [appellant’s] limited options:
C/D-6
“. . . Currently, under federal law there is no avenue for
persons to seek relief except if it is a federal agency that
imposed the mental health adjudication or involuntary
commitment, such as the Veterans Administration. In these
situations, the agency is required to provide a process for relief.
For all other persons seeking relief from the federal disability,
the person has no clear recourse (other than attempting to sue
for a violation of the person’s constitutional rights) except to
seek relief under state law. A state law may provide relief from
the federal (as well as the state) disability but only if the state
law meets specified federal criteria. Minnesota’s law
[Minnesota Statutes section 624.713] does not. Thus, in
Minnesota, a person may successfully petition a court to
remove the mental illness disability imposed by Minnesota law
but this will not affect the independent federal prohibition
(which is for the most part similar to the Minnesota one).”
(Quoting “Firearms Possession by Persons with Mental Illness,” Kenneth P. Backhus,
Senate Counsel, Research, and Fiscal Analysis, Dec. 2019,
https://www.senate.m/storage/scrfa/Firearms-1.pdf; [https://perma.cc/CG6B-QXFW]; see
also “NICS IMPROVEMENT AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2007” (not including Minnesota
on a list of states that have qualified relief of disability programs under section 105(a)),
https://www.atf.gov/frearms/docs/guide/nicsactlist7-7-210pdf/download;
[https://perma.cc/9G32-NZFL].
At oral argument, I asked counsel for respondent whether the ban would still apply
if the incident involving appellant had happened at age 18, and 50 years later, he applied
for a firearm permit. Respondent’s counsel conceded that it would. I was then, and am
now, simply astounded by that answer. In a time when society is trying finally to remove
the stigma of mental illness, respondent’s position guarantees that appellant will have that
stigma for the rest of his life.
C/D-7
Finally, although it was not raised, I feel compelled to at least mention the elephant
in the room. In N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, the United States Supreme
Court recently reiterated that the Second Amendment protects the fundamental right of
“ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens” to own firearms. 597 U.S. 1, 31-32 (2022). On the
other hand, it has also recognized that this right was not “unlimited” and observed that
longstanding prohibitions of possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill are
“presumptively lawful.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 & n.26
(2008). I completely agree with such prohibitions. However, in this case, the record
reflects that, when appellant petitioned to appeal the denial of his permit request, he was
no longer mentally ill, had not been committed to a mental institution, and was law abiding.
Consequently, I believe the denial of the permit is not only contrary to the clear,
unambiguous language of the statute but also violates appellant’s constitutional rights.
Accordingly, I dissent.