State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. J.A.B., Appellant

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0316

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

J.A.B.,
Appellant.

Filed October 13, 2025
Reversed and remanded
Segal, Judge *

Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-15-23133

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Ron Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County Attorney
Robert J. Alpers, III, Assistant County Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)

Howard Bass, Bass Law Firm, PLLC, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Frisch, Chief Judge;

and Segal, Judge.

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SEGAL, Judge

Appellant J.A.B. challenges the denial of his expungement petition, arguing that the

district court abused its discretion by relying on the fact that J.A.B.’s conviction was still

within the ten-year lookback period for enhanceability and by failing to make findings on

all of the required factors set out in Minnesota Statutes section 609A.03, subdivision 5(c)

(2024). We reverse and remand.

FACTS

In February 2016, J.A.B. was convicted of misdemeanor domestic assault in

violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivision 1(1) (2014). The district

court imposed a stayed sentence, placed J.A.B. on supervised probation for 12 months, and

required J.A.B. to complete and follow all recommendations from domestic-abuse and

chemical assessments. J.A.B. was discharged from probation in March 2017, after he had

satisfied all conditions imposed by the district court. And he has not been convicted of any

other crimes through at least October 2024, the date of his expungement petition.

J.A.B. petitioned the district court to expunge the records of his 2016 conviction

because he was worried that his prior conviction would prevent him from becoming a

certified public accountant (CPA). He asserted in the petition that he had recently been

hired by an accounting firm and that the firm wanted him to obtain certification. J.A.B.

explained that the certification application inquired into his criminal background,

“indicating that [the conviction] could prevent [him] from obtaining certification.” J.A.B.

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requested expungement so that he could “pursue a career as a CPA” and “serve society,

[his current] wife, family, and children.” The state did not oppose J.A.B.’s petition.

At the hearing on the petition, J.A.B. reiterated his arguments for expungement.

And the prosecutor confirmed on the record that the state did not oppose expungement.

Upon questioning by the district court, the prosecutor acknowledged that the county

attorney’s office is “normally . . . inclined to object to” such petitions, which is why the

prosecutor “made sure to get this approved throughout the entirety of [his] office.” The

prosecutor also advised the district court that, while correspondence the state received from

the domestic-abuse victim “had mixed messaging,” the victim “ultimately did not oppose

the expungement.” 1

The district court denied J.A.B.’s petition, concluding that he had “not established

by clear and convincing evidence that expunging the record would yield a benefit to

[J.A.B.] commensurate with the disadvantages to the public.” The order states as the basis

for the district court’s decision: “Specifically, this conviction is still currently

enhanceable.” 2 The district court also found that J.A.B. had “not shown that this conviction

1
The victim was J.A.B.’s former wife.
2
Under Minnesota Statutes section 609.2242, subdivisions 2 and 4 (2014), a misdemeanor
domestic assault can be enhanced to a gross misdemeanor if a second misdemeanor
domestic assault is committed within ten years after the first conviction and, if the
individual has committed more than one such assault within the ten-year lookback period,
the offense can be enhanced to a felony. In this case, J.A.B. was convicted of misdemeanor
domestic assault on February 29, 2016. The ten-year lookback period for enhancement, if
J.A.B. were to commit another domestic assault, would run through February 2026. The
order denying expungement is dated January 10, 2025, leaving a little less than 14 months
until the expiration of the look-back period.

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will or actually has prevented him from obtaining CPA certification.” The district court

made no other findings.

DECISION

On appeal, J.A.B. asserts that the district court’s order must be reversed and

remanded for two reasons: (1) the district court erred by basing its denial of the petition

on the fact that the lookback period for enhancement of a new domestic offense had not

yet expired; and (2) the district court failed to make findings on all 12 of the factors set out

in Minnesota Statutes section 609A.03, subdivision 5(c). The state concurs that at least a

remand to the district court to make findings on the “twelve factors outlined in [the

applicable expungement statute] would be appropriate.”

We review a district court’s expungement decision for an abuse of discretion.

State v. C.W.N., 906 N.W.2d 549, 551-52 (Minn. App. 2018). “A district court abuses its

discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic

and the facts in the record.” State v. Tapper, 993 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2023) (quotation

omitted).

An individual can petition “to seal all records relating to an arrest, indictment or

information, trial, or verdict” under Minnesota Statutes section 609A.03 (2024) if “the

petitioner was convicted of a . . . misdemeanor . . . and the petitioner has not been

convicted of a new crime for at least two years since discharge of the sentence for the

crime.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.02, subd. 3(a)(3) (2024). Because he was convicted of

misdemeanor domestic assault and had not been convicted of another crime since he was

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discharged from probation in March 2017, J.A.B. met the eligibility criteria to petition for

expungement under section 609A.03. Id.

A district court may grant expungement under section 609A.03 “only upon clear

and convincing evidence that [expungement] would yield a benefit to the petitioner

commensurate with the disadvantages to the public and public safety of: (1) sealing the

record; and (2) burdening the court and public authorities to issue, enforce, and monitor an

expungement order.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 5(a). In determining whether

expungement is warranted, the district court “shall consider” 12 factors:

(1) the nature and severity of the underlying crime, the
record of which would be sealed;

(2) the risk, if any, the petitioner poses to individuals or
society;

(3) the length of time since the crime occurred;

(4) the steps taken by the petitioner toward
rehabilitation following the crime;

(5) aggravating or mitigating factors relating to the
underlying crime, including the petitioner’s level of
participation and context and circumstances of the underlying
crime;

(6) the reasons for the expungement, including the
petitioner’s attempts to obtain employment, housing, or other
necessities;

(7) the petitioner’s criminal record;

(8) the petitioner’s record of employment and
community involvement;

(9) the recommendations of interested law enforcement,
prosecutorial, and corrections officials;

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 (10) the recommendations of victims or whether victims
of the underlying crime were minors;

(11) the amount, if any, of restitution outstanding, past
efforts made by the petitioner toward payment, and the
measures in place to help ensure completion of restitution
payment after expungement of the record if granted; and

(12) other factors deemed relevant by the court.

Id., subd. 5(c).

The use of “shall” in section 609A.03, subdivision 5(c), indicates that consideration

by the district court of the twelve factors is mandatory. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 16

(2024) (defining “shall” as mandatory). And to enable adequate appellate review, the

district court must include in the record sufficient findings that it considered those factors

in rendering its decision. Without such a record, we cannot determine whether the district

court acted within its discretion in denying an expungement petition. See State v. K.M.M.,

721 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 2006) (remanding the denial of an expungement petition

because the district court failed to apply the balancing-of-interests test or make appropriate

findings under a prior version of the expungement statute, which rendered the record

“inadequate for meaningful [appellate] review”); see also In re Welfare of J.T.L., 875

N.W.2d 334, 338 (Minn. App. 2015) (remanding the district court’s expungement of the

respondent’s juvenile-delinquency records because the district court failed to make

findings on the analogous expungement factors in Minnesota Statutes section 260B.198,

subdivision 6(b) (2014)). 3

3
We have also remanded the denial of expungement petitions for inadequate findings in a
number of recent nonprecedential decisions. See. e.g., State v. A.P.L., No. A18-1697, 2019

6
 In denying J.A.B.’s petition, the district court cited only two reasons for denial:

(1) that J.A.B.’s domestic-assault conviction was still within the ten-year lookback period

for enhancement and (2) that J.A.B.’s concern that the conviction might interfere with CPA

certification was speculative. J.A.B. argues that it was error for the district court to

consider enhanceability as a factor in determining whether to grant the expungement

petition. He notes that, even if the district court had granted his expungement petition, his

2016 conviction would still be on his record and accessible to “criminal justice agencies

without a court order for the purposes of initiating, furthering, or completing a criminal

investigation or prosecution or for sentencing purposes or providing probation or other

correctional services.” Minn. Stat. § 609A.03, subd. 7a(b)(1) (2024). He argues that

allowing denials to be based on enhanceability would result in a categorical denial of all

individuals with enhanceable offenses and that this is contrary to the plain language of the

statute.

We need not determine whether the district court’s reliance on enhanceability is, by

itself, reversible error, because we conclude that the district court’s reliance on this

consideration, without making any findings on at least nine of the other twelve required

factors, is an abuse of discretion requiring reversal and remand. Specifically, the district

court made no findings concerning: the risk J.A.B. poses to the public; the time since the

offense; the steps taken by J.A.B. toward rehabilitation; any aggravating or mitigating

WL 1983501, at *2 (Minn. App. May 6, 2019); State v. J.L.D., No. A16-1991, 2017 WL
2535734, at *2-3 (Minn. App. June 12, 2017); State v. J.E.H., No. A15-1948, 2016 WL
3659290, at *7-8 (Minn. App. July 11, 2016). Although not binding, nonprecedential
opinions can be cited as persuasive authorities. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

7
factors related to the underlying offense; J.A.B.’s criminal record; J.A.B.’s record of

employment and community involvement; “the recommendations of interested law

enforcement, prosecutorial, and corrections officials”; the recommendations of the victim;

and any outstanding restitution. 4 Id., subd. 5(c). See J.T.L., 875 N.W.2d at 338 (“Absent

findings on the required statutory considerations, we are unable to determine whether the

district court acted within its discretion in ordering expungement.”). On remand, the

district court may, in its discretion, reopen the evidentiary record.

Reversed and remanded.

4
As summarized above, J.A.B.’s petition contains argument and information relevant to
these factors, including the date of his conviction, his participation in psychiatric-treatment
programs and counselling, his ongoing education, and his assertions related to mitigating
factors related to his conviction. The record also contains the recommendations of the
prosecutor and the victim.

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