State of Minnesota v. Tyler James Kennedy

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0348

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Tyler James Kennedy,
Appellant.

Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-24-515

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael T. Walters, Olmsted County Attorney, Allison A. Freese, Assistant County
Attorney, Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Eva F. Wailes, Assistant Public
Defender, Sarah Brodwolf, Certified Student Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Wheelock,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward

dispositional departure. We affirm.
 FACTS

In January 2024, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Tyler James

Kennedy with felony domestic assault by strangulation and felony domestic assault. The

charging document alleged that, in January 2024, police were called to a residence by a

juvenile witness who reported that Kennedy, his mother’s boyfriend, was hurting her.

When the police arrived, an officer could hear yelling from outside the residence. And

when the officer approached the door, he could hear the victim yelling “help me.” The

police entered the residence, saw Kennedy on top of the victim, and took him into custody.

The victim stated that Kennedy became mad and aggressive after she told him to

leave. The victim said that Kennedy grabbed her head with his arm around her neck,

choked her, slapped her, yelled at her, and told her that he was going to push her down the

stairs. The victim also told the police that Kennedy tried to push her across the floor toward

the stairs and that she was afraid for her life. The record reveals that Kennedy has a long

history of controlled-substance abuse, and he was intoxicated when he assaulted the victim.

In October 2024, Kennedy pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault. In December

2024, the district court dismissed the charge of felony domestic assault by strangulation.

At the plea hearing, Kennedy disputed that he choked the victim, but he admitted that he

was angry with her, held her down on the ground, put his hand over her mouth, and

frightened her.

Kennedy moved for a downward dispositional departure, arguing that he was

particularly amenable to probation. The probation department supported Kennedy’s

request for a departure, but it described its support as “guarded.”

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 The state opposed Kennedy’s request noting that, when the domestic assault

occurred, Kennedy was already on felony probation after having received a dispositional

departure on his last domestic-violence-related offense—which involved the same victim

as this case. The district court denied Kennedy’s motion, entered judgment of conviction,

and sentenced Kennedy to a presumptive sentence of 33 months in prison.

Kennedy appeals his sentence.

DECISION

Kennedy contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion

for a downward dispositional departure.

The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines establish presumptive sentences for criminal

offenses and seek to “maintain uniformity, proportionality, rationality, and predictability

in sentencing.” Minn. Stat. § 244.09, subd. 5 (2022). “Consequently, departures from the

guidelines are discouraged and are intended to apply to a small number of cases.” State v.

Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn. 2016). A district court may depart from the

presumptive sentence only when there are “identifiable, substantial, and compelling

circumstances to support a departure.” Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.D.1 (Supp. 2023).

If substantial and compelling circumstances exist, the district court has broad

discretion to depart, and we generally will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion.

State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981). This court will reverse the district court’s

refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence only in a “rare” case. Id. “[A]s long as

the record shows the [district] court carefully evaluated all the testimony and information

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presented before making a determination,” we will not reverse the district court’s refusal

to depart. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).

When considering a dispositional departure, the district court focuses “more on the

defendant as an individual and on whether the presumptive sentence would be best for him

and for society.” State v. Heywood, 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983). A defendant’s

particular amenability to probation can justify a downward dispositional departure from a

presumptive sentence. State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (Minn. 2014). The requirement

of particular amenability ensures that “the defendant’s amenability to probation

distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and

compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure.” Id. at 309 (quotation

omitted).

Relevant factors for determining whether a defendant is particularly amenable to

probation include the defendant’s age, prior criminal record, remorse, cooperation, attitude

in court, and support of friends and family. State v. Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982).

Even if there is evidence that the defendant would be particularly amenable to probation, a

district court is not required to grant a dispositional departure. State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d

662, 664-65 (Minn. App. 2009).

In seeking a dispositional departure, Kennedy argued that he was particularly

amenable to probation based on the Trog factors. Kennedy acknowledged that his prior

criminal record did not support a departure, but he argued that his age—thirty-four years

old—supported a departure because “[h]e is still young enough to have the ability to learn

new lifestyle choices, while also old enough to recognize that the life he’s lived is not a life

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he wants to continue living.” Kennedy explained that the threat of prison motivated him

to change his behavior.

Kennedy also argued that he showed remorse by pleading guilty, even though he

disagreed that the charging document accurately described the crime. Kennedy further

argued that he had cooperated throughout the case, appeared consistently, was polite during

the proceedings and at the plea hearing, and voluntarily turned himself in after relapsing

several weeks before sentencing. Finally, Kennedy argued that he had the support of

friends and family, including his significant other—the victim in this case—and his

probation officer. Kennedy explained that his significant other and probation officer are

supporting him by helping him complete a dialectical behavioral therapy (“DBT”)

treatment program that he hopes will address both his addiction and mental-health issues.

Kennedy asserts that the district court abused its discretion in determining that there

were no substantial and compelling reasons to justify a downward dispositional departure.

The thrust of Kennedy’s argument is that the district court “only briefly pointed to [his]

failed attempts at treatment before” making its determination and that, contrary to the

district court’s conclusion, he is particularly amenable to probation. Kennedy also argues

that his recent DBT treatment shows that he is particularly amenable to probation and that

our caselaw has “recognized that specific community services tailored to the defendant’s

needs make the defendant more amenable to probationary rehabilitation.”

To the extent that Kennedy argues that the district court failed to consider all

relevant factors and failed to make adequate findings to support imposition of a

presumptive sentence, the district court did not err. The record shows that the district court

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considered Kennedy’s individual circumstances and his amenability to probation, which

were described in the relevant filings and arguments at sentencing. In considering those

circumstances, the district court emphasized that Kennedy has not been underserviced and

that “[m]ost everything has been tried for him.” See Pegel, 795 N.W.2d at 255 (stating that

a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion if it carefully evaluated the testimony and

information presented before making its determination). Moreover, “[a]lthough the

[district] court is required to give reasons for departure, an explanation is not required when

the court considers reasons for departure but elects to impose the presumptive sentence.”

State v. Van Ruler, 378 N.W.2d 77, 80 (Minn. App. 1985).

As to Kennedy’s argument that he is particularly amenable to probation, the

Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Soto is instructive. In Soto, the district court

determined that Soto was amenable to probation because he had been recommended as a

candidate for a particular outpatient treatment program, was only thirty-seven years old,

did not have a lot of serious crimes in his record, was respectful to the court, and had some

family support. 855 N.W.2d at 307.

The Soto court reversed the district court’s grant of a dispositional departure,

reasoning that, although the recommendation for treatment “provided some support for the

district court’s decision to depart, it was not sufficient to justify the departure.” Id. at 309-

10, 314. The supreme court rejected the district court’s conclusion that Soto’s age weighed

in favor of a departure. Id. at 310. And it noted that Soto’s criminal record “provide[d]

very little, if any, support for the conclusion that he was particularly amenable to

probation” because he “did not have a clean record; he had been convicted of two counts

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of possessing drug paraphernalia, two counts of driving with a suspended license, and one

count of simple assault against the mother of his son.” Id. at 311. Although the supreme

court acknowledged that a defendant’s attitude in court is a relevant consideration, the court

stated that “a respectful attitude in court, in this context, is far outweighed by the other

relevant considerations.” Id. at 312. The supreme court stated that, although some factors

may have suggested that Soto was amenable to probation, “those factors, individually and

collectively, provide very little support for the further conclusion that Soto had any

particular amenability to probation relative to other defendants.” Id.

Soto supports the district court’s decision not to grant a dispositional departure in

this case. With the support of his significant other and probation officer, Kennedy had

been engaged in a DBT treatment program to address his substance abuse and mental-

health issues. But as the district court observed, Kennedy had not been underserviced.

Kennedy had a long history of controlled-substance use, had been in the adult criminal-

justice system for approximately fifteen years, had been on probation several times, and

had multiple probation violations—including as recently as weeks before the underlying

sentencing hearing. Furthermore, the domestic assault in this case occurred while Kennedy

was intoxicated and on felony probation after receiving a downward dispositional departure

for his last domestic-violence-related offense involving the same victim. While we

commend Kennedy’s efforts to engage in a new form of therapy to address his mental-

health issues and to maintain his sobriety, the factors that were before the district court in

this case, “individually and collectively, provide very little support for the further

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conclusion that [he] had any particular amenability to probation relative to other

defendants.” Id.

We are not persuaded otherwise by Kennedy’s argument that his recent DBT

treatment shows that he is particularly amenable to probation based on caselaw recognizing

that “specific community services tailored to the defendant’s needs make the defendant

more amenable to probationary rehabilitation.” In each of the cases Kennedy cites, the

district court’s decision to grant a downward dispositional departure was affirmed. State

v. Hennessy, 328 N.W.2d 442, 443 (Minn. 1983); State v. Malinski, 353 N.W.2d 207, 211

(Minn. App. 1984), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984); State v. Dokken, 487 N.W.2d 914,

919 (Minn. App. 1992), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1992). Indeed, the district court has

broad discretion to depart, and we generally will not interfere with the exercise of that

discretion. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d at 7. But as we frequently state, this court will only

reverse the district court’s refusal to depart from the presumptive sentence in a “rare” case.

Id. For the reasons discussed above, this is not a “rare” case in which the district court

abused its discretion by imposing a presumptive sentence.

Affirmed.

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