Cass County, Respondent, vs. Rhonda Aho, Appellant

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0492

Cass County,
Respondent,

vs.

Rhonda Aho,
Appellant.

Filed October 13, 2025
Affirmed
Segal, Judge *

Cass County District Court
File No. 11-CV-24-1083

Jason J. Kuboushek, Emma M. Baker, Iverson Reuvers, Bloomington, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Rhonda Aho, Pine River, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Considered and decided by Schmidt, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Segal,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

SEGAL, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

respondent, arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because

*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
respondent failed to join an indispensable party. Appellant also asserts various

constitutional challenges. We affirm.

FACTS

This case arises out of respondent Cass County’s efforts to require appellant Rhonda

Aho to comply with its land-use ordinance by either obtaining permits for or removing six

storage containers and a solar panel discovered by the county on Aho’s property in January

2023. After confirming that no permits had been sought or issued for the storage containers

and solar panel, the county sent a letter to Aho, informing her that she was in violation of

the county land-use ordinance and needed to obtain “after-the-fact permits” for the

containers and panel. 1 Aho contacted the county inquiring how the county became aware

of the violations but did not apply for any permits. The county sent a second letter to Aho

about a month later, which included blank copies of the permit application, and advised

her that she had 30 days to bring her property into compliance. The county received no

response from Aho to this letter.

About six months later, after the county discovered additional construction on Aho’s

property, outside legal counsel for the county sent Aho a letter giving her ten days to come

into compliance within the ordinance. 2 When Aho again failed to submit permit

applications for the containers and panel, the county commenced this lawsuit for

1
Section 501 of the county’s land-use ordinance requires the issuance of permits for,
among other things, the placement of “structures” on real property within the county. See
Cass County, Minn., Land Use Ordinance (LUO), § 501(A) (2025).
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According to the county’s complaint, instead of complying with the ordinance, Aho sued
the county and its outside legal counsel in federal court alleging constitutional violations.

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declaratory and injunctive relief to obtain compliance with the ordinance. Aho attempted

to file papers seeking dismissal of the county’s lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, but the filing

was rejected by the court administrator because Aho declined to either pay the filing fee or

obtain a fee waiver.

The county moved for summary judgment. Aho filed no papers in opposition to the

motion, but the district court allowed Aho to present arguments orally at the summary

judgment hearing. At the hearing, Aho argued that the district court lacked “in persona,

subject matter, and in rem jurisdiction,” and that the county lacked standing to bring its

claims. She also argued that another person, C.C., “has a claim and [an] interest in th[e]

property and structures complained of” by the county, and that C.C. is an indispensable

party to the suit.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the county. The district

court noted that Aho did not file or otherwise offer any evidence or exhibits contesting the

county’s evidence aside from her challenge to the court’s jurisdiction presented orally at

the hearing. 3 It determined that the material facts are thus undisputed and establish that

Aho is the sole owner of the property and that the storage containers and solar panel were

stored on her property and lacked permits. The district court further found that the

containers and panel qualify as “structures” requiring permits under the county’s

ordinance, and that Aho was in violation of the ordinance because she did not obtain the

3
The district court noted in its order granting summary judgment that Aho “was aware that
she could file a request with the court to waive court fees and costs,” but “refused” to do
so.

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required permits. The district court ordered Aho to obtain permits or to remove the

structures within 30 days and provided that if she did not comply, the county could “enter

the property, including any structures therein, to determine the specific uses and nature of

the structures, [and] determine if additional code violations exist.”

DECISION

Aho argues on appeal that summary judgment must be reversed because the district

court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. She also argues that her due-process rights were

violated, the order constitutes an unconstitutional taking and violates the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the district court relied on inapposite

case law. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, appellate courts apply a de novo

standard of review to determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and

whether the district court erred in applying the law. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38,

42 (Minn. 2017). In doing so, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and resolv[e] all doubts and factual inferences against the moving party.”

Staub v. Myrtle Lake Resort, LLC, 964 N.W.2d 613, 620 (Minn. 2021).

I. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the county’s claims.

We address first Aho’s jurisdictional arguments. “Subject[-]matter jurisdiction

refers to a court’s authority to hear and determine cases that are presented to it.”

Rued v. Comm’r of Hum. Serv., 13 N.W.3d 42, 46 (Minn. 2024). “[D]efects in subject-

matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived or forfeited by a party.”

Id. (quotation omitted). We apply a de novo standard of review to jurisdictional questions.

Underdahl v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Minn. 2007).

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 Aho argues that the courts are without subject-matter jurisdiction because “[a] court

cannot issue binding orders against land it does not legally control.” As the district court

noted in its order, however, the Minnesota legislature expressly grants counties the

authority to enact planning and zoning ordinances regulating private property within the

county. See Minn. Stat. §§ 394.21, .24 (2024); see also Eagle Lake of Becker Cnty. Lake

Ass’n v. Becker Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 738 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. App. 2007)

(“Minnesota counties are empowered [by the legislature] to engage in land-use planning

and zoning.”). The legislature also grants counties the authority to enforce those

ordinances by, among other measures, initiating an action in district court. See Minn. Stat.

§ 394.37, subd. 3 (2024). The county thus has authority from the state legislature to adopt

a land-use ordinance, and the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.

Aho also argues that the district court “lacked subject[-]matter jurisdiction because

it proceeded without joining [C.C.], the indispensable party.” She asserts that C.C. “built

the structure” and “occupies it,” and “is the one [that the county] wants to remove or force

into compliance.” But Aho submitted no evidence into the record to counter the county’s

evidence that Aho was the sole record owner of the property. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05(b)

(providing that, if a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as

required by [r]ule 56.03, the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of

the motion”); see also DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Minn. 1997) (stating that

“the party resisting summary judgment must do more than rest on mere averments”). The

district court’s finding that Aho was the sole owner of the property is thus undisputed. And

Cass County’s ordinance imposes the duty to apply for permits on the “landowner or their

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agents with the landowner’s written consent,” not mere occupants. LUO § 501(B) (2025).

As such, we discern no error in the district court’s determination that C.C. is not an

indispensable party to this action. 4

II. Aho’s remaining arguments are procedurally barred or otherwise fail.

Aside from her jurisdictional arguments, Aho also asserts that (1) her procedural

due-process rights were violated because C.C. was not given an opportunity to be heard;

(2) the district court’s order amounted to a regulatory taking without compensation; (3) the

order violated her Fourth Amendment rights; and (4) “the district court relied on

fundamentally inapplicable caselaw.” She claims that these “structural errors require

dismissal with prejudice.” The county argues that Aho failed to properly preserve these

issues for appeal because she did not raise these arguments before the district court. We

address the parties’ arguments in turn below.

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Aho asserts a third jurisdictional argument—that the district court lacked in rem
jurisdiction over her property because the “[t]he county failed to prove situs, failed to
submit a Certificate of Real Estate Value (CRV) as required by Minn. Stat. § 272.115, and
failed to show that the property was lawfully assessed or coded for taxation as required by
Minn. Stat. §§ 272.194 and 272.196.” It does not appear from the hearing transcript that
Aho asserted these arguments before the district court, and we generally do not consider
new arguments not raised before or considered by the district court. See Thiele v. Stich,
425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, even if we were to consider these
arguments, we would conclude that they are without merit. The record shows that the
county did present the address of Aho’s property, that the address is in Cass County, and
Aho never disputed these facts. In addition, the statutes cited by Aho all relate to property
taxation, a subject not relevant to this action.

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 A. Due Process

Aho maintains that her due-process rights were violated because C.C. was not given

an opportunity to be heard. This argument is just a slightly different iteration of her claim

that C.C. is an indispensable party. For the same reasons that we reject that argument, we

reject her due-process argument.

B. Regulatory taking

Aho argues that the county’s permit requirements for the structures on her property

constitute an unconstitutional taking without compensation under the Fifth Amendment of

the United States Constitution. Aho never asserted this argument before the district court,

and we therefore need not consider this argument on appeal. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at

582. Moreover, land-use regulations such as the one at issue here have regularly been

upheld against takings claims. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438

U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (upholding a land-use regulation even though the regulation

“prohibit[ed] the most beneficial use of the property”); Thompson v. City of Red Wing, 455

N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. App. 1990) (stating that “[t]he right to use property as one wishes

is subject to, and limited by, the proper exercise of police power in the regulation of land

use”), rev. denied (Minn. June 6, 1990). And “[s]uch regulation does not constitute a

compensable taking unless it deprives the property of all reasonable use.” Id. (quoting

Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. City of Afton, 323 N.W.2d 757, 761 (Minn. 1982)). The

district court’s order did not deprive Aho of all reasonable use of her property, it only

required her to seek permits for the storage containers and solar panel or to remove them

from the property.

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 C. Fourth Amendment

Aho next argues that the district court’s order allowing the county to enter her

property if Aho does not comply with the court’s order violates her Fourth Amendment

rights against governmental intrusion on her private property. Again, Aho failed to assert

this argument before the district court, and we decline to address it here. Thiele, 425

N.W.2d at 582. We also note that the case cited by Aho, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387

U.S. 523, 534 (1967), holds no more than that an administrative search of property without

proper consent or a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. Here, the district court

authorized the entry not on the basis of an ex parte warrant application in which only the

county’s contentions would be considered, but after a hearing at which Aho had notice and

an opportunity to submit evidence and to make arguments to the court. Aho thus had

greater process than the minimum required by the Fourth Amendment to allow entry onto

private property. We further note that the district court’s order gives Aho 30 days to

comply with the court’s order, which allows her the opportunity to avoid having county

representatives enter her land simply by submitting proper permit applications for the

structures or removing them.

D. Case law relied on by the district court

Finally, Aho complains that the district court cited inapposite case law because the

cases involved either property owners who were engaged in commercial activity or a party

who applied for a permit and thereby voluntarily consented to the county’s jurisdiction.

The distinctions asserted by Aho, however, are not relevant to the holdings for which they

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were cited by the district court. And we discern no error in the district court’s application

or interpretation of the applicable law.

Affirmed.

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