State of Minnesota v. Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0615
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson,
Appellant.
Filed December 29, 2025
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge
Scott County District Court
File No. 70-CR-22-3380
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Ronald Hocevar, Scott County Attorney, Elisabeth M. Johnson, Assistant County
Attorney, Shakopee, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrew J. Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Wheelock, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge. *
*
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s revocation of his probation, arguing that
the district court abused its discretion because it revoked his probation without first
imposing intermediate sanctions. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2022, officers executed a search warrant for narcotics at a Scott County
residence in which they found appellant Zachary Jaymz Edberg-Anderson as well as
multiple firearms, drug paraphernalia, and substances that tested positive for
methamphetamine. Appellant and his girlfriend were living in one of the rooms at the
residence, in which officers found numerous items belonging to appellant, including a
credit card, clothing, a FedEx box with his name on it, and a passport. In the room’s closet,
officers found over 25 grams of methamphetamine in a tampon box and a Glock handgun
magazine that contained a single 9mm round. Appellant is ineligible to possess
ammunition or a firearm because he has a previous conviction for a crime of violence.
The officers arrested appellant, and respondent State of Minnesota charged him with
one count of second-degree possession of methamphetamine in violation of Minn. Stat.
§ 152.022, subd. 2(a)(1) (2020), and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm or
ammunition in violation of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2020).
Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree controlled-substance possession, and the
state agreed to dismiss the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition. The
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plea agreement included a presumptive 58-month stayed prison sentence and up to three
years of probation.
At the sentencing hearing on November 15, 2023, the state informed the district
court that, due to an increase in appellant’s criminal-history score, the correct presumptive
sentence was an executed prison sentence of 58 to 81 months. See Minn. Sent’g Guidelines
4.C (Supp. 2021). However, the parties agreed that appellant would move for a
dispositional departure to a stayed 58-month sentence and the state would not object.
The district court granted appellant’s motion for a dispositional departure because
it found he was “particularly amenable to probation based on his amenability to treatment”
as he was in programming at Evergreen Recovery and was “doing well.” Thus, it imposed
a 58-month stayed sentence and placed appellant on probation with multiple conditions,
including the following:
• no alcohol/controlled substance use with the exception of
prescribed medications;
• follow all instructions of probation;
• contact your probation officer as directed;
• remain law abiding;
• tell your probation officer within 72 hours if you change your
address, employment, or telephone number;
• submit to random chemical testing per probation; and
• complete chemical assessment and follow all
recommendations including completing current treatment
program.
Soon after the sentencing hearing, however, appellant’s alleged probation violations
began. Appellant’s probation officer reported that he refused to meet with her after his
sentencing, failed to return her phone calls, and did not provide her with his current address.
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The probation officer spoke with appellant’s counselor at Evergreen Recovery, who
informed her on November 22 that appellant had “numerous” positive drug tests and was
not attending treatment sessions.
In December, the probation officer filed a probation-violation report alleging that
appellant failed to
• refrain from the use of illegal substances;
• maintain contact with his supervising agent;
• provide a valid address, and his whereabouts were unknown;
• submit to random drug testing for the county;
• attend scheduled office visits; and
• comply with the recommendations from his chemical-use
assessment, including by not remaining sober.
The district court issued a warrant for his arrest, but appellant was not arrested until about
a year later. On January 27, 2025, the probation officer filed an amended
probation-violation report that included an additional violation: “[appellant] has failed to
complete chemical dependency programming and was terminated from programming.”
Appellant admitted to failing to refrain from the use of illegal substances but denied
the rest of the alleged violations. On January 30, 2025, appellant appeared for a contested
revocation hearing. At the hearing, the probation officer testified that she never met with
appellant because “he refused to come in for probation appointments” and told her that “he
didn’t have to.” She also testified that his treatment counselor reported that appellant was
not sober and not complying with treatment and was therefore eventually terminated from
the program. The probation officer testified that, although appellant entered another
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treatment program afterwards, he was also terminated from it after “about a month” for
continued use of illegal substances and for not attending treatment sessions.
The probation officer testified that she did not believe appellant was amenable to
probation or treatment. The probation officer stated that she believed appellant “meets
every Austin factor” 1 and “needs to be in custody” for the safety of the public, to receive
proper treatment, and so as not to depreciate the seriousness of the violations. Counsel for
the state recommended, based on the probation officer’s testimony and appellant’s conduct,
that the district court revoke probation and execute the stayed sentence.
Appellant’s counsel argued that appellant had wanted to transfer his probation to
Hennepin County because he had trust issues with Scott County, he did not have
transportation to reach the probation offices, and Evergreen turned out to be a “bad place”
for appellant that probation should have prevented him from attending.
During the probation officer’s testimony, she explained that appellant’s probation
could have been transferred to a different county eventually but that he had to be in a sober
residence for 60 days before that was possible. She also noted that the first probation
meeting is required to be at her office for safety reasons and that she tried to send appellant
a letter regarding office appointments but it was “returned to sender” after she mailed it.
When the probation officer informed appellant of this, he said that her “office was stupid
1
The Austin factors refer to the three findings a district court must make before it may
revoke a defendant’s probation following a violation. See State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246,
250 (Minn. 1980). “[T]he court must 1) designate the specific condition or conditions that
were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable; and 3) find that
[the] need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” Id.
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and that [they] can’t get anything right.” The probation officer sent a second letter to a
new address appellant gave to her, but that letter was returned as well. The probation
officer also testified that she did not select the Evergreen program and had shared her
concerns about the program but that appellant “didn’t want to leave Evergreen; he was able
to use there.”
Appellant’s counsel requested an intermediate sanction of a 60- to 90-day jail term
instead of revocation of his probation, arguing that Scott County should have assisted
appellant with enrollment in an abstinence-only treatment center. His counsel also argued
that this was appellant’s first violation hearing and that it was “only fair” to give him
another chance.
After the hearing, the district court issued a written order revoking probation in
which it found that appellant had violated several probation conditions, many of them
“almost immediately after [he] was sentenced.” The district court specifically found that,
from the start of probation, appellant failed to meet with his probation officer, refused to
answer her phone calls, blocked her number, did not give her a valid address, did not submit
to drug testing through probation, attended the Evergreen program against his probation
officer’s advice, consistently tested positive for drugs, did not attend treatment sessions
regularly, and was terminated from two separate treatment programs.
Based on these violations, the district court found that revocation of appellant’s
probation was appropriate and executed appellant’s 58-month sentence.
This appeal follows.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant’s probation
without first imposing intermediate sanctions.
If the district court finds that a probationer has violated probation, it may continue
the existing stay and order probation or revoke probation and execute a sentence. Minn.
R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd. 3(2)(b). The district court “has broad discretion in determining if
there is sufficient evidence to revoke probation”; however, it must make specific findings
before doing so, based on the Austin factors. Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50. These factors
require the district court to (1) identify the specific condition of probation violated,
(2) determine that the violation was intentional or inexcusable, and (3) determine whether
the need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation. Id. at 250. If the
district court determines that it should revoke probation pursuant to the Austin factors,
appellate courts will reverse only if there is a clear abuse of that discretion. Id. at 249-50.
When analyzing the third Austin factor, the district court must balance the
“probationer’s interest in freedom and the state’s interest in insuring his rehabilitation and
the public safety.” Id. at 250; see also State v. Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn.
2005). The district court must find only one of the following subfactors to determine that
the balance weighs in favor of revocation:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from
further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment
which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
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(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the
violation if probation were not revoked.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d at 607 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Smith, 994 N.W.2d
317, 320 (Minn. App. 2023) (concluding that “[o]nly one Modtland subfactor is necessary
to support revocation”), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 27, 2023). “Courts must seek to convey
their substantive reasons for revocation and the evidence relied upon.” Modtland,
695 N.W.2d at 608. The decision to revoke probation “cannot be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s behavior
demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.” Austin,
295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted).
Appellant does not challenge any of the district court’s findings regarding the
Austin-Modtland factors; rather, he claims that, although the district court properly found
that all of the factors were satisfied, it erred because it was required to either impose
intermediate sanctions before revoking his probation or at least “discuss the 90-day jail
sanction” that he proposed.
Appellant relies on State v. Cottew, 746 N.W.2d 632, 637 (Minn. 2008), to argue
that probation revocation is not appropriate when rehabilitation is still possible, but his
reliance is misguided. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized in Cottew that the district court “has broad discretion in determining whether
to impose an intermediate sanction.” 746 N.W.2d at 638 (holding that the district court
was not required to analyze the Austin factors before imposing intermediate sanctions in a
probation hearing). Ultimately, appellant does not cite any caselaw to support his assertion
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that the district court was required to consider his suggestion of a jail sanction before
ordering a probation revocation, nor are we aware of any.
A district court only “abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous
view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Currin, 974 N.W.2d
567, 571 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). Our review of the record persuades us that the
district court’s findings are based on the record and support the probation-revocation order
here.
The record contains evidence that appellant was terminated from multiple treatment
programs for consistently using methamphetamine despite being on probation for a
methamphetamine-possession charge, 2 refused to keep in contact with his probation
officer, 3 absconded from all probation requirements for over a year, repeatedly tested
positive for illegal substances, did not provide a valid address, and failed to appear for drug
testing and office visits with the county. Based on that evidence, the district court found
that, although appellant has other treatment options available in the community, his
behavior and conduct on probation demonstrate that he is not amenable to treatment or
2
See also State v. Ziesemer, No. A23-0492, 2023 WL 7119091 (Minn. App. Oct. 30, 2023),
rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 2024). This court in Ziesemer considered the fact that the
appellant was continuing to use methamphetamine, despite being on probation for
possession of methamphetamine, as supporting probation revocation. Id. at *3.
Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority, but Ziesemer is cited here for its
persuasive value. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
3
See also State v. Rottelo, 798 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. App. 2011), rev. denied (Minn.
July 19, 2011). This court in Rottelo concluded that a district court properly revoked an
appellant’s probation based on his failure to remain in contact with his probation officer,
even though it was his first violation and he committed no new crimes while on probation.
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probation and would best be served by receiving treatment in confinement. As the district
court stated in its order, quoting Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251, “it is ‘not unreasonable to
conclude that treatment ha[s] failed’ when a probationer ‘has been offered treatment but
has failed to take advantage of the opportunity or to show a commitment to rehabilitation.’”
Thus, we conclude that the district court acted within its broad discretion when it
revoked appellant’s probation based on its determination that the Austin factors and
Modtland subfactors were satisfied, and we conclude that it was not required to specifically
address appellant’s request for intermediate sanctions.
Affirmed.
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