State of Minnesota v. Cinque Daprice Owens

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0639

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Cinque Daprice Owens,
Appellant.

Filed January 12, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-27730

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Robert I. Yount, Assistant County Attorney,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Charles F. Clippert, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and

Harris, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his

convictions for aiding and abetting attempted first-degree felony murder under a 2023 law

that created a process to challenge certain felony murder convictions based on an aiding-
and-abetting theory of criminal liability. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 864-68,

amended by 2024 Minn. Laws ch. 123, art. 4, §§ 19-21, at 2268-71 (the Act). He argues

the district court erred by determining that there was not a reasonable probability that he

was entitled to relief and denying his petition without a hearing. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2020, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Cinque Daprice Owens

with two counts of aiding and abetting attempted first-degree felony murder, in violation

of Minnesota Statutes section 609.185(a)(3) (2020). The complaint alleged that Owens,

coordinating with other gang members, planned to go to an opposing gang member’s home

and “initiate a hit on this individual.” Owens was driving one of the two vehicles that

waited at the home. When the victims got into a vehicle and drove away, Owens followed.

Owens eventually pulled his vehicle to the right of the victims’ vehicle and the two vehicles

exchanged gunfire. Owens leaned forward while the front-seat passenger shot towards the

victims’ vehicle. The two people in the back seat of Owens’s car also fired at the victims’

vehicle. The victims’ vehicle swerved and the individuals in the second vehicle fired at

the victims’ vehicle. Owens and his associates in the second vehicle sped away to an

unknown location. Following the shooting, law enforcement found the victims in their

vehicle on the side of the road. The driver and the front-seat passenger had multiple bullet

wounds.

Owens pleaded guilty to both counts as charged. During his plea hearing, Owens

agreed that he conspired with his associates, members of a particular street gang, and

decided to ambush some members of an opposition gang. He also admitted to driving one

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of the vehicles that followed the victims’ vehicle and pulling up alongside the victims’

vehicle, and that the occupants of his vehicle fired “dozens and dozens” of shots at the

opposition vehicle. And Owens agreed that “the intention and expectation of this operation

was literally to kill those opposition gang members.”

The district court accepted Owens’s plea. Under the plea agreement, the district

court imposed concurrent 230-month prison sentences. The sentence was a downward

durational departure. According to the departure report, the district court granted the

departure because Owens, as the driver and not a shooter, had less involvement than his

co-defendants. Owens did not pursue a direct appeal.

In July 2024, Owens filed a preliminary application to vacate his convictions under

the Act, which allows individuals convicted of certain kinds of first-degree murder or

second-degree unintentional felony murder “under the theory of liability for crimes of

another,” to apply to have their convictions vacated. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24

at 864-868. The district court granted Owens’s preliminary application, concluding there

was a reasonable probability that Owens was entitled to relief under the Act. Id., § 24, at

865-66 (discussing district court’s review of a preliminary application). After his

preliminary application was approved, Owens filed a petition to vacate his convictions.

Id., § 24, at 866-67 (outlining requirements for petition). As permitted by the Act, Owens

submitted additional information with his petition, including the complaint and the plea-

and sentencing-hearing transcripts. Id., § 24, at 866. The state opposed Owens’s petition

and included the police report from the incident as supporting documentation. Id., § 24, at

867 (outlining requirements for state’s responsive motions).

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 After considering the additional information in Owens’s petition and the state’s

response, the district court denied Owens’s petition without a hearing. See Id., § 24, at 867

(allowing district court to deny petition without a hearing when additional information

establishes that there is not a reasonable possibility applicant is entitled to relief). The

district court explained that based on Owens’s testimony at the plea hearing, he could not

“show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not intentionally aid, advise, hire,

counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure another with the intent to cause the death of

a human being.”

Owens appeals.
DECISION

Owens challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his convictions

for aiding and abetting attempted first-degree felony murder under the Act. Id., § 24, at

864-68.

In 2023, the Minnesota legislature amended the aiding-and-abetting-statute “to

narrow the scope of liability for aiding and abetting first- and second-degree felony

murder.” Raisch v. State, 8 N.W.3d 237, 239 (Minn. App. 2024); see 2023 Minn. Laws

ch. 52, art. 4, § 3, at 850 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 609.05, subd. 2a (Supp. 2023)). In

addition to amending the aiding-and-abetting statute, the legislation, provides

corresponding retroactive relief for those who were previously convicted of aiding and

abetting first-and-second degree felony murder and are still in custody or under court

supervision. 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 865; State v. Griffin, 24 N.W.3d 247,

251 (Minn. 2025). To qualify for relief from a first-degree felony murder conviction under

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section 609.185(a)(3), the petitioner must demonstrate “by a preponderance of the evidence

that the petitioner: (1) did not cause the death of a human being; and (2) did not

intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure with the intent

to cause the death of a human being.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 24, at 867.

To seek such relief, the petitioner first submits a preliminary application. Id., at 865

(outlining requirements for preliminary application). If the district court determines from

the preliminary application that “there is a reasonable probability that the applicant is

entitled to relief,” it must grant the preliminary application and send notice to the parties.

Id., § 24, at 865-66. Then, the petitioner files and serves a petition to vacate the judgment.

Id., § 24, at 866. The petition includes the information from the preliminary application

and “may contain any other relevant information, including police reports, trial transcripts,

and plea transcripts.” Id., § 24, at 866. The state must file a response either supporting the

petition, or “explaining why the petitioner is not entitled to relief along with any supporting

documents.” Id., § 24, at 867. The district court may either grant the petition and schedule

the matter for resentencing or deny the petition and explain in a memorandum why the

court concludes that there is not a reasonable probability that the petitioner is entitled to

relief, or schedule the matter for an evidentiary hearing. Id., § 24, at 867.

Here, the district court granted Owens’s preliminary application, but denied his

petition without an evidentiary hearing, concluding that Owens “cannot show by a

preponderance of the evidence that he did not intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or

conspire with or otherwise procure another with the intent to cause the death of a human

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being.” 1 The district court relied entirely on Owens’s testimony at the plea hearing, and

found that Owens could not “split his intention from the intentions of others involved in

the crime,” because “Owens explicitly testified that he conspired with other gang members

to ambush rival gang members [and] ‘the intention and expectation of this operation was

literally to kill those opposition gang members.’”

The supreme court recently concluded that Minnesota appellate courts review

appeals under the Act similarly to petitions for postconviction relief under Minnesota

Statutes chapter 590 (2024). Griffin, 24 N.W.3d at 254. Accordingly, we review the

district court’s order denying Owens’s petition to vacate his conviction for an abuse of

discretion. 2 Id.; see also Williams v. State, 5 N.W.3d 399, 405 (Minn. 2024) (reviewing

summary denial of postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion). “A district court

abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against

logic and the facts in the record.” Griffin, 24 N.W.3d at 255 (quoting Riley v. State, 792

1
Owens does not argue that the district court erred by applying the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard instead of the reasonable-probability standard but construes the district
court’s order as finding there is no reasonable probability Owens is entitled to relief. Issues
not briefed on appeal are forfeited. State v. Janecek, 903 N.W.2d 426, 428 n.3 (Minn. App.
2017).
2
Owens argues that this court should engage in de novo review because his challenge to
the district court’s order involves a proper interpretation of the Act. But Owens does not
seem to present a statutory interpretation argument, other than suggesting that “the district
court should have considered that the offense as charged created a specific intent crime.”
Instead, Owens challenges the district court’s findings related to his intent and its
conclusion that he did not have a reasonable probability of relief. We, therefore, follow
Griffin and review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. 24 N.W.3d at
254.

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N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011)). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear

error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id.

A person is guilty of first-degree felony murder when they “cause[] the death of a

human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or

attempting to commit . . . a drive-by shooting.” Minn. Stat. § 609.185(a)(3) (2024). There

is no dispute that the passengers in Owens’s vehicle attempted to cause the death of the

opposition gang members, and that Owens was not a shooter. But Owens may still be held

liable for the acts of the passengers under the aiding-and-abetting statute. See Minn. Stat.

§ 609.05 (2020) (outlining liability for crimes of another pre-2023 amendment). 3 “Aiding

and abetting is not a separate substantive offense,” but is “a theory of criminal liability.”

State v. Segura, 2 N.W.3d 142, 156 (Minn. 2024) (citation and quotation omitted). “In

other words, section 609.05 makes accomplices criminally liable as principals.” State v.

Ezeka, 946 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Minn. 2020).

At the time of his plea, for Owens to be guilty as an accomplice he had to admit that

he “knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime and that [he] intended

his presence or actions to further the commission of the crime.” State v. Mahkuk, 736

N.W.2d 675, 682 (Minn. 2007); see Segura, 2 N.W.3d at 158 (discussing evidence required

to support conviction of aiding and abetting attempted premeditated murder). Owens

admitted to these elements when he pleaded guilty. He admitted that he was “working

together with, or conspiring with, some other associates” and they “decided to ambush

3
The parties agree that Owens pleaded guilty under an aiding-and-abetting theory of
liability.

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some members of an opposition gang.” Owens also agreed that he drove the vehicle and

that “the intention and expectation of this operation was literally to kill those opposition

gang members.”

As outlined above, under the Act, Owens may no longer be held liable for aiding

and abetting first-degree felony murder “unless [he] intentionally aided, advised, hired,

counseled, or conspired with or otherwise procured the other with the intent to cause the

death of a human being.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 52, art. 4, § 3, at 850 (emphasis added).

Thus, we must decide whether the district court erred when it determined that Owens’s

guilty plea established that he had the intent to cause the death of a human being.

Owens argues that the district court erred in concluding there was not a reasonable

probability of relief under the Act because it “should have considered that the offense as

charged created a specific intent crime,” and “Owens acknowledged the intent of the

operation, but not his specific intent.” The state argues that the district court did not abuse

its discretion when it denied Owens’s petition “because the factual basis for Owens’s plea

shows he acted ‘with the intent to cause the death of a human.’” We agree with the state

and conclude that the district court properly denied Owens’s petition without a hearing

because, based on the record before it, the district court acted within its discretion when it

determined that Owens “cannot show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not

intentionally aid, advise, hire, counsel, or conspire with or otherwise procure another with

the intent to cause the death of a human being.”

“The requisite state of mind for accomplice liability can be inferred from

circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, a

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close association with the principal before and after the crime, a lack of objection or

surprise under the circumstances, and defendant’s flight from the scene of the crime with

the principal.” Segura, 2 N.W. 3d at 156 (quotation omitted). A person acts with the intent

to kill if he “either has a purpose to . . . or cause the result” of the death of a human being

“or believes that the act, if successful will cause that result.” Minn. Stat. § 609.02,

subd. 9(4) (2024). Intent is a state of mind generally proved by circumstantial evidence.

State v. Irby, 967 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Minn. 2021). “Intent can be inferred from the idea

that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions.” Nelson v. State, 880

N.W.2d 852, 860 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). And “[i]ntent to cause death can be

inferred from the nature and extent of the victim’s wounds and the defendant’s failure to

aid the victim after an assault.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Although Owens was responding to leading questions from his attorney, his

testimony at the plea hearing demonstrates that he shared the intent to kill the opposition

gang members. See State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (“The [district]

court should be particularly wary of situations in which the factual basis is established by

asking a defendant only leading questions.”). Owens testified that he was a member of a

gang and that there was an “ongoing dispute” between the gangs. Not only did Owens

admit that “the intention and expectation of this operation was literally to kill those

opposition gang members,” but he also admitted that he was familiar with the victims and

was participating “in connection with coordinated gang activity.” Owens decided, along

with his associates, to ambush the opposition gang; he drove the vehicle, intentionally

followed the victims’ vehicle from their home into the community, and intentionally pulled

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his vehicle alongside the victims’ vehicle, putting the occupants in position to fire “dozens

and dozens” of shots into the opposition vehicle. 4 Collectively, Owens’s testimony and

admissions support the district court’s findings that Owens knew that his associates

planned to kill the opposition gang members; he intended to aid in the murder by driving

the vehicle and following and pulling up alongside the victims’ vehicle; and he did those

things with the intent to cause the death of the opposition gang members. Accordingly, the

district court acted within its discretion when it denied Owens’s petition to vacate his

convictions under the Act.

Alternatively, Owens argues that if questions remain about his intent, this court

should remand the matter for a hearing where he can demonstrate that he is entitled to relief

under the Act. In the postconviction context, the district court must hold an evidentiary

hearing, “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively

show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2024); see

Griffin, 24 N.W.3d at 254 (applying postconviction statutory framework to appeals under

the Act). But a hearing is not necessary when there are no “material facts in dispute which

have not been resolved in the proceedings resulting in conviction.” Riley v. State, 819

4
As the state argues, there are additional facts in the complaint, which Owens submitted
with his petition, suggesting that Owens is not entitled to relief under the Act. The
complaint alleges that Owens’s co-defendant clarified that they “intended to kill [the
member of the opposition gang]” and he observed Owens “leaning all the way forward”
while the front-seat passenger was shooting at the victims’ vehicle. The state contends that
the record demonstrates that Owens “was not merely present in a passive manner, but he
was actively driving the getaway vehicle and moving his body to give his co-defendants a
better shot at the [victims’ vehicle].” Although not relied on by the district court, these
additional facts support the district court’s conclusion that Owens intended to cause the
death of the opposition gang members.

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N.W.2d 162, 167-68 (Minn. 2012); see also Grant v. State, No. A24-1908, 2025 WL

2435646, at *4 (Minn. App. Aug. 25, 2025) (concluding district court may summarily deny

petition for relief under the Act when additional submissions show there is not a reasonable

probability of relief), rev. granted (Minn. Dec. 17, 2025). 5 An evidentiary hearing is also

not required “unless facts are alleged which, if proved, would entitle a petitioner to the

requested relief.” Fratzke v. State, 450 N.W.2d 101, 102 (Minn. 1990). We review the

district court’s decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.

Caldwell v. State, 853 N.W.2d 766, 770 (Minn. 2014).

Here, the district court relied solely on the undisputed plea transcript to determine

that Owens was not entitled to relief. As discussed above, the plea transcript shows that

there is not a reasonable probability that justified relief for Owens, and Owens does not

allege additional facts, which if proven, would warrant relief under the Act. See Riley, 819

N.W.2d at 167-68. Accordingly, the district court acted within its discretion, when it

denied Owens’s petition without a hearing.

Affirmed.

5
We cite this nonprecedential opinion as persuasive authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
136.01, subd. 1(c).

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