Edward Lee Jones v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0647

Edward Lee Jones, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 3, 2025
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-22-4583

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Adam Lozeau, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra Meyer, Assistant County Attorney, St.
Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Johnson,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

In 2022, Edward Lee Jones was convicted of second-degree assault and possession

of a firearm by an ineligible person. In 2024, Jones petitioned for postconviction relief and
alleged that he was deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous

evidentiary rulings. The postconviction court denied the petition. We affirm.

FACTS

During the early evening of August 9, 2022, two men called 911 to report that

another man had fired gunshots at them while they were riding their bicycles on a city street

in Roseville and while they chased the shooter in a nearby parking lot. One of the callers

described the shooter as a bald Black man of medium build with a beard and said that the

shooter also was riding a bicycle. A police officer who responded to the call saw a man

matching the 911 callers’ description biking on a nearby street and stopped him. Another

officer brought one of the 911 callers to that spot for a show-up. The caller identified the

detained man, Jones, as the person who had shot at him with “100 percent” certainty. The

officer arrested Jones immediately after the show-up.

The state charged Jones with second-degree assault, in violation of Minn. Stat.

§ 609.222, subd. 1 (2022), and possession of a firearm by an ineligible person, in violation

of Minn. Stat. § 624.713, subd. 1(2) (2022). The case was tried to a jury on two days in

October 2022. The state called six witnesses, including the two other men who were

involved in the incident, who testified about Jones’s conduct in the incident described

above. A detective testified that Jones’s bicycle’s handlebars tested positive for gunshot

residue. The state introduced surveillance videorecordings that captured the shootings as

well as photographs of Jones immediately after his arrest, which show him wearing a light-

colored backpack. A crime-scene technician testified that multiple shell casings were

recovered from the street and parking lot outside the apartment, including shell casings

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from a nine-millimeter firearm that never was recovered. Jones did not testify. The jury

found him guilty of both charges. The district court imposed two concurrent sentences of

60 months of imprisonment. Jones did not pursue a direct appeal.

In December 2024, Jones petitioned for postconviction relief while represented by

an assistant state public defender. He alleged that prosecutorial misconduct and erroneous

evidentiary rulings deprived him of a fair trial. In April 2025, the postconviction court

denied Jones’s petition. The postconviction court reasoned that the prosecutor engaged in

two forms of misconduct but that the misconduct did not affect Jones’s substantial rights.

Jones appeals and reiterates the arguments he presented to the postconviction court.

DECISION

I. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Jones first argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition on the

ground that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that entitles him to a new trial.

The right to due process includes the right to a fair trial. State v. Duol, 25 N.W.3d

135, 141 (Minn. 2025). “Prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a

defendant receives a fair trial.” State v. Jones, 753 N.W.2d 677, 686 (Minn. 2008)

(quotation omitted). Consequently, prosecutorial misconduct may result in the denial of a

fair trial. State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006). “A prosecutor engages in

prosecutorial misconduct when he violates clear or established standards of conduct, e.g.,

rules, laws, orders by a district court, or clear commands in this state’s case law.” State v.

McCray, 753 N.W.2d 746, 751 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted).

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 Jones concedes that he did not object at trial to the misconduct that he challenges in

this postconviction action. Accordingly, we apply a modified plain-error test. State v.

Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130, 146 (Minn. 2012). To prevail under the modified plain-error

test, an appellant first must establish that an error occurred. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302.

The appellant then must show that the error was plain. Id. “An error is plain if it was clear

or obvious.” Id. (quotations omitted). At the third step of the modified plain-error analysis,

the burden shifts to the state to show “that there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence

of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the

jury.” Id. (quotations omitted). If the state does not satisfy that burden, the appellate court

proceeds to the fourth step to determine whether the plain misconduct should result in a

new trial to ensure the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Pulczinski v. State, 972 N.W.2d 347, 356 (Minn. 2022).

In reviewing a postconviction court’s denial of a petition, this court applies a clear-

error standard of review to the postconviction court’s factual findings, a de novo standard

of review to its legal conclusions, and an abuse-of-discretion standard of review to its

ultimate decision to deny relief. Sanchez v. State, 890 N.W.2d 716, 719-20 (Minn. 2017).

A. Whether Plain Misconduct Occurred

Jones contends that the prosecutor engaged in three types of prosecutorial

misconduct. We will separately consider the three allegations.

1. Right to Remain Silent

Jones contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting testimony

that he exercised his right to remain silent. Jones refers to the prosecutor’s direct

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examination of the officer who responded to the 911 call and the detective who investigated

Jones. The officer testified that he “tried to read [Jones] his Miranda rights” but that Jones

“didn’t want to talk to me about everything or give me a fingerprint.” Later the prosecutor

asked the detective a question that referred to the fact that Jones “had . . . affirmed his right

to not be interrogated.” The detective answered by reiterating that he was “aware that

[Jones] did not wish to speak to me further.”

The postconviction court determined that the prosecutor engaged in plain

misconduct by eliciting evidence that Jones had exercised his right to remain silent. On

appeal, the state concedes that the prosecutor engaged in plain misconduct. Because it is

well established that a prosecutor may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised

his right to remain silent, we agree. See State v. Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d 185, 199 (Minn.

2006); State v. Clark, 296 N.W.2d 359, 366 (Minn. 1980); State v. McCullum, 289 N.W.2d

89, 92 (Minn. 1979); State v. Beck, 183 N.W.2d 781, 784 (Minn. 1971).

2. Offensive Slur

Jones also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by eliciting

testimony that he used an offensive slur to describe the investigating officers. A detective

testified on direct examination that, when he and another officer attempted to obtain a DNA

sample from Jones pursuant to a search warrant, Jones refused to cooperate. The

prosecutor asked the detective, “Did he say anything else along with that refusal?” The

detective answered by saying that Jones “referred to us as faggots.”

The postconviction court determined that the prosecutor engaged in plain

misconduct by eliciting testimony that Jones used an offensive slur when referring to the

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officers. On appeal, the state does not challenge the postconviction court’s determination.

Because the testimony about Jones’s offensive slur has no probative value, or because its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, we agree.

See Minn. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403; see also State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 782-83

(Minn. 2006) (concluding that defendant’s “derogatory comments about the prisoners at

the local jail” were not probative of whether defendant committed charged crimes).

3. Belittling the Defense

Jones also contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by belittling the

defense. Jones bases this contention on the following statements in the prosecutor’s closing

argument: “Was [Jones’s] clone wearing his clothes, shooting at [the men who called],

who then magically vanished and Mr. Jones appeared in his place, riding the shooter’s

bike? . . . . [I]t would be absurd for you to conclude anything other than the fact that Mr.

Jones assaulted” the men who called 911.

A prosecutor’s closing argument must be “based on the evidence produced at trial,

or the reasonable inferences from that evidence.” State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363

(Minn. 1995). “The State may argue that there is no merit in a particular defense, but it

may not belittle that defense either in the abstract or by suggesting that the defendant raised

the defense because it was the only one with any hope for success.” State v. Peltier, 874

N.W.2d 792, 804 (Minn. 2016). A closing argument is improper if it “could only have been

intended to inflame the jury’s passions and prejudices.” Porter, 526 N.W.2d at 364.

The postconviction court determined that the prosecutor did not engage in improper

belittling of the defense, reasoning that a prosecutor is allowed to argue that there is no

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merit to a particular defense. Jones contends that the postconviction court erred on the

ground that this case is like State v. Hoppe, 641 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. App. 2002), in which

the prosecutor committed misconduct by stating that the defendant’s argument was

“ridiculous” and that jurors should not be “snowed” by it. Id. at 321. Jones also compares

this case to Porter, in which the prosecutor attempted to impinge on juror independence by

arguing that jurors would have to believe in Santa Claus in order to find the defendant not

guilty, that jurors surely were “not that big of suckers,” and that “there would be no sedative

or salve to make them feel better” if they found the defendant not guilty. 526 N.W.2d at

363-64.

The closing argument in this case was not sufficiently similar to the closing

arguments in Hoppe and Porter. The prosecutor’s statement about a “clone” was a way of

saying that the photograph of Jones taken immediately after his arrest was very similar to

the 911 caller’s description of the shooter and Jones’s appearance in the surveillance

videorecording. The prosecutor’s use of the word “absurd” was a way of highlighting the

weakness of the defense’s argument. The prosecutor did not use language that inherently

challenged the jurors’ intelligence and judgment. Accordingly, the prosecutor did not

belittle or disparage the defense.

Thus, the postconviction court did not err by determining that the prosecutor

engaged in two forms of plain misconduct but did not engage in plain misconduct in the

form of belittling or disparaging the defense.

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B. Whether Plain Misconduct Affected Substantial Rights

The third requirement of the modified plain-error test is that plain misconduct

affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. On this issue, the

state bears the burden of establishing “that there is no reasonable likelihood that the

absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of

the jury.” Id. (quotation omitted). To determine whether such a reasonable likelihood

exists, “we consider the strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness

of the improper suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made

efforts to) rebut the improper suggestions.” State v. Portillo, 998 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Minn.

2023) (quotation omitted).

The postconviction court determined that the two forms of prosecutorial misconduct

did not affect Jones’s substantial rights because the state presented strong evidence of his

guilt. The postconviction court reasoned that the state’s case was supported by the

surveillance videorecording, which showed the shooter on a bicycle, with clothing and a

light-colored backpack that matched Jones’s clothing and light-colored backpack. The

postconviction court also noted that eyewitnesses identified Jones as the shooter, that bullet

casings were recovered in the street and parking lot, and that the handlebars of Jones’s

bicycle tested positive for gunshot residue.

Jones challenges the postconviction court’s reasoning by pointing out weaknesses

in the state’s case. First, Jones notes that investigators did not recover DNA evidence or a

firearm to link him to the shooting. Jones also asserts that the eyewitness identification by

one of the 911 callers was unreliable because the men had never met Jones before the

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incident, cross-racial identifications are unreliable, and the show-up after Jones’s arrest

was suggestive. Jones also notes that the two men testified that the shooter rode a black

bicycle, whereas Jones’s bicycle actually was blue and teal.

Jones’s contentions understate the strength of the state’s evidence. The

videorecordings, although taken at a distance and of somewhat low quality, show a person

remarkably similar to the photograph of Jones immediately after his arrest, which was

taken only a few feet away and is of high quality. In addition to Jones’s physical

characteristics, both the shooter in the videorecordings and Jones in the post-arrest

photograph were wearing a black T-shirt with a white logo on the left side of the chest,

black shorts, black and white shoes, and a light-colored backpack. The videorecordings

and photographs allowed the jury to see the crime for themselves and to make their own

comparisons between the photograph of Jones after his arrest and his appearance in the

courtroom. The state’s identification of Jones as the shooter was corroborated by a 911

caller’s observation of Jones at a show-up shortly after the crime as well as the courtroom

testimony of both men. In addition, the state introduced bullet casings and evidence that

Jones’s bicycle handlebars tested positive for gunshot residue. This combination of

evidence constituted strong evidence of Jones’s guilt. See State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674,

682 (Minn. 2007).

In addition, the two forms of misconduct recognized by the postconviction court

were not pervasive. The evidence of Jones’s invocation of his right to remain silent was

mentioned only twice, and only briefly, in the prosecutor’s direct examination of two police

officers. The evidence of Jones’s offensive slur was mentioned only once. Importantly,

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neither Jones’s invocation of his right to remain silent nor the offensive slur was mentioned

in closing argument. The jury almost surely returned guilty verdicts because of the strength

of the state’s case, not the two isolated instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Considering

the record as a whole, “there is no reasonable likelihood that the absence of the misconduct

in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the jury.” See Ramey, 721

N.W.2d at 302 (quotations omitted).

Thus, the postconviction court did not err by denying Jones relief on his claim of

prosecutorial misconduct on the ground that the two established forms of misconduct did

not substantially affect Jones’s rights. In light of that conclusion, we need not consider

whether a new trial is required to protect the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.

See State v. Brown, 815 N.W.2d 609, 620 (Minn. 2012).

II. Evidentiary Rulings

Jones also argues that the postconviction court erred by denying his petition on the

ground that the district court erroneously admitted three types of inadmissible evidence.

Two types of evidence challenged by Jones are discussed above: evidence that he

exercised his right to remain silent and evidence that he referred to officers with an

offensive slur. Jones did not object to the admission of either type of evidence.

Accordingly, we apply the plain-error test. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.

1998).

The state concedes that the admission of evidence of Jones’s invocation of his right

to remain silent was plainly erroneous, and the state does not challenge the postconviction

court’s determination that admission of the offensive slur was erroneous.

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 The third requirement of the plain-error test requires an appellant to show that a

plain error affected his substantial rights. Id. We have concluded above that, under the

modified plain-error test, the state satisfied its burden of establishing that the prosecutorial

misconduct that resulted in the admission of the same evidence did not substantially affect

Jones’s rights. See supra I.B. In light of that conclusion, Jones cannot satisfy his burden

of showing that the admission of the same evidence affected his substantial rights.

The third type of evidence challenged by Jones is evidence that he refused to

cooperate with the execution of a search warrant seeking his DNA. Jones objected to the

introduction of that evidence on the ground that it lacked relevance because the state had

not done any DNA testing. The district court overruled the objection. The postconviction

court reasoned that the evidence was relevant to Jones’s theory that the investigation was

insufficiently thorough. The postconviction court also distinguished the facts of this case

(which involved a search warrant) from the facts of cases in which a defendant’s refusal to

consent to a warrantless search for DNA was deemed irrelevant and, thus, inadmissible.

See State v. Larson, 788 N.W.2d 25, 32 (Minn. 2010); Jones, 753 N.W.2d at 687.

On appeal, Jones does not challenge the postconviction court’s reasoning that the

evidence was relevant to the thoroughness of the officers’ investigation. Caselaw shows

that such evidence often is relevant. See State v. Gilleylen, 993 N.W.2d 266, 284 (Minn.

2023); State v. Smith, 932 N.W.2d 257, 269-70 (Minn. 2019); State v. Tran, 712 N.W.2d

540, 550-51 (Minn. 2006). Jones also does not challenge the postconviction court’s

analysis distinguishing the caselaw concerning a defendant’s refusal to consent to a

warrantless search. Rather, Jones focuses on whether the evidence is probative of

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consciousness of guilt. The caselaw shows that evidence of consciousness of guilt may be

relevant and admissible so long as its relevance is not outweighed by the potential for unfair

prejudice. See State v. McDaniel, 777 N.W.2d 739, 746 (Minn. 2010); Mayhorn, 720

N.W.2d at 783. The central issue at trial was the identity of the shooter. Jones’s refusal to

cooperate with a valid search warrant seeking his DNA arguably tends to show his

consciousness of guilt. Jones also focuses on whether the evidence, even if relevant, would

be misleading. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. But Jones’s trial attorney did not object on that

ground. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence, and

the postconviction court did not err by upholding that ruling.

Even if we were to conclude that evidence of Jones’s refusal to cooperate with the

taking of a DNA sample was erroneously introduced, Jones would not be entitled to a new

trial because the error would be harmless. An error is harmless if no reasonable possibility

exists that the error significantly affected the jury’s verdict. State v. Bigbear, 10 N.W.3d

48, 54 (Minn. 2024). We have concluded above that the state established that prosecutorial

misconduct did not substantially affect Jones’s rights because the state introduced strong

evidence of guilt and the prosecutorial misconduct was not pervasive. See supra I.B.

Similarly, the evidence of Jones’s refusal to cooperate with a search warrant seeking his

DNA was not pervasive. The prosecutor only briefly asked the detective about his attempt

to collect Jones’s DNA. The prosecutor also mentioned Jones’s refusal in one short

statement during closing argument. But the prosecutor did so in connection with his

argument that the investigating officers “were very thorough and professional” and

conducted “the best search that they could.” There is no reasonable likelihood that the

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jury’s verdict would have been different in the absence of evidence and argument about

Jones’s refusal to cooperate with the search warrant. For these reasons, Jones cannot show

that the district court’s admission of the challenged evidence substantially affected the

jury’s verdict.

Thus, the postconviction court did not err by denying Jones relief on his claim that

the district court admitted inadmissible evidence.

Before concluding, we note that Jones has made one additional argument: that the

cumulative effect of multiple errors warrants a new trial. “Cumulative error exists when

the cumulative effect of the errors . . . and indiscretions, none of which alone might have

been enough to tip the scales, operate to the defendant’s prejudice by producing a biased

jury.” Penkaty, 708 N.W.2d at 200 (quotation omitted). In other words, if an appellant

establishes that a district court committed two or more procedural errors, none of which

individually requires a new trial, the appellant nonetheless may be “entitled to a new trial

if the errors, when taken cumulatively, had the effect of denying appellant a fair trial.”

State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 698 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). We have

identified two types of errors related to two forms of prosecutorial misconduct and two

pieces of inadmissible evidence: Jones’s exercise of his right to remain silent and his use

of an offensive slur. We already have concluded that these errors, when considered

together, did not affect Jones’s substantial rights. See supra parts I.B & II. There are no

additional errors to accumulate. Cf. State v. Fraga, 898 N.W.2d 263, 278 (Minn. 2017).

Thus, the cumulative-error doctrine does not apply.

Affirmed.

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