In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Peter Allan aka Peter Allan George

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0652

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of:
Peter Allan aka Peter Allan George.

Filed October 6, 2025
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-PR-07-3493

Peter Ista Toto Allan, Moose Lake, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, James Austad, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Michelle Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter
Tail County Department of Human Services)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and

Bratvold, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under Minn. R. Civ.

P. 60.02(e) for relief from his indeterminate civil commitment. He makes essentially two

arguments: (1) he has a right to represent himself in civil-commitment proceedings, and

the district court violated that right, amounting to structural error, by appointing counsel;

and (2) his motion is proper under rule 60.02 because he does not seek discharge from civil
commitment but vacation of the order appointing counsel that predated his civil

commitment. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2009, following a trial at which he was represented by court-appointed counsel,

appellant Peter Allan was indeterminately civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender

Program (MSOP). He appealed his commitment, and we affirmed. In re Civ. Commitment

of Allan, No. A09-1607 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2010). He has since pursued various

unsuccessful challenges to his commitment, including but not limited to multiple prior

motions for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02.

In December 2024, Allan filed a motion seeking relief under Minn. R. Civ.

P. 60.02(e). He asserted that because In re Civ. Commitment of Benson, 12 N.W.3d 711

(Minn. 2024), holds that persons subject to civil-commitment proceedings are entitled to

waive counsel, the 2007 appointment of counsel during his initial commitment proceeding

was “structural error” requiring “automatic reversal” because it denied him the right to

represent himself. And he requested “a waiver of appointment of counsel so he can

represent himself at the initial proceedings.”

The district court denied the motion, reasoning that (1) Allan is not entitled to relief

under Benson because he neither requested nor was denied the opportunity to represent

himself; and (2) Allan’s motion effectively seeks discharge from his civil commitment,

which is not a form of relief available under rule 60.02.

Allan appeals.

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 DECISION

A party may obtain relief from a judgment if a district court determines that “it is

no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Minn. R. Civ.

P. 60.02(e). This may be the case if there has been a change in “the relevant decisional

law.” In re Civ. Commitment of Moen, 837 N.W.2d 40, 48-49 (Minn. App. 2013)

(quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013). We review the “denial of a rule

60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion.” In re Civ. Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d

649, 655 (Minn. App. 2019), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019).

Allan principally argues that the district court abused its discretion by determining

that he is not entitled to relief because Benson changed the relevant decisional law

regarding waiver of counsel in commitment proceedings. We begin our analysis by

reviewing Benson.

Like Allan, Benson has been indeterminately committed to MSOP for many years.

Benson, 12 N.W.3d at 713. In 2020, he petitioned for a reduction in custody and was

appointed counsel for that proceeding. Id. at 714. Benson filed a motion requesting

permission to ask questions and noting that he “prefers to proceed pro se if at all possible.”

Id. The commitment appeal panel (CAP) hearing his custody-reduction petition effectively

denied that request (along with his petition). Id. Benson appealed, arguing that the CAP

violated his “statutory and constitutional rights to self-representation.” Id. We rejected

both arguments, concluding that (1) based on our prior decisions—In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d

366, 371 (Minn. App. 1995), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995), and In re Civ. Commitment

of Emberland, No. A11-1561, 2012 WL 612320, at *6-7 (Minn. App. Feb. 27, 2012)

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(following Irwin)—he has no such statutory right; and (2) he did not preserve his

constitutional argument. Id. at 714-15.

The supreme court reversed, reasoning that Minn. Stat. § 253D.20 (2024)

unambiguously guarantees the right to counsel for people subject to civil-commitment

proceedings but is ambiguous as to whether the right is waivable. Id. at 715-16.

Ultimately, it concluded that various aspects of that statute’s language and its historical

context indicate that the legislature “intended the right to counsel established by section

253D.20 to be waivable.” 1 Id. at 717. In doing so, the supreme court explained that “the

right to waive counsel is neither absolute nor unfettered” but exercisable only by those who

are competent to enter a knowing and intelligent waiver, much like in criminal cases. Id.

at 720. And even then, it emphasized, “[i]n most cases, waiving the right to counsel is a

bad idea with potentially dire consequences.” Id. Finally, the supreme court noted that its

holding obviated the need to address whether Benson preserved his constitutional argument

or decide that argument on the merits. Id. at 717, 721 n.13.

Here, the district court concluded that Benson does not apply because Allen did not

ask to waive counsel and represent himself, as Benson did. Allan does not dispute that he

did not object to the order appointing counsel or otherwise seek to waive counsel and

1
Allan asks us to take judicial notice of a federal district court decision in a habeas
proceeding that he initiated—specifically the court’s description of Benson as holding “that
a civil commitment petitioner has the right to waive counsel in all commitment and post-
commitment proceedings.” Allan v. Gandhi, No. 24-CV-2458, 2025 WL 1745900 (D.
Minn. June 24, 2025). We may take judicial notice of “adjudicative facts in civil cases.”
Minn. R. Evid. 201(a). But that court’s description of Benson’s holding is not an
adjudicative fact subject to judicial notice.

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represent himself in his civil-commitment proceeding. Instead, he asserts three reasons

why his failure to do so should not preclude him from obtaining relief under rule 60.02.

None persuades us to reverse.

First, he contends that, before Benson, he was “prohibited” from asking to represent

himself by the Irwin and Emberland decisions that we relied on in rejecting Benson’s

statutory argument. But the existence of unfavorable caselaw does not prohibit a party

from requesting relief. To the contrary, a party may seek relief based on existing law or “a

nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the

establishment of new law.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.02(b). Benson itself shows that such

changes are possible—if parties ask for them.

Second, Allan suggests that, because he has a right to waive counsel, he also has a

right to be so advised, and the district court erred by failing to give him such an advisory.

He did not present this argument to the district court and, therefore, has not preserved it for

appeal. In re Civ. Commitment of Turner, 950 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. App. 2020)

(“Appellate courts generally will not consider matters not argued to and considered by a

district court.”). But the argument also fails on the merits. While Benson recognizes the

right to waive counsel, it does not require an advisory of the right. Nor does the criminal

rule that the Benson court cited in discussing how a court (or a CAP) in a civil commitment

proceeding may determine whether a request to waive counsel is knowing and intelligent.

See Benson, 12 N.W.3d at 720 (citing Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1(3), (4)); Minn. R.

Crim. P. 5.04, subd. 1 (requiring district court to “advise the defendant of the right to

counsel” and discussing procedures for when defendants “wish to represent themselves”).

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Indeed, the supreme court “refer[red] the issue of waiver of counsel in civil commitment

proceedings to the relevant advisory committee to recommend any necessary and

appropriate procedural rule amendments consistent with this opinion.” Benson, 12 N.W.3d

at 721 (footnote omitted). In short, Benson does not require the type of advisory that Allan

claims he should have received.

Third, Allan appears to contend that he has a constitutional right to represent himself

in civil-commitment proceedings, the district court violated that right by appointing

counsel when he did not request it, and the constitutional violation is structural error,

requiring reversal. But he did not present a constitutional argument to the district court.

His suggestion that he did so by arguing that the appointment of counsel was “structural

error” is unconvincing. He premises this argument on Benson, in which the supreme court

conducted a statutory analysis and expressly declined to decide “whether there is a

constitutional right to self-representation in civil commitment proceedings.” Id. at 721

n.13. Moreover, Allan’s own brief—which contains more than 20 pages of constitutional

analysis—demonstrates that merely reciting the phrase “structural error” is insufficient to

present a constitutional claim. Because Allan did not present a constitutional argument to

the district court, he has forfeited the argument for purposes of this appeal. Turner, 950

N.W.2d at 306.

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 In sum, Allan has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by

determining that, because he did not ask to represent himself in his civil-commitment

proceeding, he is not entitled to relief based on Benson. 2

Affirmed.

2
Allan also challenges the district court’s determination that his rule 60.02 motion is
improper because its ultimate purpose is discharge from civil commitment. Because we
affirm the district court’s denial of the motion on the merits, we need not address this issue.

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