In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Benjamin A. Ebert

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0738

In the Matter of the Civil Commitment of: Benjamin A. Ebert.

Filed October 6, 2025
Affirmed
Bentley, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-MH-PR-25-344

Gabe Monson, Hennepin County Adult Representation Services, Minneapolis, Minnesota
(for appellant Benjamin Ebert)

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, Brittany D. Lawonn, Senior Assistant
County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent North Memorial Health Care /
Hennepin County)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

BENTLEY, Judge

On appeal from a commitment as a person who poses a risk of harm because of

mental illness, appellant Benjamin A. Ebert argues that the district court erred by finding

that autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)

are substantial psychiatric disorders under the commitment statute, Minn. Stat. § 253B.02,

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
subd. 17a(a) (2024). Because the district court also based its decision on a third diagnosis

that Ebert does not dispute is a substantial psychiatric disorder, we affirm.

FACTS

On March 29, 2025, Ebert’s mother called Hennepin County Community Outreach

for Psychiatric Emergencies (COPE) to report that Ebert had “destroyed his apartment”

and had been sending “bizarre” text messages. When COPE responders arrived at Ebert’s

apartment, they observed that Ebert was intoxicated and “speaking nonsensically,” and

they could not engage him in conversation. The COPE responders transported Ebert to the

hospital, where a blood sample showed his alcohol concentration was 0.308. At the

hospital, Ebert said that he had been suicidal, attempted to overdose, and planned to kill

himself. He also reported that he had been hospitalized in Duluth under similar

circumstances in June 2024, when he attempted suicide through drinking and overdose.

During that hospitalization, he admitted to three prior suicide attempts.

Respondent Hennepin County petitioned to commit Ebert as a person who is

mentally ill and in need of hospitalization, and the district court appointed Dr. Casey

Boland to examine Ebert and prepare a report. In her report, Dr. Boland opined that civil

commitment is the least-restrictive, appropriate treatment for Ebert. Based on her review

of Ebert’s records, Dr. Boland did not believe that Ebert would follow through with

treatment voluntarily. “[R]ecords indicated [Ebert] disengaged from treatment when he

faced . . . barriers, rather than seeking alternative treatment.” Dr. Boland was concerned

about Ebert’s disengagement because he currently posed a “significant risk of harm to

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himself” and had reported that “he did not use his identified coping mechanisms prior to

his current admission because he wanted to die.”

The district court held a hearing on the commitment petition on April 10, 2025. At

the hearing, the court took judicial notice of the examiner’s report and received medical

records relating to Ebert’s current and June 2024 hospitalizations. Ebert testified about his

mental health history, diagnoses, and treatment needs. He stated that prior hospital stays

have been challenging for him for several reasons, including his sensory issues. Ebert’s

attorney asked the district court to either deny the petition or continue the matter for

dismissal so that Ebert has a chance to seek treatment in the community.

The district court filed an order on April 14, 2025, committing Ebert as a person

who poses a risk of harm because of mental illness. The district court found that “Ebert is

ill with major depressive disorder, ADHD, and autism spectrum disorder—which is a

substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, and perception, which grossly impairs

his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, and ability to reason or understand.”

Relying on Dr. Boland’s report and the medical records, the district court found that Ebert

“poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to himself” due to his mental illness.

Because of Ebert’s “prior disengagement from treatment in similar settings” and “the

seriousness of recent safety concerns,” the district court was persuaded that he “would

benefit from oversight to ensure he receives appropriate ongoing care.” And although the

district court considered Ebert’s testimony that he “no longer intends to harm himself and

would voluntarily engage in treatment that would be able to accommodate his sensory and

social needs,” it did not credit that testimony because of Ebert’s past struggles to “ward

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against him being a danger, particularly to himself.” As a result, the district court found

that the “least restrictive, appropriate, available placement” was civil commitment.

Ebert appeals.

DECISION

Ebert argues that the district court erred when it stated that ASD and ADHD are

substantial psychiatric disorders under the commitment statute. The county argues that the

district court’s comment regarding ASD and ADHD is not relevant because, based on the

evidence indicating that Ebert had major depressive disorder, the district court did not err

in concluding that Ebert had a substantial psychiatric disorder.

When reviewing an order of commitment, an appellate court examines whether the

district court complied with the commitment statute and whether the district court’s

findings support its conclusions of law. In re Knops, 536 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995).

Appellate courts review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, “considering the

record in the light most favorable to the findings of fact.” In re Civ. Commitment of Breault,

942 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted). “[F]indings are clearly

erroneous when they are manifestly contrary to the weight of the evidence or not

reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” In re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963

N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021) (quotation omitted). Appellate courts “review de novo

whether there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the district court’s

conclusion” that an individual’s circumstances require commitment. In re Thulin, 660

N.W.2d 140, 144 (Minn. App. 2003).

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 A district court shall civilly commit an individual “[i]f the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence that the proposed patient is a person who poses a risk of harm due to

mental illness” and there is “no suitable alternative to judicial commitment.” Minn. Stat.

§ 253B.09, subd. 1(a) (2024). A person poses a risk of harm because of mental illness if

they have “an organic disorder of the brain or a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought,

mood, perception, orientation, or memory”; the disorder “grossly impairs judgment,

behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or to reason or understand” and “is manifested by

instances of grossly disturbed behavior or faulty perceptions”; and, because of their

condition, the person “poses a substantial likelihood of physical harm to self or others.”

Minn. Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 17a(a) (2024). The commitment statute does not list any

specific disorders that qualify as a mental illness, but we have concluded that “[a]n

individual who suffers from an antisocial personality disorder, but not a major mental

illness, may not be a ‘mentally ill person’” as that term was defined under a prior version

of the statute. In re El-Rashad, 411 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 1987).

Ebert challenges the district court’s findings relating to his mental illness, that

“Ebert is ill with major depressive disorder, ADHD, and autism spectrum disorder—which

is a substantial psychiatric disorder of thought, mood, and perception, which grossly

impairs his judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, and ability to reason or

understand.” Ebert reads this as the district court determining that major depressive

disorder, ADHD, and ASD each meet “the mental illness definition in the statute.” He

suggests that public policy considerations weigh against committing people with

neurodevelopmental disorders such as ASD and ADHD because they may be placed in

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settings that do not align with their treatment needs. Ebert therefore asks us to remand “for

additional findings concerning [his] mental illness diagnoses.”

As an initial point, it is not clear that Ebert’s reading of the district court’s order is

the right one. Another reasonable interpretation of the order is that the district court

determined that Ebert’s diagnoses of major depressive disorder, ADHD, and ASD together

constitute a “substantial psychiatric disorder.” After all, the district court listed the three

diagnoses and then used the singular verb “is” to describe them as a substantial psychiatric

disorder.

Even assuming without deciding that the district court identified ASD and ADHD

as substantial psychiatric disorders and erred in that respect, Ebert has not shown that he

was prejudiced by any such error. “If an appellant shows that the district court erred, the

mere existence of that error is, by itself, insufficient to require a grant of relief; the appellant

must also show that the error was prejudicial.” In re Civ. Commitment of Turner, 950

N.W.2d 303, 309 (Minn. App. 2020). Ebert does not challenge the finding that he has major

depressive disorder, he concedes that “[m]ajor depressive disorder may be a basis for civil

commitment,” and he notes that a person with a neurodevelopmental disorder and another

disorder (i.e., schizophrenia) could be committed if the statutory criteria are otherwise met.

Indeed, our caselaw instructs that a district court does not reversibly err by making

“extraneous” findings about a nonqualifying disorder when the record supports its

determination that a person has a substantial psychiatric disorder. El-Rashad, 411 N.W.2d

at 569-70 (“The findings referring to El-Rashad’s possible personality disorder are

extraneous to our conclusion that the trial court’s finding that El-Rashad is a mentally ill

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person is not clearly erroneous.”). Here, the record supports the district court’s conclusion

that Ebert had a substantial psychiatric disorder and we discern no basis to conclude that

the district court would have reached a different decision had it not identified ASD and

ADHD as substantial psychiatric disorders.

Ebert requests that we remand the case to the district court for additional findings

that disaggregate its findings with respect to major depressive disorder, ASD, and ADHD.

But nothing in the statute requires the district court to make those express findings or to

explain on the record the extent to which a risk of harm is due to various diagnoses, so long

as at least one diagnosis constitutes a substantial psychiatric disorder. See Minn. Stat.

§ 253B.02, subd. 17a (2024); see also In re Civ. Commitment of Suchan, No. A11-1415,

2012 WL 686187, at *4 (Minn. App. Mar. 5, 2012) (concluding that “the statute does not

require the district court to specify a diagnosis”). 1 “[W]hen a requirement is not present in

a statute, we will not ‘read [it] into an unambiguous statute under the guise of statutory

interpretation.’” Turner, 950 N.W.2d at 308-09 (quoting Breault, 942 N.W.2d at 377).

Ebert also seems to argue that the district court should have considered his ASD in

determining his treatment placement. He asks that we consider a nonprecedential opinion

of this court in which “the dissent discussed the appellant’s possible diagnosis of [ASD] as

one of the many reasons that civil commitment to [the Minnesota Sex Offender Program]

was not appropriate.” See In re Commitment of Eischens, No. A14–0013, 2014 WL

2808060, at *7 (Minn. App. Jun. 23, 2014) (Randall, J. dissenting). But the dissent in

1
We cite this nonprecedential opinion for its persuasive value only, and we note that it is
not binding authority. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

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Eischens does not persuade us that the district court erred here. First, the dissent does not

assert, as Ebert seems to suggest, that Eischens’s ASD was a reason why a less-restrictive

placement was appropriate in that case. Id. at *6-11. Rather, the dissent contends that

Eischens’s possible ASD diagnosis could partially explain why he “acted out sexually”

when he was 14 years old, which would make civil commitment for that conduct especially

egregious. Id. at *7. Second, the record shows that the district court here considered Ebert’s

ASD in determining whether there was a less-restrictive alternative to civil commitment.

Specifically, the district court considered Ebert’s testimony that he “would voluntarily

engage in treatment that would be able to accommodate his sensory and social needs.” But

the district court did not find Ebert’s testimony credible because “[h]is best intentions have

not been able to ward against him being a danger, particularly to himself.” We defer to the

district court’s credibility determinations. Kenney, 963 N.W.2d at 221-22.

In sum, even assuming that the district court erred in determining that ASD and

ADHD alone are substantial psychiatric disorders, Ebert has not established that he is

entitled to appellate relief. And the district court did not clearly err in finding that civil

commitment is the least-restrictive treatment program that can meet Ebert’s treatment

needs.

Affirmed.

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