State of Minnesota v. Guy Willard Blessing

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0764

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Guy Willard Blessing,
Appellant.

Filed March 9, 2026
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Aitkin County District Court
File No. 01-CR-22-897

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Thomas Ragatz, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James Ratz, Aitkin County Attorney, Aitkin, Minnesota (for respondent)

Travis M. Keil, Chanhassen, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and

Schmidt, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

After waiving his right to a jury trial and stipulating to the state’s case to obtain

review of the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress, appellant was

convicted of two counts of felony possession of pornographic work involving a minor. In
this direct appeal, appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence that

law enforcement obtained after the search of his home and seizure of his electronic devices

pursuant to a search warrant. Because the search warrant was supported by probable cause,

we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Guy Willard Blessing with two

counts of felony possession of pornographic work involving a minor in violation of

Minnesota Statutes section 617.247, subdivision 4(a) (2020). The allegations in the

complaint stem from material discovered on Blessing’s electronic devices after law

enforcement searched Blessing’s home and seized the devices pursuant to a search warrant.

On February 23, 2021, law enforcement applied for and was granted a warrant to

search Blessing’s home for “Miller High Life beer bottles” and “[c]ellular phones,

computers and other electronic equipment and the contents thereof that could be used for

the storage of personal data.” The search-warrant application was made based on

allegations that Blessing provided alcohol to a 17-year-old male (the minor) and made

unwanted advances towards the minor on the day before the application was submitted.

The minor’s mother reported the allegations and law enforcement spoke with the minor.

The search-warrant application included the following information from law

enforcement’s interview of the minor. Blessing was a substitute teacher at the minor’s

school. Notwithstanding Blessing’s position as the minor’s teacher, the two had a

relationship outside of school as friends for about a year. The minor had been to Blessing’s

home about 12 times to assist him with property maintenance. Each time the minor had

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been to Blessing’s home, Blessing’s wife was present except on the day in question—the

day before the search-warrant application was filed.

On that day, Blessing texted the minor asking him for a ride to town to get his truck

because his wife fell recently and was in the hospital. When the minor arrived at Blessing’s

home, Blessing offered him a beer, which was not unusual. Then, Blessing asked the minor

if he knew what “philia,” “pedophilia,” and “ephebophilia” meant. The minor said that he

did not know what “ephebophilia” was and Blessing told him it was an attraction to people

of the minor’s age. Blessing also made comments about the minor’s body, including “that

his body was looking nice and he can’t wait to see what boot camp will do to [the minor’s]

body,” and that he wanted to “see the rest of [the minor’s] body.” During the interaction,

Blessing repeatedly offered the minor another beer, and the minor felt like Blessing was

pressuring him to drink more. Before leaving to pick up the truck, Blessing squeezed the

minor’s shoulder and said, “you going to show me,” and told the minor that “he could just

close his eyes and pretend [Blessing] wasn’t there.” Later, in the car on the way to get

Blessing’s truck, Blessing told the minor “that his wife would be in the hospital for a few

days and . . . that [the minor] would really be helping him out by showing him,” and asked

the minor to text him about it. Blessing also reportedly told the minor “that he had felt this

way about other kids before but never acted on it,” and “just couldn’t resist with [the

minor].” Throughout the interaction, the minor felt uncomfortable, sickened, and scared.

The application also explained that, after interviewing the minor, law enforcement

went to the high school where Blessing worked and arrested Blessing for furnishing alcohol

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to the minor. Following his arrest, Blessing gave a Mirandized 1 statement to law

enforcement that was summarized in the search-warrant application. In the Mirandized

statement, Blessing admitted giving beer to the minor. He also stated that he “does have

interests in the post-pubescent young men,” and agreed that he planned to ask the minor

about his body but that there was no touching or video/photography. When asked if he had

acted on his feelings, Blessing said no except for pornography. Additionally,

[Blessing] said that he does search out photos on the
internet for young men. He believed that the images are
supposedly not underage. Blessing said that he stores the
images on his laptop. Blessing did provide a website of
“Gayboytube.com” that he frequents. Blessing said that he
does not consider himself a pedophile, “by definition.”

Based on the foregoing information, the search-warrant application stated that law

enforcement believed that a search of Blessing’s residence would result in locating

evidence supporting that Blessing provided alcohol to the minor and “electronic devices

[that] could provide additional evidence of crimes related to juvenile sex crimes or juvenile

pornography.” The search-warrant application also stated that law enforcement

“underst[ood] that electronic devices located during the [execution of the] search warrant

would require additional warrants prior to . . . being searched.”

After the district court granted the search-warrant application, law enforcement

executed a search of Blessing’s home for the items specified in the application: “[a]lcohol

1
To protect a defendant’s right against self-incrimination, law enforcement must
implement “procedural safeguards” prior to subjecting the defendant to custodial
interrogation, which includes informing the defendant of their right to remain silent and
have an attorney present. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 478-79 (1966).

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containers specifically Miller High Life beer bottles,” and “[c]ellular phones, computers

and other electronic equipment and the contents thereof that could be used for the storage

of personal data.” Law enforcement recovered Miller High Life beer bottles and three

laptop computers. The next day, law enforcement submitted three additional search-

warrant applications to search the contents of a cell phone that was seized from Blessing’s

person when he was arrested and two of the laptop computers collected during the search

of Blessing’s home. The applications contained the same information as the first

application and included additional details about the search of Blessing’s home and the

applicant’s training and experience. The district court granted the three additional search

warrants for Blessing’s devices. After searching the devices and analyzing the digital

material, law enforcement found several images of “apparent child sexual abuse.” 2

Blessing moved to suppress the evidence found on his electronic devices, arguing

that law enforcement lacked sufficient probable cause to support the initial search warrant

to permit law enforcement to seize Blessing’s computers and other electronic devices.

Blessing did not dispute the validity of the search warrant as it pertained to the alcohol

2
The complaint uses the terms “apparent child sexual abuse” and “child sexual abuse
material.” At the time of Blessing’s conviction, the relevant statute criminalized the
possession of “a pornographic work” involving a minor. Minn. Stat. § 617.247 (2020). In
2025, the legislature amended the statute and changed the phrase “pornographic work” to
“child sexual abuse material.” Minn. Stat. § 617.247 (Supp. 2025). Although this updated
language does not appear to affect the resolution of the case, we must apply the statute that
was in effect at the time of the criminal offense. See State v. Soukup, 746 N.W.2d 918, 923
(Minn. App. 2008) (stating that a law violates the ex post facto clause “by punishing as a
crime an act previously committed, which was not a crime at the time”), rev. denied (Minn.
June 18, 2008).

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containers and also did not challenge the additional three search warrants, issued after the

initial search warrant, allowing the search of the contents of his electronic devices.

The district court denied the motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of

the seizure of his electronic devices under the initial search warrant. It concluded that the

information in the initial search warrant application, including that Blessing “admitted to

being attracted to young men, that he had inappropriate interactions with a minor for which

he was arrested . . . , and that he searches out pornography of young men,” provided

probable cause for the search of Blessing’s home and the seizure of the devices.

The parties agreed that the district court’s denial of Blessing’s motion to dismiss

was dispositive, and Blessing waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to the state’s

case to preserve the ruling for appellate review under Minnesota Rule of Criminal

Procedure 26.01, subdivision 4. 3 The state’s case included the probable-cause packet

submitted by the state at the omnibus hearing and the parties’ agreement that the events

discussed in the probable-cause packet occurred. Among other evidence, the probable-

cause packet included two images of pornographic work involving a minor found on

Blessing’s electronic devices and affidavits establishing the ages of the victims. The

district court convicted Blessing of both counts and imposed concurrent stays of

imposition, placing Blessing on probation for five years.

Blessing appeals.

3
Rule 26.01, subdivision 4, provides the process by which a defendant may preserve
appellate review of a pretrial issue that the parties agree is dispositive. Here, the parties
agreed that the district court’s ruling on the search warrant was dispositive.

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 ANALYSIS

Blessing challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence

obtained as a result of the search of his home and the seizure of his computers under the

initial search warrant, arguing that the warrant authorizing the search was not supported by

probable cause. 4

Both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions require search warrants to be

supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “A warrant

is supported by probable cause if, on the totality of the circumstances, there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

State v. Holland, 865 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2015) (quotations omitted). A fair

probability requires “a direct connection, or nexus, between the alleged crime and the

particular place to be searched.” State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). “A

nexus may be inferred from the totality of the circumstances,” and the issuing judge may

consider, among other factors, “the type of crime, the nature of the items sought, the extent

of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and the normal inferences as to where the

defendant would usually keep the items.” State v. Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d 619, 622-23

(Minn. 2014). “[D]irect observation of evidence of a crime at the place to be searched is

4
In his appellate brief, Blessing challenges the “search warrant for [his] electronic
devices,” but does not otherwise clarify which of the four warrants he is challenging. We
focus our analysis on the first warrant authorizing the search of Blessing’s home because
this was the only warrant challenged by Blessing and ruled on by the district court. See
Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (reaffirming the principle that “[t]his
court generally will not decide issues which were not raised before the district court,
including constitutional questions of criminal procedure”).

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not required.” Id. at 622. “The issuing judge’s task is to make a practical, common-sense

decision.” Id. And “[appellate courts] afford the issuing judge great deference,

recognizing that doubtful or marginal cases should be largely determined by the preference

to be accorded to warrants.” State v. Sardina-Padilla, 7 N.W.3d 585, 596 (Minn. 2024)

(quotation omitted).

“When reviewing a pretrial order denying a motion to suppress, we review the

district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations de novo.” Id.

at 595-96 (quotation omitted). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it does not have

evidentiary support in the record or if it was induced by an erroneous view of the law.” Id.

at 596 (quotation omitted). “When a defendant’s pretrial motion claims that the facts

alleged in a search warrant application failed to establish probable cause, [this court’s]

review is limited to the information presented in the application, and the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from that information.” Id. “Based on that information,

[reviewing courts] ask only whether the issuing judge had a ‘substantial basis’ for

concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting Yarbrough, 841 N.W.2d at 622).

Blessing argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because the search-warrant application did not establish “particularized probable cause to

search for child pornography images.” 5 He contends that the application “was entirely

absent of any particular evidence of child pornography possession,” because “[w]hile [he]

5
Blessing confirmed in his reply brief and at oral argument that he is challenging only
probable cause, not the particularity of the warrant, and the state correctly contends that
any particularity argument asserted on appeal is forfeited because it was not raised to the
district court. See Roby, 547 N.W.2d at 357.

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admitted to an interest in ‘post-pubescent young men’ and viewing pornography of ‘young

men,’ he explicitly disclaimed any interest in or possession of pornography depicting

minors.” Blessing maintains that the application “fails to connect his admitted interest in

‘post-pubescent young men’ to the highly specific crime of possessing child pornography,

especially in light of his explicit denials,” and that “[l]aw enforcement in . . . the absence

of any prior reports from online platforms or other proactive investigations . . . appears to

have proceeded on a ‘hunch’ that [Blessing’s] admitted interest in ‘post-pubescent young

men’ somehow translated into probable cause for a wide-ranging search of his electronic

devices for child pornography.” Blessing’s arguments ignore the reasonable inferences

that can be drawn from the totality of the information presented in the search-warrant

application.

The search-warrant application described both the February 22 incident involving

the minor and Blessing’s Mirandized statement to police, which established probable cause

to search his home for computers and other electronic devices for evidence of pornographic

images involving a minor. As detailed in the search-warrant application, Blessing texted a

minor to come to his home. Blessing provided the minor alcohol and initiated conversation

about “pedophilia” and “ephebophilia.” The minor reported that Blessing made comments

about the minor’s body. Blessing’s statements included, “that [the minor’s] body was

looking nice and [Blessing] can’t wait to see what boot camp will do to [the minor’s] body,”

and that Blessing wanted to “see the rest of [the minor’s] body.” Blessing squeezed the

minor’s shoulder and said, “you going to show me,” and told the minor that “he could just

close his eyes and pretend [Blessing] wasn’t there.” And later, in the car on the way to get

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Blessing’s truck, Blessing told the minor “that his wife would be in the hospital for a few

days and . . . that [the minor] would really be helping him out by showing him,” and asked

the minor to text him about it. Blessing also reportedly told the minor “that he had felt this

way about other kids before but never acted on it,” and “just couldn’t resist with [the

minor].”

Following his arrest, Blessing stated in a Mirandized interview that he “does have

interests in the post-pubescent young men” and agreed that he planned to ask the minor

about his body and that there was no touching or video/photography. Blessing also stated

that he has not acted on his feelings, other than pornography. But he admitted that “he

does search out photos on the internet for young men,” and while “[he] believed that the

images are supposedly not underage,” he confessed to “stor[ing] the images on his laptop,”

and searching a website “Gayboytube.com.” (Emphasis added.)

When viewed in the totality, the facts provide a “fair probability” that pornographic

work involving a minor would be found at Blessing’s home and on his electronic devices.

Holland, 865 N.W.2d at 673. Here, Blessing was originally investigated for criminal

sexual conduct involving the minor based on his activities described above. And he

admitted to having an interest in “post-pubescent young men,” searching for photos of

“young men” on the internet, frequenting a website that includes the word “boy,” and

storing images on his laptop. This court has recognized that “viewing and possessing child

pornography is, by its nature, a solitary and secretive crime” and, based on an affiant’s

training and experience, “the court could reasonably draw an inference that the suspect

would keep the illicit images in a place considered safe and secret, like the home.”

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State v. Brennan, 674 N.W.2d 200, 206 (Minn. App. 2004), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 20,

2004). While Blessing’s claimed belief “that the images are supposedly not underage” may

make his conduct seem legal or innocent when viewed in isolation, we view this claim in

light of the totality of the circumstances, including Blessing’s request to see the minor’s

body. See State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1985) (stating that even if each

component, when viewed in isolation, is insubstantial to establish probable cause, “the

components viewed together may reveal . . . an internal coherence that gives weight to the

whole” (quotation omitted)). Taken as a whole, the facts set forth in the search-warrant

application established a fair probability that evidence of the crime of felony possession of

pornographic work involving a minor would be found on Blessing’s computers or other

electronic devices and therefore probable cause existed to support the search of Blessing’s

home for those devices.

We also note that the challenged warrant did not authorize an unrestricted search of

Blessing’s electronic devices. Here, law enforcement recognized in the search-warrant

application that the “electronic devices located during [the execution of] the search warrant

would require additional warrants prior to that item being searched.” See State v. McNeilly,

6 N.W.3d 161, 177-78 (Minn. 2024) (“[A] warrant that authorizes seizure of a computer

allows for a search of that computer, but only for the items otherwise listed in the warrant

that reasonably may be found on the computer.”). After searching for computers in

Blessing’s home and seizing those devices consistent with the initial search warrant, law

enforcement properly sought and obtained additional warrants to search the seized devices.

As mentioned above, these additional warrants were not challenged in district court.

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 In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances and affording the issuing judge

deference, the initial search-warrant application established probable cause to search

Blessing’s home for electronic devices that could be used for storage of personal data

related to possession of pornographic work involving a minor. Accordingly, the district

court properly denied Blessing’s motion to suppress.

Affirmed.

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