In re Cottonwood County’s Decision on the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Sioux Rock Quarry ...

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0806
A25-0821
A25-1125

In re Cottonwood County’s Decision on the Need for an Environmental Impact Statement
for the Proposed Sioux Rock Quarry Expansion Project in Delton Township.

--------------------------

In the Matter of the Application of OMG Midwest, Inc. d/b/a Minnesota Paving and
Materials for a Conditional Use Permit.

Filed October 13, 2025
Appeal to proceed (A25-0821)
Appeal dismissed (A25-1125)
Frisch, Chief Judge

Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners
Resolution No. 25-04-15

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Oliver J. Larson, Philip S. Pulitzer, Assistant Attorneys
General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relators Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and
Department of Administration)

Jeffrey M. Markowitz, Corey S. Bronczyk, Arthur, Chapman, Kettering, Smetak & Pikala,
P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent OMG Midwest Inc., d/b/a Minnesota Paving
and Materials)

Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota; and

Jay T. Squires, Michael J. Ervin, Squires, Waldspurger & Mace P.A., Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and Ede,

Judge.
 SYLLABUS

A state agency with permitting or other approval authority over a project may be

aggrieved when a responsible governmental unit decides not to require an environmental-

impact statement for the project, and, in such a situation, a state agency has standing to

appeal the responsible governmental unit’s decision under Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 10

(2024).

SPECIAL TERM OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Relators Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) and Minnesota Department

of Administration (MDA) (together, the state relators) filed two appeals to challenge

decisions made by respondent Cottonwood County Board of Commissioners (the county)

in relation to a project proposed by respondent OMG Midwest, Inc., d/b/a Minnesota

Paving & Materials (MPM). 1 Both appeals center on concerns about the project’s potential

impacts on the nearby Jeffers Petroglyphs, property listed on the state register of historic

sites. See Minn. Stat. § 138.662, subd. 17 (2024). MPM moved to dismiss both appeals,

arguing that the state relators lack standing to challenge the county’s decisions. In a special

term order, we denied the motion as to the first appeal (A25-0821), concluding that the

state relators established standing to appeal the county’s determination that an

1
This opinion uses acronyms for the following terms: environmental-assessment
worksheet (EAW); environmental-impact statement (EIS); Environmental Quality Board
(EQB); interim-use permit (IUP); Minnesota Department of Administration (MDA);
Minnesota Paving & Materials (MPM); Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA);
responsible governmental unit (RGU); and State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO).

2
environmental-impact statement (EIS) is not necessary for MPM’s project. We granted the

motion as to the second appeal (A25-1125), concluding that the state relators had not

established standing to appeal the county’s grant of an interim-use permit (IUP) for the

project. We indicated that this special term opinion would follow. We now explain our

reasoning. 2

FACTS

In response to a citizen petition under the Minnesota Environmental Policy Act

(MEPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 116D.01-.11 (2024), the county prepared an environmental-

assessment worksheet (EAW) for a project proposed by MPM. An EAW is “a brief

document which is designed to set out the basic facts necessary to determine whether an

EIS is required for a proposed project.” Minn. R. 4410.0200, subp. 24 (2023). According

to the EAW prepared by the county, the purpose of MPM’s proposed project is to “expand

the approved mineral extraction area of the existing [MPM] Sioux Rock quarry to help

meet market . . . demand for sand and aggregate rock in the construction industry.”

MPM’s activities at the quarry consist of “blasting, crushing, dewatering, size

classification, and reclamation activities.” And the EAW provides that the “project will

include expanding the mineral extraction area of the existing mine operation by

approximately 10 acres across two parcels of land.”

2
Relators Lower Sioux Indian Community in the State of Minnesota and Kevin O’Keefe
(the tribal relators) also filed certiorari appeals to challenge the county’s EIS (A25-0806)
and IUP (A25-1104) decisions. We consolidated the EIS appeals of the tribal relators and
the state relators. MPM did not move to dismiss the tribal relators’ appeals, and those
appeals are not the subject of this opinion.

3
 After publishing the EAW and accepting public comments, the county adopted a

resolution determining that it was not necessary to prepare an EIS for the project. An EIS

is

an analytical rather than an encyclopedic document that
describes the proposed action in detail, analyzes its significant
environmental impacts, discusses appropriate alternatives to
the proposed action and their impacts, and explores methods
by which adverse environmental impacts of an action could be
mitigated. The [EIS] must also analyze those economic,
employment, and sociological effects that cannot be avoided
should the action be implemented.

Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(a). An EIS is required, as pertinent here, when a

responsible governmental unit (RGU) determines, based on an EAW, that a project has the

potential for significant environmental effects. See Minn. R. 4410.1700, subps. 1, 3 (2023).

The county in this case determined that MPM’s project does not have the potential for

significant environmental effects and thus an EIS is not required.

Following its EIS decision, the county granted an IUP for the project. The IUP is a

form of a conditional-use permit under the county’s zoning ordinance. Cottonwood

County, Minn., Zoning Ordinance (CCZO) § 18 (2015). The ordinance defines a

conditional use as

[a] land use or development as defined by ordinance that would
not [be] appropriate generally but may be allowed with the
appropriate restrictions as provided by official controls upon a
finding that certain conditions as detailed in the zoning
ordinance exist, the use or development conforms to the
comprehensive land use plan of the community, and the use is
compatible with the existing neighborhood.

4
CCZO § 4, subd. 2 (2008); see also Minn. Stat. §§ 394.22, subd. 7 (defining conditional

use), .301 (authorizing counties with zoning authority to allow conditional use under

certain circumstances), .303 (defining interim use and authorizing zoning authorities to

allow interim uses under certain circumstances) (2024). MPM needs the IUP because the

land it proposes to use for mining activities is zoned for agricultural use but allows mining

as a conditional use.

The state relators filed certiorari appeals to challenge the county’s EIS and IUP

decisions. MPM filed a motion to dismiss both appeals, asserting that the state relators

lack standing to appeal either the EIS or the IUP decision. The state relators filed a

response opposing the motion.

ISSUES

I. Have the state relators established standing to appeal the county’s EIS decision?

II. Have the state relators established standing to appeal the county’s IUP decision?

ANALYSIS

“Standing is a jurisdictional doctrine,” and the absence of standing bars our

consideration of an appeal. Richards v. Reiter, 796 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2011). “To

have standing, a party must have a sufficient stake in a justiciable controversy to seek relief

from a court.” Growe v. Simon, 2 N.W.3d 490, 499 (Minn. 2024) (quotation omitted). In

Minnesota, “[s]tanding to appeal may be conferred by a statute or by the appellant’s status

as an aggrieved party.” Richards, 796 N.W.2d at 513; see also Growe, 2 N.W.3d at 499

n.6 (noting that state courts are “not bound by the standing constraints of Article III of the

United States Constitution”).

5
 Minnesota courts have accorded the same meaning to the term “aggrieved party”

regardless of whether standing arises pursuant to statute or by judicial manifestation.

Compare Richards, 796 N.W.2d at 513 (addressing appeal from appealable order under

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03), with Stansell v. City of Northfield, 618 N.W.2d 814, 818

(Minn. App. 2000) (addressing statutory standing), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 26, 2001); see

also Minn. Educ. Ass’n v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 404, 287 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Minn. 1980)

(favorably comparing statutory and judicial standards). A party’s “status as an aggrieved

party depends on whether there is injury to a legally protected right.” Richards, 796

N.W.2d at 513 (quotation omitted). Stated differently, to be aggrieved, a “person must be

‘injuriously or adversely affected by [a decision] when it operates on [their] . . . personal

interest.’” Stansell, 618 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting In re Getsug, 186 N.W.2d 686, 689 (Minn.

1971)). The supreme court has further explained:

To have standing to petition successfully for writ of
certiorari . . . [a] person must articulate with a degree of clarity
some legally cognizable interest of his which has sustained
injury in fact by the agency action—i.e., that he has in fact
sustained injury to some interest which differs from injury to
the interests of other citizens generally.

In re Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1992). “[I]n its judicial

manifestation, standing cannot come into existence solely by participation in agency

proceedings.” Id. at 798. Moreover, “[a] mere ‘interest’ in the problem, regardless that

the interest is longstanding, does not confer standing on an individual or organization.” Id.

Nor does a party’s expertise on an issue render it adversely affected or aggrieved. Id.

6
 As the parties seeking to invoke our jurisdiction, the state relators bear the burden

of demonstrating that they have standing. See Webb Golden Valley, LLC v. State, 865

N.W.2d 689, 693 (Minn. 2015) (stating that plaintiff-appellant “must establish an injury-

in-fact to have standing”); accord Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 58 (2024) (stating that

a plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing standing as of the time she brought the lawsuit

and maintaining it thereafter” (quotation omitted)). And they must satisfy this burden as

to their appeal of each county decision. See State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551

N.W.2d 490, 493 (Minn. 1996) (explaining that “analysis of standing turns on the specific

statutory or common law requirements of each type of claim advanced”). The state relators

generally argue that they have “standing to sue.” But they do not differentiate between the

county’s EIS and IUP decisions or explain why they have standing to seek certiorari review

of each of the county’s separate decisions. We address in turn below whether the state

relators have established standing to appeal the county’s EIS and IUP decisions.

I. The state relators have established standing to appeal the county’s EIS
decision.

The county’s EIS decision is subject to certiorari review under Minn. Stat.

§ 116D.04, subd. 10, which provides:

A person aggrieved by a final decision on the need for an
environmental assessment worksheet, the need for an
environmental impact statement, or the adequacy of an
environmental impact statement is entitled to judicial review
of the decision under sections 14.63 to 14.68. . . . The
[Environmental Quality Board (EQB)] may initiate judicial
review of decisions referred to herein and the [EQB] . . . may
intervene as of right in any proceeding brought under this
subdivision.

7
The statute explicitly affords the EQB standing to appeal from the county’s EIS decision.

The issue before us is whether the state relators, who are not expressly referenced in the

statute, have standing to appeal the county’s EIS decision as “person[s] aggrieved.”

MPM argues that the state relators are not aggrieved by the county’s EIS decision

because the decision does not adversely affect the state relators’ interests. The state relators

counter that the county’s failure to conduct adequate environmental review impacts their

interests as state agencies with statutory obligations to protect the environment, including

historical resources. To resolve this dispute, we begin by examining the nature of the

county’s decision.

MEPA sets forth the state’s public policy of environmental protection and imposes

numerous duties on state agencies in relation to that public policy. See Minn. Stat.

§§ 116D.02, .03. Pertinent here is the duty of an RGU to prepare an EAW or EIS when

required. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a. 3 The general rule is that an EIS is required

when a project has the “potential for significant environmental effects.” Id., subd. 2a(a);

Minn. R. 4410.1700, subp. 1. As directed by statute, the EQB adopted administrative rules

identifying categories requiring the preparation of an EAW or EIS and designating the

RGU obligated to prepare the required environmental review. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04,

subd. 2a(b); Minn. R. 4410.1000, .2000 (2023). Importantly here, historical resources are

among the resources that MEPA seeks to protect. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 1a(a);

Minn. R. 4410.0200, subp. 23 (2023).

3
An RGU may be a state agency or a local governmental unit. See generally Minn. R.
4410.4300, .4400 (2023) (designating RGUs for mandatory EAW and EIS categories).

8
 “MEPA’s purpose is ‘to force agencies to make their own impartial evaluation of

environmental considerations before reaching their decisions.’” Iron Rangers for

Responsible Ridge Action v. Iron Range Res., 531 N.W.2d 874, 880 (Minn. App. 1995)

(quoting No Power Line, Inc. v. Minn. Env’t Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312, 327 (Minn.

1977)), rev. denied (Minn. July 28, 1995). Thus, no final government approvals may be

granted and construction may not begin on a project until any required environmental

review is complete. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2b; In re Applications of Enbridge

Energy, Ltd. P’ship, 930 N.W.2d 12, 20 (Minn. App. 2019). Consistent with the

requirement that environmental review inform governmental decision-making, an EAW

must identify those permits a project proposer must obtain from a governmental unit or

units. Minn. R. 4410.1200(F) (2023). But MEPA directs that just one governmental unit—

the RGU—complete any required environmental review to inform the RGU’s own

decisions and those of other governmental units. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(a),

(b), (e), (i); Minn. R. 4410.1000, .1100, .2000 (2023).

In this case, the county prepared an EAW for MPM’s project after the EQB received

a citizen petition from the requisite number of individuals and designated the county as the

RGU to act on the petition. See Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(e); Minn. R. 4410.1100.

The EAW references the Jeffers Petroglyphs, stating that “[i]ndirect effects of the proposed

project on the Jeffers Petroglyphs, which is a [National Register of Historic Places]-listed

site, will be considered to mitigate any potential adverse indirect effects from the operation

of the quarry.” The EAW also references consultation with the State Historic Preservation

Office (SHPO), a division of the MDA, and appends correspondence in which the SHPO

9
emphasizes the cultural and historical importance of the Jeffers Petroglyphs and the need

for study on the indirect effects of the project. And the EAW identifies two permits that

the project requires from the MPCA—a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System/State Disposal System permit and an air-emissions permit. The state relators each

submitted comments raising concerns about the project’s potential impacts on the Jeffers

Petroglyphs and asserting that the EAW does not adequately address those potential

impacts. The MPCA urged the county to prepare an EIS or, alternatively, to postpone the

decision on the need for an EIS so that additional information could be gathered. See Minn.

R. 4410.1700, subp. 2a (2023) (directing RGU with insufficient information to either

prepare an EIS or postpone decision to gather additional information).

In opposing MPM’s motion to dismiss, the state relators argue that they are

aggrieved because the county’s decisions impact their ability to fulfill statutorily imposed

duties in relation to environmental protection. The MPCA notes its regulatory role in

relation to air quality and argues that it is aggrieved by the county’s EIS decision because

the project may have adverse environmental effects. 4 See Minn. Stat. § 116.081, subd. 1

(2024). The MDA asserts that it has standing by virtue of a requirement in the Minnesota

Historic Sites Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 138.661-.669 (2024), that governmental units consult

with the SHPO “[b]efore carrying out any undertaking that will affect designated or listed

4
The MCPA is the state agency charged with enforcing the federal Clean Air Act in
Minnesota. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 70, App. A (2025); see also Minn. Stat. § 116.07, subds. 2(a),
4a(a) (2024) (authorizing MPCA to set air-pollution standards and issue air-emissions
permits).

10
properties, or funding or licensing an undertaking by other parties.” 5 Minn. Stat.

§ 138.665, subd. 2. The MDA asserts that “SHPO is the only entity with authority to

enforce the consultation requirement” and that it has suffered a cognizable injury because

the county has not fulfilled its consultation obligation. The state relators further assert that

“[a]n agency’s failure to follow [MEPA’s] prescribed procedures creates a risk that serious

environmental consequences of the agency action will not be brought to the

decisionmaker’s attention.”

Given the purpose and operation of MEPA, and in light of the statutory duties of the

state relators, we are persuaded that the state relators have standing to appeal the county’s

EIS decision. When an RGU decides not to prepare an EIS, state agencies with permitting

or other approval authority must either render a permitting or other approval decision based

on the limited information in the EAW or divert their own resources to additional

investigation to inform their decision. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 2a(i) (“Whenever

practical, information needed by a governmental unit for making final decisions on permits

5
More specifically, governmental units must consult
pursuant to the [SHPO’s] established procedures to determine
appropriate treatments and to seek ways to avoid and mitigate
any adverse effects on designated or listed properties. If the
state department or agency and the [SHPO] agree in writing on
a suitable course of action, the project may proceed. If the
parties cannot agree, any one of the parties may request that the
governor appoint and convene a mediation task force
consisting of five members, two appointed by the governor, the
chair of the State Review Board of the [SHPO], the
commissioner of administration or the commissioner’s
designee, and one member appointed by the director of the
Minnesota Historical Society.
Minn. Stat. § 138.665, subd. 2.

11
or other actions required for a proposed project must be developed in conjunction with the

preparation of an [EIS].”). These state agencies therefore have a definite stake in EIS

decisions that is distinct from the interests of the general citizenry and reach further than

the agencies’ mere expertise or interest in the issues. We therefore hold that a state agency

with permitting or other approval authority over a project may be aggrieved when an RGU

decides not to require an EIS for the project, and, in such a situation, a state agency has

standing to appeal the RGU’s decision under Minn. Stat. § 116D.04, subd. 10. And in this

case, the state relators have established that they have permitting and other approval

authority over MPM’s project, such that the county’s alleged failure to conduct adequate

environmental review is specifically injurious to them. Accordingly, the state relators have

standing to appeal the county’s EIS decision.

II. The state relators have not established standing to appeal the county’s IUP
decision.

The county’s IUP decision is a quasi-judicial decision for which there is no statutory

right of appeal and is thus appealable through a certiorari petition pursuant to Minn. Stat.

§§ 606.01-.02 (2024). See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 617

N.W.2d 566, 574 & n.5 (Minn. 2000). Such a certiorari appeal may be taken by “an

aggrieved party.” In re Haymes, 444 N.W.2d 257, 259 (Minn. 1989); see also CCZO § 6,

subd. 5 (2016) (providing that “[a]ny aggrieved person” may seek certiorari review of final

zoning decision). Although the same aggrieved-person standard applies to both of the state

relators’ appeals, we focus now on whether the state relators have established that they are

“injuriously or adversely affected by” the county’s IUP decision because “it operates

12
on . . . [their] personal interest.” Stansell, 618 N.W.2d at 818 (quoting Getsug, 186 N.W.2d

at 689).

The state relators advance the same standing arguments in relation to the county’s

IUP decision as in relation to the county’s EIS decision. But the county’s decisions are

distinct. We again begin by examining the nature of the decision at issue.

The county is authorized by statute to “carry on county planning and zoning

activities.” Minn. Stat. § 394.21, subd. 1 (2024). “[T]he purpose of zoning laws is to

control land use and development in order to promote public health, safety, welfare, morals,

and aesthetics.” City of Waconia v. Dock, 961 N.W.2d 220, 231 (Minn. 2021) (quotation

omitted). “More narrowly, zoning ordinances are regarded as being aimed primarily at

conserving property values and encouraging the most appropriate use of land.” Id.

(quotation omitted). Consistent with these purposes, we have required parties to identify

specific property or personal interests that will be impacted by zoning decisions to establish

standing to challenge those decisions. See Citizens for a Balanced City v. Plymouth

Congregational Church, 672 N.W.2d 13, 18-19 (Minn. App. 2003) (concluding that

advocacy group’s allegations of detrimental effects that would be caused to neighborhood

by conditional-use permit demonstrated particularized property and personal interests);

Stansell, 618 N.W.2d at 818 (concluding that city residents lacked standing to oppose

zoning ordinance allowing construction of a store because they did not “allege that they

have suffered any specific injuries” and “seem[ed] to be litigating a matter of public

interest”).

13
 Here, MPM needs the IUP to conduct mining operations as a conditional use, and

the county granted the IUP pursuant to its statutory authority to regulate land use. The

state relators have not identified any specific property or personal interests impacted by the

county’s IUP decision. In contrast to their persuasive arguments about the EIS decision,

the state relators have not demonstrated that the county’s IUP decision impacts their ability

to perform their statutory duties or is otherwise specifically injurious to them, which is

their burden. And the state agencies have not set forth any impediment to the fulfillment

of their statutory obligations. The state relators may have an interest in and expertise on

the issues that will be raised in the IUP appeal. But that interest and expertise is, without

more, insufficient to confer standing upon the state relators to appeal the county’s IUP

decision. See Sandy Pappas Senate Comm., 488 N.W.2d at 798 (concluding that a

registered voter’s interest in the problem and experience in evaluating the problem did not

confer standing to appeal state ethics board’s adjudication of liability). Accordingly, the

state relators’ certiorari appeal from the IUP decision is dismissed. 6

DECISION

A state agency with permitting or other approval authority over a project may be

aggrieved when an RGU decides not to require an EIS for the project, and, in such a

situation, a state agency has standing to appeal the RGU’s decision under Minn. Stat.

§ 116D.04, subd. 10. Based on their permitting and other approval authority over MPM’s

6
We note that our decision is limited to the issue of whether the state relators have
established standing based on the arguments made in this certiorari appeal. We express no
opinion on any other relief available to the state with respect to the project.

14
project, the state relators have established standing to appeal the county’s EIS decision.

But the state relators have not established standing to appeal the county’s IUP decision.

Accordingly, the state relators’ appeal of the EIS decision shall proceed, and their appeal

from the IUP decision is dismissed.

Appeal to proceed (A25-0821); appeal dismissed (A25-1125).

15