Joshua Jerome Ingebrigtsen v. Commissioner of Public Safety

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-0878

Joshua Jerome Ingebrigtsen, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed March 23, 2026
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Goodhue County District Court
File No. 25-CV-25-326

Joshua Jerome Ingebrigtsen, Cannon Falls, Minnesota (self-represented appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Eva Kendrick, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Bond, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

REYES, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s denial of his petition to review the

extension of his license-revocation period. Because the district court properly dismissed

the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we affirm.
 FACTS

Self-represented appellant Joshua Jerome Ingebrigtsen is enrolled in the ignition-

interlock-device program (the interlock program). See generally Minn. Stat. § 171.306

(2024) (describing interlock program). In May 2024, respondent Commissioner of Public

Safety (the commissioner) sent appellant a notice that he violated the guidelines of the

interlock program because his interlock device registered an alcohol concentration above

0.02. As a result of this violation, the commissioner extended appellant’s enrollment with

the interlock program for six years.

In February 2025, appellant petitioned the district court for a hearing on his request

to have his driver’s license reinstated, after its revocation had been extended, under

Minnesota Statutes section 171.19 (2022). He argued that the interlock program was “no

longer necessary” for him and, in fact, posed issues for his career and ability to take care

of his child. The commissioner moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of

untimeliness and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. After the district court held a hearing

on the commissioner’s motion, it dismissed appellant’s petition for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

This appeal follows.

DECISION

Appellant challenges the district court’s dismissal of his petition for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction, arguing that the district court did not properly “hear[] or consider[]” his

concerns. We disagree.

2
 Appellate courts review the question of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. Rued

v. Comm’r of Hum. Servs., 13 N.W.3d 42, 47 (Minn. 2024). “Subject matter jurisdiction

refers to a court’s authority to hear and determine cases that are presented to it.” Id. at 46.

“Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction generally depends on the scope of the

constitutional and statutory grant of authority to the court.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“[D]efects in subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time and cannot be waived

or forfeited by a party.” Id. (quotation omitted). The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure

further explain that: “Whenever it appears . . . that the [district] court lacks jurisdiction of

the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c).

The relevant version of Minnesota Statutes section 171.19 restricts a petition for

review of “license reinstatement” to “any person whose driver’s license has been refused,

revoked, suspended, canceled, or disqualified by the commissioner,” dependent on certain

conditions. We recently reviewed the question of subject-matter jurisdiction as it pertains

to this version of the statute in Reihs v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 17 N.W.3d 155

(Minn. App. 2025), rev. granted (Minn. May 28, 2025) and ord. granting rev. vacated

(Minn. Sept. 10, 2025). In Reihs, we explained: “A district court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction under Minn. Stat. § 171.19 to review the extension of a driver’s license-

revocation period.” 17 N.W.3d at 160. 1

1
Appellant requests a stay of this appeal pending the outcome of the supreme court’s
review of Reihs. Because there is no longer a review of Reihs pending with the supreme
court, this request is moot.

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 After this court’s decision in Reihs, the legislature amended section 171.19 to permit

judicial review of extensions of license-revocation periods. See 2025 Minn. Laws, ch. 29,

§ 15, at 432 (allowing petition by someone “whose driver’s license revocation, suspension,

or cancellation period has been extended by the commissioner based on a violation of the

ignition interlock program guidelines”). But this amendment states that it applies only “to

crimes committed on or after” August 1, 2025, and includes no evidence of retroactive

intent. See id. at 426; State v. Basal, 763 N.W.2d 328, 335 (Minn. App. 2009) (presuming

that statutory amendments do not apply retroactively absent “clear evidence of retroactive

intent”).

Here, appellant’s petition challenged the May 2024 extension of his license-

revocation period. At the time of this extension, the 2022 version of the statute was in

effect. As we stated in Reihs, district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to review

extensions of license-revocation periods under the 2022 version of the statute. 17 N.W.3d

at 160. Our decision in Reihs “ha[d] immediate authoritative effect” on this court and is

binding on us. See State v. Chauvin, 955 N.W.2d 684, 690 n.3 (Minn. App. 2021)

(explaining “the respect that an appellate court owes to its own precedents”), rev. denied

(Minn. Mar. 10, 2021). Applying Reihs, we conclude that the district court properly

dismissed appellant’s petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 2

Affirmed.

2
As explained in the commissioner’s notification letter and cited to by the district court’s
order, appellant may request administrative review of the May 2024 extension “at any
time” during the revocation period.

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