Julie Massaquoi v. Abe Al-Qudeh

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1128

Julie Massaquoi, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Abe Al-Qudeh,
Respondent.

Filed March 16, 2026
Affirmed
Frisch, Chief Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-24-11636

Eric Bond Anunobi, Eric Bond Law Office, PLLC, West. St. Paul, Minnesota (for
appellants)

Abraham S. Kaplan, Parker Daniels Kibort, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Bentley, Judge; and Smith, John,

Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

Following the summary-judgment dismissal of their defamation claim against an

owner of a residential rental property, appellants argue that the district court (1) erred by

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
determining that there were no genuine issues of material fact as to any element of the

defamation claim and (2) abused its discretion by denying appellants’ motion to amend the

complaint to add “defamation by implication” as an alternative theory of relief. Because

the record evidence taken in the light most favorable to appellants does not present any

genuine issue for trial under the identified theories of defamation, we affirm.

FACTS 1

Appellants Julie Massaquoi and Lemuel Massaquoi rented a residential home (the

home) from respondent Abe Al Qudah. 2 The Massaquois signed a 12-month rental

agreement with Al Qudah for the home that began on August 1, 2022, and they entered a

second 12-month rental agreement that began on September 1, 2023. The Massaquois

operated a nursing-home business, appellant Thrive Health Services LLC, out of the

home. 3

In November 2023, Al Qudah provided the Massaquois with notice that someone

would be taking photos in preparation for listing the property for sale. Al Qudah had

1
The following undisputed facts are drawn from the district court’s order granting
summary judgment and are taken in the light most favorable to the Massaquois as the
nonmoving party.
2
The case caption in the district court identified respondent as “Al-Qudeh.” But
respondent is identified in his appellate brief as “Al Qudah.” The caption of this opinion
conforms to the caption used in the district court. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 143.01. But
we use respondent’s indicated spelling throughout the body of the opinion.
3
While not relevant for purposes of this appeal, we note that the operation of a
nursing-home business appears to plainly violate the rental agreement, which expressly
limited use of the property to a “private residence” and required the Massaquois to use it
“only for residential purposes.”

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previously offered to sell the home to the Massaquois, who declined the offer. A realtor

thereafter took pictures of the interior and exterior of the home for the purpose of listing

the home for sale. The home was listed for sale on several residential home real estate

websites.

The Massaquois terminated the rental agreement and commenced this action against

Al Qudah alleging three counts of defamation—one count for each appellant. The

complaint alleged that the photos of the home on real estate websites generated posts from

“millions of google patrons variously describ[ing] [the Massaquois’] business as a scam.”

Al Qudah moved for summary-judgment dismissal of the Massaquois’ complaint.

On the same day, the Massaquois’ counsel sent a letter to the district court requesting to

extend certain deadlines, including the deadline for non-dispositive motions. The district

court’s initial scheduling order had set a deadline of March 26, 2025, for all non-dispositive

motions, including motions to amend the pleadings. The district court filed an amended

scheduling order extending the deadline for non-dispositive motions to be heard on or

before May 5, 2025.

On April 11, the Massaquois moved to amend the pleadings. On April 16, the

district court held an off-the-record status conference. According to the district court in its

summary-judgment order, during the conference:

[The Massaquois’] counsel represented that the proposed
amendments were to provide some additional detail on the
lease and to provide additional information on damages. In the
sworn words of [the Massaquois’] counsel, “The amendment
is intended to correct errors regarding the period of the initial
lease agreement between the parties. The amendment also
seeks to include claims for special and general damages, a

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 permanent injunction as well as a demand for a public apology
against the defendant.”

The district court instructed the parties to work out an agreement to add these provisions.

If the parties did not reach an agreement, the district court would also hear the motion to

amend at the summary-judgment hearing on May 9, four days after the motion deadline.

The parties did not reach such an agreement.

Instead, on April 25, the Massaquois filed what they described as a “second

amended notice of motion and motion to amend complaint.” Without leave of district

court, they noticed this motion to be heard at the May 9 summary-judgment hearing, four

days after the motion deadline. The affidavit of the Massaquois’ counsel submitted with

this filing included as an exhibit a new proposed amended complaint. In this proposed

amended complaint, instead of solely providing additional information regarding the lease

and damages as discussed at the April 16 conference, the Massaquois added “defamation

by implication” as an additional count and to their description of the prayer for relief.

Al Qudah opposed the Massaquois’ second motion as untimely and prejudicial.

The district court held the hearing on May 9, and the parties argued their respective

motions. On May 13, the district court filed an order granting Al Qudah’s motion for

summary judgment and denying the Massaquois’ motion to amend the complaint. The

district court concluded that the Massaquois’ motion to amend the complaint to include

“defamation by implication,” whether understood as an alternative theory of liability for

the underlying defamation claim or an additional cause of action, was both untimely and

futile. The district court concluded that neither the underlying defamation claim set forth

4
in the Massaquois’ original and amended complaints nor the proposed “defamation by

implication” claim included in the amended complaint survived summary judgment, as the

Massaquois failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to any element of

defamation.

The Massaquois appeal.

DECISION

I. The Massaquois failed to produce evidence establishing a genuine issue for trial
on their defamation claim.

The Massaquois argue that the district court’s summary-judgment dismissal of their

complaint was improper because genuine issues of material fact exist on each element of

their claim for defamation. We disagree.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Montemayor v.

Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017). “In doing so, we determine

whether the district court properly applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of

material fact that preclude summary judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev.

Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170 (Minn. 2010); see also Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.01. “A

genuine issue of material fact exists when there is sufficient evidence regarding an essential

element to permit reasonable persons to draw different conclusions.” St. Paul Park Refin.

Co. v. Domeier, 950 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted); see also Doe v.

Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012) (“[I]n order to establish that

there is a disputed material fact, the party against whom summary judgment was granted

must present specific admissible facts showing a material fact issue.” (quotation omitted)).

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On appeal from the entry of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve any doubts as to the existence of a material

fact in that party’s favor. Senogles v. Carlson, 902 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn. 2017). The

nonmoving party “may not establish genuine issues of material fact by relying upon

unverified and conclusory allegations, or postulated evidence that might be developed at

trial, or metaphysical doubt about the facts.” Dyrdal v. Golden Nuggets, Inc., 689 N.W.2d

779, 783 (Minn. 2004). “A defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law

when the record reflects a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff’s

claim.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995).

To establish the elements of a defamation claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the

defendant communicated a statement to a third party, (2) the statement is false, (3) the

statement tends to harm the plaintiff’s reputation and to lower the plaintiff in the estimation

of the community, and (4) the recipient of the false statement reasonably understands it to

refer to a specific individual. McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 729-30 (Minn. 2013).

“Defamation by implication” has not been recognized as a separate cause of action under

Minnesota law, but we have recognized it as an alternative theory of liability “when a

defendant (1) juxtaposes a series of facts to imply a defamatory connection between them;

or (2) creates a defamatory implication by omitting facts.” Metge v. Cent. Neighborhood

Improvement Ass’n, 649 N.W.2d 488, 498 (Minn. App. 2002), petition for rev. dismissed

(Minn. Oct. 15, 2002). The supreme court has held that whether a defamatory meaning is

conveyed depends on how an ordinary person understands the language given the

“surrounding circumstances.” McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 731. If the statements cannot be

6
ordinarily understood as defamatory, summary judgment is appropriate. Schlieman v.

Gannett Minn. Broad., Inc., 637 N.W.2d 297, 308 (Minn. App. 2001).

The Massaquois’ defamation claim is predicated on the publication of interior

photos of the home rented from Al Qudah. The Massaquois contend that the publication

of those photos in a real estate listing identifying the address of the home, at a time when

the Massaquois were advertising and soliciting new clients for their business,

communicated a false and defamatory statement to third parties to the effect that the

Massaquois’ business was for sale and was a scam. We are not convinced.

Assuming that the publication of the real estate listing is attributable to Al Qudah,

the Massaquois have not presented a genuine issue for trial that such publication could be

capable of being understood as communicating the false statement that the Massaquois’

business was for sale or a scam—either on its face or by implication. The Massaquois do

not dispute that the house was for sale, and they do not dispute that the photos included in

the real estate listing are true and authentic photos of the home and some of its contents. 4

The Massaquois do not identify any affirmative misrepresentation in the real estate listing

itself. The listing did not provide that the contents of the premises or the business operating

on the premises were for sale. Indeed, the listing did not reference or identify the

4
The Massaquois emphasize in their appellate briefing that they did not consent to
photographing the interior of the home, and, at oral argument, argued that Al Qudah failed
to provide them with notice that photos of the interior of the home would be taken. We
note that it appears from the record that there is no genuine dispute that Al Qudah complied
with the notice provisions set forth in the rental agreement. But even taking these assertions
as true, the Massaquois provide no argument or authority as to why their consent to such
photos is relevant to their defamation claim.

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Massaquois or their business in any way. Nor do the Massaquois allege any facts that

Al Qudah purportedly juxtaposed or omitted within the real estate listing information to

create any implication that the Massaquois’ business was for sale. 5

And the Massaquois failed to produce evidence that third parties understood the

publication to communicate a statement referring to the Massaquois or their business. For

purposes of summary judgment, the Massaquois produced a single undated, unverified

online comment credited to “Johnny diecast.” The comment stated: “It’s a scam no one is

ever[] here always an empty house. Now it’s up for sale.” 6 While the Massaquois assert

that they intended to provide witnesses at trial to testify how they “were shocked by the

publication and who in turn regarded [the Massaquois’] business as a scam or fraudulent,”

the Massaquois cannot defeat summary judgment by relying upon “postulated evidence

that might be developed at trial.” Dyrdal, 689 N.W.2d at 783.

Further, the Massaquois did not produce evidence of damages. The record is devoid

of evidence showing that the publication communicated a statement that tends to harm the

Massaquois’ reputation or lower them in the estimation of the community. See Richie v.

Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn. 1996) (stating that “Minnesota law

5
At oral argument, counsel for the Massaquois conceded that there was no evidence that
Al Qudah had knowledge that the Massaquois were advertising and soliciting new clients
for their business.
6
Before the district court, the Massaquois appeared to present this online comment as an
additional false and defamatory statement on which their defamation claim was based.
However, the Massaquois did not allege that this statement was made by Al Qudah and
produced no evidence that would support any such finding. On appeal, the Massaquois
identify this online comment as support for their contention that the publication of the real
estate listing harmed their reputation and was understood by the public to refer to them.

8
imposes a reputational harm prerequisite in defamation actions”). The Massaquois assert

they were “forced to incur expenses rebutting” claims by online reviewers that their

business was a scam because the home had been advertised for sale, but again, they

produced no evidence to support that assertion. We are unconvinced that the mere

publication of unaltered photos of the interior of a house within a real estate listing could

ordinarily be understood to imply that a business operating within such home is for sale or

a scam. See McKee, 825 N.W.2d at 731 (holding that whether a defamatory meaning is

conveyed depends on how an ordinary person understands the communication given the

“surrounding circumstances” (quotation omitted)). We are similarly unconvinced by the

Massaquois’ suggestion that an ordinary person who searches online for the address of the

Massaquois’ business and finds a real estate listing for the home would conclude that the

business that operated within that home was for sale and a scam, rather than concluding—

correctly—that only the home was for sale.

The Massaquois summarily assert in their appellate briefing that “[d]efamation

affecting a plaintiff’s ‘business, trade, profession, office or calling’ is defamation per se,”

stating that “[t]here is at a minimum, a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not

defendant published a false statement to the public of and concerning the business of the

plaintiffs.” We agree that “[s]tatements that we have recognized as defamatory per se

include ‘false accusations of committing a crime and false statements about a person’s

business, trade, or professional conduct.’” Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d

868, 875 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Becker v. Alloy Hardfacing & Eng’g Co., 401 N.W.2d

655, 661 (Minn. 1987)). However, for the reasons identified above, we disagree with any

9
characterization that the real estate listing is capable of being understood as a false

statement about the Massaquois’ business. Cf. id. (stating that the supreme court agreed

with the appellant that “some of the challenged statements here, when viewed in the light

most favorable to him, could be capable of being understood as accusing him of a crime”).

Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing the

Massaquois’ defamation claim because they failed to produce evidence establishing a

genuine issue for trial.

II. The Massaquois’ amended complaint was futile and untimely.

The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “a party may amend a pleading

only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party” if outside the time frame

to amend a pleading as a matter of course, and “leave shall be freely given when justice so

requires.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. Generally, “amendments should be freely granted,

except where to do so would result in prejudice to the other party.” Fabio v. Bellomo, 504

N.W.2d 758, 761 (Minn. 1993). In determining whether the nonmoving party would be

prejudiced, the district court considers various factors, including: (1) the stage of the

proceeding; (2) whether “substantial delay” will result; and (3) whether the amendment

states a “cognizable legal claim.” Envall v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 704, 399 N.W.2d 593,

597 (Minn. App. 1987), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). “A plaintiff may not amend

the complaint if the proposed amendment would be futile because it would serve no useful

purpose.” U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. RBP Realty, LLC, 888 N.W.2d 699, 705 (Minn. App.

2016), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 18, 2017). An amendment is futile when a proposed claim

could not survive summary judgment. See Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC,

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685 N.W.2d 320, 332 (Minn. 2004) (“[T]he court should deny a motion to amend a

complaint where the proposed claim could not withstand summary judgment.”).

“The decision whether to permit a party to amend pleadings rests within the

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of clear abuse of such

discretion.” Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn. 1980). “If a district court

denies a motion to amend on the ground of futility, our review of the district court’s ruling

‘may turn on whether it was correct in an underlying legal ruling.’” U.S. Bank, 888 N.W.2d

at 705 (quoting Doe v. F.P., 667 N.W.2d 493, 500-01 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied

(Minn. Oct. 21, 2003)).

As a threshold matter, and based on our analysis set forth above, amendment of the

pleadings to add a claim of defamation by implication would have been futile. See

Rosenberg, 685 N.W.2d at 332. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion to amend.

Even so, and independently, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying

the amendment as untimely. 7 The district court reasoned that the Massaquois’ request to

7
In their appellate briefing, the Massaquois contend that “[b]y declining to allow [them to]
move their second notice of motion to amend complaint and by disallowing their Second
Amended Complaint, the trial court essentially violated the due process rights of the
[Massaquois] in so far as it involved Notice and a Fair hearing.” First, we note that the
district court expressly considered the Massaquois’ second proposed amended complaint
in reaching its determination on their motion to amend. Second, we note that although the
Massaquois use the words “due process” and cite Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976), they make no arguments evaluating the Mathews three-factor balancing test
applicable to alleged due-process violations, and their brief is predominantly focused on
the argument that the district court should have allowed them to amend their complaint
under Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01 because doing so would not be prejudicial to Al Qudah.

11
amend the complaint was untimely under the scheduling order and sought to add an

alternative theory of liability on the day discovery closed. The district court’s scheduling

order required all non-dispositive motions, including motions to amend the pleadings, to

be scheduled to be heard on or before May 5. The Massaquois did not seek or obtain

permission from the district court to schedule for May 9 the second motion to amend the

complaint to add “defamation by implication” as a theory of relief. The Massaquois did

not explain why they waited eight months into the litigation to move to amend—after the

completion of discovery and while dispositive motions were pending. See Envall, 399

N.W.2d at 597 (providing that the stage of the proceeding is relevant to consider when

determining whether a proposed amendment would be prejudicial). The district court’s

denial of the motion as untimely is not an abuse of discretion under these circumstances.

Affirmed.

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