Tory Brent Apps v. Jesse Stowers

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1138

Tory Brent Apps, et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

Jesse Stowers,
Respondent.

Filed February 23, 2026
Affirmed
Harris, Judge

Mille Lacs County District Court
File No. 48-CV-24-1267

Patrick R. Gillespie, Michael P. Gillespie, Gillespie Law Offices, LLP, Rogers, Minnesota
(for appellants Tory and Sierra Apps)

Paul E. Storm, RGP Law, Ltd., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Harris, Presiding Judge; Smith, Tracy M., Judge; and

Segal, Judge. ∗

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

HARRIS, Judge

Appellant challenges the summary-judgment dismissal of her negligence claim for

damage sustained to her vehicle after colliding with respondent’s cow on a highway.

Because there is no genuine issue of material fact and judgment is appropriate as a matter

of law, we affirm.

FACTS

In the early morning hours of August 18, 2023, two officers with the Mille Lacs

Tribal police responded to a call requesting assistance to stop a “wrong way driver”

traveling northbound in the highway’s southbound lanes. While the first officer prepared

to assist in stopping the driver, the second officer observed another vehicle traveling

northbound (in the northbound lanes). As the vehicle passed by, the second officer “heard

a loud impact” and “observed that the vehicle had struck a cow, which was crossing the

highway at that time.” That officer responded to the collision and identified the driver as

appellant Sierra Jewel Apps. 1

Apps informed the officer that no one was injured and that she did not see the cow

before the collision. Apps’s passenger told the officer that “they were looking at [the]

[o]fficer’s vehicles when the cow ran into the roadway in front of them.” The officer

1
Appellant Tory Brent Apps is also listed as an appellant, but he is not directly involved
in this matter. Tory Brent Apps is the owner of the vehicle involved in the collision, which
was driven by his daughter, appellant Sierra Jewel Apps. Sierra Jewel Apps is the only
party pursuing the appeal.

2
observed that Apps’s vehicle “sustained disabling damage to the front and front left quarter

panel.”

The first officer also responded to the collision. He observed that the cow was

“severely injured and unlikely to survive.” He grabbed his department-issued rifle and

“dispatched the cow.” The officer later visited a nearby residence and identified

respondent Jesse Stowers as the owner of the cow.

Stowers had owned his property for 18 months prior to the collision. At the time of

the accident Stowers owned one cow. His property includes a small barn for animals and

a pasture of approximately three acres, enclosed by a mesh wire fence about five feet high.

The mesh wire fence is supported by metal stakes driven into the ground. Stowers

additionally installed two electrified wires: one approximately 20 inches from the ground,

and the other 40 inches from the ground. He maintained the same mesh wire fence and

electrified wires and was never aware of his cow “jumping over or breaking through the

fence” during the 18 months he owned the property.

Apps filed an insurance claim for damage to the vehicle—approximately $11,700.

Her claim was denied. To recoup her loss, Tory and Sierra Apps sued Stowers in

conciliation court, claiming that he negligently permitted his cow to escape the enclosure

and run at large as prohibited by Minnesota Statutes section 346.16 (2024). At the hearing,

the conciliation court heard testimony from Stowers and received photos of the fence and

the fence energizer. After a court trial in June 2024, the conciliation court found Stowers

negligent. One month later, Stowers filed a demand for removal/appeal from the

3
conciliation court and requested a de novo trial by jury under Minnesota General Rule of

Practice 521.

Once the matter was removed to district court, the parties developed a joint

discovery plan. Both parties stipulated that expert witnesses would not be required in the

matter. 2 At the end of August 2024, the district court issued a scheduling order that

provided both parties until February 2025 to complete discovery. During that time, Apps

did not produce any witness statements relating to the incident and did not produce exhibits

or documentation in response to Stowers’s discovery request.

In April 2025, both parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Stowers argued

that Apps failed to produce evidence showing that the wire fence was inadequate or

defective or that he permitted his cow to run at large. He also informed the district court

that Apps did not request or conduct an investigation of the fence, nor did Apps interview

anyone about the adequacy of the fencing. Apps filed a response to Stowers motion,

claiming that additional evidence of negligence would be produced at trial. Apps also

attempted to use the conciliation court’s memorandum summarizing the parties’ testimony

as impeachment evidence against Stowers. 3

2
Apps’s attorney had suggested stipulating that expert witnesses would not be necessary
“[s]ince there [was] only a vehicle damage claim at issue.” And in response to
interrogatories by Stowers, Apps answered, “The parties have stipulated that expert
witnesses will not be necessary in this matter.”
3
According to Apps, the statements contained in Stowers’s affidavit conflict with his
earlier testimony before the conciliation court.

4
 The district court granted Stowers’s motion for summary judgment, denied Apps’s

motion, and dismissed Apps’s claims with prejudice. Apps appeals.

DECISION

Apps first argues that the photographs of Stowers’s fence could permit a jury to

conclude that Stowers negligently installed and maintained the fence and, therefore, it was

inadequate to prevent the cow from escaping the enclosure. She also argues that section

346.16 imposes strict liability on owners of animals running at large, and that even if she

is unlikely to prevail under section 346.16, she may still prevail under a common-law

theory of negligence. 4

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo to determine whether there are

genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application of the

law.” Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc., 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. 2017). “We

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment

was granted.” STARS Ctrs., Inc. v. Faegre & Benson, L.L.P., 644 N.W.2d 72, 76-77 (Minn.

2002). The nonmoving party cannot avoid summary judgment by pointing to “unverified

and conclusionary allegations in his pleading or by postulating evidence which might be

developed at trial.” Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (quotation

omitted). Instead, the nonmoving party must establish that there is a genuine issue of

4
We note that, in its single-page order, the district court provided no analysis in granting
summary judgment to Stowers. The district court failed to discuss, let alone address, the
facts and the relevant law. Because our review is de novo, we proceed with our analysis.

5
material fact through substantial evidence. DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn.

1997).

To succeed on a negligence claim, Apps needed to show that (1) Stowers owed a

duty of care, (2) Stowers breached that duty of care, (3) Apps suffered an injury, and (4) the

breach proximately caused that injury. Fenrich v. The Blake Sch., 920 N.W.2d 195, 201

(Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted). When the doctrine of negligence per se applies, a

“violation of the statute constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence . . . unless excusable

or justifiable under the circumstances of the case.” Pigman v. Nott, 233 N.W.2d 287, 288

(Minn. 1975) (citation omitted) (applying this rule to section 346.16).

Under section 346.16, owners of certain species of animals, including cattle, cannot

permit the animals “to run at large.” Peterson v. Pawelk, 263 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Minn.

1978). “Running at large” means permitting any animal “to stroll, wander, rove or ramble

at will without restraint or confinement.” Id. “[I]t is not necessary that the owner have

knowledge that his animal is running at large, but he must in some way have allowed it to

do so.” Id. The mere fact that an animal is running at large is not, by itself, evidence that

the animal’s owner permitted it to do so in violation of the statute. Id.

The facts here are similar to Clark v. Goihl, A21-0136, 2021 WL 5442347 (Minn.

App. Nov. 22, 2021). 5 Clark and his passenger were driving late at night when they noticed

a vehicle parked on the opposite side of the road with its hazard lights activated. Id. at *1.

Just as Clark passed the parked vehicle, he struck a cow on the road. Id. The occupants of

5
Nonprecedential opinions are nonbinding and are cited as persuasive authority. Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1.

6
the parked car had earlier seen a cow near the roadway and pulled over, activating their

hazard lights in an effort to locate it. Id. Although they later heard the impact of Clark’s

car striking the cow, they did not witness the collision. Id. The son of the cow’s owners

learned of the incident and searched for the cow but was unable to locate it. Id. After

arriving at the scene, the son inspected the gate to his family’s farm and the surrounding

electrical fencing and found both to be in proper working order. Id. The cow was never

located, but the family verified the next day that all of their cows were accounted for. Id.

Clark sued the family-owners of the cow, claiming that they negligently permitted

the cow to run at large. Id. at *2. For purposes of their motion for summary judgment, the

owners agreed to assume that they owned the cow. Id. During a deposition, the father

testified that his cattle escaped the enclosure only “two or three times” in the 15 years since

owning the farm. Id. The son testified that the “cows had escaped more than three times

before, and perhaps as often as once a year.” Id. This court concluded that there was no

evidence that the owners permitted the cow to run at large. Id. at *4. Rather, the undisputed

evidence showed that the father and son “checked the fence on the night of the accident,

and they found it working and the gate latched.” Id. at *2.

Here, the undisputed evidence shows Stowers was never aware of his cow “jumping

over or breaking through the fence” in the 18 months before the incident. As part of his

daily routine caring for the cow, he inspected the fence line every evening. And on the

evening prior to the collision, Stowers again walked the fence line and observed no “gaps

or holes in the mesh wire fence” or “any damaged or downed fence stakes.” Stowers also

tested the electrical wires using the “energizer” located next to the fence’s gate and

7
confirmed the electrical wires were functioning by hearing the “distinct clicking sound.”

After inspecting the fence, Stowers closed the fence gate and affirmed there was no other

means of exit for the cow. The day after the incident, Stowers double checked the fence

and found nothing different from his observations the evening prior.

There was arguably more evidence that the owners in Clark permitted their cow to

run at large compared to Stowers’s case because, in Clark, the father and son testified that

the cows had previously escaped, as often as once a year. Id. at *2. Still, the Clark court

determined the owners were not negligent. Id. at *4. But here, there was no evidence that

Stowers’s cow had ever escaped.

Apps insists that the district court “improperly disregarded evidence of [Stowers’s]

negligence.” She contends that the “photographs of the fence arguably show that cows

routinely lean over it to eat grass on the other side.” She adds that “[t]his fact gives rise to

the inference that the electrification system . . . was not operational since it did not prevent

a cow from putting its head over it.” We are not persuaded for two reasons.

First, she advances nothing more than speculative assertions. Apps theorizes that

because one of the photographs depicts tall grass on the other side of the wired fence, then

Stowers’s cow must have “routinely lean[ed] over it to eat grass.” This inference lacks

record support. 6 Apps then suggests that the tall grass rendered the electrical fence

inoperable by “shorting out” the wires. She points to the electric fence information booklet

6
This inference is further undermined by the fact that the accident occurred in August
2023, whereas the photograph depicts snow on the ground. This raises serious doubt as to
whether the photograph was contemporaneous with the accident and, accordingly, whether
it provides reliable evidence of the condition or maintenance of the fence in August 2023.

8
as support, claiming that the manufacturer recommends that the “electric fence energizer”

be installed indoors. We do not find this persuasive because the information booklet says

that it is a “recommendation” and that the “energizer’s enclosure is basically

weatherproof,” suggesting that it could be placed outdoors. Even taking this evidence in

the light most favorable to Apps, it does not create a genuine dispute of material fact

regarding whether Stowers negligently installed the electric fence.

Second, Apps’s argument would likely require expert-witness testimony regarding

the feeding habits of cattle, the electrical conduction of the wired fence, or whether the

fence was adequately installed or maintained. See Rygwall v. ACR Homes, Inc., 6 N.W.3d

416, 430 (Minn. 2024) (“Where a question involves obscure and abstruse medical factors

such that the ordinary layman cannot reasonably possess well-founded knowledge of the

matter and could only indulge in speculation in making a finding, there must be expert

testimony.” (quotation omitted)). But Apps produced no expert witnesses on this matter.

She relies only on the photographs of the mesh wire fencing, which, as we have explained,

do not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding negligence.

To convince us otherwise, Apps argues that section 346.16 “imposes strict liability

and tr[e]ble damages for violations of its standards.” We are not persuaded. The supreme

court stated that the legislature’s use of the word “permit” in the statute demonstrates that

it did not intend to impose strict liability to an owner of an animal running at large.

Peterson, 263 N.W.2d at 637. She also argues that even if she cannot prevail on negligence

per se, she may still prevail under common-law negligence. Apps offers no meaningful

analysis on how she would prevail under the common law. Apps argues only that she could

9
prevail under the common law if she could show that Stowers “failed to take actions, such

as properly installing and grounding his electric fence, or using inadequate ‘chicken wire’

fencing.” But again, she points to no evidence in the record to support her claim. And the

only authority to which she cites simply discusses the types of negligence claims.

Overall, Apps failed to provide admissible evidence demonstrating that a genuine

issue of material fact exists. As such, the district court’s order granting summary judgment

to Stowers was not erroneous. 7

Affirmed.

7
As a final point, Stowers argues that Apps attempted to use the conciliation court’s
vacated order as evidence at trial, which is impermissible because the matter was removed
to district court for a de novo trial. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 521; Akhtar v. Dairkee,
A16-1201, 2017 WL 1210140, at *2 (“When a district court tries a case de novo, it tries
the case as if it had not been tried before.” (quotation omitted)); Nicollet Restoration, Inc.
v. Turnham, 475 N.W.2d 508, 510 (Minn. App. 1991) (“[T]he district court is not required
to give deference to the conciliation court’s decision nor is it bound by the conciliation
court’s rules of practice.”). In Apps’s reply brief, she claims that she only relied upon “the
memorandum memorializing [Stowers’s] testimony,” not the conciliation court’s judgment
itself. This is a trivial distinction with no meaningful difference. Regardless of whether
she relies on the judgment or the memorandum, the district court conducts a trial de novo
and Apps has offered no basis on which the conciliation court’s summary of testimony
would be admissible in this case.

10