Ashaunti Quantay Prowell v. State of Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1228

Ashaunti Quantay Prowell, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed January 12, 2026
Affirmed
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-1303

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Mary F. Moriarty, Hennepin County Attorney, N. Nate Summers, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Reyes,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction for driving while impaired, arguing that the

evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict and that the district court
plainly erred by accepting his proposed stipulation regarding his prior conviction for

driving while impaired. We affirm.

FACTS

This is the second appeal in this case. As to the relevant procedural history, a jury

found appellant Ashaunti Quantay Prowell guilty of driving while impaired (DWI) in

August 2023.1 Prowell petitioned for postconviction relief in February 2025. He argued

that respondent State of Minnesota failed to prove the DWI charge beyond a reasonable

doubt and that he was prejudiced by the district court’s adoption of a stipulation that he

proposed. The postconviction court summarily denied Prowell’s petition. It concluded

that the evidence was sufficient to support the DWI conviction, that the district court did

not plainly err by accepting Prowell’s stipulation, and that even if the district court had

erred, the alleged error was not prejudicial.

Prowell appeals.

DECISION

We review a denial of a postconviction petition for an abuse of discretion. Brown

v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn. 2017). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion

when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts

in the record.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We review a postconviction court’s legal

determinations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Id. (quotation omitted).

1
The state charged and tried additional offenses. Because the outcome of those offenses
does not impact our decision, we do not discuss them.

2
 I.

Prowell contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding that

he was guilty of DWI. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to prove that he was

impaired by alcohol as opposed to some other intoxicating substance. Prowell relies on

evidence that the responding officers found a prescription bottle for Oxycodone bearing

his name in his vehicle, the pills in that bottle field-tested positive for amphetamine, and a

witness who observed Prowell crash his vehicle reported that he thought Prowell had been

smoking a “blunt.”2

Prowell was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(1) (2018), which

provides that it is a crime for a person to operate a motor vehicle when “the person is under

the influence of alcohol.” A person is under the influence of alcohol if he does not possess

“that clearness of intellect and control of himself that he otherwise would have” or if he

drank enough alcohol that his “ability or capacity to drive was impaired in some way or to

some degree.” State v. Ards, 816 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotations

omitted).

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty

verdict, our standard of review depends on whether the verdict was based on direct or

circumstantial evidence. State v. Petersen, 910 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Minn. 2018). Direct evidence

is “[e]vidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves

a fact without inference or presumption.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn.

2
Based on Prowell’s arguments at trial, we understand this to be a reference to a marijuana
cigarette.

3
2017) (quotation omitted). In contrast, circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which

the factfinder can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.” Id. (quotation

omitted). “[C]ircumstantial evidence always requires an inferential step to prove a fact that

is not required with direct evidence.” State v. Jones, 4 N.W.3d 495, 501 (Minn. 2024)

(quotation omitted).

The postconviction court determined that there was sufficient direct evidence to

support the jury’s finding of guilt. Prowell asserts that we should apply the circumstantial-

evidence standard of review. He cites three cases in support of that assertion. The first

case is State v. Stokes, in which we stated:

Stokes’ assertion that his conviction was based solely
on circumstantial evidence characterizes all of the testimony of
both police officers and of [a witness] as circumstantial
evidence. This characterization is in error. The observations
of [those witnesses] that Stokes was “unsteady,” smelled of
alcohol, etc., are direct evidence of the conditions they
observed. Stokes also overlooks his own admission that he was
driving and had consumed alcohol. These admissions are
direct, not circumstantial, evidence.

354 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. App. 1984).

The second case is State v. Holmes, in which we rejected Holmes’s argument that

because no witness observed him consume alcohol and he refused blood-alcohol testing,

the eyewitness accounts of his condition and behavior was “circumstantial and . . . .

insufficient to prove that he was under the influence of alcohol when he drove his pickup

truck into the back of a van at an intersection in front of a police officer.” 701 N.W.2d

267, 271 (Minn. App. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 719 N.W.2d 904

(Minn. 2006). We noted that four eyewitnesses opined that Holmes was intoxicated based

4
on their direct observations of him. Id. We also noted that the officer who testified about

Holmes’s intoxication had training and experience in detecting intoxication. Id.

We also stated that the evidence of Holmes’s intoxication was “more than sufficient

to support the verdict even if the evidence is characterized as only circumstantial.” Id. We

reasoned that no evidence supported Holmes’s assertion of a rational alternative hypothesis

of innocence, which was that “the odor of an alcoholic beverage was coming from someone

other than [Holmes], or that his behavior was due to a head injury or due to his being a

‘terrible driver and belligerent scofflaw with a major attitude problem.’” Id.

The third case is State v. Olson, in which we concluded that the direct-evidence

standard of review applied “because the state presented direct evidence of Olson’s alcohol

consumption and impaired driving through eyewitness testimony.” 887 N.W.2d 692, 700

(Minn. App. 2016). We reasoned as follows:

Here the record shows Olson consumed multiple
alcoholic beverages over the course of the day—from 10:00
a.m. to around 6:00 p.m. Both [Olson’s friend] and the trooper
testified that, based on their observations, they believed Olson
was too drunk to drive. [Olson’s friend] took over driving and
described Olson’s unusual behavior at the restaurant just
before he fell and hit his head. The trooper detected an odor of
alcohol coming from Olson, and observed that Olson was
staggering and had an unsteady gait. Olson admitted he had
been drinking, and Olson refused to perform field sobriety tests
or a preliminary breath test. Based on this record, a jury could
reasonably conclude that Olson was driving while impaired by
alcohol. The evidence is sufficient to support his conviction
for this offense.

Id.

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 In this case, the state presented evidence—described below—similar to the evidence

deemed to be direct in Stokes, Holmes, and Olson. We therefore apply the standard of

review applicable to a guilty verdict based on direct evidence. Under that standard, we

carefully analyze the record to determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jury to reach its verdict. State v.

Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989); State v. Olson, 982 N.W.2d 491, 495 (Minn.

App. 2022). We assume that the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any

contrary evidence. State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998). We defer to the

jury’s credibility determinations and will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. State v.

Franks, 765 N.W.2d 68, 73 (Minn. 2009); State v. Watkins, 650 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn.

App. 2002). We will not disturb a guilty verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the

presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could

have reasonably concluded that the state proved the defendant’s guilt. Bernhardt v. State,

684 N.W.2d 465, 476-77 (Minn. 2004).

At trial, the jury in this case heard testimony from several officers. Officer MB

testified that she was dispatched to “a vehicle that had struck the median” near Interstate

394 and Highway 169 in Golden Valley. Upon arrival, she observed a vehicle with

significant damage. It is undisputed that Prowell was the driver of that vehicle. Officer

MB testified, “As I was speaking with [Prowell] and getting him in the handcuffs, I did

smell the odor of a consumed alcoholic beverage emanating from his person.” She further

testified that Prowell had “slurred speech” and that his responses were “somewhat

delayed,” which—based on her training and experience—led her to believe that he was

6
intoxicated and laboring under the influence of alcohol. Officer MB testified that Prowell

was transported to the police station and given a breath-alcohol test, however the state did

not offer the test results as evidence at trial.

Video from Officer MB’s body-worn camera was admitted as evidence. The video

shows Prowell admit, at the scene, that he was driving the vehicle before it crashed. Later

in the video, Prowell is shown performing field sobriety tests at a police station. During

the heel-to-toe steps, Prowell was wobbly and had trouble keeping his balance. Prowell

admitted that he had consumed “a couple beers.” The officer conducting the tests remarked

that Prowell appeared to have consumed more alcohol than that. Prowell later admitted

that he had also consumed “one shot.” The postconviction court noted that, in the video,

Prowell’s “speech is noticeably slurred and delayed” and that the video shows him

“stumbling while attempting to walk in a straight line.”

Officer LS testified that, when he arrived at the accident scene, he observed a

heavily damaged vehicle. He testified that after briefly interacting with Prowell, he

“detected an odor . . . consistent with that of a consumed alcoholic beverage emitting from

him.” Officer LS also testified that he recovered an Oxycodone prescription bottle with

Prowell’s name on it from the center console of the vehicle. The pills were field tested and

were presumptively positive for amphetamine.

Video from Officer LS’s body camera was also admitted as evidence. At the

beginning of the video, the officer is shown interacting with a bystander, who confirmed

that he reported the crash. Their conversation was captured on the video. The officer asked

the bystander if Prowell was “drunk or something” and the bystander replied: “Oh man

7
he’s got to be yeah, I think he’s smoking a blunt. We were on 394 and he lost his sh-t. He

was going about 100 miles an hour, blew past us, [and] smacked into the median.” The

video also showed Officer MB ask Officer LS, “Did you smell the booze?” Officer LS

replied, “Yeah, he reeks like it.” Officer LS later stated, “[h]e reeks like booze,” and “I

don’t know how drunk, but you can smell it.”

In sum, the jury heard direct evidence that Prowell admitted that he had consumed

alcohol, a bystander observed Prowell drive approximately 100 miles per hour and crash

into the median, the bystander told a responding officer that he believed Prowell was

intoxicated, two responding officers detected an odor of consumed alcohol emanating from

Prowell, Officer MB testified that Prowell slurred his words and was slow to respond,

Officer MB testified that she believed Prowell was impaired by alcohol, and video evidence

corroborated that testimony and showed that Prowell had a difficult time maintaining his

balance. Under the caselaw described above, this is direct evidence. And based on this

evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Prowell was

driving while impaired by alcohol, as the postconviction court concluded.

Application of the circumstantial-evidence standard of review would not change our

determination that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict. Under that

standard we first determine the circumstances proved, disregarding evidence inconsistent

with the verdict. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 600-01. Next, we determine “whether the

circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational

hypothesis other than guilt.” Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017)

(quotation omitted). In doing so, we do not defer to the fact-finder’s choice between

8
reasonable inferences. State v. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 2013). But we

will not reverse a conviction based on circumstantial evidence unless there is a reasonable

inference other than guilt. Loving, 891 N.W.2d at 643.

Prowell argues that “[w]hen viewed as a whole, the circumstances proved do not

preclude a reasonable inference that [he] was not impaired by alcohol but instead some

other substance” such as Oxycodone, ecstasy, or marijuana. The postconviction court

noted that even if the circumstantial-evidence standard applied and it were to accept

Prowell’s hypothesis of innocence as reasonable, “that does not prohibit him from also

being impaired by alcohol.” We agree.

We also reason that, despite the evidence of the Oxycodone bottle containing a

substance that field-tested positive for amphetamine, there was no evidence that Prowell

had consumed or was under the influence of either substance. And despite the bystander’s

report that he thought Prowell had been smoking a “blunt,” there is no evidence showing

that the “blunt” contained marijuana, and there was no evidence that the police found or

smelled marijuana on Prowell or in his car. Under the circumstantial-evidence standard of

review, we do not reverse a conviction for mere conjecture. State v. Lahue, 585 N.W.2d

785, 789 (Minn. 1998). “[P]ossibilities of innocence” do not justify relief. State v. Ostrem,

535 N.W.2d 916, 923 (Minn. 1995). Prowell’s hypothesis of innocence is based on mere

conjecture and is not reasonable.

In sum, the postconviction court did not err in determining that the evidence was

sufficient to sustain the jury’s guilty verdict.

9
 II.

Prowell argues that the district court committed reversible error by accepting his

signed stipulation regarding his prior DWI conviction as a trial exhibit. The postconviction

court rejected this argument.

Prowell concedes that he did not object to the stipulation and that he invited the

error. But as he notes, although “[t]he invited error doctrine prevents a party from asserting

an error on appeal that he invited or could have prevented in the court below,” “[t]he invited

error doctrine . . . does not apply to plain errors.” State v. Goelz, 743 N.W.2d 249, 258

(Minn. 2007). We therefore review the admission of the challenged stipulation for plain

error, as the postconviction court did.

“To establish a plain error a defendant must demonstrate that (1) there was an error,

(2) it was plain, and (3) it affected substantial rights.” Id. If a defendant establishes all

three factors, an appellate court then considers “whether the error should be addressed to

ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted).

“An error is plain if it is clear and obvious; usually this means an error that violates

or contradicts case law, a rule, or an applicable standard of conduct.” State v. Matthews,

779 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Minn. 2010). Prowell asserts that admission of his stipulation was

error that was plain under Minn. R. Evid. 403, which states, “Although relevant, evidence

may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
 Under the elements of the enhanced DWI offense with which Prowell was charged,

the state had to prove that Prowell had a qualifying DWI conviction within the previous

ten years. See Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.26 (imposing a gross-misdemeanor penalty for DWI if

an “aggravating factor” is present), .03, subd. 3(1) (defining the term aggravating factor to

include “a qualified prior impaired driving incident within the ten years immediately

preceding the current offense”), subd. 20 (defining the term “[p]rior impaired driving

conviction” to include a prior conviction for DWI) (2018). When proof of a prior impaired

driving incident is required, the district court “must accept an unequivocal judicial

admission of a prior DWI and let the defendant remove from the jury the issue of whether

he had prior DWI convictions.” State v. Clark, 375 N.W.2d 59, 61-62 (Minn. App. 1985).

“By judicially admitting the existence of the element of the prior conviction, the defendant

removes that issue from the case. The effect is that the case will be submitted to the jury

as an ordinary DWI case.” State v. Berkelman, 355 N.W.2d 394, 397 n.2 (Minn. 1984).

Prowell and his counsel submitted a signed stipulation, which was later admitted

into evidence, stating that “Prowell has a conviction for driving while impaired from 2014”

and that “[t]his conviction enhances this driving under the influence incident to a Gross

Misdemeanor.” Prowell’s counsel discussed the ramifications of the stipulation on the

record and asked Prowell, “Okay. You don’t dispute that you had a prior conviction for

driving while impaired, right?” Prowell responded, “No.” Prowell’s counsel also asked,

“And you understand that by conceding that you have the prior DWI . . . , it reduces what

the State has to prove as to your priors? Do you understand that?” Prowell responded in

the affirmative. Prowell’s counsel stated, “But it also, you get the benefit from them not

11
knowing the details of these prior convictions.” Prowell responded, “Yeah.” The district

court questioned defense counsel regarding the stipulation stating:

One last thing, . . . I do want to know is the form of
that stipulation. We off the record had a conversation in
which I asked about the form and the stipulation. You told
me that the form of the stipulation was consistent to a
strategic decision that you had made, which I don’t need to
know about. It’s just that you are specifically approving of
as a matter of strategy to the form of the stipulation. Is that a
correct statement?

Defense counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.”

At the beginning of trial, the district court read the stipulation to the jury. The

district court then asked counsel if this was a correct recitation of the stipulation, and

Prowell’s counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” The district court then received the

signed stipulation as an exhibit.

When instructing the jury, the district court addressed the stipulation as follows:

“The parties have agreed and you therefore must accept as true that the Defendant has a

prior impaired driving incident within ten years immediately preceding the current

offense.” The instructions also contained, at defense counsel’s request, a cautionary

instruction regarding Prowell’s prior convictions:

Now, the parties have stipulated, and you’ve heard it
twice, to the existence of prior convictions. This evidence is
not to be used as proof of the character of the Defendant or that
the Defendant acted in conformity with such character. The
Defendant is not being tried for and may not be convicted of
any offenses other than the charged offenses and you’re not to
convict the Defendant on the basis of his prior convictions. To
do so might result in unjust double punishment.

12
 In sum, Prowell expressly stipulated to having “a conviction for driving while

impaired from 2014,” instead of simply stipulating to the relevant element and removing

that issue from the jury’s consideration. Prowell complains that “submitting into evidence

a form that stated that [he] had a prior DWI” instead of “simply stipulating to his legal

status” defeated the purpose of the stipulation because by “admitting in writing to the jury

that he had previously been convicted of DWI,” the jury could conclude that he had a

propensity to drive while intoxicated and was, therefore, “likely guilty here.”

Prowell’s concern is reasonable. However, when the district court questioned his

approach to the stipulation, defense counsel assured the court that the approach was based

on trial strategy. Indeed, “[w]hat evidence to present to the jury . . . represents an

attorney’s decision regarding trial tactics and lies within the proper discretion of trial

counsel.” State v. Doppler, 590 N.W.2d 627, 633 (Minn. 1999). For that reason, the

postconviction court determined that the district court did not err in accepting the

stipulation.

Prowell argues that any strategy underlying the stipulation is irrelevant. He notes

that the Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the plain-error rule in a variety of situations

in which the defendant invited, presumably for strategic reasons, an error by the district

court. For example, in State v. Gisege, the supreme court addressed a “fundamental error”

arising from the district court’s provision of a jury instruction regarding a lesser-included

offense even though the defendant had requested that instruction. 561 N.W.2d 152, 158-

61 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court also applied the plain-error rule in State v. Carridine

to the district court’s provision of a self-defense jury instruction even though the defendant

13
had requested that instruction. 812 N.W.2d 130, 142-44 (Minn. 2012). Prowell asserts

that the requests by the defense for jury instructions in Gisege and Carridine were also

strategic.

This case is unique in that the district court apparently recognized that the “form”—

which we understand to mean the wording—of the defense’s stipulation was unusual.

Thus, the district court raised the issue with defense counsel, and counsel assured the

district court that his decision to use that particular wording was strategic. As the

postconviction court noted, the district court allowed Prowell “to stipulate to his prior

conviction in the specific form he approved.” The postconviction court concluded that the

district court did not err in admitting the stipulation because “rather than denying a request

to stipulate, the district court facilitated it, honoring [the defense’s] strategic choice.”

Prowell does not address whether it is appropriate to apply plain-error review if the

district court grants a defendant’s request for a specifically worded stipulation after (1)

questioning defense counsel to ensure that he wants that wording and (2) being assured by

defense counsel that the wording it is consistent with a defense strategy. But we need not

resolve that issue because the postconviction court correctly reasoned that alleged error did

not affect Prowell’s substantial rights. See State v. Moore, 863 N.W.2d 111, 119 (Minn.

App. 2015) (“If an appellate court concludes that any requirement of the plain-error test is

not satisfied, the appellate court need not consider the other requirements”), rev. denied

(Minn. July 21, 2015).

An error affects an appellant’s substantial rights if there is a reasonable likelihood

that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict, that is, if the error changed the

14
outcome of the case. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998). “When

considering whether an error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, we consider the

strength of the evidence against the defendant, the pervasiveness of the improper

suggestions, and whether the defendant had an opportunity to (or made efforts to) rebut the

improper suggestions.” State v. Mosley, 853 N.W.2d 789, 803 (Minn. 2014) (quotations

omitted).

As to the pervasiveness of the stipulation, the state did not focus on the stipulation

during its case in chief or in its closing argument. As the postconviction court noted, the

state did not mention the stipulation during either its closing or rebuttal arguments. And

the district court provided a cautionary instruction to dissuade the jury from using Prowell’s

prior DWI conviction for an improper purpose. “We presume a jury follows a court’s

cautionary instruction.”3 State v. Riddley, 776 N.W.2d 419, 428 (Minn. 2009).

As to the strength of the evidence, Prowell argues that if the jury had not known

about his prior DWI, “it is reasonably likely that it would not have found him guilty because

the [s]tate’s evidence was otherwise weak.” Prowell notes that the state did not introduce

evidence of chemical testing or a field sobriety test, “which are expected in a DWI case.”

Prowell relies on Clark, but that case is distinguishable procedurally and factually.

3
We acknowledge Prowell’s argument that the circumstances warranted a curative
instruction striking the stipulation and instructing the jury to disregard it instead of a
cautionary instruction regarding proper use of the stipulation. See State v. Strommen, 648
N.W.2d 681, 687 (Minn. 2002) (“Because the testimony was inadmissible, the [district]
court’s instruction should have been curative, rather than cautionary, and the inadmissible
testimony should have been stricken.”). However, because we assume without deciding
that acceptance of the stipulation was a plain error, we consider the mitigating effect of the
instruction, which—like the stipulation—was proposed by the defense.

15
 Procedurally, Clark is distinguishable because the district court in that case erred by

refusing to allow the defendant to stipulate to the existence of his prior DWI conviction.

375 N.W.2d at 62. We therefore applied the harmless-error standard of review, and not

the plain-error standard. Id. at 62-63. Although the standards are similar, “the state bears

the burden of establishing that [an] error was harmless.” State v. Craig, 807 N.W.2d 453,

468 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d, 826 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. 2013). But under the plain-error

standard, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that the error affected his

substantial rights, and it is a “heavy burden.” See State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872

(Minn. 2010) (stating that “[p]lain error is prejudicial when there is a reasonable likelihood

that the error had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict” and that “[t]he defendant bears

a heavy burden of persuasion on this prong”) (quotations omitted)).

Factually, Clark is distinguishable because unlike this case, in which Prowell

crashed into a median while driving at a high speed, Clark’s observed driving conduct was

much less egregious: the police stopped him because he was “traveling very slowly and

weaving in and out of [his] proper traffic lane.” Clark, 375 N.W.2d at 61. In addition, in

Clark, “[t]he evidence of intoxication was entirely observation testimony by police

officers.” Id. at 63. Unlike the facts here, Clark does not indicate that the driver in that

case admitted consumption of alcohol, smelled like alcohol, slurred his words, had slow

responses, or had trouble maintaining his balance during a sobriety test. See id. at 61. As

the postconviction court reasoned, unlike Clark, evidence in this case corroborated the

officer’s opinion that Prowell was intoxicated. For example, the body-worn camera video

showed Prowell slur his speech, respond slowly, and stumble during a sobriety test.

16
 In sum, the evidence of impaired driving in this case was much stronger than the

evidence in Clark. On this record, Prowell has not met his “heavy burden” to show that

the alleged error affected his substantial rights. The postconviction court therefore did not

err in determining that he was not entitled to relief under the plain-error standard.

Affirmed.

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