In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. K. H., B. M. P., G. J. S., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1355

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child(ren) of: T. K. H., B. M. P., G. J. S., Parents.

Filed February 9, 2026
Affirmed; motion denied
Cochran, Judge

Wadena County District Court
File No. 80-JV-25-76

T.K.H., Cambridge, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, Amanda N. Heifort, Assistant County Attorney,
Center City, Minnesota (for respondent Wadena County Human Services)

Angela J. Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Mary Weaver)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,

Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

Appellant mother challenges the district court’s order denying her motion for a new

trial following the termination of her parental rights. Appellant argues the district court

abused its discretion when it denied the motion because she demonstrated that (1) she

received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, which violated her right to a fair trial;

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
(2) she was denied her constitutional right to due process; (3) fraud on the court occurred

through false testimony and fabricated reports at trial; and (4) the district court lacked

jurisdiction to enter the order terminating her parental rights due to improper venue.

Because appellant has not met her burden to demonstrate the district court abused its

discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial, we affirm.

FACTS

Appellant T.K.H. is the mother of two children—Child 1, born in 2016, and Child 2,

born in 2020. The children have different fathers. The respective fathers of the children,

G.J.S. and B.M.P., take no part in this appeal.

Respondent Wadena County Human Services (WCHS) became involved in the

spring of 2024 when law enforcement received reports regarding mother and the children.

Those reports expressed concerns that mother and her children were living out of mother’s

vehicle and that mother had a history of drug use. The reports also expressed concern about

mother’s mental health.

Child in Need of Protection or Services (CHIPS) Petition

On April 23, 2024, Child 1 and Child 2 were placed into emergency protective care

at the request of WCHS based on concerns that the children were “found in surroundings

or conditions which endanger the child[ren]’s health or welfare.” On the welfare-hold

request form, WCHS noted that mother was a “flight risk” and that she “[a]bsconded from

child protection in Illinois . . . .” The form also noted that Child 1, then age seven, was not

enrolled in school and that mother tested positive for controlled substances on March 14,

2024.

2
 On April 25, 2024, WCHS filed a CHIPS petition. The petition raised concerns

about mother and the children living out of mother’s car, mother’s chemical dependency,

mother’s neglect of the children, and Child 1’s absence from school. That same day,

mother applied for, and the court appointed, an attorney (Attorney 1) to represent mother.

The following day, an emergency protective care hearing was held, and the district court

ordered the out-of-home placement of the children. Shortly after the hearing, the county

developed case plans for the children and mother that included visitation as well as

measures to address the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement. Mother was

involved in the development of the plans.

On October 29, 2024, the district court held a trial on the CHIPS petition. Mother

did not attend the trial. Following the trial, the district court filed an order concluding that

WCHS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that the children were in need of

protection or services. The district court based its decision on evidence that mother “has

struggled with her mental health, chemical use, and homelessness and as a result has been

unable to meet the [c]hildren’s basic needs for food, shelter, education and other required

care.” The district court ordered that WCHS “shall retain custody” of the children and

approved the continued out-of-home placement of the children. The court also ordered

WCHS to develop updated case plans with mother and ordered mother to complete a

comprehensive chemical use assessment (with WCHS and the guardian ad litem (GAL)

listed as collateral contacts), follow all resulting recommendations, and abstain from mood-

altering substances, among other terms.

3
 Following the trial, mother agreed to updated versions of the case plans (one for

each child). Mother’s case plans included five goals: address mother’s substance use,

stabilize mother’s mental health, maintain safe and stable independent housing, improve

and maintain mother’s relationship with her children, and ensure the children’s safety and

wellbeing. Both case plans required, among other terms, that mother: (a) complete a

chemical use assessment with WCHS and follow all resulting recommendations,

(b) abstain from substance use unless prescribed, (c) comply with random drug testing,

(d) develop a relapse prevention plan, (e) remain law abiding, (f) sign all necessary releases

to ensure open communication, (g) attend visits with the children as scheduled by WCHS,

(h) complete a parenting education class, (i) participate in family therapy with the

children’s support system, (j) demonstrate a period of at least six months of sobriety and

follow a relapse prevention plan to ensure the safety of her children, (k) complete a

diagnostic mental health assessment and successfully follow the recommendations thereof,

(l) reduce mental health symptoms and demonstrate stability for a period of at least six

months, and (m) address and take care of physical and mental health needs per doctor

recommendations.

On December 13, mother obtained private counsel (Attorney 2) to represent her. A

permanency progress hearing was held on December 17, at which the district court found

that mother had not made substantial progress on her case plan. 1

1
At this time, neither father had any contact with the children.

4
 Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) Petition

On January 29, 2025, WCHS filed a TPR petition to involuntarily terminate

mother’s parental rights to both children, citing the following statutory bases: (1) that

mother has abandoned the children, (2) that mother has substantially, continuously, or

repeatedly refused or neglected to comply with the duties imposed upon her by the parent

and child relationship, (3) that mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child

relationship, (4) that mother failed to correct the conditions leading to the out-of-home

placement despite reasonable efforts by the county, and (5) that the children are neglected

and in foster care. 2 See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(1)-(4), (7) (2024). Mother

entered a denial and requested a change of venue, which the district court later denied. On

March 26, the district court approved WCHS’s request to cease reunification efforts with

mother.

On April 30, Attorney 2 requested leave to withdraw as mother’s counsel.

Attorney 2 cited differences with mother about “how this matter should be litigated” and he

noted that, despite Attorney 2’s “numerous” attempts to contact mother, “she has not

returned or accepted [his] phone calls.” Nonetheless, the district court still required

Attorney 2 to attend a pretrial hearing on May 2. At the hearing, mother indicated that she

wished to discharge Attorney 2 and understood that discharge of Attorney 2 would not be

a basis for continuing the TPR trial scheduled for May 5. But, prior to the start of trial,

mother filed a request for a court-appointed attorney, and at the scheduled start of trial,

2
The petition also sought to terminate the parental rights of B.M.P., the father of Child 2.
As noted above, the termination of B.M.P.’s parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.

5
WCHS supported a continuance to ensure the protection of mother’s rights. The district

court appointed a new attorney for mother—Attorney 3.

The trial was held on July 16. Mother was represented by Attorney 3. At trial,

WCHS presented testimony from a WCHS child protection social worker and the GAL for

both children. Mother did not testify, but the court admitted a number of exhibits offered

by mother’s attorney and stipulated to by the parties. At the time of trial, the children had

been placed out of the home for 449 days.

At trial, the social worker testified about her work with mother and the children

beginning with the CHIPS case. The social worker testified both children had needs that

were different or more particularized than the average child. According to the social

worker, Child 1 had nightmares and was in “therapy weekly to . . . help

process . . . whatever he’s going through.” The social worker indicated that, while Child 1

had struggled academically and “almost didn’t get to go into 2nd grade” due to serious

deficiencies in his math and reading levels, his academic performance had improved since

his out-of-home placement began. She also testified that Child 2 had behavioral problems,

including sensory issues and emotional outbursts. He also had “quite a few cavities” and

needed eyeglasses.

In addition, the social worker testified to mother’s substance use issues and her

compliance with the requirements of the case plans relating to substance use. The social

worker testified that mother completed a chemical use assessment in accordance with the

case plans but did not list WCHS as a collateral contact as required. Mother also refused

required drug testing on several occasions, tested positive for methamphetamine and

6
amphetamine on multiple occasions, admitted to using THC and methamphetamine, and

was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) on January 4, 2025. Because of her drug

use while on her case plans, mother was required to complete additional chemical

assessments. She completed a second chemical use assessment in November 2024 and

started outpatient treatment for chemical dependency, but she was discharged after two

weeks due to being “unsuccessful” in the program. At that time, she stated that she did not

need to be in treatment. She then completed another chemical use assessment in

February 2025 following her DWI arrest and started a new treatment program in March

but did not attend regularly.

The social worker provided additional testimony about other aspects of mother’s

compliance with her case plans. According to the social worker, as of the time of trial,

mother failed to comply with the following case-plan requirements: (1) remain law abiding,

(2) follow through on the recommendations of her chemical assessments, (3) abstain from

use of all chemical substances except prescribed medication, (4) comply with random drug

testing, (5) develop a relapse prevention plan, (6) obtain a parenting assessment,

(7) develop skills in therapy to manage trauma responses and anger, (8) obtain

employment, (9) complete a parent education class, and (10) attend scheduled visits with

the children. 3

The district court also heard testimony from the GAL about mother and the children.

She testified that she met with mother monthly. According to the GAL, mother would

3
According to the district court, mother later “submitted an Exhibit showing proof of
completion of some online parenting course.”

7
often “yell and scream and get upset and lose her cool” and “would show up very dirty and

unclean.” The GAL suspected that mother appeared either ill or “withdrawing” at

meetings. She claimed that mother had a serious problem following through with her

commitments to the children and that, while mother loved the children, “her actions do not

follow . . . her words.” The GAL also testified about the children and stated that they were

doing well in their foster home placement. The court found both the social worker and the

GAL to be credible.

In a thorough and detailed order filed on July 31, 2025, the district court concluded

that WCHS proved by clear and convincing evidence three of the five statutory grounds

alleged in the TPR petition for termination of mother’s parental rights. The three statutory

grounds were: (1) mother is palpably unfit to be a party to the parent and child relationship,

(2) mother failed to correct the conditions leading to removal of the children, and (3) the

children were neglected and in foster care. The district court also found that WCHS made

reasonable efforts to reunify mother and the children and that termination of mother’s

parental rights is in the best interests of the children. 4 Having found that the statutory

requirements for termination were met, the district court granted WCHS’s petition to

terminate mother’s parental rights to the children.

On August 4, mother then made a motion for a new trial without counsel, arguing

ineffective assistance of counsel and due-process violations. A week later, on August 11,

4
The district court also ordered the involuntarily termination of B.M.P.’s parental rights
on the ground that he abandoned his child and granted the voluntary termination of G.J.S.’s
parental rights.

8
mother’s counsel moved for a new trial based on the interests of justice and asserting that

the decision was not supported by the evidence or was contrary to the law. The district

court held an evidentiary hearing on mother’s request for a new trial, at which mother

testified after mother waived the attorney-client privilege.

Following the hearing, the district court denied mother’s request for a new trial in a

written order. The district court rejected mother’s ineffective assistance of counsel

argument because mother failed to demonstrate she was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged

errors. The district court also rejected mother’s due-process argument, noting that

“[o]utside of [m]other’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [m]other does not

meaningfully articulate any other violation of her due process rights.” Finally, the court

found there was no legal support for mother’s ongoing contention that venue in Wadena

County was not proper. Based on these determinations, the district court concluded that

mother had not demonstrated that she was entitled to a new trial.

Mother appeals. 5

5
On January 30, 2026, mother filed a motion asking us to remand the case to the district
court for that court to address motions mother filed in that court after she filed this appeal.
The crux of mother’s motion seems to be that rulings on the motions she filed in district
court are necessary for this court to have “a complete record” for purposes of this appeal.
Mother cites no authority for the relief sought. Thus, her motion is not properly before us.
See State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 1997) (declining to address inadequately briefed question); Melina v. Chaplin, 327
N.W.2d 19, 20 (Minn. 1982) (noting that inadequately briefed questions are not properly
before an appellate court); In re Welfare of Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn.
App. 2003) (applying Wintz in a juvenile-protection appeal), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15,
2003); In re Welfare of Child of L.M.L., 730 N.W.2d 316, 322 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying
Melina in a juvenile-protection matter). Further, as this court noted in its order filed on
October 23, 2025, in this appeal: Materials not before the district court when it made the
decision(s) at issue in the appeal are not part of the record on appeal. Minn. R. Civ. App.

9
 DECISION

In this appeal, in which mother is self-represented, mother does not challenge the

district court’s order terminating her parental rights. Instead, she limits her appeal to the

district court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. A district court may grant a new trial

in a TPR case for any of the following reasons:

(a) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, referee, or
prevailing party, or any order or abuse of discretion whereby
the moving party was deprived of a fair trial;

(b) misconduct of counsel;

(c) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the
county attorney, any party, their counsel, or their guardian ad
litem;

(d) accident or surprise that could not have been prevented
by ordinary prudence;

(e) material evidence, newly discovered, which with
reasonable diligence could not have been found and produced
at the trial;

(f) errors of law occurring at the trial and objected to at
the time, or if no objection need have been made, then plainly
assigned in the motion;

P. 110.01; see In re Nelson, 495 N.W.2d 200, 202, 204 (Minn. 1993) (ruling we should not
have considered a letter sent to district court after that court made the ruling at issue on
appeal). Thus, in this appeal, we could not consider whatever might result from the remand
mother seeks. We deny mother’s motion.

10
 (g) a finding that the statutory grounds set forth in the
petition are proved is not justified by the evidence or is
contrary to law; or

(h) if required in the interests of justice.

Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.04.

We review the denial of a motion for a new trial in a juvenile-protection case for an

abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of V.R., 355 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. App. 1984)

(affirming denial of new trial), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 11, 1985). “A district court abuses

its discretion by making findings of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying

the law, or delivering a decision that is against logic and the facts on record.” Woolsey v.

Woolsey, 975 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). The district court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. V.R., 355 N.W.2d at 430-31. A finding is

clearly erroneous if we are left with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In

re Civ. Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221 (Minn. 2021).

Mother argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for

a new trial because: (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel at the TPR trial,

violating her right to a fair trial, (2) she was denied her constitutional right to due process

at the trial, (3) fraud on the court occurred through false testimony and fabricated reports

at the trial by the social worker and GAL, and (4) the district court lacked jurisdiction to

enter the TPR order due to improper venue. We consider each argument in turn and discern

no abuse of discretion by the district court.

11
 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Rule 21.04 of the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protection Procedure provides that a

district court may grant a new trial for “misconduct of counsel” but it does not expressly

provide that a new trial may be granted based on a showing of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 21.04. But, as the district court noted, rule 21.04 also

permits a district court to order a new trial “if required in the interests of justice.” Id. We

agree with the district court that the interests of justice may support the grant of a new trial

if mother received ineffective assistance of counsel at the TPR trial. But, for the reasons

explained below, we also agree with the district court that mother is not entitled to a new

trial on this basis because mother failed to meet her burden to demonstrate ineffective

assistance of counsel.

A parent has “the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection with a

proceeding in juvenile court,” including in connection with a petition to terminate parental

rights. Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2024). To determine whether a party received

ineffective assistance of counsel, Minnesota courts typically apply the standard set out in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), including in juvenile-protection

matters. See In re Welfare of L.B., 404 N.W.2d 341, 345 (Minn. App. 1987) (applying

Strickland to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a juvenile-protection appeal).

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim under the Strickland standard, the

party alleging ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to demonstrate (1) that

“counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that

a reasonable probability exists that, but for . . . counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

12
of the proceedings would have been different.” Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 391

(Minn. 2010) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694)). A court “may dispose of a claim

on one prong without considering the other.” Lussier v. State, 853 N.W.2d 149, 154 (Minn.

2014) (citation omitted).

We review the district court’s findings of fact made during the course of its

consideration of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for clear error, but we review

de novo the district court’s application of the two Strickland requirements. Pearson v.

State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 600 (Minn. 2017). The district court limited its analysis to the

second prong and concluded that mother did not meet her burden on that prong.

Mother argues the district court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based

on ineffective assistance of counsel because she established both Strickland prongs. More

specifically, she argues that she demonstrated that her counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness because her attorney did not “call [mother] to testify,

introduce material evidence, [or] challenge false reports” of the WCHS witnesses. And

she contends that there would have been a different outcome “had counsel presented the

full defense.” We are not persuaded.

We begin our analysis with the first Strickland prong. “The objective standard of

reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills

and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar

circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).

“There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance falls within the wide range of

13
reasonable professional assistance.” Pierson v. State, 637 N.W.2d 571, 579 (Minn. 2002)

(quotation omitted).

Mother’s claims relate to her counsel’s decisions about which witnesses to call,

which exhibits to offer, and how to cross-examine the WCHS witnesses. These are matters

of trial strategy. See State v. Bobo, 770 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Minn. 2009) (“What evidence

to present to the jury, what witnesses to call, and whether to object are part of an attorney’s

trial strategy which lie within the proper discretion of trial counsel and will generally not

be reviewed later for competence.”); State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 689 (Minn. 2001)

(noting trial counsel’s alleged failure to vigorously cross-examine a witness and object to

certain testimony are matters of trial strategy). Appellate courts generally do not

consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial strategy. See, e.g.,

Andersen v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn. 2013) (explaining that claims of an attorney’s

alleged failure to “investigate the case” and to “call exculpatory witnesses or impeach

adverse witnesses” were not reviewable because “the conduct at issue arguably falls within

trial strategy”).

Even so, mother has not demonstrated that her counsel’s performance fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. First, regarding trial counsel’s decision to not call

mother as a witness at trial, mother claims that her attorney told her that she did not need

to testify because the WCHS social worker had discredited herself. While we acknowledge

that the district court did find the social worker to be credible, mother has not shown, based

on the testimony at trial, that her counsel’s advice that mother refrain from testifying was

objectively unreasonable. Furthermore, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based

14
on a failure to call a particular witness—as mother argues here—“are of the type we have

repeatedly declined to recognize as amounting to ineffective assistance of counsel.”

State v. Miller, 666 N.W.2d 703, 717 (Minn. 2003).

Similarly unpersuasive are her claims that her counsel did not “introduce material

evidence, [or] challenge false reports.” The trial record reflects otherwise. The record

shows that mother’s counsel offered a number of exhibits at trial pursuant to a stipulation

with WCHS. And, as the district court noted in its order denying mother’s motion for a

new trial, many of the other documents that mother thought should have been offered by

her counsel were offered by WCHS and admitted by the district court. Others were

irrelevant. In sum, there is no basis to conclude that counsel was ineffective for failing to

offer material evidence.

Likewise, mother has not demonstrated that her counsel was ineffective for failure

to challenge “false reports” by the social worker and GAL. As the district court noted in

its order, the record reflects that mother’s counsel cross-examined both witnesses

extensively. And “failure to conduct cross-examination in a certain manner and failure to

investigate certain witnesses” are matters of trial tactics and “do not demonstrate

ineffective counsel.” State v. Irwin, 379 N.W.2d 110, 115 (Minn. App. 1985), rev.

denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1986).

Consequently, we conclude that mother did not demonstrate that her trial counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore she did not

meet the first Strickland prong. This conclusion is sufficient to reject mother’s argument

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. But because the district court focused its

15
analysis on the second Strickland prong, we also consider this prong and agree with the

district court that mother failed to meet this prong as well.

Mother claims that the outcome at trial would have been different if her counsel had

“presented the full defense.” Mother does not specify what she means by a “full defense”

but we interpret her argument to include efforts by counsel to introduce additional exhibits,

challenge the “false reports,” and call her as a witness to testify. We agree with the district

court’s finding that mother has failed to demonstrate that this additional evidence would

have changed the result in the TPR proceeding. At the hearing on her motion for a new

trial, mother told the district court that, if she had testified at trial, she would have testified

to the reasons that she missed some of her scheduled visits with the children and her

concerns about the social worker and GAL. But the district court’s decision to terminate

mother’s parental rights relied heavily on her failure to maintain sobriety and the impact of

that failure on her ability to parent. Mother fails to show how her testimony would have

altered the district court’s finding that she failed to maintain her sobriety or its decision to

terminate her parental rights. Similarly, mother has not pointed to any potential exhibits

that would have changed the outcome. Lastly, there is no basis to conclude that the

outcome would have been different if her counsel had engaged in additional

cross-examination of the WCHS witnesses. Accordingly, mother has not shown that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the outcome of the TPR

petition would have been different. Where an appellant fails to show prejudicial error, the

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 376

(Minn. 2005).

16
 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined that mother’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim does not provide

a basis for a new trial.

Due Process

Mother also argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her

request for a new trial based on due process concerns. Specifically, she claims that she

was denied her constitutional right to due process “when the trial court silenced her

testimony and excluded her exhibits” and thereby deprived her of “a fair opportunity to be

heard and to present evidence.”

In the context of a TPR proceeding, “[d]ue process requires reasonable notice, a

timely opportunity for a hearing, the right to counsel, the opportunity to present evidence,

the right to an impartial decision-maker, and the right to a reasonable decision based solely

on the record.” In re Welfare of Child. of D.F., 752 N.W.2d 88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008).

“Although the amount of process due in a particular case varies with the unique

circumstances of that case, prejudice as a result of the alleged violation is an essential

component of the due process analysis.” In re Welfare of Child of B.J.-M., 744 N.W.2d

669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (citations omitted).

In its order denying mother’s motion for a new trial, the district court concluded that

mother had not demonstrated due-process violations at trial. The district court noted that

aside from her ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, mother did “not meaningfully

articulate any other violation of her due process rights.” The court further explained that,

because mother had the opportunity to present evidence favorable to her case, there was no

17
basis upon which to grant her a new trial. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district

court’s decision.

Here, the record reflects that the district court afforded mother due process and took

great efforts to ensure mother’s rights were protected throughout the trial. Indeed, when

mother requested a new attorney on the day trial was scheduled to begin, the district court

granted mother a continuance to ensure her rights would be protected. Additionally, the

record reflects that mother received timely notice of the trial, had an opportunity to present

evidence, had an impartial trial judge, and a decision based solely on the record.

We also note that there is no support for mother’s contention that the district “court

silenced [mother’s] testimony.” Rather, as mother acknowledges elsewhere in her own

brief, her counsel made a strategic decision to not call her as a witness and mother agreed.

The district court did not preclude mother from testifying. And due process does not

require mother to testify at trial. In fact, due process does not compel the physical

attendance of a parent at a termination proceeding, particularly in cases where the parent

is represented by counsel—as was the case here. See In re Welfare of A.Y.-J., 558 N.W.2d

757, 759 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that “due process does not compel the physical

attendance of a parent at termination proceedings”), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 1997).

Furthermore, the district court permitted mother to offer exhibits at trial even without

mother’s testimony. In short, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined that mother failed to demonstrate a due-process violation entitling her

to a new trial.

18
 Claims of False Testimony

Mother also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not ordering a new

trial based on fraud on the court. Specifically, mother contends that the “district court erred

by relying on demonstrably false statements—such as falsified test results and

contradictory GAL summaries” and therefore she is entitled to a new trial based on fraud.

The district court did not rule on this matter because mother raised the issue only in an

affidavit submitted after filing her motion for a new trial. Given that mother did not allege

to the district court that she was entitled to a new trial because of fraud, the issue is not

properly before this court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding

that we generally do not entertain arguments that were not “presented and considered by”

the district court).

But even if the issue was timely raised, it is not adequately briefed. Mother only

makes passing reference to the court’s reliance on “demonstrably false statements—such

as falsified test results and contradictory GAL summaries.” And while her supplemental

briefing, which was deemed part of her principal brief by this court, makes reference to

over twenty allegedly fraudulent statements made by the GAL and the social worker at

trial, she fails to demonstrate how the statements were fraudulent beyond conclusory

statements. 6 This court declines to “consider pro se claims on appeal that are unsupported

by either arguments or citations to legal authority.” State v. Bartylla, 755 N.W.2d 8, 22

6
An order of this court allowed mother to supplement her principal brief with additional
arguments made in a motion filed with this court. We deemed pages 7-13 of the motion to
be part of mother’s principal brief.

19
(Minn. 2008). Lastly, to the extent that mother is challenging the district court’s

determination that both the GAL and the social worker testified credibly, we defer to the

district court’s credibility determinations. Butler v. Jakes, 977 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn.

App. 2022) (“We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations and do not reconcile

conflicting evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

Accordingly, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to

decline to grant mother a new trial based on her assertions of fraud on the court.

Venue

Mother also appears to argue that venue in Wadena County, where the trial was

held, was improper and that the district court “lacked jurisdiction.” The district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for a new trial on this basis. 7

The legislature has specified the venue for child protection matters. “When it is

alleged that a child is in need of protection or services, venue may be in the county where

the child is found, in the county of residence, or in the county where the alleged conditions

causing the child’s need for protection or services occurred.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.121,

subd. 1 (2024) (emphasis added). Here, it is undisputed that the children were found in

Wadena County. And WCHS brought its CHIPS petition and the TPR petition in Wadena

7
For purposes of this appeal, we assume both that (a) mother uses the word “jurisdiction”
to refer to subject-matter jurisdiction; and (b) what mother asserts is that erroneous venue
for the case could deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction. We note,
however, that venue is “the proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed[,]” Black’s
Law Dictionary 1876 (12th ed. 2024), and that, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, venue is
not jurisdictional, Peterson v. Holiday Recreational Indus., Inc., 726 N.W.2d 499, 504
(Minn. App. 2007), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 28, 2007).

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County. Therefore, venue in Wadena County was proper and the district court had

jurisdiction over the proceeding.

Furthermore, as the district court noted in its order denying the motion for a new

trial, mother’s challenge to venue was untimely. Failure to timely object to improper venue

may constitute a waiver of the objection. Rosnow v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 444 N.W.2d

591, 592 (Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 13, 1989).

For these reasons, the district court properly rejected mother’s argument based on

improper venue.

Conclusion

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother’s request for

a new trial. Mother’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, due-process violations,

fraud on the court, and improper venue do not establish an adequate basis for reversal.

Affirmed; motion denied.

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