Peter K Butler v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1380

Peter K Butler,
Appellant,

vs.

City of St. Paul, Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed March 23, 2026
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-24-5226

Peter K. Butler, St. Paul, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Irene Kao, St. Paul City Attorney, Curtis Grayer III, Assistant City Attorney, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Bratvold,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

WORKE, Judge

Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

respondent-city on appellant’s claim that the city unlawfully disbursed public funds to city

projects that were not specifically included in the city’s resolution regarding entitlement to

the funds. We reverse and remand.
 FACTS

To provide context for the facts, we begin with an overview of the governing

statutory scheme. The legislature allows municipalities to impose a general sales tax

through special law, provided that (1) the municipality adopts a resolution indicating its

approval of the tax and submits that approved resolution to the legislature, (2) the

legislature grants conditional authority to impose the tax, and (3) the city obtains residential

authority to impose the sales tax and use the revenue for the projects through an election

vote. Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subds. 1-3 (2024). Minnesota Statutes require that the city’s

resolution include several specific elements before it can be submitted to the legislature for

conditional authority. The resolution must include:

(1) the proposed tax rate;
(2) a detailed description of no more than five capital
projects that will be funded with revenue from the tax;
(3) documentation of the regional significance of each
project, including the share of the economic benefit to or use
of each project by persons residing, or businesses located,
outside of the jurisdiction;
(4) the amount of local sales tax revenue that would be
used for each project and the estimated time needed to raise
that amount of revenue; and
(5) the total revenue that will be raised for all projects
before the tax expires, and the estimated length of time that the
tax will be in effect if all proposed projects are funded.

Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 2(a). The special legislation granting authority to impose a

local sales tax “must not include any projects not contained in the resolution.” Minn. Stat.

§ 297A.99, subd. 2(c). The statute defines “project” or “capital project” as “(1) a single

building or structure including associated infrastructure needed to safely access or use the

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building or structure; (2) improvements within a single park or named recreation area; or

(3) a contiguous trail.” Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 2(d).

In January 2023, respondent City of St. Paul, Minnesota (the city) adopted

Resolution 23-33 (RES 23-33), indicating its approval of a one-percent sales tax for

20 years to fund “[r]ebuilding and improving regionally significant transportation

infrastructure,” and “[r]ebuilding and [i]mproving regionally significant parks and

recreational infrastructure.” The resolution indicated that the specific investments of both

projects would be listed in “Attachment A.” Attachment A to the resolution listed 25 roads

as “specific investments” under the “[r]ebuilding and improving regionally significant

roads and trails” project. Under the “[r]ebuilding and improving regionally significant park

and recreational infrastructure” project, Attachment A indicated the following specific

investments:

Revitalize Existing Facilities: . . .
Mississippi River Learning Center: . . .
Multipurpose East Side Community Center: . . .
Mississippi River Balcony: . . .
Multipurpose Athletic Complex: A versatile, dedicated
multi-sport/multi-use regional athletic complex that would
serve Saint Paul[,] along with visitors from the metro area and
the entire state. This 21st[-]century facility would provide the
ability to host sporting events and other large-scale programs
and activities.
Downtown Park Improvements: Park improvements and
revitalization for several downtown parks[,] including Pedro
Park, Lower Landing Park, and Kellogg Mall Park, Mears
Park, Harriet Island, and Wacouta Commons. . . . .
Bruce Vento Bridge: . . .

The city submitted RES 23-33 to the Minnesota Legislature seeking conditional

authority to impose the tax for the described projects. In a 2023 session law, the legislature

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granted the city the authority to impose “a sales and use tax of one percent for the

[improvements] specified in subdivision 2b.” 2023 Minn. Laws ch. 64, art. 10, § 2,

subd. 1a, at 3116. The legislature also removed specific statutory requirements governing

the use of the tax revenue on those listed improvements. See id. § 2, subd. 2b(a), at 3117.

The legislature also required the city to amend its resolution to include bridges within the

authorized use of revenues. Id. § 2, subd. 2b(b), at 3117.

The city made the requisite amendment to include bridges as an authorized use of

the tax revenue through subsequent resolution. The city’s voters approved the sales tax,

and the city adopted an ordinance imposing the tax.

In February 2024, the city adopted Resolution Public Hearing 24-3, which

earmarked the sales-tax revenue to, among other things, “the [Heights] 1 development”

(the Heights) and a multi-use athletic field at Victoria Park (Victoria Park). Appellant

Peter K. Butler filed suit against the city, claiming it was unlawfully disbursing public

funds to the Heights and Victoria Park. The city moved for summary judgment. The

district court granted summary judgment, concluding that the legislature’s elimination of

specific statutory requirements created a broad view of what improvements the city could

utilize the revenue for. The district court concluded that, based on this broad view, there

was no genuine issue of material fact and “the [d]efendant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” This appeal followed.

1
The resolution originally stated, “the Hillcrest development.” The name of the
development changed to “Heights” after the resolution was adopted.

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 DECISION

Butler challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment, arguing it erred in

its interpretation of the session law. “On an appeal from summary judgment, we ask two

questions: (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the

district court erred in its application of the law.” Hayden v. City of Minneapolis,

937 N.W.2d 790, 795 (Minn. App. 2020) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 14,

2020). Based on the record and briefs, the dispute is based solely on the interpretation and

application of the session law, not on any material facts. We review a grant of summary

judgment based solely on the application of a statute de novo. Id. We also review

interpretations of statutes and municipal resolutions de novo. Eagan Econ. Dev. Auth. v.

U-Haul Co., 787 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Minn. 2010).

We interpret statutes to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Hayden,

937 N.W.2d at 795. To do so, we first look at whether the statute’s language is ambiguous,

and if not, apply its plain language. Id. In interpreting a statute, “no word, phrase, or

sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant,” and we “cannot add to a

statute what the legislature has either purposely omitted or inadvertently overlooked.”

Id. at 795-96 (quotations omitted). If the statute is unambiguous, we will not “disregard

the letter of the law in pursuit of its purpose.” Id. at 795 (quotation omitted). In rare cases

where the statute’s literal meaning “utterly confounds” clear legislative purpose, we may

“examine other indicia of legislative intent.” Id. at 795-96 (quotations omitted).

We also recognize that municipalities are creatures of the state and possess no

powers other than those conferred by statute or that are necessarily implied to carry out

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express powers. Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 110 (Minn. 2006) (citing

Minn. Const. art. XII, § 3). Thus, cities have no inherent power beyond that allowed by

state law. See id.

The city asserts that, once the legislature approves the sales tax, it can dictate or

change what projects the revenue can be used for, so long as the project serves a public

purpose. The city appears to conflate the public-purpose requirement for spending tax

revenue with the requirement for legislative authorization.

The use of public funds is lawful if it is spent for a public purpose, authority has

been given allowing the expenditure, and the use is genuine. See Clapp v. Sayles-Adams,

15 N.W.3d 648, 652 (Minn. 2025); Tousley v. Leach, 230 N.W. 788, 789 (Minn. 1930). A

municipality may impose a local sales tax only if the law already grants it the authority, or

it seeks approval from the legislature. See Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 1(a). If the city

seeks approval from the legislature, it must adopt a resolution indicating approval of the

tax, with the inclusion of several specific statutorily listed requirements, and submit the

resolution to the legislature. Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 2(a)-(b). And the statute states

that the legislature cannot approve “any projects not contained in the resolution.”

Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 2(c).

Permitting postapproval changes would render the statute’s resolution and

submission requirements meaningless, and provide a municipality—a creature of the

state—authority that the legislature does not have: the power to modify projects after the

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fact. 2 Thus, the city cannot spend local sales tax revenue on a project, even if it is for a

public purpose, unless the legislature has authorized the expenditure of the funds on that

specific project.

In the session law authorizing the local sales tax, the legislature stated that the

associated revenue may be used for improvements to streets and bridges “notwithstanding

Minnesota Statutes, section 297A.99, subdivision 2, paragraphs (a), clause (2), and (d),”

and capital improvements to the city’s parks and recreation facilities “notwithstanding

Minnesota Statutes, section 297A.99, subdivision 2, paragraph (d).” 2023 Minn. Laws

ch. 64, art. 10, § 2, subd. 2b(a), at 3117. Minnesota Statutes, section 297A.99, subdivision

2(d) establishes the definition of “capital project” and “project” as: “(1) a single building

or structure including associated infrastructure needed to safely access or use the building

or structure; (2) improvements within a single park or named recreation area; or (3) a

contiguous trail.” Minnesota Statutes, section 297A.99, subdivision 2, paragraph (a)(2)

states that the resolution the municipality submits to the legislature must include “a detailed

description of no more than five capital projects that will be funded with revenue from the

tax.” Thus, the session law omits the statutory definition of “capital project” from both

project categories, but the requirement limiting the resolution to “no more than five capital

projects” is omitted only from the project to improve the streets and bridges. This

distinction assists us with our legislative interpretation. See White Bear Lake Restoration

2
Additionally, Minnesota law allows a first-class city to use excess local-sales-tax revenue
for other regionally significant capital projects. Minn. Stat. § 297A.9905 (2024). The
legislature would not have created this excess-revenue exception if cities had unrestricted
authority to redirect revenues to any public-purpose project.

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Ass’n ex rel. State v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 946 N.W.2d 373, 383 (Minn. 2020) (“A statute

should be interpreted to give effect to all of its provisions[,] . . . to be read and construed

as a whole, and each section must be interpreted in light of the surrounding sections to

avoid conflicting interpretations.”).

Attachment A to the city’s resolution for improvements to streets and bridges,

RES 23-33, lists 25 streets and one bridge to improve. Streets and bridges are not included

within the statutory definition of capital projects. See Minn. Stat. § 297A.99, subd. 2(d).

The 25 streets and one bridge listed are also beyond the statutory limitation of listing “no

more than five capital projects” within the submitted resolution. Thus, the legislature

needed to remove both the “capital projects” definition and the limitation of “no more than

five capital projects” for the city to use the revenue on the streets and bridge listed in

Attachment A.

Attachment A of RES 23-33 also lists five parks to be improved: “Pedro Park,

Lower Landing Park, and Kellogg Mall Park, Mears Park, Harriet Island, and Wacouta

Commons.” While Attachment A appears to list six parks, the first coordinating

conjunction “and” between Kellogg Mall Park and Lower Landing Park combines the two

parks into one project, while the second “and” in the list indicates the end of the list. This

explains why the legislature did not remove the five-project-maximum requirement from

the improvements to the parks and recreational facilities. Further support for this

conclusion includes the fact that (1) Lower Landing Park and Kellogg Mall Park are

geographically near each other, and (2) while the legislature did not remove the five-

project-maximum requirement, it did remove the statutory definition of “capital projects,”

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which limited a project to a “single park or named recreational area,” Minn. Stat.

§ 297A.99, subd. 2(d) (emphasis added), which ensured that the Landing Park and Kellogg

Mall Park project would be seen as one project, not two. Thus, once the legislature

removed the statutory definition of “capital projects,” it created only five projects, and

there was no need to remove the five-project-maximum requirement.

The legislature’s elimination of the statutory definition and five-project-maximum

requirement from the streets and bridge improvements, but only the statutory definition

from the park improvements, shows that the legislature saw Attachment A as a final list of

the city’s intended improvements. This conclusion is further supported by the legislature’s

requirement that the city adopt an amended resolution authorizing the use of tax revenues

for “bridges” within the body of the resolution. This requirement indicates that the

legislature took notice of the bridge improvement identified in Attachment A, noticed it

was pigeonholed under park improvements, and wanted to ensure (1) the voters knew that

bridges were an intended improvement for which the revenue would be used, and (2) the

city did not try to hide the bridge improvement within the parks category. 3

In total, the session law shows that the legislature viewed Attachment A as the

comprehensive list of intended projects for which the revenue would be used. As such, the

3
The argument may be raised that if Attachment A were part of the resolution, then there
would be no need to amend. The main text of RES 23-33 does not discuss bridges
specifically, but improvements to the Bruce Vento Bridge appear in Attachment A. This
created a discrepancy between the body of the resolution and Attachment A. To ensure the
revenue was to be used on the bridge, the legislature told the city to adopt an amended
resolution so that the resolution reflected the specific investments listed in Attachment A.
In other words, the legislature saw the main text and Attachment A as one piece, and
wanted to ensure the main text mirrored the investment listed in Attachment A.

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district court erred by granting summary judgment under the conclusion that the session

law broadened the scope of the projects on which the city could use the revenue to include

parks that were not listed within Attachment A. We reverse the grant of summary judgment

to the city and remand for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

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