In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. J. W. and L. S. G., Parents

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A25-1603

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: C. J. W. and L. S. G., Parents.

Filed March 2, 2026
Affirmed
Larson, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-JV-23-788

Mary I. Johnson, Johnson Law Firm, P.A., Virginia, Minnesota (for appellant mother
C.J.W.)

Joshua P. Nuckols, Joshua Nuckols Law, Pine City, Minnesota (for respondent father
L.S.G.)

Jeffrey Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, Molly French, Assistant County
Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Koochiching County Public
Health and Human Services)

Angela J.S. Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for guardian ad litem Ashlee Larson)

Considered and decided by Larson, Presiding Judge; Schmidt, Judge; and Florey,

Judge. ∗

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

LARSON, Judge

In this appeal after remand, appellant-mother C.J.W. (mother) challenges the district

court’s decision to deny her private petition to terminate respondent-father L.S.G.’s (father)

∗
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
parental rights to their joint child. Specifically, mother argues the district court abused its

discretion when it determined that termination was not in the child’s best interests. Because

the district court’s best-interests determination addressed the appropriate criteria and has

support in the record, we affirm.

FACTS

Mother and father have one joint child, a son (the child), who was born in 2017.

The parties were never married but lived together with the child and mother’s two other

children for the first five years of the child’s life. During that time, father was actively

involved in caring for the child.

In mid-2022, father was charged with two counts of second-degree criminal sexual

conduct after mother’s daughter from a previous relationship (daughter) disclosed that

father had sexually abused her. Father continued to have contact with the child until that

December, when mother requested supervised visits. Father refused, explaining that he did

not want supervised visitation to be the child’s last memory of him if he was sent to prison.

In January 2023, father was convicted of both charges and received a probationary

sentence, a downward dispositional departure. His probation conditions required him to

participate in sex-offender treatment, and his treatment program prohibits him from having

any contact with minor females but not minor males.

In November 2023, mother filed a private petition to terminate father’s parental

rights to the child. At the time she filed the petition, mother had sole legal custody and

sole physical custody of the child. In the petition, mother asserted multiple statutory bases

2
to terminate father’s parental rights and argued that termination was in the child’s best

interests.

During a two-day trial in July 2024, the district court received numerous exhibits,

including records from father’s probation and sex-offender treatment, and testimony from

ten witnesses: mother, father, father’s probation agent, a social worker, the guardian ad

litem (GAL), the child’s maternal grandmother, two of father’s older children from a

previous relationship (the older children), father’s neighbor, and mother’s husband. Based

on this evidence, the district court found that mother presented clear and convincing

evidence to prove two statutory bases for terminating father’s parental rights: (1) father

inflicted egregious harm on daughter while daughter was in father’s care and (2) father was

convicted of an offense requiring him to register as a predatory offender. See Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), (8) (2024). 1 Nonetheless, the district court determined that,

despite those bases, it was not in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental

rights and denied the petition.

Mother appealed. We determined that the district court’s findings on the child’s

best interests were insufficient for appellate review and remanded for further findings,

providing that the district court had “discretion to reopen the record, and if necessary,

require the parties to submit expert material or data on the issue.” In re Welfare of Child

of C.J.W., No. A24-1591, 2025 WL 957962, at *3 (Minn. App. Mar. 31, 2025).

1
We generally apply the law in effect at the time we decide a case, unless doing so would
alter vested rights or result in a manifest injustice. See Interstate Power Co. v. Nobles Cty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 617 N.W.2d 566, 575 (Minn. 2000). Because there were no substantive
amendments to the relevant statutes, we apply the current version.

3
 On remand, the district court granted mother’s request to reopen the record to

receive additional expert evidence. Mother submitted a report from the child’s

psychologist, and father submitted a report from a psychologist, both addressing the child’s

contact with father. Thereafter, the district court filed an amended order denying the

petition. In doing so, the district court retained its determination that mother proved two

bases for termination. But the district court again determined that termination was not in

the child’s best interests, making more than six pages of findings and conclusions on that

point.

Mother appeals.

DECISION

A natural parent is generally presumed to be “fit and suitable” to care for their child,

and a court may terminate a parent’s rights to their child only for “grave and weighty

reasons.” In re Welfare of K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d 649, 653 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation

omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 8, 2019). To terminate parental rights, a district court

must find at least one of the eight statutory bases for termination is supported by clear and

convincing evidence. 2 In re Welfare of Child of J.H., 968 N.W.2d 593, 600 (Minn. App.

2021), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 6, 2021); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (2024)

(listing bases for termination). But the best interests of the child are the “paramount

consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2024). Even if a statutory basis for

2
Termination also generally requires a finding that the responsible social services agency
has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, but the district court determined that no
such efforts were required here because of the termination grounds proved. See Minn. Stat.
§§ 260.012(a)(1), (6), 260C.301, subd. 8 (2024).

4
termination exists, “the district court must still find that termination of parental rights . . .

is in the best interests of the child.” In re Welfare of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn.

App. 2018); see also In re Tanghe, 672 N.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Minn. App. 2003)

(recognizing that “a child’s best interests may preclude terminating parental rights” even

when a statutory basis for termination exists (quotation omitted)).

To evaluate a child’s best interests, a district court must consider “(1) the child’s

interests in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interests in preserving

the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interests of the child.” In re Welfare

of Child of R.V.M., 8 N.W.3d 680, 696 (Minn. App. 2024), rev. denied (Minn. July 19,

2024); see also Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (requiring a district to court to

consider these factors when addressing a child’s best interests). A child’s “competing

interests” may include a “stable environment, health considerations, and the child’s

preferences.” In re Welfare of Child. of J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 905 (Minn. App. 2011),

rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).

We review a district court’s best-interests determination for an abuse of discretion.

A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 657. A district court abuses its discretion if it “makes findings of

fact that lack evidentiary support, misapplies the law, or resolves discretionary matters in

a manner contrary to logic and the facts on record.” In re Welfare of Child of T.M.A., 11

N.W.3d 346, 355 (Minn. App. 2024). We will not disturb a district court’s factual findings

unless they are clearly erroneous because they are “manifestly contrary to the weight of the

evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d

at 654.

5
 Mother argues that the district court abused its discretion when it determined it was

not in the child’s best interests to terminate father’s parental rights. She advances three

arguments, which we address in turn.

First, mother cites K.L.W., a case affirming a district court decision to terminate

parental rights after a parent was convicted of a sexual offense. See 924 N.W.2d at 656.

Relying on this case, mother appears to assert that a district court abuses its discretion if it

does not terminate the parental rights of any individual with such a criminal background.

This argument misstates the law. In K.L.W., like this case, the conviction for a sexual

offense was used to establish a statutory basis for terminating parental rights. Id. at 653-

56; see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b) (listing the statutory bases for termination).

This determination was necessary, but not sufficient, to terminate parental rights because

the child’s best interests are a separate and “paramount” consideration. See Minn. Stat.

§ 260C.301, subd. 7. It is on the best-interests analysis that this case diverges from K.L.W.

That case turned on a determination that it was in the child’s best interests to terminate

parental rights because of factors that made termination beneficial to the child, like parental

inattentiveness and noncompliance with probation. K.L.W., 924 N.W.2d at 656-57. But

the district court did not find those factors present here. Instead, the district court found

other factors, like shared health concerns and a strong historical bond between father and

the child, supported preserving the parental relationship. In short, the district court reached

a different decision because it faced different facts, which was an appropriate exercise of

discretion.

6
 Second, mother asserts repeatedly that father is an “untreated predatory offender”

who continues to deny his criminal conduct, appearing to argue father poses a risk of harm

such that termination of father’s parental rights must be in the child’s best interests. 3 This

argument is unavailing. The district court found, based on the testimony of father’s

probation agent and the GAL, that father was removed from his first sex-offender treatment

program because he refused to admit the offense—which was permissible in light of his

pending appeal. 4 Father was then placed in an appropriate treatment program for those

maintaining their innocence during an appeal, and he had been compliant with that

program. The district court also found, based on testimony and treatment records, that the

treatment program did not consider father to pose a risk of harm to minor males and did

not prohibit father from having contact with them. Because the findings regarding father’s

treatment and lack of risk of harm to the child find ample support in the record, the district

court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that those considerations do not

indicate that termination was in the child’s best interests.

Third, mother argues the district court placed too much weight on the testimony of

the older children—specifically, that they wished they had a relationship with their father

3
Mother also asserts that father has a “severe and persistent mental illness” but
acknowledges that her basis for this assertion is a document that was not presented to the
district court. As such, it is not properly before us. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (“The
documents filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any,
shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.”); In re Welfare of Child of K.O., 4 N.W.3d
359, 365 n. 1 (Minn. App. 2024) (“An appellate court is generally limited to the record that
was before the district court when it made the decision being appealed.”).
4
Father’s appeal was not fully resolved until after the district court issued the September
12, 2025 decision under review in this appeal. See State v. Glover, No. A23-1144, 2025
WL 1923684 (Minn. App. July 14, 2025), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 24, 2025).

7
while growing up—as evidence that it would be detrimental to the child to only have one

parent. In support of this argument, mother asserts that father “physically and emotionally

abused” the older children. Mother provides no citation to the record to substantiate her

assertions, and our careful review of the record reveals that most of her assertions lack

evidentiary support. Additionally, the district court expressly considered evidence that

father has had anger issues and actively worked on managing them. The district court also

explained that its assessment of this factor was not based solely on the testimony of the

older children but also on the GAL’s testimony. In short, mother has not demonstrated that

the district court made clearly erroneous factual findings, reached an illogical decision, or

otherwise abused its discretion in determining that concerns about having only one parent

indicate that termination of father’s parental rights is not in the child’s best interests.

In sum, the district court made the findings addressing the appropriate best-interests

factors, and mother has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion in

determining that termination of father’s parental rights is not in the child’s best interests.

Affirmed.

8