Cited by

Co. 38 Minn. 74 , ; Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Duxbury v. Boice, 70 Minn. 113 , ; 17 Minn. L. Rev. 99 .

In Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 , the question was whether a party believed in the correctness of an exhibit as represented, and relied upon it and the truth of certain representations.

In Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287, 288 , the syllabus- states: “Another act of fraud is admissible to prove a particular alleged fraud whenever there is evidence that the two are parts of one scheme or plan of fraud, committed in pursuance of a common purpose,” this being a quotation from Jordan v. Osgood, 109 Mass. 457, 461 , 12 Am.

§ 3231; Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Bank of Commerce v. Selden, 1 Minn. 251 (340); State v. Garvey, 11 Minn. 95 (154); State v. Pierce, 85 Minn. 101, 102 , ; Jones, Ev.

Among our own cases bearing on the question are the following: Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Hinkley v. Freick, 112 Minn. 239 , 127 N.W.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; 1 Dunnell, Minn. Dig.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287, 297 ; Grout v. Stewart, 96 Minn. 230, 234 , ; Timmerman v. Whiting, 118 Minn. 398, 403 , ; Crandell v. White, 164 Mass. 54 , 41 N. E. 204 ; Jarrell v. Young, 105 Md.

Cole v. Curtis, 16 Minn. 161 (182); Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Deakin v. Chicago, M. & St.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; 1 Bunnell, Minn. Dig.

That such is the holding of this court appears from Martin v. Hill, 41 Minn. 337 , , and in Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 , where it is said “that fraud is never to be presumed, but must be proved, yet this rule does not require direct, positive proof in all cases, but is satisfied if the facts •and circumstances surrounding the alleged fraudulent transaction are such as reasonably point to the conclusion that a fraud was intended and ac

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

Humphrey v. Havens, 12 Minn. 196 (298); Dayton v. Buford, 18 Minn. 111 (129); Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; McLachlan v. Branch, 39 Minn. 101 , ; Cornish, C. & G. Co. v. Antrim Coop.

In Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 , the principle was announced that, whenever the motive, belief, or intention of any person is a material fact to be proved under the issue on trial, it is competent to prove it by direct testimony of such person, whether he happens to be a party to the action or not.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287, 297 ; Garrett v. Mannheimer, 24 Minn. 193 .

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Ganser v. Fireman’s Fund Ins.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

P. R. Co., 27 Minn. 303 , ; Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

This rule was applied in Rice v. Tavernier, 8 Minn. 214 , (248;) Greve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 263 , (345;) Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 .

497 ,) a deed executed by an attorney in fact was held good, though there was no reference to the authority, except in the signature of the attorney; and in Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 , that the attorney need not sign his own name.

Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287 ; Garrett v. Mannheimer, 24 Minn. 193 .

This was proper evidence, within the rule laid down in Berkey v. Judd, 22 Minn. 287, 297 , especially where the transaction upon which an asserted agreement of minds is predicated was of such a nature that it may or may not have resulted in such an agreement.