Cited by

In Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , ; Id.

Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , 14 N.W.

The statements made therein are not, as they must be, “clearly defamatory on their face.” Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41, 43 , ; Ten Broeck v. Journal Printing Co. 166 Minn. 173 , .

Among them are the following decisions: Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , ; Dennis v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 301 , ; Byram v. Aiken, 65 Minn. 87 , ; McDermott v. Union Credit Co. 76 Minn. 84 , , ; Keating v. Prudential Cas.

Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , .

That is because its statements are not “clearly defamatory on their face.” Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , *175 .

The general rule is stated in Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , ; Zier v. Hofflin, 33 Minn. 66 , , 53 Am.

Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co. 30 Minn. 41 , .

Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41 , ; Woodling v. Knickerbocker, 31 Minn. 268 , .

Co., 29 Minn. 147 ; Fox v. Burke, 29 Minn. 171 ; Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41 ; Wilcox v. Landberg, 30 Minn. 93 ; Young v. Davis, 30 Minn. 293 ; Carlson v. Small, 32 Minn. 439 ; Clapp v. Minn, & St.

We do not think the words published come under the third class in the classification given in Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41, i. e., of words clearly defamatory on-their face.

These conclusions would dispose of the case, but with reference to a future trial we observe that, as held in this case when it was here before, ( 30 Minn. 41 ,) libels like that here charged are actionable per se, and neither proof of special damage or actual malice is necessary to the maintenance of'an action therefor.

The first one, that removed by plaintiff, comes within the second class of words classified in Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41, i. e., those that are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one, according to the occasion and circumstances of using them.