Hamlin v. Wistar
Cited by
- Simon v. Carroll 62 N.W.2d 822 Minn. 1954
- Brearley v. Schoening 210 N.W. 588 Minn. 1926
- Bergh v. Stanek 184 N.W. 371 Minn. 1921
- Baker v. Polydisky 174 N.W. 526 Minn. 1919
- Krohn v. Dustin 172 N.W. 213 Minn. 1919
- Kull v. Wilson 162 N.W. 1072 Minn. 1917
- McAlpine v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 158 N.W. 967 Minn. 1916
- Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co. 158 N.W. 979 Minn. 1916
- Kilburn v. National Surety Co. 157 N.W. 498 Minn. 1916
- Kileen v. Kennedy 97 N.W. 126 Minn. 1903
- Ames & Frost Co. v. Smith 67 N.W. 999 Minn. 1896
- Langellier v. Schaefer 31 N.W. 690 Minn. 1887
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- 14 Minn. 55 not in our corpus
Opinion text
Berry, J. To make out an agreement for the sale and conveyance of real estate sufficient to entitle to specific performance, it must appear that there was a “clear accession on both sides to one and the same set of terms.” Lanz v. McLaughlin, 14 Minn. 55 , (72,) and cases cited. The evidence relied upon to establish such an agreement in this case fails to satisfy this rule. It consists wholly of correspondence between the parties, containing propositions and counter-propositions, but as to several material particulars the minds of the parties never met. . It will be sufficient to refer to two of these particulars, without uselessly consuming time or space to mention others: First. Defendant’s requirement or condition (for it clearly was such) that the cash payment of $6,163.65 should be deposited “in bank, to lie there bearing interest until the trade is made, and as much longer as I may desire,” was not acceded to by plaintiff. Second. Plaintiff’s proposition, that $5,000 of the purchase-money should be payable on or before six months, was never acceded to by defendant; neither was defendant’s counter-proposition, that it should be payable in six months, acceded to by plaintiff. The letter written by defendant under date of November 10th, while it gives another reason for abandoning negotiations, by no means waives, or assumes to waive, the above-mentioned reasons, on account of which defendant had failed *419 to enter into any legal obligation to sell or convey. This is all that we deem it necessary to say, as the ease turns moon its special facts, and presents no question of general interest. Order affirmed.