Cited by

at 539 (quoting Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 377-78 , 26 N.W.

at 539 (quoting Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 377-78 , 26 N.W.

2 As Mr. Justice Mitchell said in Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 377 , , 2: “* * * But to allow a party to lay the foundation for such parol evidence by oral testimony that only part of the agreement was reduced to writing, and then prove by parol the part omitted, would be to work in a circle, and to permit the very evil which the rule was designed to prevent.” The tes

Co. v. Swartwood, 159 Minn. 1 , ; Samuel H. Chute Co. v. Latta, 123 Minn. 69 , ; Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; The Dayton Co. v. Carpet, Linoleum, etc., Union, 229 Minn. 87, 96 , 39 N. W. (2d) 183, 188 ; Village of Hibbing v. Township of Stuntz, 225 Minn. 31 , 29 N. W. (2d) 808 ; Bergland Oil Co. Inc. v. Grommesh, 226 Minn. 19 , 31 N. W. (2d) 644 .

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; Mitchill v. Lath, 247 N. Y. 377 , 160 N. E. 646 , 68 A. L. R. 239; Osterberg v. Section 30 Development Co. 160 Minn. 497 , ; Taylor v. More, 195 Minn. 448 , .

This court is committed to the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Mitchell in Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 377 , : *453 “But to allow a party to lay the foundation for such parol evidence by oral testimony that only part of the agreement was reduced to writing, and then prove by parol the part omitted, would be to work in a circle, and to permit the very evil which the rule was designed to prevent.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; Current v. Muir, 99 Minn. 1 , ; Samuel H. Chute Co. v. Latta, 123 Minn. 69 , ; Security Nat.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; Gasper v. Heimbach, 53 Minn. 414 , ; Mueller v. Barge, 54 Minn. 314 , ; 9 Encyclopedia of Evidence, p. 321.

Its result, as there indicated, would be “to permit the very evil which the rule” against destroying the obligation of a written contract by oral evidence “was designed to prevent.” That case followed and applied Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , , and Wheaton Roller Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mnfg.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47 , ; McNaughton v. Wahl, 99 Minn. 92 , , 116 Am.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Thompson, 46 Minn. 15 , ; Bradford v. Neill, 46 Minn. 347 , ; Wisconsin Red Pressed-Brick Co. v. Hood, 54 Minn. 543 , ; Wheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mnfg.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , , is not therefore in point.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374, 377 , ; Wheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mnfg.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; Wheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mnfg.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , , illustrates this doctrine.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ; Bradford v. Neill, 46 Minn. 347 , ; Wheaton Roller-Mill Co. v. John T. Noye Mnfg.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , .

What was said on this subject in Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , , is perhaps incomplete, in not specifically adverting to this rule of construction, and for that reason capable of being understood as meaning that the incompleteness must appear on the face of the document from mere inspection.'

Afterwards the plaintiff moved for a new trial, upon the minutes of the court, and it granted a new trial, holding that this case is controlled by the decisions of this court in the case of Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N. W. Rep.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N W. Rep.

The case in no way differs from Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N. W. Rep.

In considering whether the formal written contract, to which we have referred, is to be deemed to have embodied the whole agreement of the parties, so as to exclude proof of contemporaneous oral representations or agreements, we seek to apply the principles laid down in Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N. W. Rep.

Thompson v. Libby, 34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N. W. Rep.

34 Minn. 374 , ( 26 N. W. Rep.