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This theory is meant to prevent fraud where one party “has been induced or allowed to alter [their] situation on the faith of an oral agreement.”

See Burke v. Fine, 236 Minn. 52, 55- 56, (describing these alternative bases for removing an agreement from the statute of frauds); Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 376, (noting that principles of equitable estoppel preclude a party from asserting a statute-of-frauds defense if the party against whom the defense will be asserted detrimentally relied on an agreement by performing enough of the agreement to cause “an unjust and unconscientious injury and loss” if the agr

Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 377-378

See, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 497 -499; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 224 ; cf. Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , and Happel v. Happel, 184 Minn. 377 , .

Application of the doctrine in some cases has been explained by the extreme hardship which would result if the statute were applied (Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , ); while in others the court has felt that the policy behind the statute was adequately protected if acts of performance unequivocally referable to the contract were shown (Shaughnessy v. Eidsmo, 222 Minn. 141 , 23 N. W. [2d] 362, 166 A. L. R. 435).

Plaintiff is attempting to enforce what he claims is an oral contract to convey real estate, claiming that the alleged oral contract was taken out of the statute of frauds under the doctrine of Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , .

In Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 375 , , however, the court expressly rejected the unequivocal reference theory upon which the earlier cases were based and adopted the fraud theory under which the plaintiff must show that his acts of part performance in reliance upon the contract so altered his position that he would incur an unjust and irreparable in

Schaefer v. Thoeny, 199 Minn. 610 , ; Svanburg v. Fosseen, 75 Minn. 350 , , 43 L. R. A. 427, 74 A. S. R. 190; Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , .

In Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373, 377 , , the court, speaking by Justice Mitchell, said: “As already remarked, the doctrine of part-performance rests on the ground of fraud.

We note in addition Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , and Veum v. Sheeran, 95 Minn. 315 , .

See also Drager v. Seegert, 138 Minn. 6 , ; Snow v. Snow, 98 Minn. 348 , ; Hayes v. Hayes, 126 Minn. 389 , .” To these may be added Trebesch v. Trebesch, 130 Minn. 368 , , and the earlier decisions in Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , ; Schmitt v. Schmitt, 94 Minn. 414 , .

Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , is cited in support of this proposition.

There was sufficient part performance of the oral agreement to take it out of the statute of frauds within the rule stated in Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Veum v. Sheeran, 95 Minn. 315 , 104 N W. 135; Chapel v. Chapel, 132 Minn. 86 , .

Gill v. Newell, 13 Minn.. 430 (462); Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 81 Minn. 428 , ; Veum v. Sheeran, 95 Minn. 315 , .

In Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , the court say at page 377, : “As already remarked, the doctrine of part-performance rests on the ground of fraud.

It was said in one case: “The whole doctrine (of part performance) rests upon the principle of fraud.” Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , .

The facts do not bring the case within Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , and other like cases cited by plaintiff.

Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Mournin v. Trainor, 63 Minn. 230 , ; Ferguson v. Tro *142 vaten, 94 Minn. 209 , .

Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , ; Id.

The principle applied in *477 Williams v. Stewart, supra, is further elucidated in the cases of Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , , Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 81 Minn. 428 , , Veum v. Sheeran, 95 Minn. 315 , , and Paine v. Wilcox, 16 Wis.

“The underlying principle is that, where one of the contracting parties has been induced or allowed to alter his situation on the faith of an oral agreement *348 within the statute, to such an extent that it would be a fraud on the part of the other party to set up its invalidity, equity will make the case an exception to the statute.” Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , .

Place v. Johnson, 20 Minn. 198 (219) ; Williams v. Stewart, 25 Minn. 516 ; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , ; Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Veum v. Sheeran, 95 Minn. 315 , .

The rule guiding the court is well stated in Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , as follows: “It may be well *319 at this point to correct what we deem misapprehensions on part of appellant as to the meaning and application of certain familiar rules governing this subject of part performance.

Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ; Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , , 46 Minn. 100 , .

See Martin v. Elwood, 35 Minn. 309 , .

In such cases the vendor will not be heard to insist upon the statute (Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , ); and when the part performance is of such a nature that the parties cannot be restored to their former condition and situation, and substantial injustice or fraud will result from failure of performance, equity will compel the parties to carry out their contract.

P. R. Co., 23 Minn. 343 , Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , , and Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197 , , in which many cases are considered, and Mournin v. Trainor, 63 Minn. 230 , .

See Brown v. Hoag, 35 Minn. 373 , .