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Cited by

Opinions in Minnesota that cite Christianson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Railway Co., 69 N.W. 640.

225 citing documents.

  • Thelen v. Spilman 86 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1957
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , that: “* * * an act or omission of a second tortfeasor (or actor), as a matter of law, cannot constitute an efficient intervening cause which breaks the chain of causation between the negligence of the original tortfeasor and the resulting accident or collision, when such act or omission occu
  • Lund v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 86 N.W.2d 78 Minn. 1957
  • Lund v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 86 N.W.2d 78 Minn. 1957
    Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Schmanski v. Church of St.
  • Peterson v. Truelson 83 N.W.2d 236 Minn. 1957
  • Peterson v. Truelson 83 N.W.2d 236 Minn. 1957
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: * * jf a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then * * * the act would not be negligent at all; * * *.” In Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst, 229 Minn. 436, 447 , 40 N. W. (2d) 73, 81 , we state the rule as follows:
  • Lee v. Lee 80 N.W.2d 529 Minn. 1957
  • Lee v. Lee 80 N.W.2d 529 Minn. 1957
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , wherein the court said: “* * * Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the partic
  • Cook v. Person 74 N.W.2d 389 Minn. 1956
  • Cook v. Person 74 N.W.2d 389 Minn. 1956
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , as follows: “* * * if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which did ha
  • Ferguson v. Kehoe 71 N.W.2d 168 Minn. 1955
  • Ferguson v. Kehoe 71 N.W.2d 168 Minn. 1955
    Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Seward v. Minneapolis St.
  • Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells 67 N.W.2d 644 Minn. 1954
  • Schmanski v. Church of St. Casimir of Wells 67 N.W.2d 644 Minn. 1954
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , when he said: “* * * Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; * * *.” In regard to plaintiffs' first two theories of negligence, even though it might be said for the sake of argument tha
  • Albertson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad 64 N.W.2d 175 Minn. 1954
  • Albertson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad 64 N.W.2d 175 Minn. 1954
  • Peterson v. Lang 58 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 1953
  • Peterson v. Lang 58 N.W.2d 609 Minn. 1953
    Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Kopp v. Ryckman, 238 Minn. 342 , 57 N. W. (2d) 31 .
  • Kopp v. Ryckman 57 N.W.2d 31 Minn. 1953
  • Kopp v. Ryckman 57 N.W.2d 31 Minn. 1953
  • Peterson v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 53 N.W.2d 817 Minn. 1952
  • Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis 53 N.W.2d 17 Minn. 1952
  • Sylvester v. Northwestern Hospital of Minneapolis 53 N.W.2d 17 Minn. 1952
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , Mr. Justice Mitchell states the rule: “* * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; * * *.
  • Standafer v. First National Bank 52 N.W.2d 718 Minn. 1952
  • Standafer v. First National Bank 52 N.W.2d 718 Minn. 1952
  • Knutson v. Lambert 51 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1951
  • Knutson v. Lambert 51 N.W.2d 580 Minn. 1951
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , to the effect that if injury to someone could not reasonably be anticipated there was no negligence.
  • Rugg v. Rugg 50 N.W.2d 486 Minn. 1951
  • Rugg v. Rugg 50 N.W.2d 486 Minn. 1951
    Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 185 ; Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 19 ; Note, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 829 .
  • Thompson v. Peterson 50 N.W.2d 53 Minn. 1951
  • Thompson v. Peterson 50 N.W.2d 53 Minn. 1951
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “ * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; * * ” Under all the circumstances existing here, we believe that defendant had no reasonable ground to anticip
  • McDonald v. Fryberger 46 N.W.2d 260 Minn. 1951
  • McDonald v. Fryberger 46 N.W.2d 260 Minn. 1951
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “‘* * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; * * *.’ “As a corollary, it follows that ordinary care does not involve forethought of extraordinary peril.
  • Goede v. Rondorf 43 N.W.2d 770 Minn. 1950
  • Followed Goede v. Rondorf 43 N.W.2d 770 Minn. 1950
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , where we said: “What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate cause of an injury which ensues.
  • Mickelson v. Kernkamp 42 N.W.2d 18 Minn. 1950
  • Mickelson v. Kernkamp 42 N.W.2d 18 Minn. 1950
  • Callahan v. City of Virginia 40 N.W.2d 841 Minn. 1950
  • Callahan v. City of Virginia 40 N.W.2d 841 Minn. 1950
    Co. 67 Minn. 94 , ; Pepperling v. Emporium Merc.
  • Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst 40 N.W.2d 73 Minn. 1949
  • Despatch Oven Co. v. Rauenhorst 40 N.W.2d 73 Minn. 1949
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , 641: “* * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; * * *.” As a corollary, it follows that ordinary care does not involve forethought of extraordinary peril.
  • Rivera v. Mandsager 36 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1949
  • Rivera v. Mandsager 36 N.W.2d 700 Minn. 1949
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , ,” where he said: “* * * Consequences which follow in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though he could not have foreseen the particular res
  • Robinson v. Butler 33 N.W.2d 821 Minn. 1948
  • Robinson v. Butler 33 N.W.2d 821 Minn. 1948
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , as follows: *494 “* * * if the act is one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the particular injury which d
  • Knight v. Powers Dry Goods Co. Inc. 30 N.W.2d 536 Minn. 1948
  • Knight v. Powers Dry Goods Co. Inc. 30 N.W.2d 536 Minn. 1948
    Co. 67 Minn. 94, 97 , , Mr. Justice Mitchell states the rule: “* * * If a person had no reasonable ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be negligent at all; * * *.
  • Squillace v. Village of Mountain Iron 26 N.W.2d 197 Minn. 1946
  • Squillace v. Village of Mountain Iron 26 N.W.2d 197 Minn. 1946
  • Seward v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 25 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 1946
  • Seward v. Minneapolis Street Railway Co. 25 N.W.2d 221 Minn. 1946