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A political question presents “a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity” or a matter that “has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.” In re McConaughy, 119 N.W. 408, 417 (Minn. 1909).

A political question presents “a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity” or a matter that “has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.” 5 (Minn. 1909).

Separation-of-powers 12 principles preclude the judiciary from resolving political questions, which involve matters “to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity” or which “ha[ve] been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.”

" d at 8 (quoting In re McConaughy , 106 Minn. 392 , 119 N.W.

In re McConaughy , 106 Minn. 392 , 119 N.W.

See In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392 , 119 N.W.

Similarly, nothing in McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , 119 N.W.

“What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.” In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 415 , 119 N.W.

at 332 (citing McConaughy v. Sec’y of State, 106 Minn. 392 , 119 N.W.

While there is some merit to respondents’ claim that the city council’s decision on whom to appoint to the city council is a political question which this court has no jurisdiction to decide, see In re McConaughy, 106 Minn. 392, 415 , 119 N.W.

This amendment, quite commonly referred to as the “wide open tax amendment,” was declared legally adopted by the supreme court in McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , .

McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , ; Cooke v. Iverson, 108 Minn. 388 , , 52 L.R.A.(N.S.)

It must be conceded settled by *81 McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , , that courts have jurisdiction to determine whether an amendment to the constitution proposed by the legislature and submitted to the electors was proposed, submitted, and ratified conformably to the mandate of the constitution so as to become a part thereof.

In McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , , it *305 is stated on page 419: “It is settled law that the decisions of election officers and canvassing boards are not conclusive, and that the final decision must rest with the courts, unless the law declares that decisions of the board shall be-final.” In the very case upon which appellant relies

McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392 , ; State v. Churchill, 15 Minn. *369 369 (455).

Such a proposition is an unthinkable one; for, as said by this court in McConaughy v. Secretary of State, 106 Minn. 392, 416 , : “Every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject to its restrictions, and every departure therefrom or disregard thereof must subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the agency of the judiciary; for it must be remem