Cited by

“The possession of a tenant is, as to third parties, the possession of the landlord.” Ebenhoh, d at 109 (); see also Sherin v. Brackett, 30 N.W.

vey being conducted, “both parties believed [the fence] was located on the true boundary line between their respective holdings”); (stating that the parties acted as if the fence was the boundary line because they believed that the adverse claimant’s predecessor in interest had purchased the land all the way up to the fence); -24 (Minn. 1919) (observing that a row of trees was treated as the boundary line for 26 years prior to discovering this may not actually be the boundary); Fredericksen v. H

257, 258-59 (Minn. 1926) (concluding that a decades-old fence built by a previous owner resulted in a party mistakenly claiming that the fence was the proper boundary line); -24 (Minn. 1919) (noting that the parties and their 9 predecessors treated a row of trees as the boundary line for approximately 26 years before discovering that the row of trees might not be the actual boundary).

For example, in Mellenthin v. Brantman , we excused non-payment of taxes on a disputed strip between adjoining properties by noting that our prior cases had given the boundary line exemption “full support.” (citing Kelley v. Green , Fredericksen v. Henke, 209 N.W.

B. Continuity Adverse possession for any consecutive 15 year period is sufficient to establish continuity of use, Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82, 84 , 170 N.W.

Mellenthin v. Brantman, 211 Minn. 336 , Skala v. Lindbeck, 171 Minn. 410 , Riley v. Kump, 170 Minn. 58 , Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , , 46 A. L. R. 785 (1926); Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82

The claim of plaintiff that there could be no continuous occupancy because defendants were in the State of Idaho for about 4 months may be disposed of by Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82, 85 , , where it was said: *61 “Her temporary absence for three months on a trip to California did not break the continuity of her possession.

Schmidt v. Marschel, 211 Minn. 539 , 2 N. W. (2d) 121 ; Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , ; Rupley v. Fraser, 132 Minn. 311 , ; Murphy v. Doyle, 37 Minn. 113 , .

Gehan v. Morgan, 189 Minn. 250 , 248 N. W. *546 820; Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , ; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , , 46 A. L. R. 785; Stevens v. Velde, 138 Minn. 59 , ; Ramsey v. Glenny, 45 Minn. 401 , , 22 A. S. R. 736; Brown v. Morgan, 44 Minn. 432 , ; 1 Am.

st it, as in other cases where the possession of land is withheld.” Therefore, said the court ( 31 Minn. 85 , ): “Upon the facts in this case, we conclude that the actual, exclusive possession of the defendant and his grantors must, to the extent of their occupancy, be deemed adverse, whether the original entry and possession thereunder were by mistake or not.” So in Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82, 86 , , a case similar in its controlling facts to those here presented, in that there also the resp

rse to the true owner and a disseizin; and if the disseizor or his grantee is suffered to remain continuously in possession for the statutory period, the remedy of the former is extinguished.” That principle was followed in Brown v. Morgan, 44 Minn. 432 , ; Ramsey v. Glenny, 45 Minn. 401 , , 22 A. S. R. 736; Weeks v. Upton, 99 Minn. 410 , ; Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , ; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , , 46 A. L. R. 785; Glidden Co. v. Twin City H. L. Co. 171 Minn. 160 , .

Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , ; Fredericksen v. Henke, 167 Minn. 356 , , 46 A. L. R. 785.

See G. S. 1923, § 9187; Post v. Sumner, 137 Minn. 201 , ; and Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , .

736; Marek v. Holey, 119 Minn. 216 , ; Kelley v. Green, 142 Minn. 82 , .